The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia and Historiography

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The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia and Historiography

New Research Perspectives

By

Egidia Occhipinti



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To my parents

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Contents

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The responsibility for eventual mistakes or any misunderstanding is wholly mine.

E.O.
Turin 2016

CHAPTER 1

The *HO* in the View of Modern Scholars

This book involves a historiographical study of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (henceforth *HO*) that defines its relationship with fifth- and fourth-century historical works as well as its role as a source of Diodorus' *Bibliotheke*. The study is, therefore, supported by intertextual comparison; other tools of enquiry, such as papyrological and narratological investigations, are also used.

The *HO* is a historical work written as a continuation of Thucydides' *Histories*. It deals with the history of Athens and Greece in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC and presents a documentary tradition that differs from that offered by Xenophon's *Hellenica*. Scholars hold different views about the number of papyri that can be ascribed to the *HO*. There is general agreement on three of them: the *London papyrus*, P. Oxy. V 842, the *Florence papyrus*, PSI XIII 1304, and the *Cairo papyrus*, 26 6 SR 3049, 27 1; on the basis of stylistic reasons almost all[1] believe that they come from the same work. At the same time, the attribution to the *HO* of other papyri—P. Mich. 5982 and P. Mich. 5796b (the so-called *Theramenes papyrus*), P. Oxy. II 302, P. Oxy. XI 1365 and P. Oxy. XIII 1610—is controversial.[2]

The *London Papyrus* narrates events from 397 to 395 BC: the naval operations led by the Athenian Conon near Caunus and Rhodes against the Spartans; the Theban-Phocaean conflict which caused the outbreak of the Corinthian war; an important excursus on the Boeotian constitution; the military operations led by Agesilaus in Asia Minor against the Persians. The *Florence papyrus* offers some events of the Decelean war (409–407 BC). The *Cairo papyrus* deals with earlier events than the other two papyri, and exactly with the period from 411 to 406 BC.

The script of these three papyri is dated between the late first century and the late second century AD. Since each of these papyri is part of a different copy of the work, the hypothesis that they belong together relies on the connections between their contents as well as on stylistic reasons. As for the date of composition, scholars commonly agree that it can be fixed within wide margins after

1 With the exception of Canfora (1970): 211–217.

2 Chambers (1993), Mariotta (2012): 139–154. The *Theramenes papyrus* is ascribed to Ephorus by Loftus (2000): 11–20 and Hurni (2010): 234–238. See also Youtie-Merkelbach (1968): 161–169, Andrewes (1970): 35–38, Luppe (1978): 14–16, Breitenbach (1989): 121–135, Bearzot (1991): 65–87, Engels (1993): 125–155, Vannini (2012): 87–95, Occhipinti (2014 b). See Appendix.

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387/386 and before 346 BC.[3] Despite that, however, thematic and internal evidence will allow us to suggest a new chronological framework for dating the *HO*'s writing (chh. 3, 5, 6).

1.1 The Authorship

The first papyrus of the work—that is, the *London papyrus*—was discovered in 1906[4] and published in 1908 (*ed. pr.*), and since then the *HO* has been ascribed to many different candidates: Androtion, Cratippus, Daimachus, Ephorus of Cyme, Theopompus of Chios.

More than a century of researches does not allow us to give here an exaustive and analytical picture of all scholarly opinions on the authorship issue. A useful tool might be Lérida Lafarga's commentary on the *HO* ([2007]: 114–206) which offers an overall picture of the issue.[5] Therefore, I give just some of the first and/or most important studies. Momigliano ([1931]: 29–49),[6] following De Sanctis' idea,[7] suggested Androtion, author of a local history of Attica (*Atthis*), in consideration that the *HO*'s description of Greek policy seems to rely upon someone who wrote from an Athenian perspective; moreover, the chronological framework of the *HO*, presumably based on a seasonal succession schema (summers and winters), is typically Athenian.

Cratippus has strong supportes still today (lastly Schepens [2007]: 48); and the first editors of the *London papyrus*, Grenfell-Hunt (1908 and 1909), were already in doubt whether the work should be ascribed to Cratippus or Theopompus.[8] While some considered Cratippus an author of the late Hellenismus,[9] others were in favour of the Cratippus-theory. Breitenbach ([1970]: 418) found a few key aspects which led him to identify the Oxyrhynchus historian with

3 Bruce (1967): 4.

4 The *Florence papyrus* was found at Oxyrhynchus in 1934; the *Cairo papyrus* was first published by Koenen in 1976.

5 On the issue, see, moreover, Bianchetti-Cataudella (2001), Canfora (2002–2003): 213–235, and Pintaudi (2003): 5–95.

6 Published later in Momigliano (1980), 801–819.

7 De Sanctis (1907–1908): 331–356.

8 However, later, when Grenfell-Hunt published the papyri 1365 and 1610, they maintained that those papyri belonged to the same work along with number 842 (the *London papyrus*), and that their author was Ephorus. Grenfell-Hunt (1915): 107 and (1919): 109–111.

9 Schwartz (1909), 501 s., followed by Momigliamo (cit.), on the basis of Marcellinus' evidence, *Vit. Thuc.* 31.

Cratippus: both are followers of Thucydides; Cratippus criticises Thucydides' use of speeches, and the Oxyrhynchus historian does not insert direct speeches within his narrative;[10] Cratippus presumably deals with the trial against the *Hermocopid* conspirators within a digression, and the *HO* often relates in a digressive way those events that Thucydides had already dealt with.[11]

According to Jacoby ([1926]: 17–35 and *Comm.* 6–20) the Oxyrhynchus historian should be identified with Daimachus, a Boeotian writer, from Plataea, whose work was a source for Ephorus' *Histories*. It is true that a great deal of interest for Boeotian history and constitution is found in the *HO*'s narrative, but this is the only clue supporting Jacoby's theory.[12]

As for Androtion, Cratippus and Daimachus very little information comes from their fragments. In my view, the format of Androtion's work (chronicle form under archon-names) is quite alien to the format of the *HO* and consequently excludes Androtion from the authorship issue.[13] The (probably) Athenian Cratippus and Daimachus of Plataea are just names to us, unless of course Cratippus is the author of the *HO*. Furthermore, it is important to stress that we do not know much about the style of their works because their narrative is not preserved.

The claims of Ephorus[14] were favourably considered by Walker ([1913]: 49–78),[15] who based his arguments on assumed correspondences between the *HO*'s content, style and thematic interests and those of two authors who excerpted Ephorus, that is Diodorus and Polyaenus.[16] Yet Ephorus is particularly problematic for several reasons. His *Histories* is not extant and we rely solely on the passages that later writers cite under his name (Diodorus, Strabo, Plutarch); therefore we cannot say much about the author's style.[17] In a few cases we can

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10 However this is not true. See Appendix, *1. A New Supplement for Lines 31–32 of the Theramenes Papyrus* (*P. Mich. 5982*).

11 For the attribution of the *HO* to Cratippus see Pareti (1912–1913): 398–517, Lipsius (1916): 2–5, Kalinka (1917): 409–429, Bartoletti (1959): XVII–XXI, Accame (1978): 125–183, Harding (1987): 104–107, Chambers (1993): XVII–XXV.

12 Mossé (2001): 189–192 has recently suggested this theory again.

13 See Harding (1994), Rhodes (2014).

14 Reuss (1909): 37 f., Judeich (1911): 94–105.

15 The scholar had previously been in favour of the Cratippus-theory; see Walker (1908): 356–371.

16 Also later Ephorus will gain followers, such as Gelzer (1914): 125, Grenfell-Hunt (1915): 107 and (1919): 109–111, Schwartz (1937): 21, note 3, and a few others. See lastly Mariotta (2012): 139–154 and (2015): 507–514. Schwartz had previously supported the Theopompus-theory against Cratippus ([1909]: 481–502).

17 Walker (1913): 70–72 found similarities of style between the *HO* and Ephorus.

read Ephorus' own exact words, for example in fragments preserved by Strabo, Athenaeus and Stephanus of Byzantium. But for him, unfortunately, we do not have long quotations in which Athenaeus preserves the historian's words and prose, which we find, for instance, of Theopompus' *Philippica*. Furthermore, it was considered an established fact for nearly a century that Diodorus used Ephorus as his main authority for books 11 through 16 of his *Bibliotheke*, and it was generally assumed that Diodorus was capable of no more than mechanically reproducing the words of his sources. However, the relation between Diodorus and Ephorus is quite controversial. Recent contributions have tried to reinterpret Diodorus in the light of the expectations of his own times by approaching the issue in different terms, that is by identifying and explaining the historiographical, political and philosophical categories that Diodorus applied to his work, considering also the historian's Roman background and his moral outlook.[18] We are also used to hearing from the tradition of *Quellenforschung* that the *HO* was used by Diodorus, but that it only came to him through Ephorus' mediation; today, however, scholars are of the opinion that Diodorus might have gained his knowledge of fifth- and fourth-century history through several other sources rather than through Ephorus alone, and may have read them directly instead of through Ephorus' mediation.[19]

The attribution of the *HO* to Theopompus depends on assumed analogies between that work and the lost *Hellenica* by Theopompus (just a few fragments of it remain). A lot of people ascribed the *HO* to Theopompus: we can mention Busolt ([1908]: 255–285), Wilcken ([1908]: 475–477), Meyer (1909), Swoboda ([1910]: 315–334), Wilamowitz-Moellendorff ([1912]: 3–318), Laqueur ([1934]: 2176–223), Lehmann ([1972 a]: 385–398; [1978]: 73–93; [1984]: 19–44), and Ruschenbusch ([1980]: 81–90; [1982]: 91–94). In fact the Theopompus-theory was initially very attractive, but it was gradually abandoned. Only recently has Bleckmann's monograph (1998) re-evaluated it.[20] All things considered, perhaps Theopompus might appear the best candidate for the authorship of the *HO*, especially in light of the fact that we do have extensive parts of his narrative (*Philippica*), though they are preserved in a fragmentary state. Nevertheless, the evidence emerging from my researches leads me to think differently (ch. 9).

To add just a few remarks, the *Theramenes papyrus* (P. Mich. 5982 and P. Mich. 5796b) has recently been attributed to Ephorus; but I have found some evidence of stylistic similarities between the *Theramenes papyrus* and the text

18 Sacks (1990) and (1994): 213–232.

19 Rood (2004 a): 341–395, Parmeggiani (2011).

20 See also Bleckmann (2006).

of the *HO*.[21] I have also proposed to supplement column II of P. Oxy. II 302. This fragment, along with P. Oxy. XI 1365 and P. Oxy. XIII 1610, was attributed at different times to Ephorus or to the Oxyrhynchus historian. Stylistic observations suggest that P. Oxy. II 302, P. Oxy. XI 1365 and the *HO* are by the same author, while P. Oxy. XIII 1610 might be part of another work (presumably Ephorus').[22] All this could be a good starting point for further contributions to a discussion of the authorship issue in the future.

1.2 A New Proposal and Old Theories

The *HO* is particularly problematic for many reasons. We do not know the date of composition, the author's identity, nor his method and aims. Scholars have focused on particular, often isolated, topics such as the question of the authorship, the historical perspective of the *HO*,[23] the character of the *Theramenes papyrus* and general issues related to the so-called 'fragmentary' historians (writers of *Hellenica* from the fourth century BC).[24] The traditional and common approach taken by those scholars who studied the *HO* is primarily historical. Scholars usually study the *HO* in order to find new versions of historical events that sometimes contrast with those related by the parallel account given by Xenophon's *Hellenica*; and the main questions addressed to these works are intended to show whether one account is more trustworthy and reliable than another.[25] This is the approach most followed by scholars of historiography, who tend to discuss and assess the historical reliability of what the *HO* relates.

This book is more unconventional in that it offers a historiographical study of the *HO* supported by papyrological enquiries and a plurality of literary strategies, such as intertextuality and narratology, which without any doubt will contribute to the progress of research in ancient historiography. It fits, moreover, with a specific strand of studies that has developed especially in the Anglo-Saxon and American academic world and applies intertextuality and a literary approach to ancient historical works.[26] The last few decades in particular have seen a full flowering of the study of allusion and intertextuality in classical texts.

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21 Occhipinti (2014 b): 34–44. See Appendix, *1. A New Supplement for Lines 31–32 of the Theramenes Papyrus* (*P. Mich. 5982*).

22 Occhipinti (2014 a): 25–33. See Africa (1962): 86–89.

23 See lastly Pownall (2004).

24 Shrimpton (1991), Flower (1994), Parmeggiani (2011).

25 Bleckmann (1998) and (2006). Lastly, Valente (2014).

26 Marincola (2011): 1–31, Baragwanath (2012): 317–341, Flower (2012), Pelling (2013 b): 1–20.

As scholars have pointed out, the study of allusion was well developed in the ancient world, and ancient literary criticism is full of remarks comparing how later authors refer to and modify their predecessors. The ancients saw themselves as working within a tradition that had endorsed certain models that had attained the status of canon: later writers were expected to compete, and indeed saw themselves as competing, with their great predecessors. With such a conscious looking-back at previous models, it is inevitable that historians—and not only poets—would also try to bring something of their predecessors into their accounts. 'Intertextuality' is a more recent term than 'allusion,' and though it clearly deals with some elements of the same phenomenon, allusion thinks primarily in terms of individuals—an author intentionally calling to mind another author—whereas intertextuality thinks of the relations between texts as functions of discourse.[27] Intertextuality considers echoes and traces of earlier texts as inevitable in any system of language and especially, one might say, in highly formal and stylised genres such as historiography. Nevertheless, for the future we should perhaps ask ourselves whether 'allusion' also has a place in the criticism of historiography, with its greater focus on an intention of the author that is conveyed by the text and acknowledged by its readership as part of the construction of that author's personality. The author of the *HO*, for instance, appears to be referring to previous and contemporary historians, whose historiographical patterns he adopts and modifies; his 'allusions' to Xenophon's *Hellenica* seem pretty clear (ch. 3), while in other cases (i.e. ch. 8 and 9) the question of whether he created a dialogue with past authors deliberately or unconsciously may well remain an open issue. Furthermore, anyone who studies historiographical thinking in terms of intertextuality may feel the need to turn also to narratology as a helpful tool of scientific enquiry, not only because it is particularly innovative and productive, but primarily because it allows us to analyse and describe authorial narrative techniques with extreme precision. Originating in France (G. Genette) and the Netherlands (M. Bal, I. De Jong), and widespread especially in the Anglo-Saxon and American academic world, this approach is currently applied in classical studies to canonical historical and literary texts; it has never been applied to the *HO* before now. In some cases (see especially chapters 2, 3, 5, 8 and 9) this methodology has allowed me to assess several textual elements and devices and thereby cast new light on the authorial intention in regard to certain questions (the evaluation of Athenian activism, the relationship with Xenophon's *Hellenica* and Persian sources, the approach to historical causation).

27 Hinds (1998).

The *HO* has received little attention from literary scholarship, nor has it ever been studied by using literary tools of enquiry. Only historical matters and partially related topics have been dealt with in several articles on the authorship issue or on the historical value of the work and its content. Numerous editions have been produced, though they do not contribute substantially to solving the many papyrological and historiographical problems created by the text. In fact, the editions published after Bartoletti's (1959) generally tend to retain the papyrological supplements made by that scholar and do not provide any commentary;[28] on the other hand the commentaries that have been produced show interest solely in historical matters.[29] This monograph will be the first step of a gradual reassessment centred, but not exclusively so, on the *HO*. It will help us to understand the place of the *HO* in the development of Greek historiography by setting up an accurate basis for comparison to the practices of earlier and contemporary historians, in addition to advancing our understanding of the relationship between the *HO* and Diodorus' historiographical practice.

Broadly speaking, anyone who studies the *HO* is usually led to take a position on the authorship issue, whatever the issue being dealt with, and whatever approach is taken. On the contrary, this work is proposing something new and unconventional: it deals primarily with historiographical issues, leaving aside the debate over the authorship momentarily and taking it up again only in chapter 9. Our concern is not to understand which author (of the *HO*, Xenophon, Diodorus, etc.) is speaking the truth, or what piece of narrative is more accurate than another from a historical perspective; nor do we offer any historical reconstructions. It is a comparison of the historiographical choices of the *HO* with the practices of earlier and contemporary historians that provides a basis for a fuller understanding of the place of that work in the development of Greek historiography. Besides, another important issue is here thoroughly discussed, that is the relationship between the *HO* and Diodorus' historiographical practice. This is necessary because Diodorus used the *HO* extensively as his

28 Take, for example, Chambers' edition (1993).

29 Bruce (1967), McKechnie-Kern (1988), Lérida Lafarga (2007). I studied the text of the *Theramenes papyrus* (P. Mich. 5982 and P. Mich. 5796b), the *Florence papyrus* (PSI XIII 1304) and P. Oxy. II 302 from a papyrological perspective, and I found interesting evidence which enabled me to propose new supplements (published in *ZPE* and *APF*). I realised that all the texts ascribed to the *HO* need to be reconsidered from a papyrological point of view; therefore, in collaboration with Giuseppe Mariotta, I have been preparing a new critical edition of the *HO* together with an accompanying commentary for the Italian series "I Frammenti degli Storici Greci". Cfr. Occhipinti (2013 b): 72–76, (2014 a): 25–33 and (2014 b): 34–44.

source (though not exclusively), especially with reference to the events of the last phases of the Peloponnesian war and Agesilaus' campaign in Asia (books 13–15). This type of investigation is, moreover, quite productive and, as a result, it can cast light on the authorship issue as well—but that only at the end of the procedure, not at the beginning.

1.3 The *HO* and Xenophon's *Hellenica*

The study of the *HO* is made by way of literary comparison between its narrative and Xenophon's *Hellenica*, Thucydides' *Histories*, Theopompus' and Ephorus' fragments, Diodorus' books 13–15 of his *Bibliotheke*.[30] This excludes, however, any other Xenophontic works. The choice is partially due to reasons of thematic selection (i.e. peculiar historical subjects); it can also be explained by the fact that apparently there is a close relation *especially* between the *HO* and Xenophon's *Hellenica*. This special relation has given way to discussions and disagreements among scholars. Here I give two of the most relevant views about that association. Cartledge in his *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* defined Xenophon's *Hellenica* as the memories of an old man, who intends to give utterance to correct conceptions that meet the needs of readers well schooled for virtue;[31] the historian would resemble a figure familiar to British audience, someone like 'the retired general, staunch Tory and Anglican, firm defender of the Establishment in Church and State, and at the same time a reflective man with ambitions to write edifying literature.'[32] The scholar considered the *HO* a more reliable testimony than Xenophon's *Hellenica*; as for the historicity of both works, in fact, he suggested the superiority of the *HO* compared to Xenophon's narrative, which is more concerned with illustrating ethical lessons to be learned from individuals or peoples:[33]

> It is of course impossible to deliver a final judgment on a historian on the basis of about 1200 surviving lines, but the little we have […] suffices to show that P [*the Oxyrhynchus historian*] was far closer in approach and execution to Thucydides than was Xenophon. Where it is possible to compare P and Xenophon directly, for example over the autumn 395 campaign of Agesilaos in Asia Minor, […] the differences between them leap on the

30 At times Herodotus' narrative is considered a precedent model for comparison.
31 Cartledge (1987): 65.
32 Irwin (1974): 410 in Cartledge cit.
33 Cartledge (1987): 66.

> eye. While Xenophon was clearly concerned primarily with the personality of Agesilaos and so concentrated on episodes that lent themselves to more picturesque or dramatic treatment, P as a good military historian sturdily ignored the incidentals retailed by Xenophon and allowed the reader to see clearly the truth Xenophon strove to obfuscate, namely that Agesilaos achieved no notable victories. P's flat, 'antirhetorical' style [...] was an admirable vehicle for this approach.

With a certain enthusiasm Cartledge defined the author of the *HO* as a historian of the first rank, maintaining that he is even superior to his model, Thucydides. This would be shown by the account of the Boeotian constitution as it was in 395 BC, which Thucydides has taken for granted providing just isolated details throughout his *Histories*. Besides, the *HO*'s interest in displaying the rivalry of factions within Greek states and in connecting domestic politics and foreign policy would show features that Thucydides tended to overlook.[34]

An opposite view has recently been held by Bleckmann. He has expressed his theory in the work *Fiktion als Geschichte*.[35] Following Busolt's vision, he suggests that the text of the *HO* is a variation and re-adaptation of Xenophon's narrative. According to him, in fact, both authors, Xenophon and the Oxyrhynchus historian, appear to have selected identical historical items to develop, but, in arranging the material coming from Xenophon, the Oxyrhynchian historian is said to have inserted mere variants (modified names of persons and places, patterns, and so on):[36]

> [...] Viele Indizien sprechen dafür, daß Xenophon die authentische und die Hellenika Oxyrhynchia die späte und frei erfundene Darstellung bietet. Akzeptiert man einige Grundgegenheiten der Biographie Xenophons als real gegeben, etwa die Tatsache, daß er zum militärischen Stab des Agesilaos gehörte, dann wird man annehmen können, daß er dort, wo er deutliche sachliche Unterschiede zur Hellenika Oxyrhynchia-Tradition aufweist, das Richtige bietet.

Narrative, especially historical narrative, is neither neutral nor ingenuous, and any sophisticated reader knows that there are at least two main perspectives of textual reading: the one consists in considering a text as a sample of narra-

34 Cartledge (1987): 66–67.

35 Bleckmann (2006): 9–21 and 132–145.

36 Bleckmann (2006): 136.

tive history, and the other regards a text as a reliable reproduction of reality. The relation between fictiveness and reality is, however, controversial. Bleckmann's monograph has the valuable merit of offering interesting theoretical observations about this relation. It has traced four different models, according to approaches followed by scholars who studied historical works:

– To maintain that two accounts, which come from two different works, show the factual knowledge held by their authors, who are contemporary to the events (Model 1)
– To maintain that two accounts, which come from two different works, cannot demonstrate the factual knowledge of their authors, because of their fictional character (Model 2)
– To maintain that only one of two accounts is reliable (original account), whereas the other arranges events freely and, in particular,
  a. independently from the original account (Model 3) or
  b. in dependence on the original account (Model 4)

Bleckmann has, moreover, shown how these four models can all be found among scholars who have compared Xenophon's *Hellenica* with the *HO*. Model 1 is the approach most followed by scholars of historiography, while model 2, comes from scholars of classical philology who consider history a genre closely connected with poetry.[37] Cartledge's book on Agesilaus is based on model 3, because the scholar maintains the superiority of the *HO* (original account) over Xenophon's narrative. For his part, Bleckmann follows model 4.

Some of the he issues raised by both Cartledge and Bleckmann will be extensively dealt with throughout this book (i.e. the relationship between the *HO* and Xenophon's *Hellenica* in reference to a few episodes of the campaign of Agesilaus in Asia, the Corinthian war, the last events of the Peloponensian war; chapters 3, 4, 6), but according to a different perspective, in order to achieve different goals. We aim to evaluate the *HO* both in relation to fifth- and fourth-century historiographical practices and as a source for Diodorus' *Bibliotheke*, without any attempt to answer questions about the historicity of what is said; we intend to find new historiographical patterns to cast further light on the character of the *HO*'s writing. To some extent this way of working is inspired by that literary approach that, in accordance with contemporary postmodern criticism, is taken by scholars of classical philology who consider history as a literary product, one that descends from epic poetry. Gomme in

37 Gelzer (1914): 126, Gomme (1984): 1–48, Lossau (1990): 47–52, Rengakos (2004): 73–99.

the preface to his book, *The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History*,[38] which deals chiefly with Homer, Herodotus, Aeschylus and Thucydides, showed what is peculiar of the subjects he chose: the authors in question share the principle that Greek poetry may concern a historical subject and history may be written in a poetic manner. Literary and fictive aspects can be considered features proper to ancient historiographical practice.

This book is divided into two parts. In the first part discussions involve a close analysis of the *HO* against other sources relating the same facts; the second part offers thematic chapters. This produces a tight separation of the very technical material from material of broader interest, though in some ways the first section lays the foundations for the second.

I follow McKechnie-Kern's edition of the *HO* with relative translation (slightly modified). In one case I refer to Bartoletti's edition (at ch. 4.2). As for the Cairo papyrus I give Koenen's text. Throughout the book the emphasis is mine.

38 Gomme (1984): v.

PART 1

CHAPTER 2

The Work and the Reader

The main group of the three papyrus fragments which form the *HO*, that is, P. Oxy. V 842, offers a continuous narration that deals separately with a set of three contemporary scenarios: events happened in mainland Greece and preceding the Corinthian war, Agesilaus' campaign in Asia Minor, and Conon's activity in the southern part of Asia Minor. This papyrus group will be under consideration throughout this book, for it is the most extensive of all fragments, and, moreover, gives us a good sample of the narrative structure of the work.

An important issue is raised here: is the *HO* written according to the narrative model offered by Thucydides? If it is true that historians who followed Thucydides' historiographical method wrote 'Hellenica,' that is, historical works ordered according to an annalistic framework, nevertheless fourth-century writers of histories seem to have progressively distanced themselves from their model and to have combined together Herodotus' narrative style and method of composition with that of Thucydides.

2.1 The Narrative Character of Fourth-Century *Hellenica*

Scholars interested in Greek historiography agree that in the Hellenistic period the use of Herodotus was quite extensive. In particular, as Strasburger has shown, the two main traditions of Herodotean and Thucydidean historiography were at the same time distinct and often combined.[1] Recently, it has been suggested that a broad use of Herodotus' work is also traceable in texts from the late Hellenistic period, such as the geographical and historical works of Polybius, Posidonius and Strabo, which contain historiographical, ethnographical and geographical material.[2] In addition to this, it seems highly probable too that the debt to Herodotus in the so-called followers of Thucydides, who wrote *Hellenica* as a continuation of Thucydides' *Histories*, was broader than has been noticed so far.[3]

1 Strasburger (1966): 57–58.
2 Clarke (1999).
3 Murray (1972): 200–213.

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Labels such as *Hellenica* and *Historiai* are peculiarly related to modern terminology,[4] and accounts that modern scholars have called *Zeitgeschichte*, that is some sort of Greek contemporary histories which, broadly speaking, appear as structured in annalistic fashion, were not defined with specific terms in antiquity.[5] Jacoby considered Thucydides the predecessor of the so-called *Hellenica* which offered a picture of Greek history—either contemporary or with an earlier start-point—as conceived from a Greek perspective. Despite that, he aknowledged that it is not always possible to distinguish exactly what aspects are peculiar and characteristic of the *Historiai*, or universal histories, and what are, instead, typical of the *Hellenica*; therefore, he published in one single volume of his Collection (*Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*), II C, fragments of historical works which he supposed to be samples of *Universalgeschichte* or *Zeitgeschichte*.[6] Ancient Greeks and Romans did not use the expression 'universal history,' nor did they define the authors who wrote works dealing with the history of the Afro-Eurasian *oikoumene* (such as Polybius, Diodorus, Trogus and Livy) as 'universal historians.' In the Hellenistic period, for instance, the term ἱστορίαι appeared quite imprecise in its meaning: in fact, it referred to every kind of historical works; while the expression κατ' ἐξοχήν was used to define annalistic accounts, genealogies, local chronicles, monographs, etc. Furthermore, it seems that, at least until Polybius' times, a clear distinction between 'continuous, or uninterrupted narratives' (κατ' ἐξοχήν) and monographs was not consistently established.[7]

As is well-known, the canonical title that ancient Greeks and Romans gave to fourth-century annalistic histories is *Hellenica*. In a strict sense the expression 'ta hellenica' refers to those annalistic compositions written by the followers of Thucydides, such as Xenophon, Theopompus, Cratippus, and the Oxyrhynchus historian. But, in a broad sense, this expression suits later historians as well, who wrote *Macedonica* and *Philippica*.[8] To give some examples, the *Histories* of Duris, usually mentioned as *Macedonica*, is once called *Hellenica* (Diod. 15.60.6);[9] a certain Antipater wrote a history on Philip II, which was entitled πράξεις ἑλληνικαί (Epist. Socrat. 30 = Theop. *FGrHist* 115, T 7);[10] Callisthenes

4 Both concepts developed in Reinassence thought. Cf. Vattuone (1998): 57–96, Marincola (1999): 281–324, Desideri (2001): 199–209.

5 Bloch (1956): 34, note 53.

6 Jacoby, *FGrHist* II C *Comm.* pp. 1–2.

7 Canfora (1999): 92–100.

8 Bloch (1956): 43f.

9 Cf. Landucci Gattinoni (1997).

10 He did so probably in competition with the historian Theopompus.

called *Hellenica* both his Greek history of the years 387/86–357/56 BC and his monograph on Alexander:[11] thus Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις were considered by that historian as Ἑλλήνων πράξεις.[12] Later, after Alexander's Asiatic campaign, the typology of *Hellenica* probably opened to new contents: the *Hellenica* of Anaximenes of Lampsacus, for instance, started with a mythical theogony,[13] which obviously had nothing more to do with Greek events, that is to say, 'ta hellenica.'

Thus, the equivalence and interchangeability of such labels *Hellenica*, *Macedonica*, *Philippica*, and *Alexandrou praxeis*, suggest that in the course of the fourth century the *Hellenica* had been progressively referring to broad contents, which were not limited to Greek subjects. It is also possible that the *Hellenica* had been modifying their previous narrative structure, dealing now with parallel accounts of contemporary events happened in different places; these works seem to show a sort of synchronistic narrative adapted to their annalistic framework. This probably happened because the traditional chronological framework was judged too restrictive, in consideration of the fact that new political powers had been growing: therefore, the writers of *Hellenica* were induced to extend their subject matter to Macedonian, Persian and West (Sicilian) history as well, for those scenarios were considered now as belonging to Greek history. The physical space was perceived as a whole, according to a new vision of political realities, seen as forming a network of relations and connections.

Before turning to the Oxyrhynchus historian and his method of composition, and in coherence with the picture presented thus far, it is helpful to outline some aspects of Xenophon's and Theopompus' narrative style, to throw further light on this new way of thinking of 'ta hellenica' by fourth-century historians.

It is interesting to notice that accounts of Persian and Sicilian history were inserted within the first two books of the *Hellenica* of Xenophon (1.2.19; 2.1.8–9; 1.1.37; 1.5.21; 2.2.24; 2.3.5); we regard these passages as interpolations, which are evidently later than Xenophon's lifetime. In fact, aside from these interpolations, there is no further evidence of synchronistic narrative within the *Hellenica*.[14] Leaving aside the chronological errors that the interpolations may offer and the controversial issue about the identity of the assumed interpola-

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11 Schwartz (1900): 106.

12 Bloch (1956): 44, note 77.

13 Jacoby, *FGrHist* II A p. 1.

14 There are other passages where Xenophon refers to Sicilian events or personages, such as Hermocrates (1.1.27–31; 1.3.13) or the two Dionysii (6.2.4; 6.2.33; 7.1.20–22 and 28–29; 7.4.12), but these events and personages are directly and closely related to Greek affairs.

tor or interpolators,[15] let us consider that these Sicilian and Persian insertions are arranged *ad annum*, in conformity with the chronological framework of the main narrative of Xenophon's *Hellenica* which is centred on Greek history. This seems to confirm that, immediately after Xenophon, a new view of historical writing developed; in coherence with it, contemporary events, happened in different places, were now narrated through synchronisms, jumping from one scenario to another. To some extent this characterisation of writing through synchronisms might be applied to Thucydides too, but perhaps we should consider the peculiarity of his *Histories*. Thucydides presumably came to be concerned with Sicilian history progressively. After the second Athenian expedition to Sicily was undertaken, he abandoned his previous project on the Archidamian war and made his work include broader scenarios.[16] So, with a sort of syncronistic arrangement of the narrative some chapters of Sicilian history go well with the main account of Spartan fortifications of Decelea (book 7.18–28). Something similar can be said of book eight with reference to Persian manoeuvres in the Aegean Sea. Thucydides usually shows little interest in Persian matters throughout the *Histories*,[17] but near the end of it he offers some stuff[18] arranged in a way which fits within the main narrative timeline, as if he realised the important role played by spatraps through their involvement in Greek affairs. This led scholars to assume that the historian began a revision of his earlier work, in order to insert Persian material into it, but he could not achieve his goal because of his death.[19] However, aside from this, one has to admit that Thucydides' *Histories* shows tighter chronological and spatial boundaries than fourth-century historical works, and this partially limited the scale of its subject matter.

The second example comes from Theopompus' *syngraphe* or, to be precise, from what Dionysius of Halicarnassus relates about it (T 20). According to the rhetorician, the historian dealt with an extraordinary variety of themes, all interrelated: origins of peoples, foundations of cities (*ktiseis*), geographical

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15 Beloch (1931): 254 f. considered Timaeus the interpolator of the Sicilian passages, while Raubitschek (1973): 315–325 indicated Xenophon; see also Lotze (1974): 215–217. According to Mazzini (1971): 77–95 several different interpolators added the Sicilian and Persian sections to Xenophon's narrative.

16 Musti (1988): 39–51, Meister (1992): 59 ff. Cf. Cataldi (1990), Bianco (1992): 7–19, Muratore (1992): 37–62, Burelli Bergese (1992): 63–79, Corcella (1996): 9–41.

17 At 4.50.3 and 5.1.

18 At 8.5.4 the historian begins the history of the negotiations of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus with Sparta, in the winter of 413/412.

19 Andrewes (1961): 1–18.

places, *thaumasia*, *paradoxa*, laws and governments, Greeks and Barbarians, lives of kings and βίους ἀνδρῶν καὶ πράξεις καὶ τέλη καὶ τύχας (§5). Dionysius points out that, despite this, the narrative is not straightforward because of a frequent use of digressions, most of which he judges as neither necessary nor appropriate, but just a matter of narrative delay. Even though the full context of Dionysius' passage does not allow us to understand which Theopompean works the rhetorician exactly refers to, nonetheless, these general aspects of Theopompus' historical *syngraphe*, as described by Dionysius, seem to be features of both the *Hellenica* and the *Philippica*. This is suggested by the evidence coming from Photius, who maintains that he read the twelfth book of the *Philippica*, which others thought to have been lost (T 18), and gives a summary of its content (F 103). From Photius' statement we can deduce that the historian inserted an excursus on the Cyprian king of Salamis, Evagoras, into the section dealing with the alliance that the Egyptian ruler, Acoris, concluded with Cyprus against the Persians (§1, 391–380/79 BC):[20] the narrative goes back through time until Evagoras' ascension to the throne of Cyprus (§2, a. 410),[21] and backwards still further till mythical times, when Cyprus was conquered by Agamemnon (§3); finally the tale goes forward to the starting point, that is the war between Evagoras and the Persian King (§§4; 6; 9–11, 390–380 BC), and ends with the death of the Salaminian ruler (§12, 374 BC). It is striking that a piece of Greek history, the account of the peace of Antalcidas, has been inserted *en passant* within the main account, the Cyprian war (§§5; 7–8). The alliance of the Egyptian ruler, Acoris, with Psidians (§13), gives occasion for a further excursus, which has a similar narrative structure to that offered by the previous excursus (§1–3): this is an ethnographical digression on southern Anatolian lands and peoples, such as the Asclepiades of Cos and Cnidus (§14) and Mopsus' descendants in Lycia and Pamphilia (§15). At this point, as at chapter 3, the historian inserted the account of a Greek *ktisis*, the foundation of Pamphilia, followed by the report of a war fought between Greeks and Pamphilians (§16); finally the excursus ends with a further war, fought between Lycians and Telmessi (§17).

Jacoby, referring to the episode of Agamemnon (§3), defines it as 'exkurs im exkurs.'[22] Indeed, it seems as if the author manages a play of 'Chinese boxes,'

20 Costa (1974): 40–56; according to Jacoby, *FGrHist* II B *Comm.* pp. 372–374, this war is dated to 392–380 BC. See also my article (2010): 23–43.

21 Presumably this event is to be dated to 413/412 BC, as was suggested by Giuffrida (1996): 589–627 with good evidence.

22 Jacoby, *FGrHist* II B *Comm.* p. 372.

in which bigger containers include smaller ones within. The shape of the two digressions (on Evagoras and on Anatolian peoples) recalls the Herodotean model and more precisely two main Herodotean digressions, which—as in Theopompus—come from the same book (in Herodotus' case, the fourth of the *Histories*) and have been fitted into a military context: the former, on the Scythians, was inserted within the narrative of Darius' expedition against Scythia (4.1–82), and the latter, on Cyrene, was placed into the account of the war led by the Egyptian satrap Ariandes against the cities of Cyrene and Barce (4.145–205). In their turn, these two excursuses contain so many digressions in ring composition style, on various subjects, such as historical events, mythical tales, geographical and ethnographical information, that the main narrative thread appears as completely unrelated to these excursuses, both as regards content and also from a chronological point of view.[23]

We may presume that in book 12 Theopompus resorts to his usual practice of going backwards and dealing with the origins of a people every time he writes on a country and its own population; this way of writing characterises, in fact, both the two main digressions of the twelfth book examined above. Furthermore, this peculiar method of composition was later used by Pompeius Trogus too, who entitled 'Philippica' his universal history of the world under Roman rule.[24] The summary of the twelfth book of Theopompus' *Philippica* shows, one might say, a 'global' view of historical happenings, and confirms the idea that new political realities, which had been previously considered as not central in any discussion about the Greek mainland, now deserve the attention of historians.

It seems that the systematic insertion of digressions, τὸ πολύμορφον τῆς γραφῆς, was a structural feature of Theopompus' narrative. Although Dionysius appreciated the qualities of Theopompus' historical writing ('the crowning and most characteristic of his achievement is something never accomplished with such precision and power by any other historian either before or after his time [...]' T 20, § 7),[25] nevertheless he probably did not realise fully the value of these digressions, παρεμβολαί, judging them as just παιδιῶδες, some sort of playful narrative. Dionysius presumably failed to understand what is fundamentally a Herodotean technique of structuring the narrative through digressions:

23 Cf. Lang (1984): 1–17.

24 It is not surprising then if we assume that Trogus' debt to Theopompus is considerable. See my article (2011): 295 f.

25 Dionysius is referring here to Theopompus' peculiar way of dealing with the issue of historical causation.

several interpretations of a story are offered and, consequently, several layers of understanding it. Similarly, Dionysius did not appreciate Thucydides' method of composition: Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides' arrangement of his first book of the *Histories*, which is found in *De Thucydide*, clearly shows that the rhetorician prefers a straightforward, linear exposition, and just does not grasp the subtlety with which Thucydides displays his material in ways and sequences that make causal interactions clearer to readers.

2.2 P. Oxy. V 842: Annalistic Framework, Synchronistic Narrative

The Oxyrhynchus historian probably regarded some form of chronological framework as a natural and convenient way of organising his material within the narrative. The historian's ordering principle seems to be chronological, as the notorious formula of transition, borrowed from Thucydides, shows: ἀρχομένου] δ̣ὲ τοῦ [θ]έρους τῇ μὲν | [……………………] ἔτος ὄγδον / 'at the beginning of the summer … the eighth year began.' Moreover, the narrative may also have been divided into years starting with the beginning of summer, according to a seasonal succession schema: 'this was the course of the most important events occurring in the Greek world in this winter. At the beginning of the summer … the eighth year began' (9.1).[26]

However, identifying that chronological order as a principle of arrangement does not mean to claim that that is the only governing principle. For, if we consider the several temporal expressions found within the introductory sentences of the *HO*, we cannot draw a clear picture of the temporal setting of the whole narrative, nor elucidate how the Oxyrhynchus historian selected and arranged his material at the beginning and at the end of the narrative of each year. Furthermore, most of these temporal expressions give evidence that the historian intended to point synchronisms between events that happened in different places; in so doing he leads us to jump from one context to another:

a) ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺ[ς αὐτοὺς χρόνο]υς (6.1)[27]
b) μετὰ ταῦτα (6.2)
c) κατὰ τοῦτον τ[ὸν] χρόνον (8.1)

26 Cf. Schepens (1993): 195–202 and (2001 a): 529–565.

27 Cf. Thuc. 1.100.3; 2.95.1; 3.52.1; 4.2.1; 5.12; 7.21.1; 8.99.1; 8.20.1.

d) κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐ]τὸν χρόνον (9.2)[28]
e) τούτου τοῦ θέρους (16.1)[29]
f) κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον (19.2)
g) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα (21.3)
h) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα (22.1)

It is striking that each of these formulas[30] is a sort of short transitional clause between two different contexts: the narrative jumps abruptly from Demaenetus' sea journey to Athens (b), from the Spartan harmost at Aegina to Demaenetus at Thoricus (c), from the Spartan perspective (the navarch Pollis) to the Athenian one (Caunus) (d), from the Rhodian revolt to the events that happened in mainland Greece (e), from Conon to his mercenaries (f), from Agesilaus' camp to the Mysians (g), and from Gordium to Paphlagonia (h).

Moreover, it is interesting to notice that the so-called 'Demaenetus affair'[31] and Conon's operations in Asia Minor are defined as τὰ μ]ὲν οὖν ἁδρότατα τῶν | [κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τῷ χειμῶν]ι τούτῳ συμβάντων / 'this was the course of the most important events occurring in the Greek world in this winter' (9.1). In fact, it seems that the concept of *Hellas* is now extended to any field of Greek action, to any deed performed by Greek people: it has become a sort of ethnical concept applied to space. Probably this peculiar view of Greek history is in accordance with the new shape of fourth-century *Hellenica*, which—as maintained above—opened to broad contexts connected with Greek political action. This ethnical concept applied to space may well explain why the *Hellenica* embraced numerous historical scenarios.

If the *HO*'s annalistic framework is not perspicuous, the narrative shape is clearly traceable. The narration unfolds through two typologies of episodes: narrative and analytical. The narrative episodes are brief and characterised by a fast writing style; the analytical ones contain a quite extensive and slow presentation of events, and are arranged in a digressive form. Digressions, which combine background analysis and *événementiel* history, are intended to play an important role in the narrative: they aim to produce suspense, and to

28 Cf. Thuc. 3.7.1; 3.18.1; 4.7.1; 4.78.1; 4.46.1; 5.115.1; 6.4.1; 6.61.3; 8.40.1.

29 Cf. Thuc. 2.79.1; 4.42.1.

30 We cannot discuss the first example (a), because it is at the very beginning of the *London papyrus* (part A).

31 The Athenian Demaenetus was sent in aid of Conon; it is unclear if he was authorised by the Athenian council or not. Because Athens' relations with Sparta were regulated by a peace agreement occurred at the end of the Peloponnesian war, the affair could prejudice those relations.

modify the rhythm of the narrative by the frequent interruptions they cause. This particular narrative arrangement seems, moreover, to recall Thucydides' narrative style, which the Oxyrhynchus historian develops further by managing shorter episodes than those found in his model.[32] Besides, I suggest that the Oxyrhynchus historian has combined together both Thucydides' and Herodotus' methods of composition, as we can deduce from a closer examination of the *HO*'s narrative structure.

The narrative episodes of the *HO* are arranged as follows:

Demaenetus affair, chh. 6–8
Conon's defence of Caunus from a Spartan attack, ch. 9.1
Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign, chh. 9.2–14
Conon: Rhodian revolt, ch. 15
the Corinthian war, chh. 16–18
Conon: Caunian revolt, chh. 19–20
Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign, Mysian revolt, chh. 21–22

The narration clearly jumps from one context to another. The systematic interruption of the episodes produces suspense, because it delays the outcomes of each of them. Not only are these episodes repeatedly interrupted, but they also appear to be closely interrelated: in fact, the author usually recalls letimotivs of preceding episodes or anticipates letimotivs of following ones. For instance, the outbreak of the Corinthian war (16–18) is anticipated by a discussion on the causes of Greek hostility towards Sparta (7.2–5), and at chapter 17.1 the narrator discusses Theban inner politics which he has already dealt with at 7.2–5.

Besides interruptions occurring between one episode and another, the narrative is also often interrupted inside the episodes themselves. The Demaenetus affair (chh. 6–8), for example, gives occasion to digress and to speak of Greeks' ill-disposition towards Sparta[33] as the main cause of the outbreak of the Corinthian war (7.2–5); a further digression, on the Decelean war, has been inserted into that account in ring composition style (7.4).[34] As we can see, the historian's treatment of the Greek opposition to Sparta comes round in a circular movement, assisted by repetition of ideas or even of phrasing:

32 Behrwald (2005): 15–20, esp. 16. Cf. Bloch (1973): 303–316.
33 It echoes Thucydides 2.8 on Greek ill will towards Athens in 431.
34 Moreover, a piece of Decelean history has been also put in digressive form (19.2) into the narration of Conon's Asiatic operations (19–20).

7.2 Starting point: 'And yet some say that the money from him [*Pharnabazus*] was the cause of concerted action by these people [*Athenians*] and some of the Boeotians and some **in the other cities previously mentioned** (ἐ̣[ν τ]α̣[ῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι τ]αῖς προειρημένα[ις]).'

Discussion of the true cause of the outbreak of the Corinthian war, that is to say, the long-time hostility to Sparta by Boeotians, Argives, Athenians and Corinthians: 'but they did not know that all had long been **ill-disposed** (δυσμενῶς ἔχειν) towards the Spartans, looking out for a way that they might make the cities adopt a war policy. For the Argives and the Boeotians **hated** (ἐμίσουν γὰρ) the Spartans […].'

7.4 Excursus on Timolaus of Corinth, who, though now hostile to the Spartans, during the period of the Decelean war supported them: 'For having obtained a force of five ships he ravaged some of the islands in support of the Athenians. And having sailed to Amphipolis with two triremes and manned from there another four in addition, he defeated Simichus, the Athenian general, in a sea-fight, as I have said earlier, and he captured five enemy triremes and thirty vessels which they had sent. Afterwards with … triremes he sailed to Thasos and caused it to revolt from the Athenians.'

7.5 Ending point: 'So it was for these reasons much more than on account of Pharnabazus and the gold that those **in the previously mentioned cities** (ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ταῖς προει|ρημέναις) had been incited **to hate** (ἐπηρμένοι μισεῖν ἦ̣[σ]α̣ν̣) the Spartans.'

This writing style is found especially in the first twenty-three chapters of Thucydides' work,[35] but it is characteristic of Herodotus' narrative, and, as is well known, in its essence it consists of certain repetitions occurring at the beginning and at the end of a narrative section; moreover, such structural correspondences, which in Herodotus and in other authors are much more complex than here, are regularly found within sections of narrative framed in ring composition structures.[36]

35 Adcock (1963): 91 f.

36 This method of writing is familiar to Greek authors from the archaic period onwards and is very common in fifth-century tragedy. Cf. Fraenkel (1950): 119–120 and (1964): 329–351. On the Roman side, we can notice that Tacitus in his *Annals* arranged freely historical material

A good sample of elaborate ring composition style can be found in the *HO*'s account of the Corinthian war. In fact, the narration of the conflict between Boeotians and Phocians [*a*] (chh. 16–18, 16.1) allows the narrator to elucidate the causes of the war (that is to say, the anti-Spartan activity of the Theban group led by Androcleidas); so he goes back some years before, to the time of the conflict between the two main Theban parties, led respectively by Androcleidas and Leontiades [*b*] (16.1), when Boeotia had a peculiar institutional system, here described [b^1] (excursus, 16.2–4). Later the narrator comes back again to the conflict between the groups of Androcleidas and Leontiades, and explains that at that time the party of Androcleidas was dominant among the Thebans and in the council of the Boeotians [*b*] (17.1–2). After this, he goes back to the period of the Decelean war, when Thebes was under the control of Leontiades' group, and enjoyed a period of economic growth [*c*] (excursus, 17.3–5). Then he again returns to the causes of the conflict between Boeotians and Phocians, that is the political activity of Androcleidas' group [*b*] (18.1–5); he therefore includes here a further excursus on the *aitiai* of hostility between Locrians and Phocians [b^1], coming back again to Androcleidas' activity [*b*] (18.3). Finally, the narrative ends with a reference to Boeotians and Phocians, as at the starting point [*a*] (18.5):

> [*a*] 16.1 'This summer **the Boeotians and the Phocians** went to war.'
>
> [*b*] 16.1 'Those chiefly responsible for the bad relations between them were some people in Thebes. **Not many years previously there had been political conflict in Boeotia** (εἰς στασιασμὸν οἱ Βοιωτοὶ | προελθόντες).'
>
> [b^1] 16.2–4 Description of the Boeotian constitution and its institutional organisms.
>
> [*b*] 17.1–2 'In Thebes the best and most notable of the citizens, as I have already said, **were in dispute with each other** (στασιάζοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους). […] At that time and even a little earlier **the party of Ismenias and Androcleidas was dominant** among the Thebans (ἐδύναντο δὲ τ[ότε μὲν καὶ ἔτι | μικ]ρῷ πρότερον οἱ πε[ρ]ὶ τ̣ὸ̣ν Ἰσμη[νίαν καὶ τὸ]ν | [Ἀνδ]ροκλείδ⟨α⟩ν) […].'

within an annalistic framework and also used ring composition narrative schemas. See Woodman (1972): 150–158, Ginsburg (1981), Pelling (2010): 364–384. Cf. Rengakos (2004): 73–99.

'[...] Previously **the party of Astias and Leontiades had control in the city** for some length of time.'

[c] 17.3–5 'When the Spartans were at Decelea during the war against the Athenians, and gathered their allies there en masse, **this party [*the group led by Leontiades*] was more dominant then the other**, partly because the Spartans were nearby, partly because the city was profiting considerably on their account.'

Description of Theban prosperity at the time of the Decelean war, and Athens' economical difficulties due to Spartan damaging attacks.

[*b*] 18.1–2 '**The party of Androcleidas and Ismenias** (οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀ[ν]|δροκλείδαν κα[ὶ τὸν Ἰσμηνίαν) [...].'

'This was the trick they used to lead them into war: they persuaded certain men among the Phocians to launch an attack on the territory of the western Locrians.'

[b^1] 18.3 'These people have a disputed area near Mount Parnassus, over which they had previously fought, which both Phocians and Locrians often encroached on for grazing. Whichever side it was that noticed the other side doing this, collected together a large force and made a sheep raid. Many such incidents had arisen previously from both sides, but the sides were reconciled to each other on those occasions for the most part through arbitration and discussion;

[*b*] 18.3 but now on this particular occasion the Locrians seized in return an equivalent number of sheep for the ones they had lost, and straightaway the Phocians, urged on by those men whom **the party of Androcleidas and Ismenias** had put up to it, invaded Locris under arms.'

[*a*] 18. 5 'Having done that much damage to **the Phocians**, **the Boeotians** returned to their own country.'

The narration unfolds through a ring composition structure, very close to the Herodotean model; it also shows a well-balanced and symmetric disposition of the material, according to a schema a-b-b^1-b-c-b-b^1-b-a. The narrative goes back and forward, from one scenario to another, breaking repeatedly the logical and chronological order of events. It is interesting that the chiastic repetition of phrasing contributes to develop a very clear narrative framework which stresses the chief idea that the causes of the outbreak of the Corin-

thian war are to be found in the anti-Spartan political activism of Androcleidas' group.[37]

2.3 The Historian's Evaluation and Its Impact on the Readers

Now we need to investigate and explain why the Oxyrhynchus historian used such a narrative construction unfolding through excursuses and narrative episodes. As suggestes above, in terms of readers' expectations this way of writing κατὰ μέρος[38] delays systematically the outcomes of events and clearly produces suspense, giving rhythm to the narrative. Eventually, the reader would expect the narration of the battle of Cnidus, but the story of Conon's activity is instead continuously interrupted and delayed by the narration of Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign and, on one occasion, by the account of the Corinthian war.[39]

However, I wonder whether the narrator aims chiefly to guide his reader through this peculiar textual structure: he gives his opinion on which accounts, explanations, or causes (αἰτίαι) of events, are trustworthy in comparison with others.[40] In other words, it would not be left up to the reader to decide which versions of a story should be trusted. It seems, in fact, that most of the (seemingly) inorganic or non-integrated narrative sections help to enhance the understanding of what the narrator has already maintained before, or/and of what he maintains in the course of the narration. A good instance is given by the account of the Corinthian war (chh. 16–18). Here, the narrator aims to demonstrate that hostilities against Sparta were caused by the activism of an anti-Spartan group at Thebes. This is stressed by the two main rings of the composition ([*b*]), which deal with episodes concerning this group:

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37 A further example of ring composition style is shown by McKechnie-Kern (1988): 172, and it refers to Conon's activities; see below, chapter 3.3.

38 Cf. Diod. 5.1, 16.1. Bloch (1973): 310–312.

39 Cf. Behrwald (2005): 13–15. However, we do not know when and if the battle of Cnidus was dealt with by the Oxyrhynchus historian.

40 On narrative delay as an interpretative technique see Pelling (2000): 82–94, esp. 89; Rood (1998): 109–130. Broadly speaking the shape of any literary product—historical works included—consists of a significant component of authorial manipulation, which is responsible for narrative structure and contents, and can also tell us much about meanings that are sub-textual or, at any rate, not transparent. As regards the so-called 'literary turn,' as to say, the narratological approach in studying ancient historical works, see, among others, Dewald (2005): 1–22 and (2009): 114–147. Cf. Clarke (1999): 22–34.

- εἰς στασιασμὸν οἱ Βοιωτοὶ | προελθόντες ... **there had been political conflict in Boeotia** ... (16.1); στασιάζοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους ... 'the best and most notable of the citizens **were in dispute with each other** ...' (17.1–2); ἐδύναντο δὲ τ[ότε μὲν καὶ ἔτι | μικ]ρῷ πρότερον οἱ πε[ρ]ὶ τὸν Ἰσμη[νίαν καὶ τὸ]ν | [Ἀνδ]ροκλείδ⟨α⟩ν ... 'At that time and even a little earlier **the party of Ismenias and Androcleidas was dominant** ...' (17.1–2);
- οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀ[ν]δροκλείδαν κα[ὶ τὸν Ἰσμη|νίαν ... '**the party of Androcleidas and Ismenias** ...' (18.3).

Other subjects are arranged in digressive form within this ring composition framework, such as the Boeotian constitution, the story of Thebes during the period of the Decelean war, the causes of hostility between Locrians and Phocians; they are intended to enlarge the framework itself, giving relevance to it.

Furthermore, the narrator's reflection on the issue of historical causation, found in the account of the Corinthian war, is foreshadowed in the text some chapters before by a digression (ch. 7.2–5, examined above). Here the narrator explicitly maintains that, though some say that the causes of the outbreak of the Corinthian war are to be found in the gold of the Persian King, they ignore the fact that many Greeks had long been ill-disposed towards Sparta. Thus, the peculiar construction of both digressions, at 7.2–5 and 16–18, seems aimed at leading the reader to agree with the narrator's suggestions. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand why the narrator included two extensive digressions on the causes of the outbreak of the Corinthian war and then devoted so little attention (just two paragraphs) to the narration of the war itself (18.4–5).

A further example of digressions reinforcing the narrator's viewpoint is a brief excursus on the issue of the payment of mercenaries during the Decelean war (19.2–3). In this case, the narrator shows that what happened at Conon's times, as to say, the difficulty in finding money to pay troops, was a common problem among people fighting for the King (ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτως συμβαίνειν εἴ̣ω̣θε̣):

> [*a*] 'It happened that at this time the soldiers were owed many moths pay. For they were badly paid by the generals—which is normal practice for **those fighting for the King**,'
>
> [*b*] 'as in the Decelean war when they were allies of the Spartans, they provided the money on an altogether mean and niggardly scale, and the triremes of their allies would often have been disbanded had it not been for the energy of Cyrus.'

> [*a*] '**The responsibility for this lies with the King** who, whenever it is decided to make war, sends a small sum of money at the beginning to those in charge and takes no account of the future. And those in charge of affairs, not having the means to pay from their private fortunes, sometimes permit the disbandment of their forces. This is what usually happens.'

Our examination so far suggests that the Oxyrhynchus historian wrote according to a synchronistic narrative style, though the material is arranged into an annalistic framework, and that he followed and combined together both Thucydides' and Herodotus' methods of composition. While in Herodotus' narrative there are various voices, or focalisations, aside from the controlling voice of the narrator, who rarely suggests which stories are more or less trustworthy,[41] the narrator of the *HO* has a predominant role throughout the narrative; especially his 'digressive' style gives evidence that he has undertaken to guide readers in forming their opinions on what happened.

2.4 Conclusion

The peculiar narrative structure of the *HO*, which combines excursuses and annalistic narrative, along with some cases of synchronism and ring composition style offered by other authors of *Hellenica* reinforce our idea that fourth-century historians were inspired by the Herodotean narrative model; they gave examples of narrative writing which adopted and combined together annalistic and syncronistic narrative schemas.

If the turn to Herodotus' method can give reason for writing in ring composition style, syncronisms are presumably related to an unprecedented historical reading tending to connect and associate different areas of the Afro-Eurasian *oikoumene*. Contemporary events, happening in different places, are narrated by way of synchronisms between several different scenarios. The concept of *Hellas* is now extended to any field of Greek action, to any deed performed by Greek people: that is as a sort of ethnical concept applied to space. And, consequently, the expression 'ta hellenica' may refer to happenings concerning any parts of Greece. The interpolator/s of Xenophon's *Hellenica* as well as the Oxyrhynchus historian can be considered as pioneers of this new historical tendency.

41 Dewald (2009): 114–147. Cf. Baragwanath (2008). Herodotus sometimes openly comments on trustworthiness.

The more or less elaborated ring compositions found in the *HO*, while recalling Herodotus' method of writing, show something different, that is, a simplified view of the issue concerning the causes of events. The shape of the narrative is far from recalling the complexity of Herodotus' reading of events, according to which a plurality of voices and explanations are to be expected; the narrator's voice instead prevails on the others, instructs readers, and gives explanations on why things happened in a given manner.[42]

42 See ch. 8.1.

CHAPTER 3

Spartan Motivations: the *HO* and Xenophon

This chapter presents a broad discussion of the reasons why, according to the author of the *HO*, several Greek cities of the mainland were led to oppose Sparta, as well as Spartan motivations for undertaking a military enterprise in Asia Minor near the end of the fifth century. The analysis is developed through a cross-comparison of the *HO*'s narrative and the parallel account given by Xenophon's *Hellenica* on Agesilaus' military manoeuvres in Asia in 395 BC. One of the main concerns in our discussion regards the issue of whether there are clues that suggest the idea that the Oxyrhynchus historian resorted to Persian materials and informants as sources, along with a possible use of the *Hellenica* of Xenophon. Furthermore, it is worth investigating whether the *HO*'s narrative can be seen as a sort of historiographical reply to Xenophon's *Hellenica*.

3.1 Greek Hostility and Sparta's Reasons

According to the *HO* the true cause of the outbreak of the Corinthian war was the long-standing hostility of numerous Greek cities towards Sparta and her foreign policy.[1] The King's gold and the resulting bribery of Greek *poleis* were *not* responsible for the creation of 'war-parties' at Athens and elsewhere, for they were already extant (7.2; 7.5). The narrator is clearly intent on establishing accuracy and dispelling rumours and false beliefs: there is a Thucydideanism here that recalls the causation issue (*prophasis/aitia*), discussed by Thucydides in his programmatic methodological discussion of scientific inquiry (1.23.5–6).[2] Bribery is not denied, though it is not considered the true cause of that war, but something like a triggering event.

The narrative distances itself clearly from some people (καίτοι τινὲς λέγ[ουσιν) who maintained[3] that the money from Timocrates brought about a con-

1 In this chapter I refer to P. Oxy. V 842.

2 Fornis (2007): 187–218. See Pelling (2000): 87–89. We find also Thucydides' near-obsession with the mistaken Athenian tradition regarding the tyrannicides (1.20.2 and 6.53–59). See McKechnie-Kern (1988): 135. Cf. Arist. *AP* 18.5.

3 Here I would give the verb λέγω a stronger reading, as 'to maintain' (i.e. a thesis), than merely as ὡς λέγουσι (as they say) or λέγεται (it is said).

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certed action of the Boeotians and other Greeks (7.2). But who were these 'some people'? Or, rather, might they have been writers? Possibly, yes. The present tense of the verb (λέγουσιν) indicates something that was still said in the Oxyrhynchus historian's own day; this does not exclude, however, that those rumours came from certain writings as well, such as Xenophon's *Hellenica* and also, for instance, the works of Deinon and Ctesias. Plutarch, who in his *Artaxerxes* (20.3) shows that he knows the same version about the outbreak of the war as the one given by Xenophon,[4] does not conceal elsewhere in the *Life* that he is following Xenophon (20.4), in addition to Deinon and Ctesias (20.1). The *HO* might represent a sort of reply to Xenophon's text where we find the belief that Timocrates' bribery was at the origin of an anti-Spartan coalition, led by Thebes, Corinth and Argos (*Hell.* 3.5.1–2).[5] This is a controversial point and implies that the *HO* was written a little later than Xenophon's *Hellenica*. The claim is however plausible. Xenophon presumably wrote the most extensive part of the *Hellenica* (from 2.3.10 to the end) after the *Anabasis*, which is dated to the 360s.[6] Though we do not know when the first part of the *Hellenica* was written, books 1–2.3.9 were probably amongst the earliest of Xenophon's writings.[7] Besides, we can assert confidentely that Xenophon's *Hellenica* was completed in the mid-350s.[8] That the *HO* is only fixable within fairly wide margins—after 387/386 and before 346 BC—is a conventional formulation,[9] and it is possible to say more on the issue. The constitution of Boeotia, as described in the *HO* (16.2–4), is a kind of federal state that was presumably in

4 Xenophon, followed by Plutarch, is probably mistaken in making the Persian action directly consequent upon Agesilaus' victory at Sardis: Tithraustes sent Timocrates with the money to bribe anti-Spartan politicians because he feared Agesilaus' military strengthening after the battle of Sardis (*Hell.* 3.5.1). So Tuplin (1993): 60. According to Xenophon, the Athenians did not take the money, though they appeared already disposed to go to war (*Hell.* 3.5.2). For a quick view of contemporary and later authors who relied upon Xenophon's *Hellenica* and the *HO* in relation to the theme of the outbreak of this war see Valente (2014): 114–135. On the *HO*'s account of the Corinthian war see Buckler (2004): 397–411, Rung (2004): 413–426, Schepens (2012): 213–241.

5 *Contra* McKechnie-Kern (1988): 135. According to Valente (2014): 10–12, Xenophon is replying here to the *HO*, and, polemising with it, expresses a pro-Spartan view in support of Agesilaus and Sparta; see also 103–109, 112, 113–114, 119 ff.

6 Cawkwell (2004): 47–48; see lastly Pelling (2013 a): 40, note 1.

7 Cawkwell (1979): 28–33. Differently, Gray (1991): 201–228 argues that the first part is a bridging summary of the last years of the Peloponnesian war that was composed at the same time as the rest of the *Hellenica*.

8 Tuplin (2007): 166.

9 Cf. Bruce (1967): 4.

force before the dissolution of Boeotian unity under the terms of the peace of Antalcidas (387/386 BC).[10] In fact, in introducing his excursus on the constitution of Boeotia by the words εἶχεν δὲ τὰ πράγματα τότε κα[τὰ τὴ]ν Βοιωτίαν οὕτως (16.2) the Oxyrhynchus historian seems to indicate that he was writing after the dissolution of that constitution, which happened in 387/386 BC.[11] Some time later, in 378 BC, the constitution was reformed on 'democratic' lines, and according to Cartledge a date for the composition of the *HO* might be indeed something between 378 and 346 BC. The *terminus ad quem* is given, again, by internal evidence. A passage of the *HO* relating to a disputed territory between Phocis and Locris ('these people have a disputed area near Mount Parnassus,' 18.3, ll. 484–485) suggests that its author considers events that occurred along the borders between Phocians and Locrians (cattle driving, raids; ll. 486–489) as close to the time of his writing (and so uses 'have'); this is no longer the case after 346, that is, the end of the third Sacred war (356–346), and therefore the historian probably wrote before that war.[12] Besides, as we shall see (chh. 5 and 6), thematic evidence too, along with further internal evidence (below, in this chapter), enforces our assumption that the Oxyrhynchus historian replies to Xenophon's narrative.

Turning to the Corinthian war, while people's motivations within the anti-Spartan coalition (Boeotians, Argives, Corinthians and Athenians) are emphasised in the *HO* throughout the narrative of the prelude to that war (7.2–5), weak clues can be found about Sparta's own reasons. The Spartans are introduced to the reader through the common ill feeling of some Greeks (Argives and Boeotians, in particular), who blamed them for supporting pro-Spartan groups in Boeotia and in Argos (7.2, ll. 41–43). Furthermore, the Spartans' response to the Boeotian menace of an attack on Phocis—they actively promoted a diplomatic solution—seems to be evidence of Sparta's impartiality as well as of a certain disinterest for the area; this may indicate what the narrator believes as true or what he wants his audience to believe. Moreover, the focalisation through the Spartans' thoughts and words ('though they thought the story was

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10 Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.33. It is possible that its origin dates back to 447 BC, when the region gained its independence from Athens. Cf. Bruce (1967): 157. This idea would be supported by the evidence coming from Boeotian coins, which for the period 447–386 BC do not bear the names of the Boeotian cities individually, except for Thebes. Cf. also Sordi (1968): 66–75.

11 Gigante (1949): 65.

12 Cartledge (2000): 397–415, 401. For Walker (1908): 361 the historian wrote between 356 and 346 BC. Cf. Bruce (1967): 4–5. For other suggestions see Mazzarino (1965): 401, Accame (1978): 176–177, Bianchetti (1992): 10–12 and (2001): 33–46, Magnelli (2006): 47–48, Lérida Lafarga (2007): 263, Valente (2014): 9.

unworthy of belief,[13] they sent envoys and told the Boeotians not to make war on the Phocians, but if they thought that they were wronged in any way, they ordered them to obtain justice from them in a meeting of their allies,' 18.4, ll. 505–509) shows Sparta's own evaluation of the report (i.e., they considered it to be untrustworthy), which to some extent anticipates the narrator's suggestion that the whole deceitful business had been set up by the Theban group led by Androcleidas and Ismenias (18.4, ll. 509–513). Thus, if the Boeotians' alleged reasons were trustworthy, then the Corinthian war would be caused by Spartan activism (7.2, ll. 41–43). Otherwise, if the Spartan reading of events (as well as the narrator's suggestion!) prevailed, the war would originate from a Theban conspiracy.[14]

3.2 Sparta's Asiatic Campaign and Its Analysis

To thoroughly explore Spartan motivations for action in the *HO* we need to turn to the most extensive part of the work pertaining to Sparta, that is, the account of the Asiatic campaign led by the Spartan king Agesilaus. Immediately, some questions appear inevitable. What were Sparta's motivations for that campaign, which, along with the accounts of the Corinthian war and Conon's military operations, is one of the most extensive episodes of the *HO*? And, also, is the story really a mere variation and re-adaptation of Xenophon's narrative?[15] Or rather does the Oxyrhynchus historian answer and dialogue with Xenophon's text, adding further and at times contrasting evidence? Might this perhaps depend on his informants and Persian materials?

There are many controversial aspects related to Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign, and these regard mainly presumed similarities and differences in the historical explanations given by Xenophon[16] and by the Oxyrhynchus historian (and consequently by Diodorus—so far considered as depending on the *HO* through the mediation of Ephorus).[17]

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13 The Phocians had ravaged an area of the Locrian territory (18.3–4).

14 For historical reconstructions of the relationship between Sparta, Thebes and Boeotia on the eve of the Corinthian war see McKay (1953): 6–7, Hamilton (1972): 21–37, Lehmann (1978): 73–93, Lendon (1989): 300–313, Bakhuizen (1994): 307–330; lastly Valente (2014).

15 Bleckmann (2006): 12–21.

16 Lastly Bruce (1967): 150–156. Cf. Bleckmann (2006): 12–21.

17 Though Diodorus today has been (partially) rehabilitated as a historian. See ch. 4.1 for a close comparison between the *HO* and Diodorus, as regards the Asiatic campaign of Agesilaus.

In this section I shall focus on a few narrative elements relating to the spring and autumn/winter operations of 395 BC (chh. 11–12 and 21–22),[18] because on the one hand they seem to suggest that the Oxyrhynchus historian was interested in the Persians' military manoeuvres and was adequately informed about them and about Asia Minor's topography,[19] and on the other hand they allow us to identify and explore Agesilaus' personal motivations for his military choices (the exploration of Agesilaus' motives continues, moreover, throughout the following sections).

The impression given by the (only partially) preserved lines referring to the route taken by Agesilaus from Ephesus to Sardis is that the Oxyrhynchus historian provides information that we do not find elsewhere in the sources on the Spartan campaign:[20] Agesilaus probably followed a path along (and parallel to) the Cayster river, across the Tmolus (11, ll. 123–133).[21] Needless to say, the question of Agesilaus' route might be considered as a sort of unsolvable puzzle for scholars, whose conjectures, moreover, rely excessively on presumed correspondence between Diodorus (14.80) and the Oxyrhynchus historian. It appears we obtain a different piece of information from Diodorus' text, where it is stated that Agesilaus 'led forth his army into the plain of Cayster and the country around Sipylus' (80.1); this leads us to think that, for Diodorus, Agesilaus took the so-called Karabel route.[22] Besides, if one compares the *HO*'s textual evidence (11, ll. 123–133) with that of Xenophon,[23] it seems that the

18 Agesilaus' intervention in Asia is part of the Spartan campaign conducted from 400 to 395 BC.

19 See also 7.3.

20 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.16–29; 4.1; *Ages.* 1.25–38; Diod. 14.79–80; Plut. *Ages.* 6–15; Trog. *Prol.* 6; Iust. 6.2; Paus. 3.9.3–7; Polyaen. *Strat.* 2.1.8–9; 7.16; Nep. *Ages.* 2.4–6; Frontin. *Strat.* 1.8.12.

21 In ancient times there were various routes from Ephesus to Sardis across the Tmolus, and Kaupert (1924–1931): 275–280 identified four of these at least: the westernmost part of the Tmolus was the Karabel pass; a second pass crossed the Tmolus above Bayindir; a third route proceeded from Ödemiş crossing the Tmolus; the most easterly route, also going through Ödemiş, went past Hypaepa and Gölcük.

22 See note above.

23 Xenophon reports that Agesilaus announced his intention to march to Sardis across τὴν συντομωτάτην ἐπὶ τὰ κράτιστα τῆς χώρας (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.20). This statement initially led scholars to suppose that the 'shortest' route to Sardis was the Hypaepa-Tmolus route; conversely, for the *HO*, followed by Diodorus, Agesilaus travelled across the 'ordinary' or 'normal' route, supposedly the one along the Karabel pass, Mount Sipylus and Nymphaeum; so Dugas (1910): 62 ff. In reality, though, it is not fully clear what was regarded as the 'ordinary' route. Xenophon maintains that Agesilaus marched through the countryside for three days before encountering the enemy cavalry (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.22), and we know from

Oxyrhynchus historian is giving his own distinctive version of Agesilaus' march, demonstrating his or his sources' thorough knowledge of the topography of Asia.

It has been maintained that on the subject of Agesilaus' manoeuvres in Asia Minor the Oxyrhynchus historian used a sort of camp-journal, written by a Greek officer,[24] or that, being an Athenian writer of an *Atthis*, he received information from Conon's group in Asia.[25] But, if this were so, it would not be easy to attribute to such a source the account, for example, of the execution of Tissaphernes, related in the thirteenth chapter of the *HO* (13.1). On the contrary, news of this event might have spread widely in Asia Minor by word of mouth, for it is that sort of news—about a notable figure—which arouses public interest the most; therefore, it may have been conveyed through Persian informants.[26] The content of this story is partially found in Diodorus (14.80. 6–8) and Polyaenus (7.16.1).[27] They report that the killing of Tissaphernes was due to the revenge of Artaxerxes' mother, Parysatis, who wanted the satrap to pay a high price for Cyrus' death. Going along with Meyer's supplement, we might, moreover, assume that the chapter in question points to Parysatis by name (Παρ[ύσατις, 13, l. 244).[28] Wherever the Oxyrhynchus historian got his information, judging by the length and the intelligible fragments on the tale (13.1–2), he shows he obtained as much detail as was possible, and, consequently, that he was inter-

Herodotus that the Hypaepa-Tmolus route between Ephesus and Sardis, of five hundred and forty stades and taken by the Ionians in 498 (Hdt. 5.100), was a three days' journey (Hdt. 5.54). Thus the 'ordinary' route might have been the Hypaepa-Tmolus route (Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.11). Lastly, scholars have supposed that both the *HO* (> Diodorus) and Xenophon refer to the same route, the Karabel, which would be shorter than the route across Smyrna (Hypaepa-Tmolus route). So Nellen (1972): 49, Anderson (1975): 27–53, Botha (1988): 71–80, Bleckmann (2006): 12–21. On the Battle of Sardis and on the value of the *HO*'s testimony, see also Gray (1979): 183–200, Cartledge (1987): 215–217, De Voto (1988): 41–53, Wylie (1992): 118–130.

24 Dugas (1910): 92. There are similar suggestions about Xenophon's *Anabasis* made by Cawkwell (1972): 9–48 and (2004): 47–67.

25 Pintaudi (2003): 37.

26 Cf. Bruce (1967): 11.

27 Polyaenus tells a story in which Ariaeus, on instructions received by letter, summoned Tissaphernes to Colossae and, with the help of bath attendants, arrested him while he was bathing. Then he handed him over to Tithraustes, who took him in a wagon to Celaenae; there he beheaded him and sent his head to the King. Artaxerxes sent the head to his mother Parysatis, who now could be sure that Tissaphernes had paid the penalty for Cyrus' death (7.16.1). The same episode is found in summarised form in Diodorus 14.80.6–8.

28 Meyer (1909): 179.

ested in Persian events. Though Ctesias probably did not report this event,[29] nevertheless he knew that Tissaphernes had calumniated[30] (or informed on)[31] Cyrus before Artaxerxes, and for this reason Cyrus took refuge in Parysatis' abode; after that, he organised and led the so-called expedition of the Ten Thousand against his brother.[32] Ctesias might have heard this story (as well as others) from the mouth of Parysatis herself.[33] In other words, probably something like a vulgate of the whole episode might have circulated at that time.

The Oxyrhynchus historian shares with Ctesias the preference for writing Persian names in accordance with their original etymology (and not, as Herodotus usually does, in their Graecised or popular form);[34] this is shown by the name of 'Spithradates' in its correct noun form (in reference to a Persian man who guided Agesilaus into Paphlagonia), which is attested twice in the *HO* (21.3–4, ll. 692, 693) together with its Graecised form, 'Spithridates' (21.4, l. 701. 22.1, l. 722).[35] Therefore, I would stress the idea that the author of the *HO* *also* had access to memoirs, reports, stories or other kinds of written sources, especially some coming from the Persian camp.[36]

It is undeniable that the Oxyrhynchus historian devotes considerable attention to Persian events, especially if compared with Xenophon. Even if he is playing with Xenophon's narrative (this is what I suggest), he shows an unprecedented interest in Persian matters. In the account of the battle of Sardis,[37] for instance, according to the *HO*, the Persians pursued Agesilaus' troops ceaselessly along their route (11.3) before the battle took place; on the contrary, Xenophon omits this, reporting the arrival of the Persian cavalry only on the fourth day of Agesilaus' march (*Hell.* 3.4.21–22). More generally, Xenophon's narrative gives the impression that only upon the arrival of Persian cavalry did

29 His work ends with the year 398/397 BC. (Diod. 14.46.6).

30 Orsi-Manfredini (1987): XXXV–XXXIX. Cf. Xen. *An.* 1.1.3.

31 Lenfant (2004): 276.

32 Ctesias *FGrHist* 688, F 16 = Phot. *Bibl.* 72 p. 43 b 3–44 a 19, 53 (cf. F 16 Lenfant). Cf. Lane Fox (2004): 12–20.

33 See ch. 5.3.

34 Schmitt (1979): 119–133.

35 Ctesias *FGrHist* 688, F 15 a = Phot. *Bibl.* 72 p. 41 b 38–43 b 2, 53 (cf. F 15 Lenfant). Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.10. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.10 (ed. Hatzfeld). Stonecipher (1918): 62.

36 Cf. Westlake (1987): 241–254.

37 The battle of Sardis, fought between the armies of Agesilaus and Tissaphernes in the valley of the Hermus (Paus. 3.9.6; cf. Diod. 14.80), or on the banks of the Pactolus (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.22), took place in the spring of 395 BC. The differences between Diodorus (14.80.1–4) and Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.4.20–25 and *Ages.* 1.28–33) are so striking that it has even been doubted whether they describe the same battle. Cawkwell (1968): 288–290.

Agesilaus face his enemy, while the Oxyrhynchus historian gives us to understand that the decisive encounter (in his portrayal, not quite decisive at all!) took place after previous skirmishes. It does look as if the Oxyrhynchus historian, here, puts the whole event in its correct perspective, while Xenophon (as well as Diodorus) considers the battle a great happening.[38] I leave aside the question whether this might be explained by Xenophon's pro-Agesilaus bias, and whether for this reason he might also have intentionally omitted the episode of Xenocles' ambush (related by the *HO*), a surprise attack delivered by Agesilaus' hoplites and light-armed troops, before the battle of Sardis (11.4).[39] Xenophon might simply have been less interested than the Oxyrhynchus historian in Persian issues.

Whatever Xenophon's motives were, some narrative features of the *HO*'s account of the battle of Sardis show clearly the narrator's interest in Persian operations and in giving a more balanced view of the forces that were deployed. The focus on Agesilaus' expectations seems to put the emphasis on the menace represented by Tissaphernes and his troops in the campaign, based primarily on their number and strength, and we learn that when Agesilaus was being pursued by Tissaphernes' army 'he thought it difficult to resist the enemy attacking in battle array, since they were more numerous than the Greeks …' (11.3, ll. 133–136). Moreover, even though the Spartans won the battle, they nevertheless appear to have difficulty handling the aftermath. In fact, they 'chased the enemy but not for very long, for they could not catch them because the majority were cavalry and troops without armour' (11.6, ll. 193–196).

Furthermore, the ambush led by Xenocles just before the battle of Sardis, as well as the aftermath of the battle itself, is narrated through a plurality of focalisations, which, in swift succession, alternate the Spartan perspective with that of the *barbaroi* (11.4–12.4). The narrative unfolds through verbs of perception, or by referring to knowledge coming from inquiry (like πυνθάνομαι, 'I know, after having asked for information;' cf. 12.1, l. 213), so as to indicate what appeared, seemed to (or even was felt by,[40] or known to) each side at the same time. An illuminating example is the parallelism between the Persian and Spartan response: 'when the barbarians saw (εἶδον) the Greeks charging at them, they fled all over the plain. Seeing (κατιδὼν) them terrified,

38 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.22–24. Diod. 80.3.

39 This is, however, a delicate issue, for it might appear as connected with the traditional view, according to which Xenophon had an apologetic aim in writing the *Hellenica*. Cf. Tuplin (2004). According to some scholars, Xenophon has omitted the episode because he was not present at that battle: Dugas (1910): 70–72; Valente (2014): 77.

40 12.1, l. 204: καταπλαγέντες [τοὺς] Ἕλληνας.

Agesilaus sent the light-armed troops of his army and the cavalry to pursue them' (11.5, ll. 187–191).

The narrative of Agesilaus' Mysian campaign (winter 395 BC, 21.1–3, ll. 648–686)—omitted by both Xenophon and Diodorus—is moulded again by Greek and Persian perceptions. Appearance, deception and misunderstanding lead the reader through the chapters in question. Agesilaus' decision to make terms with the Mysians relies upon his own sight and thoughts: 'when he came during his advance to the middle of the Mysian Olympus as it is called, seeing (ὁρῶν) that the way through was difficult and narrow and wanting (βου]λόμ[ενος]) a safe passage through it, he sent some people to the Mysians and made terms with them and led his army through the region' (21.2, ll. 655–660). But something unpredictable happened to him, because the Mysians attacked the Spartan rearguard. On the following day a deceitful thought led the Mysians, too, to misinterpret what was about to happen ('each of the Mysians thought—οἰηθ[έντες—that Agesilaus was going away on account of the loss received on the previous day, and they came out of their villages and began to pursue him with the intention—ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι—of attacking the rearguard in the same way,' 21.2, ll. 669–673), that is, an attack against them, an ambush previously organised by Agesilaus (ll. 673–675). The narrator's focus turns again to the Mysians, through the perception of those of the rearguard: 'the leaders and front soldiers of the pursuing Mysians suddenly came into conflict with the Greeks and were killed; and the main body, when they saw (κατιδόντες) their vanguard in difficulties, fled to their villages' (ll. 675–678).

3.3 Agesilaus' Motivations and the Lasting Significance of the Spartan Campaign in Asia

To continue exploring Agesilaus' motives we need to turn our attention to a very controversial topic, related to Agesilaus' war in Asia and to Spartan strategy and its policy goals. Many years ago, the question—a big question indeed!—was raised why Sparta sent a force to Asia in 400 BC to engage in a crusade for the liberation of the Asiatic Greek cities, and then kept her army there for several years, during which, for long periods, she made little effort to secure her main objective, or at least what she had declared was her main objective.[41] Surely we should emphasise, with Westlake, the emergence of disagreements in Sparta between rival political groups led by influential individuals, and suggest that

41 Westlake (1986 a): 405–426.

this crusade on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks, in the end, conferred little credit upon both the authorities at home and their top commanders in the Asiatic field.

With regard to Agesilaus' campaign, scholars have held different views: the immediate aim of the campaign was to create a sort of buffer zone of rebel satraps and tribes between the territory controlled by the Persian King and the Greek cities of the seaboard;[42] Agesilaus aimed to conquer Ionia;[43] finally, he wanted to prevent a Persian attack against Greece.[44]

Broadly speaking, the Spartan Asiatic campaign might be easier to understand if it had aimed to block the Carian naval station. As Meyer observed in 1909,[45] it was precisely from the red zone of the Carian area that Persian naval operations were conducted against Greece, and since the beginning of their campaign the Spartans appeared well aware of the necessity to invade that territory (400 BC).[46] That was a boundary zone, all the more so as there is evidence of diplomatic talks in that area, just before Conon's appointment. In 398 BC the historian Ctesias, who was presumably at Salamis in Cyprus with Pharnabazus, gave Conon the King's letter for his appointment, and then he moved to his own headquarters (Cnidus), to depart for Sparta, where he delivered a letter containing a message from Susa on the failure of the King's negotiations with the Spartans.[47]

Agesilaus could easily have opened the road to Caunus and to the Rhodian Chersonesus if he had foiled Conon's commission and induced Miletus and

42 Seager (1977): 183–184.

43 Bommelaer (1981): 188–190.

44 Hamilton (1979): 184. Valente (2014): 104 maintains that the first two suggestions are more plausible than the last one, even though not necessarily feasible.

45 Meyer (1909): 9.

46 In 399 the ephors ordered Thibron to invade Caria (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.7); in 397 another delegation of ephors gave Dercylidas the peremptory order to attack Caria (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.12); at the same time the Spartan Pharax sailed away from Rhodes and blocked the Persian fleet at Caunus, though just temporarily. All that was probably a consequence of Conon's operations at Caunus with a Persian fleet. See Valente (2014): 19.

47 Spartan envoys were in custody at the King's court; they were probably judged at Rhodes and later released. Ctesias *FGrHist* 688, F 30 = Phot. *Bibl.* 72 p. 44 b 20–42, 74–75 (cf. F 30 Lenfant): ὡς ἐτηρήθησαν οἱ παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἄγγελοι πεμφθέντες πρὸς βασιλέα […] (74); Κτησίου εἰς Κνίδον τὴν πατρίδα ἄφιξις καὶ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα· καὶ κρίσις πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀγγέλους ἐν Ῥόδωι, καὶ ἄφεσις (75). Cf. T 7 c (cf. T 7 c Lenfant). Lenfant (2004): XIII–XV, XVIII–XXII, 164, 285–286. The scholar is doubtful about the location (Rhodes), and suggests correcting ἐν Ῥόδῳ with ἐν λόγῳ, following one part of the manuscript tradition (p. XIX).

Rhodes to join him. But, like his precursors,[48] he avoided (deliberately?) going to Caria.[49] So while in the spring of 395 BC Spartan naval operations at Caunus had results that were still uncertain and ineffective,[50] Agesilaus gathered his forces at Ephesus and marched into the Caystrian Plain, engaging the Persians near Sardis, as we have just seen above.[51]

According to the Oxyrhynchus historian, whose statement seems partially confirmed by Xenophon,[52] eventually (the papyrus breaks off with this notice) the aim of Agesilaus was to march towards Cappadocia. Later authors (Plutarch and Nepos) emphasised the idea that a great campaign should have been directed against the Great King in person.[53] Probably they convey echoes of a broad debate that developed soon after Agesilaus' enterprise, given that Isocrates in 380 BC, inviting the Greeks to fight against the Persians, maintains that Agesilaus (with Cyrus' army) quickly conquered all Asiatic territory as far as the Halys, and in so doing Isocrates establishes a sort of parallelism

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48 The relations between the ephors and the commanders in Asia had been deteriorating. On his arrival, Thibron, after capturing Magnesia (Caria), withdrew to Ephesus (Ionia), doubtless in accordance with the instructions of the ephors; however his decision shows that in the open country his force, made predominantly of hoplites, could not be compared to the cavalry of Tissaphernes (Diod. 14.36). So in the following campaign season Thibron chose to operate in southern Aeolis, area controlled by Tissaphernes, on the border of Pharnabazus' satrapy (Diod. 14.36; Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.4–7). The accomplishments of Thibron in Aeolis seemed unimpressive, and the ephors, presumably believing that Thibron's army, now strengthened by the addition of the Cyreans, would be able to resist attacks by the cavalry of Tissaphernes, ordered him to reach Caria. As regards Dercylidas, after he arrived at Ephesus he decided to initiate operations in the Troad rather than in Caria: his choice was influenced by the indiscipline of his troops, which Thibron had failed to curb, and by the extreme weakness of his cavalry (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.6–7).

49 When the Spartans learned that a Persian fleet was operating in Phoenicia they prepared an expedition led by Agesilaus. He arrived at Ephesus, feinted towards Caria, but finally campaigned in Phrygia, and wintered at Ephesus (autumn 397–winter 396/395). Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1–15; Diod. 14.79.1–3.

50 Though the Spartan navarch Pollis blockaded Conon at Caunus, Pharnabazus and Artaphernes relieved him; moreover, at Rhodes the democrats expelled the Peloponnesian fleet, and 90 Cilician and Phoenician triremes reinforced Conon's fleet. P. Oxy. V 842, 9.2–3, ll. 88–112. Diod. 14.79.4–8.

51 P. Oxy. V 842, 10–11.6, ll. 113–203. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.16–20. Cf. March (1997): 257–269.

52 Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.41: 'He [*Agesilaus*] was planning to march as far as possible into the interior, with the idea of detaching from the King all the nations through which he should pass.'

53 Plut. *Ages.* 15.1; *Pel.* 30.3; Nep. *Ages.* 4.1–2.

between Agesilaus' expedition and that led by Cyrus the younger.[54] And it is precisely this aspect that is emphasised most recurrently by ancient writers in their readings of the Spartan campaign. For instance, in his analysis of the causation issue, with particular reference to the outbreak of the Second Punic war, Polybius gives some *exempla* coming from Greek history: he compares Cyrus' and Agesilaus' campaigns, because they both are seen as the origin of the war against Persia. It is worth noting that Polybius omits recalling the two previous Persian wars![55]

The hypothesis that Xenophon might have reused materials coming from the drafting of the *Anabasis* for the composition of the third and fourth book of the *Hellenica*[56] today is out-dated, since it is closely related to the 'old-fashioned' analytical approach in studying ancient works; despite that it suggests the degree to which the atmosphere of the expedition of the Ten Thousand comes back to life throughout the narrative of Sparta's Asiatic campaign. Leaving aside the controversial question of the character, aim and audience of the *Anabasis*,[57] we would remark that the reference to Cyrus' experience is found not only in those books of the *Hellenica* (3–4) that were alleged as coming from the *Anabasis*, but also elsewhere in the text. That is, the experience of the Ten Thousand—which we can call here the 'Cyrus-topic'—may have influenced Xenophon's historical reading as well as his writing, becoming an important benchmark for comparison. So when Dercylidas was going

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54 Cf. Lehmann (1972 a): 385–398. According to the scholar, Isocrates' evaluation of the campaign follows the *HO*'s narrative closely.

55 Polyb. 3.6: 'The true causes and the origins of the war against Persia are easy enough for anyone to recognise. The first of these was the retreat of the Greeks under Xenophon from the upper satrapies, a march during which, though they traversed the whole Asia and were constantly passing through hostile territory, none of the barbarians dared to stand in their way. The second was the invasion of Asia carried out by the Spartan king Agesilaus, during which he encountered no opposition worth mentioning in any of his campaigns, and was only compelled to return without achieving his aims because of the outbreak of troubles in Greece.'

56 Sordi (1951): 273–348.

57 Some scholars have approached the *Anabasis* as an apologia. Those who believe that Xenophon was exiled from Athens because of his collaboration with Cyrus assume that Xenophon wrote the *Anabasis* to justify his conduct before Athenian public opinion. Others consider the *Anabasis* as a defence of his own conduct on the march, against accusations made by the Spartan authorities and by the members of the expedition itself. Other scholars interpret the work as a piece of political 'propaganda,' a vehicle for Xenophon's ideas about the policies that Greek states ought to pursue. Cf. Hirsch (1985): 2–38, Dillery (1995): 41–119, Rood (2004 b): 305–329. See, lastly, Flower (2012).

to face both Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes in Caria, the narrative focalisation through Tissaphernes' thoughts emphasises that he 'could remember (καταλογιζόμενος) how the Greek troops with Cyrus had fought against the Persians. He imagined (νομίζων) that all Greeks were like them, and so was unwilling to join battle' (*Hell.* 3.2.18). Not only is the value of Cyrus' army here recalled, but also a close association of Agesilaus and Cyrus is hinted at in the speech of Jason of Pherae (brought into the speech of Polydamas of Pharsalus), delivered in book six: 'I am sure you know that the reason why the King of Persia is the richest man on earth is that he gets his revenue from a continent and not from islands. Yet I think that it would be easier to subdue him than to subdue Greece. For I know that in Persia everybody except for one man is educated to be a slave rather than to stand up for himself, and I know to what extremities the King was brought by comparatively small forces—the one that marched with Cyrus and the one with Agesilaus'[58] (*Hell.* 6.1.12). We can see that here we are quite far from the world of Agesilaus' campaign, and Jason is the expression of a completely new typology of territorial settlement and hegemonic power; nevertheless he portrays himself as heir to Agesilaus and Cyrus in a new crusade against Persia.[59]

The Cyrus-topic seems to be well known to the Oxyrhynchus historian, too.[60] True, he possibly knew and played with Xenophon's narrative, but he might also have shared with his contemporaries what had become almost a common topic of debate. In the chapter on Conon's decision to get money from Pharnabazus and Tithraustes for the payment of his troops (19), the historian refers back to the skillful leadership of Cyrus—which kept the fleet of the Spartan alliance in commission during the Decelean war—before presenting his analysis of the cause of the irregular payment of mercenaries. That is, that phenomenon originated at the heart of the Persian system, since enterprises began with a small advance of money that was not systematically followed up with the necessary support of additional funding. And, as has been correctly observed, the remark about Cyrus and the fleet during the Peloponnesian war acts as a pivotal element, giving the narrative in the whole chapter a carefully balanced character in ring-composition style:[61]

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58 Transl. by R. Warner.

59 See ch. 7.1.

60 According to Westlake (1987): 241–254, the *HO* deals with Cyrus' expedition, and that account was later used by Diodorus. Cf. Dillery (1995): 59, Stylianou (1998): 463–471. I discuss the issue at ch. 4.1.

61 McKechnie-Kern (1988): 172.

[*a*] Spartan officer takes up command
[*b*] Conon journeys to Tithraustes
[*c*] the pay due Conon's men
[*d*] generalisation: the usual Persian practice
[*e*] how Cyrus saved the fleet
[*d*] explanation: the King is personally responsible
[*c*] Tithraustes pays out money
[*b*] Tithraustes journeys to the King
[*a*] Persian officers take up command

While Cyrus' *prothumia* is clearly associated with that of Conon (19.2, l. 544 and 20.6, l. 640)[62] and expressed in terms of military and strategic skills, the character sketch of Cyrus, presumably contained in the partially preserved chapter 14 on the aftermath of the battle of Sardis, might be read in relation with Agesilaus and the aim of his campaign. It is true that the fragmentary state of the text does not allow us to know the name of the subject of this digression, and beside Cyrus, other candidates have been suggested, too, such as Agesilaus himself, Evagoras of Cyprus and Dionysius I of Syracuse.[63] But some clues in the text encourage us to lean towards the Cyrus-thesis[64] (14, ll. 303–308):

303 ἡτοί]|μασεν ἡγε̣[μ_ _ _]|.τέρους Ἑλ[λ]η̣[ν_ _ _]| ἢ̣ τοὺ[ς]
ἐκ τ[ο]ῦ π[ο]λ[έμου] γιγνομ[ένους …………]|νος
δὲ τὴν [ἡ]σ̣[υ]χ[ί]αν ἄριστα τ[οῖς πράγμασι φαίνεται]|
κεχρημέν[ος·] οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ο[ἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν πρὸ τοῦ
δυ]|ναστευόντω[ν] ὥρμησεν ἐ̣|[πί τὰς τῶν χρημάτων
ἁρπα]|γάς, καὶ δη[μο]τικώτ̣α[τ]ο̣ς τ[…………

I would suggest a supplement for the two lacunas of line 303, that is: ἡγε̣[μονι]|ωτέρους[65] Ἑλ[λ]ή̣[νων]| or Ἑλ[λ]ή̣[νας. I prefer Ἑλ[λ]ή̣[νων], as the omega may exceed one space; then the subject in question would prepare those among the Greeks who were naturally talented for leadership, and not those who (perhaps) were available from the war. Moreover, in periods of inactivity/peace he clearly could adapt to circumstances, since, unlike the previous 'dynasts,' he did not turn immediately to plunder, but was *demotikotatos*. The present

62 See ch. 5.3.
63 Bruce (1967): 93–95.
64 So Bartoletti (1959): XVI–XVII. For a different reading see lastly Magnelli (2001): 155–165; the scholar suggests that the personage of the lacuna is Agesilaus.
65 ἡγεμόνιος is only attested as epithet of Hermes. Cf. Aristoph. *Pl.* 1159.

participle γιγνομ[ένους suggests that the action is still in progress. The context is related to a military scenario, presumably a campaign. A substantial part of Cyrus' army was made of Greek soldiers; there were also numerous non-Greek troops coming from western satrapies;[66] however, Cyrus' followers and soldiers were perceived by Greek audiences as Greeks, whatever their origin was. If my supplement is correct, in this presumed digression the author may be seeking to characterise Cyrus and his army as very close to the Greek side, or even as Greeks themselves.

We find the word *demotikotatos* used to refer to the person mentioned in the papyrus. The superlative form of *demotikos* appears first in fourth-century writers who frequently referred anachronistically to the tyrannical past of Athens and her *nomothetai*.[67] That is, the notion of *demokratia* does not refer strictly to democratic constitutional systems. The Oxyrhynchus historian himself employs the word *demokratia* with reference to the coup d' état at Rhodes, pursued by Conon (15.3, l. 376). I would suggest that the term *demotikotatos*, coming from the semantic field of politics,[68] might have been used here in a broader sense, pertaining to the military sphere, with a peculiar meaning, that of leaders who are seen as 'very approachable and affable with soldiers.'[69] Xenophon, too, moves terms easily from one semantic field to another, since he uses the word *demagogos*—another term related to political experience—as an equivalent of *philostratiotes*, 'friend of soldiers,' with a special emphasis on qualities of good leaders, like approachability and affability; this was, moreover, a charge that the Spartan authorities made against Xenophon himself (*An.* 7.6.4).

The participle οἱ δυναστεύοντες, indicating the predecessors of the subject of the passage, seems to reinforce the suggestion that Cyrus may indeed be the man in question. The verb δυναστεύω is used elsewhere by the Oxyrhynchus historian with reference to the internal policy of the group led by Astia and Leontiades (17.2, l. 434), the leaders of the pro-Spartan group that operated at Thebes during the Decelean war (οὗτοι μ[ᾶ]λ|λον ἐδυνάστευον τῶν ἑτέρων, 17.3). It takes on, thus, an oligarchic connotation, especially if compared with

66 Lane Fox (2004): 16.

67 The term *demotikotatos* is used to define either Solon or Peisistratus (Isocr. [7] 16 and 59; Arist. *AP* 13.5; 14.1; Hyper. [3] col. 10, l. 10). According to Aristotle *demotikotata* is also Solon's *politeia* (*AP* 9.1; 22.1). Cf. my contribution (2011): 299.

68 Take, for example, the Oxyrhynchus historian, who uses the term *demotikos* (*demotikoi*) to indicate the popular grouping that was active in Athens during the period of the Corinthian war (6.3, l. 19).

69 There are examples of δημαγωγεῖν τὸ στράτευμα in later authors (esp. Plutarch).

Xenophon's usage of the noun δυναστεία, which refers to the oligarchic factions that came to power (δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν, *Hell.* 5.4.46) in Boeotia with Spartan support in the 380s.

We have noticed that the *HO*'s vocabulary usually remains pretty close to the Persian spelling of nouns and the text gives a Greek equivalent only sporadically. Nevertheless, I suspect that here the case is the opposite, that is, δυναστεύων/δυνάστης is referring to a peculiar Persian office, translated or given with a Greek term, which has nothing to do with Greek understanding of the notion of fourth-century *basileia/dynasteia* (that held, for instance, by the two Dionysii or by Evagoras).[70] In fact, even though the term 'dynast' may fit Agesilaus, it cannot be a reference to his predecessors in Asia (ο[ἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν πρὸ τοῦ δυ]|ναστευόντω[ν], l. 306–307), Thibron and Dercylidas, who are not kings; conversely, Agesilaus' 'predecessors' in Asia cannot be the previous Spartan kings, for within this military 'eastern' context that would make no sense at all. Therefore, I am led to think that the Oxyrhynchus historian intended to call Cyrus (as well as his predecessors, ο[ἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν πρὸ τοῦ δυ]|ναστευόντω[ν]) by his own military title, ὑπάρχων δυνάστης, chief of generals (of infantry, cavalry, etc.). This expression seems, in fact, to be the Greek equivalent of a kind of powerful Persian office. For we know that Cyrus, during his march in Cappadocia, put to death on the charge of conspiracy a Persian called Megaphernes, who was entitled to wear the royal purple, and another powerful person among the governing class, ἕτερόν τινα τῶν ὑπάρχων δυνάστην (Xen. *An.* 1.2.20). This suggests by analogy that the title *dynastes* might be used in reference to Cyrus, too; Ctesias, for instance, held the office of general (ὑπῆρξε) in Cyrus army (T 3),[71] and in the *Anabasis* the Persian Ariaeus is called ὁ Κύρου ὕπαρχος (Xen. *An.* 1.8.5).[72]

If we are right in identifying the personage in question with Cyrus, then Cyrus and the placement of the digression (the aftermath of the battle near Sardis) must be related to Agesilaus' campaign. The association of the two chiefs, even though it is speculative, appears to suggest the great value placed on Agesilaus' expedition against the Persian King.

70 See, for instance, Diod. 15.23; 16.17; Theop. *FGrHist* 115, F 103. Cf. Sartori (1966): 3–61.

71 Κτησίας δὲ ὁ Κνίδιος τοῖς μὲν χρόνοις ὑπῆρξε κατὰ τὴν Κύρου στρατείαν ἐπὶ Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν ἀδελφόν, γενόμενος δ' αἰχμάλωτος καὶ διὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀναληφθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, ἑπτακαίδεκα ἔτη διετέλεσε τιμώμενος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

72 Cf. Nussbaum (1967): 32–48. It is interesting to notice that in the *HO* the same Ariaeus is mentioned among Tissaphernes' *strategoi*, or generals (19.3, ll. 559–560; cf. 12.4). That is, a Greek term (στρατηγός) is employed to indicate a Persian military office, showing a certain degree of changeability in Greek terminological usages.

Besides this presumed association, the epic character of the expedition was emphasised, as is well known, by the *imitatio Agamemnonis*. Like a new Agamemnon, Agesilaus tried to perform a sacrifice in Aulis, presenting the enterprise as a new Trojan war. But the boeotarchs ordered Agesilaus to desist from his intent, and cast the pieces of the victim down from the altar, spoiling the sacrifice and producing an ill omen.[73] According to Plutarch, who adds a detail that is not mentioned by other sources, Agesilaus travelled to Aulis and spent the night there, during which he had a dream: he was reminded that he was the first Greek chosen to command all the Greeks since Agamemnon. Then he was ordered to offer the same sacrifice as Agamemnon had. At any rate, he decided not to make a grisly sacrifice, and—unlike Agamemnon who had killed his daughter Iphigeneia—he offered a hind instead of a virgin.[74] The Boeotarchs, continues Plutarch, interfered and interrupted the rite because Agesilaus' personal *mantis* had offered a hind as sacrifice, without obeying the traditional Boeotian laws that prescribed using one of their own priests for that kind of sacrifice.[75]

The Boeotian opposition to the sacrifice, followed by the sacrilegious action at Aulis, as well as the topic of the dream, seems to reflect a sort of *post eventum* reasoning that echoes anti-Spartan feeling.[76] It might mirror a kind of debate that arose at Sparta about the significance of the mimesis of Agamemnon; in particular, the tale of the dream may have been elaborated *a posteriori* by Agesilaus' *philoi*, after the expedition was open to criticism, either due to its

73 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3–4; Plut. *Ages*. 6.4–6. Cf. Paus. 3.9.2–5.

74 Plut. *Ages*. 6.4–5.

75 Plut. *Ages*. 6.6.9. Though the accusers make no mention of the substitution of the victim, it is very interesting to note that the substitution of Iphigeneia with a hind was made by Agamemnon, too, according to Proclus' *Epitome* of the *Cypria*, an epic poem written in the sixth century BC. Moreover, Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign seems to take the same route as the former expedition of Agamemnon, which, according to the *Cypria*, was directed against Telephus' Mysia by mistake, after a trans-Cycladic and Ionic itinerary with stops along the central coast of western Anatolia; however, only the later expedition of Agamemnon to Tenedos was successful. It is surprising that the question was not raised by Agesilaus' detractors, since this tradition (Cyprian), alternative to the Iliadic, was presumably widespread and well-known. Davies (1988): 30–33, Ragone (1996): 26, note 9.

76 According to Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.34), Pelopidas, who in 367 negotiated peace agreements with Sparta and Athens under the supervision of the Persian King, reminded him that the Thebans in the past had refused to participate in the Asiatic campaign, and had not allowed Agesilaus to sacrifice at Aulis. The Thebans, like the Corinthians, had also refused to participate in Pausanias's campaign in Attica (403) and in Agis' expedition against Elis (399). Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.29–30.

conception or its execution.[77] That is especially so if we consider that at the very beginning the project of Agesilaus' expedition ran into strong resistance in Sparta, so that Lysander, to win over the opposition at home, wrote to his numerous friends in the Greek cities of Asia Minor, asking them to request that the king be sent to their aid.[78]

Aside from what may be called 'representations' of Agesilaus' objectives and, presumably, of polemics against him, the Asiatic campaign does indeed seem to bear a new character in comparison with fifth-century Greek experiences in Asia, as Briant explains:[79]

> Mais, au-delà de la polémique grecque et des fantasmes personnels du roi lacédémonien, il ne fait pas de doute que dès son arrivée en Asie Mineure il entendait mener une toute autre guerre que celle qu'avaient conduite ses prédécesseurs du ve siècle: à l'exception d'une apparition éphémère de troupes lacédémoniennes dans la vallée du Méandre ou d'une razzia athénienne dans les champs de Lydie (*Hell.* I, 2.4–5), les généraux grecs du ve siècle s'en sont toujours tenus à des operations sur le littoral et à des pillages dans les parties du territoire royal les plus proches des côtes.

Greek political realities of the fifth century did not lead the Greeks to consider as practical or realistically feasible the idea of marching as far as the inner regions of the Persian empire. Admittedly, we can remember the warning that Mardonius gave Xerxes on the eve of the Second Persian war ('you ought to march against Greece. It will enhance your reputation, and also make people think twice in the future before attacking your territory,'[80] Hdt. 7.5), and still more Xerxes' own words about that expedition: 'If I fail to punish the Athenians, may I no longer be descended from Darius, son of Hystaspes, son of Arsames, son of Ariaramnes, son of Teïspes, and from Cyrus, son of Cambyses, son of Cyrus, son of Teïspes, son of Achaemenes. I am sure the Athenians will do something if we do not; to judge by their past moves, they will certainly mount an expedition against our country' (7.11). However, Mardonius' and Xerxes' arguments better suit the thinking of the epoch in which Herodotus was himself writing, appearing as a sort of foreshadowing of what was later

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77 Cf. Bommelaer (1983): 19–26.

78 Hamilton (1991): 29. Plutarch stresses that Lysander put pressure on Spartan authorities to give the general command in Asia to Agesilaus (*Ages*. 6.2; *Lys*. 23.1–2; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2 and Iust. 6.2.4–6).

79 Briant (1996): 660.

80 Transl. by R. Waterfield.

in people's minds. In any case only after the Ten Thousand's expedition was Greek public opinion led to realise the permeability of the Persian empire, and to speculate about the feasibility of invading and conquering that realm.

Agesilaus' goals are, however, unfeasible, and he does not seem capable of expelling the Persians from the satrapies of Sardis and Dascylium. Even if he had been able to do so, that result would have appeared too far from the spirit of those who were directing policy in Sparta at all levels. Moreover, in Asia he discovered the inadequacy of his cavalry[81] and, what proved to be decisive—as we shall show in the next section—, he faced the strong opposition of the Persian forces.[82]

3.4 The End of a Dream?

According to the *HO*, Agesilaus would have liked to march into the inner parts of the Persian domain. If this statement is true, then what were the main obstacles to accomplishing his goal?

While for Xenophon it was the King's gold that interrupted the Asiatic expedition of Agesilaus, from the Oxyrhynchus historian we have learned that Persian bribery was *not* the true cause of the outbreak of the Corinthian war, and consequently of the recalling of Agesilaus from Asia, as there is evidence of long-standing hostility of numerous Greek cities towards Sparta.[83] Agesilaus' experience in Asia, according to the *HO*, appears to be a mix of successes and failures.

Several sources agree, moreover, that Agesilaus knew well the weakness of Spartan cavalry.[84] So first of all, at the very beginning of his campaign, upon his arrival at Ephesus, Agesilaus and Tissaphernes established a truce; from his headquarters at Ephesus he directed his army to Phrygia (the satrapy of Pharnabazus) in order to test the enemy cavalry; in the winter he returned to Ephesus and spent part of that period raising and training a cavalry force; later, in the following spring, he marched against Sardis (in Lydia, the satrapy of Tissaphernes).[85]

In spite of the successful outcome near Sardis, Agesilaus did not attempt to attack the city herself (by which he could have conquered the satrapy of

81 Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.15–18.

82 Briant (1996): 664.

83 Above, ch. 3.1.

84 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.15.

85 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.16–21; Diod. 14.79; Nep. *Ages.* 2–4; Xen. *Ages.* 1.16.

Lydia), but, according to the Oxyrhynchus historian, went on a pillaging march as far as the river Maeander with the aim of marching against Celaenae, the greatest city in Greater Phrygia, followed at a distance by Tissaphernes' army (12.1–4). Agesilaus performed a sacrifice, asking the gods if it were opportune to attack Celaenae; they answered negatively and so he then returned back to Ephesus (ll. 223–232).[86] The whole episode, with its focus on Agesilaus, reflects his reluctance to press an invasion of inland Persian territories. We have become accustomed to cases where bad omens explain, justify, or reinforce *post eventum* something that happened or did not happen,[87] and here, in particular, the result of the sacrifice appears to hint at the decision, made *a priori*, to interrupt the march, probably because travelling inland would have been too dangerous for his force[88] (he had already avoided any attempt to capture Sardis!). As a consequence, Agesilaus directed his forces to the Hellespont to invade Hellespontic Phrygia, Pharnabazus' country (21.1). Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus mention the continuation of Agesilaus' expedition after the battle of Sardis. Xenophon, for his part, allows us to infer that after the battle near Sardis the Spartan king did not leave the environs of Sardis until he set off for Pharnabazus' Phrygia. According to his account, in fact, after the battle near Sardis, Tissaphernes was accused by the Persians in Sardis and sentenced to death. Tithraustes was put in charge of Sardis and, upon his arrival, he informed Agesilaus of the King's conditions for a six-month truce.[89] The truce was made, and Agesilaus obtained the provisions necessary to march against Hellespontic Phrygia.[90]

Referring to Agesilaus' arrival in Pharnabazus' Phrygia, the Oxyrhynchus historian uses an uncommon and inappropriate verb, κα[τ]ῆ̣ρ̣εν (21.1, l. 646). The verb καταίρω means 'to swoop down,'[91] and it is generally used of birds or bees, sometimes of ships coming to harbour.[92] 'To swoop down' (καταίρω) clearly does not fit as a synonym of the more general verb 'to go to' (ἔρχομαι, which would have given ἦλθον, 'they went'). It has been noticed that Theopompus

86 Cf. Diod. 14.80.5: Agesilaus was about to attack the satrapies farther inland, but led his army back to the sea when he could not obtain favourable omens from the sacrifices.

87 It is not always so, however: see Parker (2000): 299–314 and (2004): 131–153.

88 Agesilaus' inability to capture fortified centres is a point stressed in Briant's analysis of the campaign. Briant (1996): 660–664. Cf. McKechnie-Kern (1988): 147–148.

89 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25.

90 Cf. Briant (1996): 656–664.

91 Cf. ll. 282–283, where κα]|τῆρεν εἰς is used as 'swooped down on' in the context of Tissaphernes' execution.

92 Cf. LSJ.

often uses καταρᾶι as an equivalent of ἐλθεῖν,[93] and this stylistic element might weigh in favour of the hypothesis of Theopompus' authorship. Nevertheless, two main objections can be raised here. First, the metaphorical usage of the verb might have been more common among fourth-century writers than surviving sources show.[94] Second, if Theopompus is accepted as the author of the *HO*, we should in that case expect to find within the well-preserved sections of Agesilaus' campaign in Phrygia and Paphlagonia (21–22), as given by the *HO*, the tale of the meeting between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, a tale which Theopompus clearly relished.[95] According to Porphyrius, in fact, Theopompus, following Xenophon's account,[96] re-wrote that episode, and in so doing made the dialogue between the two, Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, worse from a stylistic point of view (βραδὺς […] καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον καὶ ἐνεργὸν τὸ Ξενοφῶντος διαφθείρων, F 21).

The Xenophontic gap between Agesilaus' departure from Sardis towards Pharnabazus' country (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.26–29; 4.1.1) and his meeting with the king of the Paphlagonians (*Hell.* 4.1.3) is filled by the *HO* with Agesilaus' march towards Greater Phrygia, Celaenae (12.1–4) and the Mysian ambush (which we have dealt with above, 3.2)—on the way to Hellespontic Phrygia (21.1–3). Some hints suggest that while the Oxyrhynchus historian is replying to Xenophon's text, he is also re-working the material supplied by his informants.

According to the Oxyrhynchus historian, when, after the Mysian campaign, Agesilaus went down into Hellespontic Phrygia, he led his army 'not into the region which he had invaded the previous summer but into another area as yet unravaged, and he plundered it' (21.3). We do not have the account of this particular event from the previous summer in the fragments of the *HO*;[97] and this might depend on the fact that parts of the papyrus are missing.[98] However, the negative form placed here in a strong position (οὐκ εἰς [ἥ]ν τοῦ προτέρου [θέρ]ους ἐνέβαλεν) makes good sense in reference to the more general description of the same episode that we find in Xenophon: 'he [*Agesilaus*] burned the crops, ravaged the land, and won over the cities either by force or by their voluntary surrender' (*Hell.* 4.1.1). The Xenophontic remark that Agesilaus took some cities by force, while others handed themselves over to him of their

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93 Theop. *FGrHist* 115, F 265. McKechnie-Kern (1988): 178.
94 McKechnie-Kern (1988): 178.
95 Cf. Shrimpton (1991): 191.
96 Xen. *Hell.* 14.1.29–40. Cf. Gray (1989): 52–58.
97 Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.11, Diod. 14.79.3.
98 Seven or eight columns are missing from the papyrus between sections B and D; D'Alessio (2001): 32.

own free will (*Hell.* 4.1.1), shows a noteworthy discrepancy from the *HO*'s text, according to which Agesilaus made unsuccessful attempts to occupy Leonton Cephalae, Gordium and Miletou Teichos, and did not succeed in taking any towns in Phrygia (21.5–22.3).

I would suggest that the *HO* used further sources other than Xenophon's narrative. This is shown by the story of Spithridates, a Persian man, ex-lieutenant of Pharnabazus,[99] who together with his son Megabates led Agesilaus into Phrygia and Paphlagonia (21.4). In Xenophon he receives only a cursory mention, in a different context.[100] The erotic nuance of the story, absent in Xenophon, is artfully suggested in the papyrus through a flashback to Spithridates' previous career, which ends by hinting at his son's beauty (ll. 693–698). The text continues by explaining that, as people are saying (λέγεται)—presumably at the time of the Oxyrhynchus historian's writing—, Agesilaus was extremely infatuated with the young, and this partially determined the decision to appoint Spithridates as his guide (ll. 698–703).[101] Furthermore, there are also other examples which suggest possible informants as sources, who presumably were present at the events or were related in some way to the events, the memory of which was still alive at the time of writing. In fact, the account of Agesilaus' march through Paphlagonia, as found in the *HO* (22.1–4), to some extent seems to depend on what was currently believed or known. For when Agesilaus arrived at lake Dascylitis, the narrator clarifies that some used to say (ἔλεγον—note the use of the imperfect) that at Dascylium, Pharnabazus stored the silver and gold that he had (l. 743). Moreover, the misunderstanding of the geographical configuration of Cappadocia, portrayed as a narrow strip, beginning at the Pontic Sea and going from there to Cilicia and Phoenicia, appears to come from Agesilaus' own informants (ἀκού]ων ταύτην τὴν χώραν κτλ., l. 756).

The only event of which we have parallel narratives in both Xenophon and the *HO* is the controversial episode of the alliance that Spithridates obtained

99 Cf. Xen. *An.* 6.5.7.

100 *Hell.* 3.4.10.

101 Also the general picture of Agesilaus in Plutarch carries an erotic nuance absent in Xenophon; on several occasions Plutarch introduces sexual affairs that involve the king; especially with reference to the relation between Agesilaus and Megabates we find the famous story of a kiss that Agesilaus refused to his beloved, which worsened the relations between the two (Plut. *Ages.* 11). This particular episode may be explained with Plutarch's use of the *HO* among his sources, and may be intended to stress the extraordinary strength of Agesilaus' character. According to Pontier (2012): 611–639, while for Cyrus kissing is a social custom, associated with the distribution of honour at his court, for Agesilaus the promise of a kiss from a beautiful Persian youth is a threat to his own virtue.

for Agesilaus from the king of the Paphlagonians.[102] The two historians give different versions of the name of the Paphlagonian king,[103] the meeting place between Greeks and Paphlagonians,[104] the character of those negotiations[105] and the Paphlagonian troops added to Agesilaus' army.[106] I believe that these discrepancies express different narrative and thematic purposes and cannot be explained simply by the mere substitution of names of persons, places, etc., made by the Oxyrhynchus historian in his re-moulding of Xenophon's account.[107] The general impression is that the historical information given by Xenophon is quite generic, and moreover focused on the marriage between Spithridates' daughter and Otys. As has been assumed, Xenophon could have said more about the alliance if he had wished.[108] He briefly introduces the king and the alliance *in medias res* ('when he [*Agesilaus*] reached Paphlagonia king Otys came to him and made an alliance with him,' *Hell.* 4.1.3), probably because his choice of the marriage as a subject worthy of elaboration is important and deliberate. The episode of the ensuing dialogues that Agesilaus has, first with Spithridates and then with Otys, illustrates something that goes far beyond mere gratitude on Agesilaus' part to friends like Spithridates, on account of the alliance that the ex-lieutenant of Pharnabazus has favoured. It shows rather that the friends of Agesilaus can rely on him; but he pursues primarily his

102 Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.3–15; P. Oxy. v 842, 22.1–2.

103 The papyrus has Γύης. For Xenophon the name of the Paphlagonian king is Ὄτυς in the *Hellenica*, Κότυς in the *Agesilaus* (3). Cf. Plut. *Ages.*11. Theopompus names him Θῦς (F 179), and Nepos uses the form Thys (*Datam.* 2.2). Cf. Aelian. *v.h.* 1.27. Κότυς has been judged as a corruption due to analogy with the Thracian name Κότυς, and it has been, moreover, suggested that the noun form Γύης of the papyrus should be rectified with the more correct Τύης. This because the initial dental would be heard by Greeks as voiceless or aspirated. Pintaudi (2003): 73. Cf. Athen. 4 p. 144 f; 10 p. 415 d.

104 According to the Oxyrhynchus historian Agesilaus pitched camp near the borders of Phrygia and Paphlagonia and sent Spithridates to the king of the Paphlagonians, Gyes, in order to make an alliance (22.1). Xenophon with the sentence ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφίκετο εἰς τὴν Παφλαγονίαν seems to suggest that Agesilaus entered the king's country (*Hell.* 4.1.3).

105 In the *HO* Spithridates was sent to Gyes to persuade him to make an alliance with Agesilaus, and he took Gyes to the Spartan king. For Xenophon Otys in person went to Agesilaus' camp. Moreover, Xenophon refers a long account of the ensuing dialogue between Agesilaus and Spithridates and then between Agesilaus and Otys on the marriage proposal regarding Spithridates' daughter and Otys (4.1.3–15), which is absent in the *HO*.

106 In the *HO* Gyes sent his Paphlagonian troops to Agesilaus; for Xenophon Otys left his troops in the Greek camp in the course of the negotiations with Agesilaus.

107 Bleckmann (2006): 12–21.

108 Gray (1989): 49. Cf. also Dugas (1910): 91ff. and Botha (1980): 93ff.

own interest in helping friends, and he does not even consult them.[109] The account begins with the expectation that Otys would not be keen to accept the daughter of a humble exile—as Spithridates' words suggest—and ends with Otys' enthusiastic acceptance of the girl and his impatience to meet her. Truly the story ends as Agesilaus wants it to do. He acts in a manipulative way towards both of them. First, in his meeting with Spithridates, he hints at the marriage, and second, after removing the Persian from the scene of the talks, gives Otys to understand that Spithridates is not aware of that proposal. Furthermore, Agesilaus' marriage proposal to the Paphlagonian king ('I should advise you to marry the girl'), though it is a sort of seal of those negotiations, sounds rather like an order. That Otys has understood Agesilaus' manipulation is clear from his question: 'can you tell me, Agesilaus, whether what you are saying has the approval of Spithridates too?' Later, his answer ('As a matter of fact, I think he would be more easily won over by you than by all the rest put together') to Agesilaus' question—whether they both should call on Spithridates to propose that marriage—throws light on what should be a voluntary submission to a preordained decision.

In the context of Agesilaus' alliance with the Paphlagonians, the *HO* puts more explicit emphasis than Xenophon on Agesilaus' concern for his soldiers, on supply shortage and also on the Mysians' treachery. After this alliance with the Paphlagonian king, Agesilaus, according to the *HO*, 'did not march by the route by which he had come but another one, since he thought that the crossing of the Sangarion would be less exhausting for his soldiers' (22.1, ll. 724–727). This statement is important also for another reason. At *Hell.* 4.1.16 we read that, after that alliance, Agesilaus set off for Dascyleium, the place where the palace of Pharnabazus was situated. And, there, there was a river, full of all kinds of fish, flowing by the palace; in this place Agesilaus spent the winter. Now, the context is the same as that given by the *HO*, and, again, one may wonder whether the Oxyrhynchus historian, who again gives a statement in a negative form (ἐποιεῖτο δὲ τὴν πορε[ί]|αν **οὐκέτ**[ι τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδόν, ἥν]περ ἦλθε⟨ν⟩, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν κτλ.),[110] is replying to Xenophon's generic treatment of the topographic information pertaining to that campaign.

After leaving Paphlagonia, Agesilaus' return to Hellespont is marked by yet another failure: 'he led the Greeks through coastal Phrygia and attacked a place

109 This is, moreover, the main point of the conversation between Agesilaus and Otys, as we learn that Agesilaus takes as much delight in helping friends as in harming enemies (*Hell.* 4.1.10). Gray (1989): 50–52.

110 See above. There are no missing parts from the papyrus in reference to the account of Agesilaus' Paphlagonian campaign.

called Miletou Teichos. He could not take it and led his soldiers away' (ll. 736–739). The dream of attacking the heart of the Persian kingdom is, thus, arrested partially by the weakness of Agesilaus' forces and partially by the opposition of the populations of inner Anatolia, and in particular of Mysians and Paphlagonians. Those peoples were presumably more directly controlled by the Persians than the Oxyrhynchus historian himself suggests. In fact, though he maintains that the majority of the Mysians were independent and not subjected to the Great King, and consequently Agesilaus ordered them to campaign with him (21.1), Diodorus, in different contexts (the expedition of Cyrus the younger and a rebellion of satraps in 360 BC), hints at a satrap of Paphlagonia and at another of Mysia (14.11.3; 15.90.3). It is true that the Diodorean terminology might be unfitting, and those Persian offices might well refer to a kind of appointment held by other kinds of officials; if so, however, they were in any case subordinated to satraps or to other Persian authorities.[111]

Finally, the alliances made with barbarians, such as that with the Mysians, who chose to join Agesilaus' expedition, with the Persian Spithridates and the king of the Paphlagonians (21.1; 21.3; 22.1), were clearly unstable and weakened Agesilaus' forces further. The treacherous behaviour of the Mysians is denounced by the Oxyrhynchus historian himself (22.3, ll. 732–736), and the desertion of Spithridates and the Paphlagonians is judged by Xenophon as the most grievous blow that Agesilaus suffered in the course of the campaign.[112]

3.5 Conclusion

In comparison with the *Hellenica* of Xenophon, the *HO* gives space to the Persian side—the Persians' viewpoint and feelings—and offers a more balanced

111 Briant (1996): 661.

112 Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.28. Cf. Plut. *Ages.* 11. Beside the dialogues between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.29–40) and Agesilaus and Otys (3–15), further episodes are omitted by the *HO*: the account of an encounter between Pharnabazus and a small number of Greek soldiers (*Hell.* 4.1.16–19) and the episode of a successful Greek attack on Pharnabazus' camp, led by the Spartan Herippidas (20 ff.). After Herippidas deprived Spithridates and the Paphlagonians of their share of the booty, they left for Sardis to approach the Persian Ariaeus, satrap of Lydia, because Spithridates wanted to become reconciled with the Persian King by his intercession (26–28). Ariaeus had been among the supporters of Cyrus and after the defeat at Cunaxa he had returned to Artaxerxes (Xen. *An.* 1.8.5; 9.31; 2.2.1), obtaining control over Lydia. According to the Oxyrhynchus historian, he gained control of Lydia by Tithraustes' intercession (19.3).

interaction of players, as well as an account of the Asiatic campaign that is clearly different in shape. Xenophon makes generic statements to his readers about Agesilaus' movements through Asia Minor, as well as about the topography. These differences fit, clearly, the different narrative purposes held by the two authors.

Seen as a whole, the account of Agesilaus' campaign shows that the Oxyrhynchus historian, on the one hand, replies to Xenophon's text, and, on the other, re-moulds news coming from informants who, presumably, were present at the events or had some relation to events whose memory was still alive at the time of writing. This may be an indication of the author's access to either Persian informants or Persian written sources as well.

Agesilaus, as portrayed by the *HO*, intends to repeat the enterprise of Cyrus. According to the Oxyrhynchus historian, in fact, the aim of Agesilaus is to march towards Cappadocia (the papyrus breaks off with this notice). This assumption is, moreover, partially confirmed by Xenophon himself (*Hell.* 4.1.41). Furthermore, the experience of the Ten Thousand, a sort of historical precedent, is still alive in the mind of the Oxyrhynchus historian, for he exploits a narrative pattern—what we have called the 'Cyrus-topic'—tending to associate the conduct of Greek generals (Conon, Agesilaus, etc.) to that of Cyrus the younger. Xenophon, too, bears memory of that enterprise and refers to it throughout his *Hellenica*.

CHAPTER 4

Diodorus, the *HO* and Xenophon: A Reassessment

This chapter presents a new reading of the relationship between Diodorus' *Bibliotheke*, the HO (*London papyrus*, *Florence papyrus* and *Cairo papyrus*)[1] and Xenophon's *Hellenica*. Study cases are some accounts pertaining to the Spartan expedition against Persia in the early fourth century (the battle of Sardis,[2] 395 BC) as well as episodes of the last phases of the Peloponnesian war (the battle of Notion, 407/406 BC, Thrasyllus' operations in the Aegean Sea, 409 BC, the Thirty under Theramenes).

The main objective is to cross-compare historiographical methods and practices of the authors in question in order to revise and reject old-fashioned theories about Diodorus' way of reworking his source material (in reference to some sections of books 13–15). All the cases examined contain very relevant information and have not hitherto been closely evaluated; the criterion chosen is thematic, not chronological, and a good deal of emphasis is placed on papyrological aspects and issues related to the three papyri forming the *HO*.

Several crucial questions are raised here: in what way does Diodorus distance himself from his sources, even when he follows them closely? How does he conciliate fourth-century history, Greek vocabulary and Roman historiographical modes and ideology? What functions do moralism and human chararacterisation have and how are they employed?

4.1 The *HO* as a Source for Diodorus' *Bibliotheke*

Studying the *HO* requires us to turn our attention to Diodorean narrative, since we depend on it for much of what is known of mid-fourth-century history. But our attempt to uncover the various strata of the tradition obviously requires great caution since there is the risk of attributing them too easily to one specific source. According to the nineteenth-century approach the value of Diodorean narrative depended on the sources that the historian used, and aside from factual errors and chronological blunders Diodorus was assumed to remain exceedingly faithful to his sources, acting as not much more than a copyist. Recent contributions have tried to restore Diodorus to his proper stature in his

1 Respectively P. Oxy. V 842, PSI XIII 1304, and 26 6 SR 3049, 27 1.

2 For the comparison between the *HO* and Xenophon on the battle of Sardis see ch. 3.

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own times by approaching the issue in different terms, that is by grasping and explaining the historiographical, political and philosophical categories that Diodorus applied to his work, in consideration of both the Roman background of the historian and his moral outlook.[3]

A common claim within the tradition of Diodorean *Quellenforschung* is that the *HO* was among the sources of the *Bibliotheke*, but was only known to Diodorus through Ephorus' mediation. In fact, it was considered an established fact for nearly a century that Diodorus used Ephorus as the main authority for books 11 through 16 of his work, and was capable of no more than mechanically reproducing the words of his source. While Ephorus was usually considered the main authority followed by Diodorus for fifth- and fourth-century history, all other historians (Ephorus' contemporaries or predecessors), according to scholars, were known to Diodorus only through Ephorus' mediation. Diodorus' narrative was, therefore, carefully investigated in order to find evidence of Ephorus and, behind that, evidence of Ephorus' sources. There is, it must be said, a sort of hazardous circularity in assuming that because Diodorus wrote universal history he must have based his work on a universal historian as well (Ephorus), within whose work most fifth- and fourth-century historians would also be traceable.

Ephorus himself is highly problematic. After all, his *Histories* is not extant, with the exception of what is preserved on papyrus (P. Oxy. XIII 1610),[4] and we rely solely on the passages that later writers cite under his name (such as Diodorus, Strabo and Plutarch). And in very few cases can we read Ephorus' own exact words—just a few instances preserved in Strabo, Athenaeus and Stephanus of Byzantium. Furthermore, scholars today are inclined to assume that Diodorus might have gained his knowledge of fifth- and fourth-century history through several other sources rather than through Ephorus alone, and may have read them directly rather than acquiring their material only through Ephorus' mediation.[5]

It is therefore time to ask some crucial questions. To what extent might the *HO* be considered even today a source of Diodorus' books 14–15? And is it possible that it came directly to Diodorus, without the mediation of any other writer?

It is commonly accepted that Diodorus' accounts of Cyrus' expedition against his brother Artaxerxes (14.19–31)[6] and of Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign

3 Cf. Sacks (1990), Id. (1994): 213–232, Corsaro (1998): 405–436, Id. (1999): 117–169, Sulimani (2011). Differently Ambaglio (1995).

4 Africa (1962): 86–89. See Occhipinti (2014 a): 25–33.

5 Cf. also Rood (2004 a): 362–365, Parmeggiani (2011): 373–394.

6 Westlake (1987): 241–254. Cf. Stylianou (1988): 463–471, Dillery (1995): 59. Stylianou's more

(14.79–83) rely upon the versions contained in the *HO*, and the usual assumption is again that this was transmitted to Diodorus through Ephorus' work. Unfortunately we do have not any direct account coming from the Oxyrhynchus historian in regard to the first event, so any hypothetical reconstruction of it remains highly speculative. What we can assert with some degree of certainty, on the basis of the textual evidence given by the *HO* and in accordance with our previous discussions, is that the figure of Cyrus should indeed be prominent in that work, as Cyrus was associated with Conon and (presumably) with Agesilaus.[7] Moreover, this might reflect the extent of the peculiar interest in useful associations with Cyrus and his expedition that developed and intensified soon after the Ten Thousand's expedition came to an end. So, for instance, Xenophon himself, as well as dealing with the topic in detail in his *Anabasis*, recalls Cyrus' expedition many times in the *Hellenica*, too, especially in association with the Spartan Asiatic campaigns (ch. 3). Nevertheless, our evidence does not allow us to go beyond the partial data we have, relevant though they are.

As regards the second issue, that is to say Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign described in the versions of the Oxyrhynchus historian and Diodorus, we may begin with some of Westlake's observations. The scholar noticed an incoherent picture of Agesilaus throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth books of Diodorus' *Bibliotheke*: initially Agesilaus is described with indifference (the Asiatic campaign, 14.79–84), then he is censured (15.1–22), then praised (15.23–35); later he is obscured (15.36–81), then is again depicted with favour (15.82–93).[8] This continuous shift in characterisation was thought to emanate 'not from changes of opinion by a single author but from changes of sources involving conflicting verdicts on the achievements, ability, and character of Agesilaus.'[9] Westlake assumed that through the intermediary Ephorus the *HO* was the source responsible for the lack of enthusiasm in the Diodorean account of Agesilaus' expedition (14.79–84), while (again through Ephorus' mediation) Callisthenes' *Hellenica* would be at the origin of the harsh treatment of Agesilaus found in Diodorus' fifteenth book. Admittedly, it is plausible that Callisthenes adopted a hostile attitude towards the Spartans because as a court historian at the Macedonian royal house he might have naturally presented Sparta unsympathetically, given that the city was tenaciously opposed to Philip and Alexander; furthermore as an Olynthian he may also have felt antipathy towards the Spartans,

recent essay (2004): 68–96 suggests that Diodorus' account is primarily derived from Xenophon's *Anabasis*, supplemented by Ctesias.

7 Ch. 3.

8 Westlake (1986 b): 263–277.

9 Westlake (1986 b): 272–273.

who after the peace of Antalcidas had conquered his native city.[10] But aside from possible dependencies of Diodorus on these sources (the HO, Ephorus, Callisthenes) for the factual development of his narrative, I wonder whether some purely Diodorean additions can be detected as well. And, if so, might they be related in particular to Diodorus' harsh judgement of Spartan imperialism (15.1–22)?

As Sacks showed some years ago, the additions in Diodorus' text are more frequently epideictic than factual. That is, the historian usually intrudes in his narratives with political, moral and philosophical opinions, and tends not to alter the *événementiel* form of the narrative itself, which remains largely faithful to his sources.[11] Because Diodorus is not interested in an event *per se* but in what that event can offer in terms of moral teaching or entertainment, the striking shift in tone between books fourteen and fifteen might not be so striking after all. At the beginning of the fifteenth book, the Spartans are accused of having lost their hegemony because of their harsh treatment of their allies. The historian contrasts the virtue (*arete*) of ancient Spartans with the foolishness (*aboulia*) of their descendants (15.1.3–5).[12] And in the course of the narrative, Spartan aggressive policy towards Mantinea, Cadmea and Olynthus in the 380s BC appears to be in line with the *adikia* and *aboulia* he denounces in the preface. Certain individuals, too, were responsible for that policy, which was the result of specific political choices made by Agesilaus; the king is judged *drastikos* and *philopolemos* (15.19.4; 15.31.4).[13]

This judgement of Spartan behaviour that we find in the narrative of the fifteenth book can therefore be explained not only or not necessarily by suggesting a different source, but rather by noting its consistency with what Diodorus has foreshadowed already in his preface to book 14, where it is said that the Spartans—in a similar way to that of the Athenians and Syracusans—lost their hegemony ὅτε πράξεις ἀδίκους κατὰ τῶν συμμάχων ἐπιτελεῖν ἐπεχείρησαν ('when they sought to carry out unjust projects at the expense of their allies,' 2.1).[14] In book 15 we find a form of empire that evolves from moderation into arrogance, as well as a development of the Spartan empire that fits with the cliché of the superior moral conduct of the forefathers compared to the degeneration of modern times: καὶ τοῖς ἐκ προγόνων ἀνικήτοις γεγονόσι τοσαύτη καταφρόνησις

10 Westlake (1986 b): 274.
11 Sacks (1990).
12 Cf. also Parmeggiani (2005): 67–103.
13 Diodorus' use of the word *drastikos* is peculiar. Usually it refers to the active or efficient element of something. Cf. Hornblower (1981): 279.
14 Transl. by C.H. Oldfather.

ἐπηκολούθησεν, ὅσην εἰκός ἐστι γενέσθαι κατὰ τῶν ἀναιρούντων τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀρετάς ('they who had been unconquered from their ancestors' time were now attended by such contempt as, it stands to reason, must befall those who obliterate the virtues that characterised their ancestors,' 15.1.4). Both conceptions (the paradigm of the rise and fall of empires, and the moral degeneration of modern times) may be considered in relation to a debate whose origins may go back a long way (to Polybius) and which in Diodorus' lifetime developed further.[15]

That said, do we have enough evidence to compare Diodorus' and the *HO*'s narratives? Can we really answer the question regarding the extent of Diodorus' debt to the *HO*?

Perhaps we do, and can, even though we are heavily limited by the state of our evidence. We can start by adducing one particular case, that is, what is preserved of the *HO*'s account of the battle of Sardis (part of Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign), which allows a close comparison to be made with the parallel account given in Diodorus' fourteenth book.

The battle of Sardis, fought by the armies of Agesilaus and Tissaphernes in the valley of the Hermus (Paus. 3.9.6; cf. Diod. 14.80), or on the banks of the Pactolus (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.22), took place in the spring of 395 BC.[16] For the reconstruction of this battle scholars usually infer the contents of the *HO*'s narrative through Diodorus' account.[17] This approach thus takes for granted various factual aspects due to the presumed authority of the Oxyrhynchus historian, when in reality these aspects instead reveal a perceptible distance between that historian and Diodorus. They therefore need further examination in their own right.

As we have discussed earlier (ch. 3), it is not fully clear which route Agesilaus took from Ephesus to Sardis according to the Oxyrhynchus historian (11, ll. 123–133); nevertheless it is highly probable that Agesilaus followed a path along (and parallel to) the Cayster river, across the Tmolus. However, it is not obvious which this route truly was,[18] and, above all, it is not certain that it was the one given by Diodorus, that is the Karabel route (80.1).

15 See below, Appendix, *3 Diodorus and Rome*.

16 The differences between Diodorus (14.80.1–4) and Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.4.20–25 and *Ages.* 1.28–33) are so striking that it has even been doubted whether they describe the same battle: Cawkwell (1968): 288–290.

17 Cf. Dugas (1910): 34, Nellen (1972): 49, Anderson (1975): 27–53, Botha (1988): 71–80, De Voto (1988): 41–53, Wylie (1992): 118–130, Bleckmann (2006): 12–21.

18 See above, ch. 3.2.

Diodorus maintains that Agesilaus encountered Tissaphernes' army at the foothills of Mount Sipylus and disposed his army in square formation (80.1). The evidence coming from the Oxyrhynchus historian suggests a different picture, namely that Agesilaus was still in the plain of Cayster when he first met Tissaphernes (11, l. 125); there he drew up his troops (ταξ̣άμε|[νος) and, if we accept the supplement of Grenfell and Hunt (1908), there disposed his army in square formation, εἰς πλινθίον (l. 126). He preceded (φθά|[σας, l. 128) Tissaphernes, who had been pursuing him with his army (ἐπηκο]λούθει, l. 131).

Other clues show further discrepancies between the two authors. For Diodorus, Tissaphernes was leading troops of 10,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry (14.80.1); in the *HO* the cavalry troops were somewhere between 14 and 19,000 (11.3). The description of the battle itself is partially different, too:

<table>
<tr><th>Diod. 14.80.2–5</th><th>P. Oxy. v 842, 11.4–12.4, ll. 176–232</th><th></th></tr>
<tr><td>[Agesilaus] ἀπέστειλε Ξενοκλέα τὸν</td><td>μὲν] ὁπλίτας, [πεν] || τακοσίους δ[ὲ ψ]ιλούς, καὶ το[ύτοις</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Σπαρτιάτην μετὰ χιλίων καὶ τετρακοσίων</td><td>ἐπέστησεν ἄρχοντα] | Ξενοκλέα [Σ]παρτιάτην, π[αραγγείλας</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>στρατιωτῶν νυκτὸς εἴς τινα δασὺν τόπον,</td><td>ὅταν γένωνται] | βαδίζοντε[ς] κατ' αὐτοὺς […………</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>ὅπως ἐνεδρεύσῃ τοὺς βαρβάρους. 3.</td><td>……….] | εἰς μάχην τ[άττ]εσθαι. […………..</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>αὐτὸς δ' ἅμ' ἡμέρᾳ πορευόμενος μετὰ</td><td>……]κ̣[..] | ἀναστήσας ἅ[μα τῇ ἡμ]έρᾳ [τ]ὸ̣ [στ]ρ̣ά̣[τε]υ̣-</td><td>180</td></tr>
<tr><td>τῆς δυνάμεως, ἐπειδὴ τὴν μὲν ἐνέδραν</td><td>[μα πάλιν] ἀνῆ|γεν εἰς τὸ πρ[όσθεν. οἱ] δὲ βάρβαροι</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>παρήλλαξεν, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι προσπίπτοντες</td><td>συνα[κολουθήσ]αντες | ὡς εἰώθεσα[ν οἱ μὲ]ν αὐτῶν προσέ-</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>ἀτάκτως τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐραγίας ἐξήπτοντο,</td><td>βαλλ[ον] τοῖς Ἕλλη|σιν, οἱ δὲ πε[ριίππε]υον αὐτούς, οἱ δὲ</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>παραδόξως ἐξαίφνης ἐπέστρεψεν ἐπὶ τοὺς</td><td>κ[α]τὰ τὸ πε|δίον ἀτάκτ[ως ἐπ]ηκολούθουν. 5. ὁ δὲ Ξ[ε]-</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Πέρσας.</td><td>νοκλῆς, | ἐπειδὴ καιρ[ὸν ὑπ]έλαβεν εἶναι τοῖς πολεμίοις</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>ἐπι|χειρεῖν, ἀνα[στήσ]ας ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας τοὺς Πελοπον-|</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>νησίους ἔ{ω}θ[ει δρ]όμῳ· τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς εἶδον</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>γενομένης δὲ καρτερᾶς μάχης, καὶ τοῦ</td><td>ἕ|καστοι προσθέ[ον]τας τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἔφευγον καθ'</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>συσσήμου τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἐνέδραν οὖσιν</td><td>ἅπαν | τὸ πεδίον. Ἀγ[ησίλ]αος δὲ κατιδὼν πεφοβημένους</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>ἀρθέντος, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν παιανίσαντες</td><td>αὐ|τοὺς ἔπεμπεν ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατεύματος τούς τε κούφους |</td><td>190</td></tr>
<tr><td>ἐπεφέροντο τοῖς πολεμίοις, οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι</td><td>[τ]ῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας διώξοντας ἐκείνους· |</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>θεωροῦντες αὐτοὺς ἀπολαμβανομένους εἰς</td><td>οἱ δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας ἀναστάντ⟨ων⟩ ἐνέκειντο |</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>μέσον κατεπλάγησαν καὶ παραχρῆμα</td><td>τ⟨οῖς⟩ βαρβάρ⟨οις⟩. 6. ἐπακολουθήσα̣ν̣τ̣ες δὲ τοῖς πολεμί-</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>ἔφευγον. 4. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀγησίλαον μέχρι</td><td>[ο]ις | οὐ λίαν πολὺ[ν] χρόνον, οὐ γὰρ [ἠδύ]ναντο κατα-</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>μέν τινος ἐπιδιώξαντες ἀνεῖλαν μὲν ὑπὲρ</td><td>λαμβά|νειν {ε}αὐτοὺς ἅτε τ[ῶ]ν πολλῶν [ἱππ]έων ὄν-</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>τοὺς ἑξακισχιλίους, αἰχμαλώτων δὲ πολὺ</td><td>των καὶ γυ|μνήτων, καταβάλλουσιν μὲν [αὐ]τῶν περὶ</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>πλῆθος ἤθροισαν, τὴν δὲ παρεμβολὴν</td><td>ἑξακοσί|ους, ἀποστάντες δὲ τῆς διώ[ξεω]ς ἐβ[ά]δ[ι]ζον</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>διήρπασαν, γέμουσαν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν.</td><td>ἐπ' αὐ|τὸ τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ τῶν βα[ρβάρ]ων. [κα]ταλα-</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>βόν|τες δὲ φυλακὴν οὐ σπουδαί[ως κ]αθε[στῶ]σαν ταχέ-|</td><td></td></tr>
</table>

Diod. 14.80.2–5	P. Oxy. v 842, 11.4–12.4, ll. 176–232	
	ως αἱροῦσιν, κα[ὶ] λαμβάνουσιν [α]ὐτῶν [πολ]λὴν μὲν	200
	ἀ|γοράν, συχνο[ὺς] δὲ ἀνθρώπο[υ]ς, πολλ[ὰ δὲ] σκεύη καὶ |	
	χρήματα ⟨τὰ⟩ μὲν [τῶ]ν ἄλλων τὰ δ[ὲ] Τισσαφέ[ρνους] αὐτοῦ.	
	12. 1. **Γε|νομένης δὲ τ[ῆς] μάχης τοιαύ[τ]ης** οἱ μὲ[ν	
5. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς μάχης *Τισσαφέρνης μὲν εἰς Σάρδεις ἀπεχώρησε* **καταπεπληγμένος** τὴν τόλμαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, Ἀγησίλαος δ' ἐπεχείρησε μὲν εἰς τὰς ἄνω σατραπείας, *ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἱεροῖς οὐ δυνάμενος καλλιερῆσαι* πάλιν ἀπήγαγε τὴν δύναμιν ἐπὶ θάλατταν.	βά]ρβαροι **κα|ταπλαγέντες** [τοὺς] Ἕλληνας *ἀπεχώρησ[αν σὺν] τῷ Τισ|σαφέρνει πρὸς τὰς Σάρδεις·* Ἀγησίλαος δὲ περ[ιμε]ίνας αὐ|τοῦ τρεῖς ἡμέρας, ἐν αἷς τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπ[όν]δους ἀπέ|δωκεν τοῖς π[ο]λεμίοις καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστη[σε] καὶ τὴν | γῆν ἅπασαν ἐ[πόρθ]ησεν, προῆγεν τὸ στρ[άτε]υμα εἰς | Φρυγίαν πάλιν [τὴν] μεγάλην. 2. ἐποιεῖτο	
	δὲ [τ]ὴν πορείαν | οὐκέτι συντεταγμένους ἔχων ἐν τῷ	210
	πλ[ι]νθίῳ τοὺς | στρατιώτας, ἀλλ' ἐῶν αὐτοὺς ὅσην ἠβούλοντο τῆς χώ|ρας ἐπιέναι καὶ κακῶς ποιε[ῖν τοὺς] πολεμ[ί]ους. Τισσαφέρ|νης δὲ πυθόμενος τοὺς [Ἕλληνας β]αδίζειν εἰς τὸ πρόσθε⟨ν⟩ | ἀναλαβὼν αὖθις τοὺς β̣[αρ-βάρους ἐ]πη[κολο]ύθει ὄπισθεν | αὐτῶν πολλοὺς σταδίο[υς διέχων. 3. Ἀγ]ησίλ[αος] δὲ διεξελθ[ὼν] | τὸ πε[δ]ίον τὸ τῶν Λυδῶν [ἦγε τὴν στρ]ατιὰν [......] διὰ τῶ[ν] | ὀρῶν τῶν διὰ μέσου κε[ιμένων τῆ]ς̣ τ[ε Λυδίας] καὶ τῆς | Φρυγίας· ἐπειδὴ δὲ διεπορ[εύθησαν ταῦτα, κατεβίβ]ασε | τοὺς	
	Ἕλληνας εἰς τὴν Φ[ρυγίαν, ἕως ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τ]ὸ̣ν̣ |	220
	Μαίανδρον ποταμόν, ὃ̣[ς ἔχει μὲν τὰς πηγὰς ἀπὸ Κελαι-]|| νῶν, ἣ τῶν ἐν Φρυγίᾳ μεγίστη [πόλις ἐστίν, ἐκδίδωσι | δ'] εἰς θάλατταν παρὰ Πριήνην κ̣[αὶ .... 4. καταστρα-]|| τοπεδεύσας δὲ τοὺς Πελοπ[οννησίους καὶ τοὺς | σ]υμμάχους ἐθύετο πότ[ερ]α χ[ρὴ] δ̣[ι]α̣β[αίνειν τὸν ποτ]α̣|μὸν ἢ μή, καὶ βαδίζειν ἐπὶ Κελα[ινὰς ἢ πάλιν το]ὺ̣ς | στρατιώτας ἀπάγειν. *ὡς δὲ συνέβ[αινεν αὐτῷ] μὴ | γίγνεσθαι καλὰ τὰ ἱερά*, περιμε[ί]να[ς ἐκεῖ τήν τ]ε ἡμέ|ραν ἣν παρεγένετο καὶ τὴν ἐπιο[ῦσαν ἀπῆγ]εν τὸν || [στρατὸν	
	Ἀγησί]λαος μὲν οὖ[ν ... | .... τὸ πεδίον τὸ	230
	Μαιάν]δρου καλούμενο[ν] | δ̣[..................... ....]. νέμονται Λυδ[οὶ] | κ̣[αὶ ....[19]	

19 The translations of both Diodorus' passages and P. Oxy. v 842, 11.4–12.4 are in the Appendix.

Both authors share certain terms like ἀτάκτ[ως ἐπ]ηκολούθουν (11.4, l. 184) and προσπίπτοντες ἀτάκτως (Diod. 14.80.3), or Τισσαφέρνης μὲν εἰς Σάρδεις ἀπεχώρησε (Diod. 14.80.5) and ἀπεχώρησ[αν σὺν] τῷ Τισ|σαφέρνει πρὸς τὰς Σάρδεις (12.1, ll. 204–205); and they also portray in a similar way the battle formation adopted by the Greek army against Tissaphernes' troops: a frontal attack was carried out by Agesilaus' rearguard and a lateral attack was launched in the form of ambuscades coordinated under the command of Xenocles. Nevertheless, for Diodorus, it was Agesilaus himself who gave the signal for Xenocles to attack (14.80.3), while for the Oxyrhynchus historian, Xenocles decided to attack at the opportune moment (11.5, ll. 184–187); for Diodorus the battle was a καρτερὰ μάχη and the fallen barbarians numbered 6000 (14.80.3–4), while for the Oxyrhynchus historian it was just a skirmish of light-armed troops and cavalry and the victims were 600 (11.6).

Admittedly, the numbers given by Diodorus could be explained with mistakes that might have occurred during transmission in the manuscript tradition. Despite that, however, Diodorus, in abbreviating the account of the Oxyrhynchus historian, might have condensed different events belonging to different temporal levels, so that the chronological order of the events we find in the *HO*'s text appears unclear and defective in his narrative (14.80.1–5). In fact, in Diodorus we read that Agesilaus disposed his army in square formation in the foothills of Mount Sipylus so as to attack the Persian army led by Tissaphernes; soon afterwards—continues the historian—he started a pillaging march as far as Sardis (ἐπελθὼν δέ) and, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, while returning from Sardis, led Xenocles' ambush (14.80.1–2):

> 1. After this Agesilaus led forth his army into the plain of Cayster and the country around Sipylus and ravaged the possessions of the inhabitants. Tissaphernes, gathering ten thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry, followed close on the Lacedaemonians and cut down any who became separated from the main body while plundering. Agesilaus formed his soldiers in a square and clung to the foothills of Mt. Sipylus, awaiting a favourable opportunity to attack the enemy. 2. He overran the countryside as far as Sardis and ravaged the orchards and the pleasure-park belonging to Tissaphernes, which had been artistically laid out at great expense with plants and all other things that contribute to luxury and the enjoyment in peace of the good things of life. He then turned back, and when he was midway between Sardis and Thybarnae, he dispatched by night the Spartan Xenocles with fourteen hundred soldiers to a thickly wooded place to set an ambush for the barbarians.[20]

20 Ἀγησίλαος δὲ εἰς πλινθίον συντάξας τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀντείχετο τῆς παρὰ τὸν Σίπυλον παρωρείας,

Other properly Diodorean contributions can be identified as well. One of these is his reading of the battle of Sardis as the result of the daring behaviour (of even over-boldness?) of the Spartans, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς μάχης Τισσαφέρνης μὲν εἰς Σάρδεις ἀπεχώρησε καταπεπληγμένος τὴν τόλμαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ('Tissaphernes, thunderstruck at the daring of the Lacedaemonians, withdrew from the battle to Sardis,' 14.80.5). Another Diodorean contribution is shown by the stereotyped description of the battle, which is, moreover, in line with similar descriptions found throughout the *Bibliotheke*.[21]

As can be noticed, the quite neutral assertion of the Oxyrhynchus historian, according to which the barbarians were struck with panic because of the Greeks (οἱ μὲ[ν βά]ρβαροι κα|ταπλαγέντες [τοὺς] Ἕλληνας, ll. 203–204), is found in Diodorus with a different nuance. In Diodorus the flight of the Persians—οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι θεωροῦντες αὑτοὺς ἀπολαμβανομένους εἰς μέσον κατεπλάγησαν καὶ παραχρῆμα ἔφευγον ('the Persians, seeing that they were caught between the forces, were struck with dismay and turned at once in flight,' 14.80.3)—soon after is explained through Tissaphernes' perspective, according to which that result was due to the boldness of the Spartans (14.80.5). In accordance with the Diodorean pattern of the rise and fall of empires, this campaign in Diodorus' view might indeed be near the starting-point of Sparta's daring ascent. These observations carry a certain degree of plausibility especially because there are clear indications here of Diodorus' individual prose style. The participle θεωροῦντες followed by an object and its related predicative participle recurs many times throughout the *Bibliotheke*,[22] and it is also found several times with reference to observers of enemies who are in a particular state or are performing military manoeuvres.[23] Thus, the synthetic expression describing how the Persians flee in terror after seeing the enemy (14.80.3) looks like a narrative cliché that reduces to a brief resume the detailed account given by the Oxyrhynchus historian (11.5–6).

ἐπιτηρῶν καιρὸν εὔθετον εἰς τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἐπίθεσιν. 2. ἐπελθὼν δὲ τὴν χώραν μέχρι Σάρδεων ἔφθειρε τούς τε κήπους καὶ τὸν παράδεισον τὸν Τισσαφέρνους, φυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολυτελῶς πεφιλοτεχνημένον εἰς τρυφὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν εἰρήνῃ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσιν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐπιστρέψας, ὡς ἀνὰ μέσον ἐγενήθη τῶν τε Σάρδεων καὶ Θυβάρνων, ἀπέστειλε Ξενοκλέα τὸν Σπαρτιάτην μετὰ χιλίων καὶ τετρακοσίων στρατιωτῶν νυκτὸς εἴς τινα δασὺν τόπον, ὅπως ἐνεδρεύσῃ τοὺς βαρβάρους.

21 Stylianou (1998): 15–17.

22 1.3.1; 4.57.4; 11.13.4; 11.14.1; 11.15.2; 13.14.3; 13.45.10; 13.52.8; 13.74.3; 13.78.3; 13.85.5; 13.108.9; 14.5.4; 14.32.6; 14.51.5; 14.80.3; 15.31.4; 18.21.4; 20.8.5; 20.31.2; 22.9.5; 33.21.1. Cf. Hornblower (1981): 271.

23 11.10.4; 13.6.6; 13.16.4; 13.39.3; 13.72.6; 14.102.1; 15.87.1; 20.85.4.

Moreover, the phrase in the *HO* γε|νομένης δὲ τ[ῆς] μάχης τοιαύ[τ]ης (l. 203) becomes in Diodorus γενομένης δὲ καρτερᾶς μάχης (14.80.3). Land or naval battles and sieges are related with little variations and they are frequently described in the *Bibliotheke* as ἰσχυραί or κρατεραί. One interesting study on Hieronymus of Cardia—which deals in part with the Diodorean phraseology of books 18–20—has, moreover, shown that expressions such as γενομένης … μάχης … ἰσχυρᾶς are indeed stylistic features of Diodorus' own prose. Besides, καρτερὰ (κρατερὰ) μάχη is not attested in the Oxyrhynchus historian, and, contrary to what Jacoby suggested,[24] it is not likely to be an Ephorean expression, as it is not found within the fragments from the *Histories*, and it also appears in several books of the *Bibliotheke* that are not usually ascribed to Ephorus (11–16).[25] Diodorus' formulaic language facilitated his didactic purposes—it did not matter then if battles or individuals came out in a quite stereotyped and standardised way—so that his narrative clichés appear to have been applied mechanically almost everywhere, and sometimes they are even inappropriate to the context he has just described.[26] History is for Diodorus a teacher and adviser who bases his assertions on examples from the past. As Diodorus explains in the general proem to the work, 'it is good to be able to use the mistakes of others as examples to set things right' and '[*it is good*] to be able to imitate the successes of the past' (1.4). Elsewhere in book 1 he justifies his inclusion of certain material because it is 'most able to help' his audience through historical examples (69.2). In this view formulaic language—which is more suited to epics than to history—plays its own important part, as the more recurrent a phenomenon is, the more likely it is to reappear in the reader's own experience or memory and stimulate the application of the lessons that the narrative aims to teach.

Diodorus[27] does not describe Agesilaus' follow-up to his victory outside Sardis, as described at chapter 12.1–2 of the *HO*, where it is said that Agesilaus goes on a pillaging march as far as the river Maeander, followed at a distance by Tissaphernes' army. According to Diodorus, Agesilaus would instead be directing his army towards the northern satrapies and to the sea (14.80.5). Now, the version of Diodorus might be merely a quick resume that omits the whole account of Agesilaus' march towards the region of Great Phrygia, as mentioned

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24 *FGrHist* II C 12, followed by Bruce (1967): 151. Differently Stylianou (1998): 15.

25 Cf. 11.7.1; 11.12.6; 11.32.2; 12.6.2; 13.64.1; 15.3.6; 16.86.2; 18.4.3; 18.44.4; 19.83.4; 19.89.2; 20.87.3; 20.89.2.

26 Hornblower (1981): 272. Cf. Palm (1955): 194–208.

27 Xenophon, too, gives a description of Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign and he does not hint at the aftermath to the battle of Sardis (*Hell.* 3.4.1–29) either.

in chapter 12.1–4 of the *HO*; he synthesises it with the phrase ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἱεροῖς οὐ δυνάμενος καλλιερῆσαι πάλιν ἀπήγαγε τὴν δύναμιν ἐπὶ θάλατταν ('but led his army back to the sea when he could not obtain favourable omens from the sacrifices,' 14.80.5)—whereas in the original we find ὡς δὲ συνέβ[αινεν αὐτῷ] μὴ | γίγνεσθαι καλὰ τὰ ἱερά ('since it happened that the sacrifices were not auspicious,' ll. 227–228). The verb καλλιερέω with the meaning of 'to have favourable signs in a sacrifice' goes back a long way to Herodotus as well as to Xenophon,[28] and it is used only once by Diodorus, here, in a context of sacrifice before battle;[29] elsewhere in his narrative he also gives two further examples of sacrifices before battles,[30] but there the words used with reference to the sacrifices are respectively θῦμα and σφαγιάζομαι (13.97.4 and 15.85.1). We could infer that in the case in question (14.80.5) Diodorus is not using one of those clichés that normally spring to his mind.

From the comparison made thus far it is clear that Diodorus used his own 'code' words[31] and his own way of abbreviating the sources on which he relied. Thus, he shows also a certain independence from his sources, whatever the reliability of the historical reconstruction and reproduction that resulted.

There remains another aspect that needs to be pointed out, partly related to this issue. Palm's analysis of Diodorus' Book 3 and Photius' epitome of Agatharchides' work reveals the general tendency of Diodorus to clarify and expand the language of his original.[32] That makes Diodorus' account rather longer than the original, and very much weaker in impact.[33] We should ask ourselves, however, how responsible Photius' own style is for that Agatharchidean evidence; nevertheless, a similar tendency to expand the original language has been found also within the twentieth book of Diodorus' *Bibliotheke*, for which we do have the original source, a second-century papyrus that epitomises a Hellenistic historian (P. Berl. 11632).[34] If we return to the relation between Diodorus and the *HO*, it is evident that Diodorus does not expand the language of his source in that way, but the final shape of his narrative does in any case become quite different from the original.

28 Cf. Hdt. 6.82; 7.113; Xen. *An.* 5.4.22.

29 Cf. other uses of the verb καλλιερέω in sacrificial contexts: 1.70.9; 4.24.4; 4.27.3; 8.32.2; 14.80.5; 31.11.1.

30 Pritchett (1971): 109–126.

31 Cf. Hornblower (1981): 278.

32 One good example could be Agatharchides' ὑπνοῦσι that becomes in Diodorus ποιεῖται τὴν διὰ τῶν ὕπνων ἀνάπαυσιν. Hornblower (1981): 274.

33 Palm (1955): 68–69.

34 Hornblower (1981): 274–277.

4.2 Diodorus' Thirteenth Book and the *Florence Papyrus*

The discussion up to this point has shown how difficult it is to deal with Diodorus and his sources, especially if we try to read and appreciate the author's own particular moral view of history. This shift in reading Diodorus in his own right was already felt as a necessity in the 1980s by Krentz, who, by comparing the version of the naval battle of Notion (407/406 BC)[35] found in the *Florence papyrus* with the parallel account given by Diodorus' thirteenth book, identified two examples where Diodorus added thematic material of some sort. At 13.71.2 the historian states that the Athenian navarch Antiochus—though he had been warned about sailing against Lysander by Alcibiades—launched an ambush against Lysander in the waters of Notion, ὢν τῇ φύσει πρόχειρος, καὶ σπεύδων δι' ἑαυτοῦ τι πρᾶξαι λαμπρόν. This assertion has no parallel in the *HO*. Lysander, for his part (so Diodorus continues), knew that Alcibiades was operating at Clazomenae, καιρὸν εἶναι διέλαβε πρᾶξαί τι τῆς Σπάρτης ἄξιον (13.71.3): that again has no parallel.[36] This last assertion is interesting because it puts stress upon Spartan dynamism, that dynamism that Diodorus instructs us will cause disaffection among Sparta's allies. Both examples of behaviour, that of Antiochus and that of Lysander, are moulded in parallel so as to show an equal level of personal ambition and achievement. That we are very close to Diodorus' own way of re-adaptating his source/s is clearly shown by the Diodorean periphrasis that usually recurs in character descriptions, that is the participial form of the verb εἰμί accompanied by the standard noun form φύσει (13.71.2).[37]

It has been suggested that the Diodorean account of the battle of Notion might be the result of Ephorus' blending of Xenophon's account with that of the Oxyrhynchus historian,[38] or else due to the fact that the *HO* was based on a primary source while Xenophon resorted to a secondary source—which might explain the divergences between the two traditions (Diodorean and Xenophontic).[39] In whatever way we see the matter, it is very hard to assume that the Oxyrhynchus historian dealt in detail with the more active role played by both

35 On the chronology for this battle see Ambaglio (2008): 125.

36 Cf. PSI XIII 1304, 4.1–2. Krentz (1982): 139. Diodorus seems to add his own explanations also when he refers to the Athenian campaign against Megara. At 13.65.2 he clarifies why the Athenians pursued the Megarians rather than the Spartans, that is, because they were angered by the Megarians' seizure of Nisaea (cf. PSI XIII 1304, 1.1).

37 Cf. for example 2.7.2. Hornblower (1981): 277.

38 Andrewes (1982): 15–25.

39 Bleckmann (1998): 162–180.

Antiochus and Lysander[40] as we see developed in later traditions, where the former is characterised mostly by his rashness and the latter by his provocative behaviour (Plut. *Alc.* 35.5–6;[41] Paus. 9.32.6). This moralistic characterisation would be at odds with the Oxyrhynchus historian's way of narrating events involving people, and it seems rather to be characteristic of Diodorus' manner: think, for instance, of similar cases where two personages, for some reason related to each other, are suggestively juxtaposed by Diodorus.[42]

As with the previous case (Diodorus' account of the battle of Sardis), here too the comparison between Diodorus and the *HO*'s text does not demonstrate any simple or straightforward copying of the *HO* by Diodorus. In the case of the battle of Notion, however, we cannot say much about eventual linguistical reshapings of the model on Diodorus' part, especially since some lines of the papyrus' text, unhappily defective as it is, have been supplemented by scholars through Diodorus' text itself.[43]

In Diodorus' account of the battle of Notion an aporia has been noticed in regard to Antiochus' ships. Diodorus says that Antiochus had ten ships manned while ordering the trierarchs to prepare others; the others are presumably the ships (the rest of the fleet) that stayed behind, at Notion (13.71.2). But this has been found hard to believe, for in all versions of the battle (PSI XIII 1304, 4.3; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.12–15) including Diodorus' own, these ships are found to be totally unprepared when they were needed in the final stage.[44] In the papyrus, the supplement that specifies the number of ten ships is owed to the same Diodorean passage (13.71.2), but that seems confirmed by the papyrus' reference to δεκαναΐα[ν] some lines below (l. 2 p. 4). Following Bartoletti's edition,

40 So Bleckmann (1998): 173–174. Cf. Andrewes (1982): 17–18.

41 In the tradition followed by Plutarch, Antiochus enters the harbour of Ephesus with two ships, as in Xenophon 1.5.12, but his behaviour is characterised by intemperance: he went past the prows of Lysander ships πολλὰ καὶ πράττων καὶ φθεγγόμενος ἀκόλαστα καὶ βωμολόχα (*Alc.* 35.5; cf. *Lys.* 5.1). It has been suggested that such a moralistic description might go back to Theopompus, whom I do not believe is the author of the *HO*. We can notice that in the fragment 236 the historian speaks of Philip II in a similar way: ὢν γὰρ φιλοπότης καὶ τὸν τρόπον ἀκόλαστος καὶ βωμολόχους εἶχε περὶ αὑτὸν συχνοὺς καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν ὄντων καὶ τῶν τὰ γέλοια λεγόντων. Cf. Andrewes (1982): 18. Mossé (2001): 191 explains some divergences between Xenophon and Plutarch by suggesting that Plutarch used the *HO*.

42 See, for instance, 14.3.6–7 on Lysander and Theramenes and 12.38.3–39 on Alcibiades and Pericles.

43 Scholars tend to supplement the text of the *HO* by using that of Diodorus. See Andrewes (1982): 15–25.

44 Bonamente (1973): 45–50 and Andrewes (1982): 16.

we read: τρ[ιήρεις δέκα τὰς ἄριστα] | πλεούσας, τὰς μὲν ἑτ̣[έρας ἐκέλευσε ναυ]|λοχεῖν (ll. 9–10 p. 3). We would thus find here the aporia of ships (ἑτ̣[έρας) that lay in wait presumably in the proximity of the harbour, but which were unequipped at the time of the final clash, as we see later in the papyrus (PSI XIII 1304, 4.3).[45]

To overcome this difficulty Bonamente suggested a different supplement for the papyrus, according to which Antiochus would order the equipment for ten ships in total, and he would sail against Lysander with two of those:

<table>
<tr><th>Bartoletti PSI XIII 1304, 4.1, ll. 7–12, p. 3</th><th>Bonamente's proposal</th></tr>
<tr><td>4 _]νησιω̣[. ὥ]σπερ ε̣ἰ̣ώ̣[θει ....]|ρας
ἐκπ̣[έ]μ̣πειν ν[αῦς ....] | αὐτάς, πληρώσας
τρ[ιήρεις δέκα τὰς ἄριστα] | πλεούσας, τὰς μὲν ἑτ̣[έρας
ἐκέλευσε ναυ]|λοχεῖν ἕως ἂν ἀπάρω[σιν αἱ τῶν πολε-
μί]|ων πόρρω τῆς γῆς, [**αὐτὸς δὲ ταῖς δέκα προ**]|έπλει πρὸς
τὴν Ἔφεσ[ον *omit*[46]</td><td>.. νησιω [.ὥ]σπερ εἰώ[θει ....]
. ρας ἐκπ[έ]μπειν ν[αῦς ....]
. αὐτάς, πληρώσας τρ[ιήρεις δέκα τὰς ἄριστα]
. πλεούσας, τὰς μὲν ἑτ[έρας ἐκέλευσε ναυ]
. λοχεῖν ἕως ἂν ἀπάρω[σιν αἱ τῶν πολεμί]
. ων πόρρω τῆς γῆς, [**αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ ἑτέρᾳ προ**]
. έπλει πρὸς τὴν Ἔφεσ[ον *omit*</td></tr>
</table>

In so doing the scholar manages to reconcile Xenophon's version (according to which Antiochus sailed with two ships)[47] with those given by the papyrus and by Diodorus. In fact Bonamente's supplement is made on the basis of Xenophon's own account (1.5.12). The expression τὰς μὲν ἑτ̣[έρας would refer thus to the eight[48] ships that stayed near the harbour, after Antiochus departed with two of them, while presumably the Athenian reinforcement (the rest of the fleet), as we read some lines later (PSI XIII 1304 4.3), remained definitively unprepared.

Stylistically, Bonamente's supplement would read well, since a parallelism of that sort τὰς μὲν ἑτ̣[έρας ... αὐτὸς δέ (while the others were in the harbour

45 I published part of the discussion of this section in *ZPE* 187 (2013 b), 72–76.

46 In this section I follow Bartoletti's edition. Omissions are mine.

47 Bonamente assumes that for Xenophon, too, Antiochus' contingent was made of more than two ships, since we read that at first some Athenians helped Antiochus with more triremes, and later the Athenians from Notion went to help with the whole fleet (*Hell.* 1.5.13). Bonamente, (1973): 44.

48 If one accepts Maas' supplement [σὺν μᾷ νηΐ προ]|έπλει, the ships would be nine.

… he was sailing with two of them) fits the Oxyrhynchus historian's prose style.[49] In the previous sentence it is said that Antiochus manned his ships, and in this it is clarified how they were employed. And this reading would also suggest that Antiochus' plan was not particularly hazardous in the way that Diodorus' text implies: it was limited to drawing into ambush only a few Spartan ships. That reinforces, moreover, the idea that the judgements on the two leaders (Antiochus and Lysander, 13.71.2–3) are indeed Diodorus' additions, as he tends to characterise leaders and their actions in moralistic terms.

Nevertheless, Bonamente's supplement is slightly problematic, especially for the second ἑτέρᾳ, which performs a sort of double duty by contrasting with ἑτ̣[έρας and also with the 'first' ship that we assume Antiochus is sailing himself. Moreover, I wonder whether also the indefinite ἑτ̣[έρας, expressing here the idea of vagueness, is problematic as well, and if, to validate Bonamente's proposal, we should rather expect the relative pronoun to be in the genitive plural before ἑτ̣[έρας, similarly to what we read in a passage of the *HO* itself: Φοινίκων | [καὶ Κιλίκων ἧκον ἐνενήκοντ]α νῆες εἰς Καῦνον, ὧν | [δέκα μὲν ἔπλευσαν ἀπὸ Κιλι]κίας (*London papyrus* 9.2, ll. 13–14, p. 10); or, better, we should expect αὐτῶν τινας, perhaps. In addition, the form ἑτ̣[έρας seems rather to indicate 'other,' 'a few' in comparison with something like 'the most part of.' For the pronoun ἕτερος must be correlated with a first term of comparison (cf. lat. *alter*). This is all the more so if we consider the use of ἕτερος as the second term of a parallelism that appears in the prose of the *Cairo papyrus* (col. I, ll. 1–5):

[.].ς προσβαλεῖν τοῖς τ̣ε̣[ίχεσι ….. … τὰς]
[π]λ̣είστας τῶν τριήρω[ν ….. ….. τὰς]
[δ'] ἑ̣τέρας τόπον τῆς Ἐφε[σίας ….. …..]
[ἐκ]β̣ι̣[βά]σας δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν [δύναμιν ….. .]
[..]ν ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως. Ἐφέσιοι [δὲ … τῶν Λα-]

A careful examination of the image of the *Florence papyrus* shows unexpected clues that invalidate both Bartoletti's and Bonamente's supplements. It is, in fact, possible to infer that (a) the ε of ἑτ̣[έρας can be read perfectly, but (b) the τ cannot follow the ε, because after the ε there is a trace of a letter, an almost vertical stroke that does not go below the lower line in the way that the τ usually does. Therefore, (c) the only letters that can fit this trace might be ν, μ, π, κ

49 Cf. Bauer (1913): 1–66.

or ι.[50] For all these reasons I would suggest a different supplement for lines 9–12 of the *Florence papyrus*:

> τρ[ιήρεις δέκα τὰς ἄριστα] | πλεούσας, τὰς μὲν ἐγ̣[**νέα προσέταξε ναυ**]|λοχεῖν ἕως ἂν ἀπάρω[σιν αἱ τῶν πολεμί]|ων πόρρω τῆς γῆς, [**αὐτὸς δὲ μίαν ἔχων**[51] **προ**]|έπλει πρὸς τὴν Ἔφεσ[ον ....] προσαξόμενος αὐτάς.

To confirm this reading—that is, that Antiochus' operations did not provide for manning the whole fleet at the same time—there is the statement made later in the papyrus' text, according to which the Athenians after Lysander's counteroffensive turned back in fright and fled, since they did not intend to give battle in force: Ἀθηναίων φ̣[οβηθέντες οἱ συμπλέον]|τες εὐθέως πρὸς τἄ[μπαλιν ἐτράπησαν οὐ] | προνοούμενοι τ[ὸ να]υμα[χῆσαι κατὰ κρά]τος (4.2, ll. 16–18, p. 3).[52]

According to this new supplement, the number of ships would change, and instead of the two mentioned by both Diodorus and Xenophon we would have only one. Now, one might object that in the papyrus there follows the statement that when Lysander saw them (α[ὐ]τούς) he launched three ships against the enemy; thus that reference to α[ὐ]τούς might be understood as meaning 'a plurality of men with their ships' (4.2, ll. 13–14, p. 3). Nevertheless, it is possible that Lysander saw the manoeuvres near the harbour of Notion (the nine ships) as well as the ship of Antiochus sailing to Ephesus. For the two harbours are after all very close. Furthermore, the Oxyrhynchus historian differs both from Xenophon and from Diodorus in regard to another aspect, namely in speaking of the sinking of Antiochus' ship *before* the arrival of the whole Athenian fleet and the final encounter (4.2, l. 15, p. 3). Xenophon does not report Antiochus's death at all, while Diodorus, along with Plutarch, dates Antiochus' death to the final clash.[53]

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50 For this reason also the supplement suggested by Luppe (1996–1997): 41–45 is to be rejected: πλεούσας, τὰς μὲν ἐτ̣[έρας ἐκέλευσε ναυ]|λοχεῖν ἕως ἂν ἀπάρῳ[σιν αἱ τῶν πολεμί]|ων πόρρω τῆς γῆς [, αὐτὸς δὲ μιᾷ νηὶ προ]|έπλει πρὸς τὴν Ἔφεσ̣[ον *omit*.

51 The expression δὲ μίαν ἔχων is attested in Cyrillus; Pusey (Oxford, 1872): 328, ll. 12–13. I prefer this form to Maas' supplement [σὺν μιᾷ νηῒ προ]έπλει.

52 Cf. the supplement by Gigante (1949): 7: εὐθέως πρὸς τὰ[ς ἀφορμὰς ....]| προνοούμενοι τ[ὸ να]υμα[χῆσαι κατὰ κρά]|τος. Even though that supplement suggests a different view from that of Bartoletti, it nevertheless leads us to assume that no preventive preparations had been made for the Athenian fleet before this moment. Cf. Bonamente (1973): 41.

53 Diod. 13.71.3; Plut. *Alc.* 35.6. Bonamente (1973): 50–56.

The divergences between Xenophon on the one hand and Diodorus and the papyrus on the other in regard to the number of ships that the Athenians lost (22 according to the papyrus and Diodorus, and 15 according to Xenophon) were explained long ago in the following way: Xenophon would be going back to a Spartan tradition, that is information coming from Lysander's side, while the Oxyrhynchus historian, and with him Diodorus, would reflect an Athenian tradition.[54]

As regards the place in which the Athenian survivors took refuge in the immediate aftermath, the papyrus' text relates that the Spartans blocked the Athenian ships at Notion (4.3), and Diodorus seems to confirm this by asserting that, after learning what happened, Alcibiades went quickly to Notion and then sailed to Samos (13.71.4). Xenophon states that after the battle the Athenians fled to Samos, and this has been read by scholars as a matter of simplification: Xenophon would pass over the intermediate stage of Notion. The whole Xenophontic account of the battle of Notion would be, moreover, explained as due to 'il procedere compendiario della sua [*of Xen.*] narrazione.' Consequently, the so-called 'Eforo-Diodoro' tradition was regarded as preferable (because more detailed) to that of Xenophon.[55]

Nevertheless, we should perhaps raise the question whether or not Diodorus was using the text of *HO* directly. He does agree with the Oxyrhynchus historian that Antiochus was in charge of ten ships (δέκα δὲ ναῦς τὰς ἀρίστας πληρώσας, Diod. 13.71.2 and πληρώσας τρ[ιήρεις δέκα τὰς ἄριστα] | πλεούσας,[56] 4.1, ll. 8–9, p. 3),[57] that the Athenian reinforcement faced the enemy in confusion (ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τάξει, and διὰ τὴν ἀταξίαν, Diod. 13.71.3–4; *καὶ δι' ἀταξίαν*, 4.3, ll. 8–9, p. 4) and that in the end the Athenians lost twenty-two ships in battle (Diod. 13.71.4 and 4.3, ll. 11–12, p. 4).[58] The two authors diverge, however, over some factual developments: for Diodorus the Athenians sent their reinforcements

54 De Sanctis (1931): 228.

55 Bonamente (1973): 53–56. Before the discovery of the *Florence papyrus*, scholars preferred the version of the battle of Notion found in Xenophon's text in comparison with that given by Diodorus; but after its discovery they considered Diodorus' narrative as trustworthy; see De Sanctis (1931): 222–229, Accame (1938): 347–451. And still today some maintain that Diodorus' descriptions of naval battles throughout book 13 are preferable to the parallel accounts given by Xenophon on the assumption that Diodorus would rely ultimately upon the *HO*. Parmeggiani (2011): 474, note 363.

56 As we have seen, the supplement is due to Diod. 13.71.2.

57 According to Xenophon, Antiochus cruised past Lysander's fleet with two ships (*Hell.* 1.5.12).

58 For Xenophon, the Athenians lost fifteen ships (*Hell.* 1.5.14).

(the whole fleet) after manning their triremes (μέχρις οὗ τὰς ἄλλας πληρώσαντες οἱ τριήραρχοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεβοήθησαν ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τάξει, 13.71.3), while for the Oxyrhynchus historian they could not get the ships manned before the enemy arrived (ἐπικειμένων δὲ τῶν ἐν[αντίων ἤδη διὰ] | ταχέων πάσας μὲν οὐκ ἠ[δύναντο τὰς] | τριήρεις φθῆναι π[λ]ηρώ[σαντες, 4.3, ll. 3–5, p. 4). Furthermore, according to Diodorus, Lysander launched his whole fleet at once and the battle is described as a massive encounter between the two forces (πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνταναχθεὶς, Diod. 13.71.3), while for the Oxyrhynchus historian the reaction of Lysander is articulated in two distinct phases: at first he launched three ships (Λύσανδρος δὲ κατι]|δὼν α[ὐ]τοὺς τρεῖς να̣[ῦς εὐθὺς καθεῖλκεν, 4.2, ll. 13–14, p. 3) and later he took all his triremes and pursued the enemy, ἀ[ν]αλαβ[ὼν πάσας τὰς τρι]|ήρεις, 4.2, ll. 19, p. 3.[59] In this latter case the papyrus seems closer to Xenophon's narrative than to that of Diodorus. Similarly, in fact, Xenophon says that Lysander at first launched a few ships, then the whole fleet when he saw the Athenian reinforcement coming (*Hell.* 1.5.12–13). In Diodorus, however, almost all battles are depicted as massive; furthermore, Diodorus' tendency to reduce and summarise the narrative can explain the description of Lysander's assault in that simplified manner (13.71.3).

Slight factual divergences do not necessarily need to be explained in terms of different underlying traditions. Or, at least, not always. I would suggest then that Diodorus is attempting to re-adapt his source material—I believe he used the *HO* directly—in an attractive way for his audience, and in a way that conveys clear moral examples. He represents the event as a decisive historical happening involving two leaders, Antiochus and Lysander, who are seen and portrayed as the main protagonists of the episode and characterised by their moral qualities. Lysander is here the expression of that form of unusual and improper (if compared with the policy of his ancestors)[60] Spartan individualism and dynamism that will later characterise the political choices of Agesilaus, that *drastikos* and *philopolemos* king—as he is defined by Diodorus.[61] Antiochus, with his incautious and provocative behaviour, is in line with the stereotyped view of the Athenians, seen as a daring people, that goes back a long way, to Thucydides himself.[62]

59 Cf. Plut. *Alc.* 35.6. Cf. Bonamente (1973): 35–56.

60 Diod. 15.1.1–5.

61 Diod. 15.19.4.

62 1.70, 2–5; 8–9. See Rood (2004 a): 341–395. See below, ch. 5.1.

4.3 Diodorus, the *Cairo Papyrus* and Xenophon

To throw further light on the relation between Diodorus, the *HO* and Xenophon, let us turn now to the account of the attempts made by the Athenians under Thrasyllus to take Ephesus by assault in 409 BC.[63] Despite what was presumably a quite extensive account within the *HO*'s narrative, partially preserved through the so-called *Cairo papyrus*, and the evidence of clear points of contact with Xenophon's *Hellenica* (1.2.6–9), Diodorus gives us only a short summary of that event (13.64.1). In so doing he confirms that this is one of the typical techniques he uses in managing his sources.

The *Cairo papyrus* consists of four fragments whose text is laid out in three columns and 82 lines, but it is preserved in such a damaged state that only two small portions can be read in a way that makes continuous sense. The author is working on the same facts as Xenophon had:

	P. Cairo temp. inv. no. 26 6 SR 3049, 27 1, coll. I–II	**Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.6–9**
FR. 1	Col I	
1	[.].ς προσβαλεῖν τοῖς τ̣ε̣[ίχεσι .... τὰς]	6. Θράσυλλος δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀπήγαγεν ἐπὶ
	[π]λ̣είστας τῶν τριήρω[ν .... τὰς]	θάλατταν τὴν στρατιάν, ὡς εἰς Ἔφεσον
	[δ'] ἑ̣τέρας τόπον τῆς Ἐφε[σίας ....]	πλευσούμενος. Τισσαφέρνης δὲ αἰσθόμενος τοῦτο
4	[ἐκ]β̣ι̣[βά]σας δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν [δύναμιν ..... .]	τὸ ἐπιχείρημα, στρατιάν τε συνέλεγε πολλὴν καὶ
	[..]ν ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως. Ἐφέσιοι [δὲ ... τῶν Λα-]	ἱππέας ἀπέστελλε παραγγέλλων πᾶσιν εἰς
	[κε]δαιμονίων αὐτοῖς .... [..... . τοὺς]	Ἔφεσον βοηθεῖν τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι.
	[μὲ]ν̣ μ̣ε̣τ̣ὰ τοῦ Πασίωνος τῶν Ἀθηναίων	7. Θράσυλλος δὲ ἑβδόμῃ καὶ δεκάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μετὰ
8	[οὐχ] ἑώρων—ἔτυχον γὰρ ὄντες ἔτι πόρρω καὶ	τὴν εἰσβολὴν εἰς Ἔφεσον ἀπέπλευσε, καὶ τοὺς
	[μα]κροτέραν ὁδὸν τῶν ἑτέρων βαδίζοντες—	μὲν ὁπλίτας πρὸς τὸν Κορησσὸν ἀποβιβάσας, τοὺς
	[τοὺ]ς δὲ πρεὶ τὸν Θράσυλλον ὁρῶντ[ε]ς̣ ὅ̣σ̣ο̣ν	δὲ ἱππέας καὶ πελταστὰς καὶ ἐπιβάτας καὶ τοὺς
	[οὔ]π̣ω παρόντας ἀπήντῳ̣ν̣ αὐτοῖς πρὸς	ἄλλους πάντας πρὸς τὸ ἕλος ἐπὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῆς
12	[τὸ]ν λιμένα τὸν Κορησσὸν καλούμενον	πόλεως, ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ προσῆγε δύο στρατόπεδα.
	[ἔχο]ν̣τ̣ε̣ς συμμάχους τοὺ̣ς τ̣ε̣ β̣ο̣ηθήσαντας	8. οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐβοήθησαν †σφίσιν† οἵ τε
	[....] .. π̣[.] ... [.]ο̣ν̣ καὶ πιστ̣ο̣τ̣ά̣το[υ]ς̣.ο.ε ..	σύμμαχοι οὓς Τισσαφέρνης ἤγαγε, καὶ Συρακόσιοι
	[....] .... νη̣τωνη̣κ̣[.].τ ..... [.] ε̣ [.] ... [ ]	οἵ τ' ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων εἴκοσι νεῶν καὶ ἀπὸ

63 Cf. Diod. 13.54.1. Koenen (1976): 55 discounts Xenophon's dating of the expedition (408/407, *Hell.* 1.2.1 and 1.2.7) because the dating formula in the *Hellenica* might have been interpolated.

(cont.)

	P. Cairo temp. inv. no. 26 6 SR 3049, 27 1, coll. I–II	Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.6–9
16	[...]β̣ι[.].πεδίωι κατοικο̣ύ̣ν̣τω̣ν. μ̣[ετ]ὰ̣ δ̣ὲ̣	ἑτέρων πέντε, αἳ ἔτυχον τότε παραγενόμεναι,
	[ταῦ]τ̣α Θρ̣ά̣σ̣υ̣λλος μὲν ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων	νεωστὶ ἥκουσαι μετὰ Εὐκλέους τε τοῦ Ἵππωνος
	[στρα]τ̣η̣γ̣ό̣ς, ὡς ἧκε πρὸς τὴν πόλι[ν, ἔλι]π̣έ̣ν̣	καὶ Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ Ἀριστογένους στρατηγῶν,
	[τιν]ὰ̣ς μὲν τῶν στρατιωτῶν π̣ρ̣οσβ̣α-	καὶ Σελινούσιαι δύο.
20	[λό]ν̣τ̣ας, τοὺς δὲ πρὸς τὸν λόφον α[.] …	9. οὗτοι δὲ πάντες πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ὁπλίτας
	[…]σ̣ηγεν ὃς ὑψηλὸς καὶ δύσβατός ἐστιν. …	τοὺς ἐν Κορησσῷ ἐβοήθησαν· τούτους δὲ
	[.. μ]ὲν ἐντὸς ἔστραπται, τὰ δ' ἔξω τ̣ῆ̣ς πό-	τρεψάμενοι καὶ ἀποκτείναντες ἐξ αὐτῶν ὡσεὶ
	[λεως].τῶν δ' Ἐφεσίων ἡγο̣ῦ̣ντο κ̣α̣ὶ̣ Τ̣ίμ̣α̣ρ̣-	ἑκατὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καταδιώξαντες πρὸς
24	[χο]ς̣ κ̣α̣ὶ̣ Ποσσικράτης οἱ]	τοὺς παρὰ τὸ ἕλος ἐτράποντο. ἔφυγον δὲ κἀκεῖ οἱ
	omit (*ll. 25–35*)[64]	Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀπώλοντο αὐτῶν ὡς τριακόσιοι.
	Col II	
	omit (*ll. 36–42*)	
	στ̣ρ̣α̣τ̣[ό]πεδον ἐπῆγεν. ὑπο̣χ̣[ω]ρ̣ούντων̣	
44	δ̣ὲ̣ τ̣ῶ̣ν̣ ἐναντίων οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι π̣ρ̣ο-	
	θ̣ύ̣μω̣ς̣ ἐπηκολούθουν ὡς κ[α]τὰ κράτος	
	λ̣ηψ[ό]μενοι τὴν πόλιν. Τ̣ίμαρχος δ̣[ὲ] κ̣αὶ	
	Π̣ο̣[σσ]ι̣κράτης οἱ τῶν Ἐφεσίων ἡγε̣[μόν]ες	
48	ἀνε̣κ̣α̣λ̣οῦντο τοὺς ἑαυτ̣ῶ̣ν ὁπ̣λ̣ίτας̣[.παρ]ελ-	
	θόντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων .. [..... ...]ν-	
	omit (*ll. 50–65*)[65]	

Not much is preserved of the third column. Nevertheless, since it deals with military operations in connection with Syracusans and Ephesus, it has been hypothesised that here the subject may regard the events that followed the assault on Ephesus, as recounted in Xenophon: when the Athenians sailed to Lesbos, they anchored there and saw twenty-five Syracusan ships sailing from Ephesus to Syracuse; they attacked them and chased them to Ephesus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.12–13).[66]

64 Omissions are mine.

65 The translations of both passages are in the Appendix.

66 Koenen (1976): 61.

We can notice some divergences between the two texts: for Xenophon, Thrasyllus disembarked at the foot of Mount Coressus, for the papyrus in the immediate vicinity of Ephesus; the cavalry and the light troops were brought to the marshes on the other side of the city according to Xenophon, or to a place somewhere within the territory of Ephesus according to the Oxyrhynchus historian. Furthermore, from the papyrus we learn that Thrasyllus divided his troops into two groups: a smaller one was ordered to attack the city, and the main body, which he led personally, went to a high and inaccessible hill. The first column refers to the Athenian defeat in the first part of the battle; the second column presumably relates the subsequent battle in which the Athenians lost again.[67]

The Oxyrhynchus historian might have worked on Xenophon's text, especially if Koenen's insightful proposal of supplement for parts of line 14 (π̣[ρ]ọ́τ̣ε̣[ρ]ọṿ and τ̣ότ̣ε) and 15 (ἥκ̣[ο]ṿτ̣ᾳς̣) of the papyrus' text is right, and if these lines could be related to Xenophon's phrase 'the crews of the original twenty Syracusan ships (οἵ τ' ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων εἴκοσι νεῶν) and of five others which happened to have arrived there at the time (ἀπὸ ἑτέρων πέντε αἳ ἔτυχον τότε παραγενόμεναι νεωστὶ ἥκουσαι, 1.2.8).'[68] The Oxyrhynchus historian seems to add a few particulars not found in Xenophon, and we might infer that his intention was to rectify and supplement Xenophon's model, given that Xenophon reports the campaign rather summarily. The Oxyrhynchus historian gives, for instance, the name of the leader of the Athenian light troops (Pasion), the names of the Ephesian generals (Timarchus[69] and Possicrates), and recalls the presence of both Spartan troops and the Ephesians. This detail is noteworthy, since we know that, later, in 407 BC, when Lysander held the command of the Spartan fleet, he transferred his headquarters from Miletus to Ephesus;[70] this would prove that a Spartan presence at Ephesus could be attested in the island already in 409 BC. It is hard to believe that all these additions (occurring, moreover, in such a primary source) are entirely invented,[71] and I would suggest that they rely rather upon certain reports, maybe given by local informants from Asia.[72]

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67 Koenen (1976): 59–61. Cf. Xen. 1.2.9.

68 Koenen (1976): 57.

69 Timarchus is known from coins minted between 415 and 394. Brit. Mus. Ionia, Ephesus nr. 16 p. 49; nr. 22 p. 50; Waddington Collection (M.E. Babelon, Inventaire) 1517. Münsterberg (1914): 87.

70 Source Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1.

71 Bleckmann (2006): 12–21. *Contra* Cartledge (1987): 215–217.

72 A twofold hypothesis has been suggested to explain the numerous details concerning the account found in the *Cairo papyrus*: the Oxyrhynchus historian might have followed

We can assert with certainty that the papyrus gives more detailed information than Xenophon does. Moreover, its author seems well-informed about Asia Minor's topography. Coressus is, in fact, explicitly called a harbour, and already before the discovery of the papyrus some scholars, unhappy with Xenophon's assertion that it is a mountain, had suggested this other possibility.[73] The Kilbian plain might indicate the Ödemiş region, to the northeast of Ephesus, and the people coming from there may therefore be identified as the troops that, according to Xenophon, were brought in by Tissaphernes (1.2.8).[74]

But what can we say of Diodorus' narrative? That his account is extremely synthetic is quite evident:

> κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Θρασύβουλος πεμφθεὶς παρ' Ἀθηναίων μετὰ νεῶν τριάκοντα καὶ πολλῶν ὁπλιτῶν σὺν ἱππεῦσιν ἑκατὸν κατέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν Ἔφεσον· ἐκβιβάσας δὲ τὴν δύναμιν κατὰ *δύο τόπους προσβολὰς ἐποιήσατο. τῶν δ' ἔνδον* ἐπεξελθόντων **καρτερὰν** συνέβη **μάχην** συστῆναι· πανδημεὶ δὲ τῶν Ἐφεσίων ἀγωνισαμένων τετρακόσιοι μὲν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔπεσον, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ὁ Θρασύβουλος ἀναλαβὼν εἰς τὰς ναῦς ἐξέπλευσεν εἰς Λέσβον.
>
> In Greece Thrasybulus, who had been sent out by the Athenians with thirty ships and a strong force of hoplites as well as a hundred horsemen, put in at Ephesus; and after disembarking his troops at two points he launched assaults upon the city. The inhabitants came out of the city against them and a fierce battle ensued; and since the entire populace of the Ephesians joined in the fighting, four hundred Athenians were slain and the remainder Thrasybulus took aboard his ships and sailed off to Lesbos.[75]
>
> DIOD. 13.64.1

Aside from the clear mistake of Θρασύβουλος for Θράσυλλος, here, too—in accordance with a well-known Diodorean cliché—the battle that was fought inside the city is described as a fierce one, καρτερὰ (κρατερὰ) μάχη. Nevertheless, the text resembles, though vaguely, the papyrus' account, since it refers to the two places—inside and outside Ephesus (cf. the papyrus ll. 22–23: [. . μ]ὲν ἐντὸς

Ephesian sources and/or he might have been present at Thrasyllus' expedition. Cuniberti (2008): 22.

73 Koenen (1976): 60.

74 But we should expect Κιλβιανόν and not Κίλβιον πεδίον of the papyrus: [...]β̣ι[.]. πεδίωι (l. 16). Koenen (1976): 58.

75 Transl. by C.H. Oldfather.

ἔστραπται, τὰ δ' ἔξω τ̣ῆ̣ς πό|[λεως])—in which the Athenians conducted their assaults. However, the source is rendered, as we can observe, in the shape of a brief summary, which suggests that Diodorus exercised a certain autonomy in re-thinking and managing his historical material.

4.4 Diodorus on Theramenes: Final Observations

A final case to discuss is Diodorus' account of the Thirty and of the role played by Theramenes and by the political groups present in Athens.[76] The main point is to understand whether and to what extent Diodorus relied here on the *HO* for his use of historical terminology and categories of political thought.

With reference to the installation of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens (404 BC), Diodorus' account of Theramenes and the moderates absorbs them without distinction into the group of the democrats, who all agreed that the πατέρων πολιτεία coincided with democracy:

> 2. At this time the Athenians, completely reduced by exhaustion, made a treaty with the Lacedaemonians whereby they were bound to demolish the walls of their city and to employ the polity of their fathers. They demolished the walls, but were unable to agree among themselves regarding the form of government. 3. For **those who were bent on oligarchy (οἱ γὰρ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ὀρεγόμενοι)** asserted that the ancient constitution should be revived, in which only a very few represented the state, **whereas the greatest number (οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι)**, who were partisans of democracy, made the government of their fathers their platform and declared that this was by common consent a democracy. 4. After a controversy over this had continued for some days, **the oligarchic party (οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας αἱρούμενοι)** sent an embassy to Lysander the Spartan, who, at the end of the war, had been dispatched to administer the governments of the cities and had established oligarchies in the greater number of them, for they hoped that, as well he might, he would support them in their design. Accordingly they sailed across to Samos, for it happened that Lysander was tarrying there, having just seized the city. 5. He gave his assent to their pleas for his co-operation, appointed Thorax the Spartan harmost of Samos, and put in himself at the Piraeus with one hundred ships. Calling an assem-

76 See Appendix where I discuss the *Theramenes papyrus* (P. Mich. 5982, and P. Mich. 5796b). On the Thirty cf. Wolpert (2002) and Shear (2011).

> bly of the Athenians, he advised them to choose thirty men to head the government and to manage all the affairs of the state. 6. And when Theramenes opposed him and read to him the terms of the peace, which agreed that they should enjoy the government of their fathers (τῇ πατρίῳ συνεφώνησε χρήσεσθαι πολιτείᾳ), and declared that it would be a terrible thing if they should be robbed of their freedom contrary to the oaths, Lysander stated that the terms of peace had been broken by the Athenians, since, he asserted, they had destroyed the walls later than the days of grace agreed upon. He also invoked the direst threats against Theramenes, saying that he would have him put to death if he did not stop opposing the Lacedaemonians. 7. Consequently Theramenes and **the people (ὁ δῆμος)**, being struck with terror, were compelled to dissolve the democracy by a show of hands. Accordingly thirty men were elected with power to manage the affairs of the state, as directors ostensibly but tyrants in fact.[77]
>
> DIOD. 14.3.2–7

Comparing the passage with Aristotle's textual evidence, we can infer that the political spectrum was broader than the reality described here, and that the *demotikoi* and the moderates took different interpretative lines, since only the latter (and not both) led by their leader Theramenes aimed to restore the ancestral constitution (*AP* 34.3):

> The *demotikoi* (οἱ μέν) tried to preserve the democracy; of the *gnorimoi* those (οἱ μέν) who belonged to the clubs and the exiles who had returned after the peace treaty were eager for oligarchy; those (οἱ δέ) who did not belong to any club and who in other respects seemed inferior to none of the citizens had as their objective the traditional constitution.[78] […]

Moreover, *patrios politeia* is a catchword that has different meaning and aims when used by democrats or oligarchs during the two oligarchic revolutions (411 and 404 BC). Presumably, by the time of Aristotle the expression *patrios politeia* was definitely acknowledged as a catchword. In the chapters dedicated to the oligarchic revolution of 411 Aristotle says that *patrioi nomoi* were established which were based on the constitution of Cleisthenes; nevertheless, that constitution—the philosopher adds—was not democratic (*demotike*), but sim-

77 Transl. by C.H. Oldfather.

78 Cf. Zoepffel (1974): 76, De Sensi Sestito (1979): 15.

ilar to the Solonian one (*AP* 29.3).[79] This apparent aporia of the oligarchs who in 411 adopted Cleisthenes' non-democratic constitution mirrors the ideological divisions at that time. For the oligarchs, in reacting to the democrats' claims about the *patrioi nomoi*, did not deny publicly that democratic ideal, but re-adapted it consistently to their own ideology, so that it embraced a broader meaning and, thus, they could obtain the widest possible consensus.[80] For their part, the democrats felt the need to appropriate the important figure of Solon, re-casting the lawgiver in the role of the founder of democracy.[81] This opposition of interpretative lines in regard to the fundamental concept of the ancestral constitution recalls, moreover, the analogous tendency in the political life of the Roman Republic.[82]

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79 Κλειτοφῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ Πυθόδωρος εἶπεν, προσαναζητῆσαι δὲ τοὺς αἱρεθέντας ἔγραψεν καὶ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, οὓς Κλεισθένης ἔθηκεν ὅτε καθίστη τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὅπως ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀκούσαντες καὶ τούτων βουλεύσωνται τὸ ἄριστον, ὡς οὐ δημοτικὴν ἀλλὰ παραπλησίαν οὖσαν τὴν Κλεισθένους πολιτείαν τῇ Σόλωνος.

80 Therefore, the constitutional change of 411 (παρακελευσάμενος ὅπως ξυστραφέντες καὶ κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον, '[*Pisander*] urged them to draw together and to unite their efforts for the overthrow of the democracy,' Thuc. 8. 54.4) was not presented as a replacement of the former *politeia*, but as a switchover to a different kind of government (καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δημοκρατουμένοις [...] εἰ μὴ πολιτεύσομεν τε σωφρονέστερον, 'the democratic constitution changed [...] unless we have a more moderate form of government,' Thuc. 8.53.1–3).

81 Lys. [30] 28. Isocr. [7] 16. Cf. Aristotle, who, in the *Politics*, calls the constitution that was in force at the time of Solon a *patrios demokratia* (1273 b 35–36). It is hard, in my opinion, to say whether the notion of *patrios politeia* was a peculiar product of fifth-century oligarchic thought. It is true that the concept is first attested in a fragment of Thrasymachus—a sophist who was close to Plato's circle—in a context that has been taken as hinting at the Solonian constitution (F 1, l. 47 Untersteiner; cf. F 1 Diels-Kranz). Nevertheless, the fragment seems rather to suggest a mythical utopia, without any immediate political implications. As Cecchin (1969): 86 observed, presumably the expression *patrios politeia* had not been yet fixed in 411: according to Thucydides, in fact, the oligarchs claimed to restore the *patrioi nomoi*, while the democrats replied by asserting that that system was instead at the base of democracy (Thuc. 8.76.6). However, I am not sure that the democrats were simply responding to a pre-existing oligarchic slogan (Cecchin [1969]: 85) and I wonder whether, on the contrary, it was the oligarchs who were here appropriating a democratic slogan and ideal, consistently with the meaning that they gave to *patrioi nomoi* and in line with the reflections of Thrasymachus. At any rate, it is wholly evident from the discussion thus far that the appropriation of democratic aspects occurred at some point in the forming, or at least in the phrasing, of that oligarchic ideal.

82 Syme (1939): 149–161 clarified fairly and exhaustively in a few lines the ambiguous nature of the traditional *mos maiorum*: 'the Romans believed that they were a conservative people,

Diodorus is simplifying politics (the few ~ the many) when he assigns to the democrats and Theramenes, seen as one of them, the claim in favour of the ancestral constitution (τῇ πατρίῳ συνεφώνησε χρήσεσθαι πολιτείᾳ 14.3.6). The passage is characterised by general sympathy towards Theramenes, since it emphasises the strong opposition of the politician to the Thirty as well as the popular support that he received, and attributes all responsibilities for the oligarchic coup to Lysander alone (14.3.6–7). A similar perspective is found in Plutarch, too.[83] This sympathy might give evidence of a mismatch between the moderate action of Theramenes within the council of the Thirty, testified by Aristotle and Xenophon,[84] and his image as a statesman, as it was remoulded after his death to characterise him in close connection with the democrats as a strong supporter of the democratic *patrios politeia*. Diodorus might, therefore, be reflecting his source(s) here.[85]

That said, it is difficult to work with notions such as the 'source' or 'sources' of Diodorus, and successfully determine and quantify the provenance of specific parts. On the one hand it is hard to pin down a particular source because of the complicated nature of the tradition, and on the other we must first refine the notion of 'source' by trying to clarify *how* a later author used the works of his predecessors. That at a certain point the need was felt to revise the conduct of Theramenes in a democratic perspective is probable, though it is hard to fathom the reason for that: it is difficult to contextualise this sort of reading and to say, for example, whether it was developed by the disciples of Isocrates or by Theramenes' entourage itself.[86] We could adduce the name of Androtion, Isocrates' pupil, a pro-Theramenian and a source of Aristotle, but I am not sure that we have sufficient elements from the extant fragments of Androtion to infer that he was at the origin of that process.[87] Perhaps

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devoted to the worship of law and order. The advocates of change therefore appealed, not to reform or progress, not to abstract right and abstract justice, but to something called *mos maiorum*. This was not a code of constitutional law, but a vague and emotional concept. It was therefore a subject of partisan interpretation […].' Quotation from p. 153.

83 Diod. 14.3.4–7; Plut. *Lys.* 15. Cf. Bearzot (1997): 102–105.

84 Arist. *AP* 36 and Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.35–49. Cf. Rhodes (1981): 20–21.

85 Bearzot (2012): 293–307 maintains that the source responsible for this is Ephorus. For a verbal echo (allusion?) to Lysias ([12] 69) in Diod. 13.38.2 see Harding (1974): 101–111.

86 Bearzot (1979): 195–219.

87 Bearzot (1979): 195–219. The scholar maintains that Androtion was instrumental in forming Theramenes' new image. That would be inferred from a passage of the *AP* that comes presumably from Androtion (*AP* 41.2). Here, relating the transition from the oligarchy of the Four Hundred to democracy, Aristotle omits the brief phase of government of the

Thrasybulus' proximity to Theramenes (they both were trierarchs at Arginusae, 407 BC, and later, after killing Theramenes, the oligarchs offered Thrasybulus the same office that Theramenes had held, 404 BC)[88] could to some extent taint the image of the newborn democracy if Theramenes continued to be depicted as the oligarch guilty of serious crimes against the state (a charge that Lysias moved against him). Perhaps there was also the need to reply to and blunt the strong opposition of the democrats in order to favour a general amnesty for all citizens.

Scholars have suggested the possibility that Ephorus used Xenophon to supplement or replace the Oxyrhynchus historian for his account of the installation of the Thirty. This idea is the result of a close comparison between Diodorus 14.4 and Xenophon 2.3.11–14. Not only do the events appear to unfold in an identical chronological sequence, but the phrasing and the wording also show striking similarities.[89] Here I again wonder whether at some point Diodorus resorted to Xenophon's text directly, without any Ephorean mediation. Xenophon's broad reception in the Hellenistic period and the late Republic as well as in the second and third centuries AD is pretty clear, after all. Though it was especially his philosophical and pedagogical works that seem to have mainly interested Hellenistic readers—think of philosophers such as the Cynics or the Epicureans—, his works contributed also to the development of other narrative genres, such as the so-called Greek novel,[90] and the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica* were well known in Polybius' times and presumably represented the main authority on Greek history from the retreat of the Ten Thousand onwards. In his narrative of Roman military arrangements in New Carthage, Polybius demonstrates he is conducting a sort of dialogue with Xenophon's text when he gives the same lively and theatrical scene created by Xenophon in his account of Agesilaus' arrangements at Ephesus:[91] he says that

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Five Thousand, supported by Theramenes, and in so doing he would be remoulding in a 'democratic' sense Theramenes' image. But, as Rhodes (1981): 486–487 suggests (replying to assumptions of other scholars), the explanation could be another: 'I suspect that in summarising his previous narrative [*at ch. 33*] the author thought of 411–410 in terms of an oligarchic revolution and a return to democracy without deliberately subsuming the intermediate régime under one head or the other.' Cf. Harding (1994), Rhodes (2014).

88 Cf. Diod. 13.97, Xen. *Hell.* 1.6–7. They both had fought at Abydos too in 410 (Diod. 13.49.1). Krentz (1982).

89 Krentz (1982): 131–152.

90 Reichel (1995): 1–20. For Xenophon's Hellenistic audience see Irmscher (1991): 225–232. Cf. also Hornblower (1995): 47–68.

91 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.17.

Carthage was so fervent in getting ready for fighting that it could be referred to in the words of Xenophon, 'a workshop of war.'[92] The influence of Xenophon will last a long time, affecting a wide range of Roman literary genres and writers (Cato, Cicero, Sallust, Horace, Ovid, Varro, Plinius the younger, just to name a few). Imitators of his Attic style are later found also within the Second Sophistic. Arrian, defined by Suda as νέος Ξενοφῶν, used Xenophon's *Anabasis* for his *Anabasis of Alexander* and περίπλους Εὐξείνου πόντου, and, moreover, Plutarch seems to know the entire Xenophontic corpus.[93] The impression is that for his readers Xenophon may have been much more than a mere a stylistic model or a historical source. And indeed the case of Plutarch is perhaps the most representative of that process of re-moulding Xenophon's works—and with them late-classical Greek culture—into a new blend that incorporates that culture into a Roman imperial setting.[94] Then, why not assume that Diodorus, too, was wholly familiar with Xenophon's narrative?

As we shall see (ch. 7), there is a close correspondence between the Diodorean speech delivered by the Spartan ephor Endius after the battle of Cyzicus (410 BC) and the speeches of Jason of Pherae and Procles of Phlius, as found in Xenophon, on the theme of sea and land hegemony.[95] Even though those speeches refer to different contexts, they show thematic similarities regarding the supremacy of land hegemony that are indeed striking. Furthermore, one may also be tempted to compare Diodorus' account of the events after Cyzicus (410 BC, 13.53.1–2) and the passage on the *patrios politeia* (above 14.3.2–7)—both of which reduce multifaceted realities to binary schemes—with that bipolar configuration of Athenian politics found in the *HO*'s text: γνώ]ριμ[οι κ]αὶ χα|ρίεντες / ἐπ⟨ι⟩εικεῖς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες and τὸν δῆμον / οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοί (P. Oxy. V 842, 6.2–3; see below, ch. 5.1).[96] However, in this case, speculation on verbal similarities might be misleading; a tendency to simplify political realities, reducing them to schematic and binary patterns, is, though, very frequent in Roman historiography and biography (senate ~ plebs / *oligoi* ~ *demos*). Therefore, we have to believe that even though Diodorus uses particular fourth-century labels, showing thus a certain familiarity with the fourth-century vocabulary, in some cases he applies to his narrative a mode of analysis that is common to Roman historiographical and biographical works.

92 ἐργαστήριον εἶναι πολέμου, Polyb. 10.20.6–7; cf. 3.6.9. Cf. Levene (2010).
93 Breitenbach (1967): 1902–1905.
94 Stadter (2012): 43–62.
95 Diod. 13.52 and Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.12; 7.1.3–4; 7.1.6; 7.1.8.
96 Cf. below chh. 5.1, 7.2, 7.3.

Turning to the passage on Theramenes (14.3.2–7), aside from the presumed re-consideration of the personage in a democratic perspective, the inspiration for which comes to Diodorus from his fourth-century material, an indication of Diodorus' own contribution to that debate on the *patrios politeia* might be the brief sketch portraying the sharply contrasting behaviour of Theramenes and Lysander in the same account (14.3.2–7); one is seen in a positive light and the other in a negative one (Diod. 14.3.6). The positive judgement on Theramenes' action is strengthened in the following narrative, where Diodorus says that Theramenes distinguishes himself for *epieikeia* and *kagalogathia* ('The people, observing the fair dealing of Theramenes and believing that his honourable principles would act to some extent to check the encroachments of the leaders, elected him also as one of the thirty officials,' 14.4.1). Kindness or acting with moderation (*epieikeia*) is an important and recurring concept in the *Bibliotheke*.[97] It is relevant to Diodorus' paradigm of the rise and fall of empires, which is, moreover, related to his moral view of history.[98] A state (in our case either Athens of the Thirty or Sparta) that acts harshly with its subjects will suffer their disaffection, and thus will lose its empire. Those who aspire to authority should instead surpass others in *epieikeia* (i.e. 27.16).

Such a fate awaits Athens—as Diodorus makes clear introducing the theme of the installation of the Thirty (14.2.1–2)—and then also Sparta as well as Syracuse. The tone of Diodorus' fourth chapter of book 14, centred on the harsh behaviour of the Thirty, seems to give a moral lesson, which is fully in accordance with the author's preface (14.1).[99] The historical paradigm of empire in which moderation turns to arrogance seems genuinely Diodorean, as it is found in several contexts of the *Bibliotheke*, where Ephorus and other fourth-century sources are certainly not in Diodorus' mind (in passages ranging from mythology to Alexander's *diadochoi*); the moderation-into-arrogance pattern is, moreover, applied to Roman imperialism as well.[100]

4.5 Conclusion

Some chapters of Diodorus' books 13–15 have been considered in close relation to the *HO*'s and Xenophon's textual evidence with reference to the last phases

97 Cf. Sacks (1990): 101–106.

98 Uninterested in matters of social decay, materialistic and institutional causes for empires, Diodorus argues that arrogant behaviour causes rebellions. Cf. Sacks (1990): 23–54.

99 Cf. Krentz (1982): 139–140, Sacks (1990): 19–20. *Contra* Stylianou (1998): 72 and 89–92.

100 Sacks (1990): 42–43 and (1994): 216–220.

of the Peloponnesian war and Sparta's campaign in Asia (395 BC). According to the traditional scholarly approach, Diodorus uses the *HO* (as well as Xenophon) indirectly, through Ephorus' mediation; this assumption is based in turn on what scholars presume Ephorus wrote on those same subjects. But, as I have said, Ephorus is highly elusive, especially if we consider that with reference to the period in question there is not much material outside of that which is encapsulated and absorbed in Diodorus' text.[101]

The examination conducted thus far has given important results. In the accounts of the last phases of the Peloponnesian war Diodorus uses the *HO* and Xenophon extensively. As for Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign, Diodorus' debt to the *HO* is pretty clear. However, aside from his general dependency on sources for factual reconstructions,[102] Diodorus seems to show autonomy in applying his own patterns to the Greek historical material he employed. Even though he at times chooses particular fourth-century labels, showing a certain familiarity with the fourth-century vocabulary, he applies a peculiar Roman mode of dealing with history to his narrative: that is to say, he shows a certain tendency to simplify historical realities and make epideictic additions to the narrative, in order to provide the reader with uplifting teaching. Diodorus adds picturesque colour to the stories he relates and characterises peoples on the basis of their good or bad beahaviour.

101 Plut. *Alc*. 32; *Lys*. 17, 25 and 30.

102 Diodorus usually does not alter the narrative or factual material found in his sources. When he applies his own judgements and moral lessons to events, they may not be coherent with others readings coming from his sources, producing evident contradictions. Sacks (1994): 219, 229.

PART 2

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CHAPTER 5

The *HO* and Athenian *Polypragmosyne*

The *HO* devotes many chapters to the policies of the most active Greek cities and the relative alliances they formed on the eve of the Corinthian war.[1] In particular, a special concern is shown for the actions and responsibilities of Athens, which, without hesitation, appears very keen to get involved in that war. Activism, or better, exaggerated activism (*polypragmosyne*), is the keyword for understanding Athens' foreign policy of the period, according to the *HO*.

The subject of this chapter—Athens' motivations for action—allows us to develop a plurality of interrelated themes, such as the narrative devices traceable in the Oxyrhynchus historian's presentation of Athens, his reading of Athenian activism and of the role of Conon's action in Asia, the sources he used and the historical reliability of his accounts. In fact, even though Athenian *polypragmosyne* is used in presenting the age of the Corinthian war, that activism seems highly unrealistic in reference to this epoch, and seems rather a projection onto the past of events that occurred at the time of the Oxyrhynchus historian, or slightly before it.

5.1 Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη: a Literary *Topos*

The narrator of the *HO*, in explaining the causes of the outbreak of the Corinthian war, raises the moral question of Athenian *polypragmosyne*, and he defines the leaders of the war party in Athens in 396–395 BC as 'desiring to turn the Athenians from quiet (ἡσυχία) and peace (εἰρήνη), and to lead them into war and πολυπραγμονεῖν, so that it might be possible for them to obtain money from the public treasury' (7.2):

> [ο]ἱ δ' [ἐ]ν ταῖς Ἀθήναις ἐπι|θυμοῦντες ἀπαλλάξαι τ[οὺ]ς Ἀθηνα[ί]ους τῆς ἡ|συχίας καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης καὶ [πρ]οαγαγεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ πο|λεμεῖν καὶ π[ολ]υπρα[γ]μονεῖν, ἵν' αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν | κοινῶν ᾖ χρηματίζεσ[θ]αι.

1 I refer to P. Oxy. v 842.

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Perhaps here we should hear the echoes of two main themes borrowed from Thucydides: those peculiar 'national' characterisations of Greek people that had been taking shape during the course of the fifth century, such as the activism of Athens contrasted with the static conservatism of Sparta, and also the famous Thucydidean statement on Pericles' successors, who were driven by private ambition and profit (2.65.7: κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη).

The term πολυπραγμοσύνη and its opposite ἀπραγμοσύνη/ἡσυχία[2] are typical abstract nouns of the fifth century indicating human qualities. Expressions and notions relating to these words made their first appearance in Greek historiography through Herodotus' *Histories*, where 'activism' and 'inactivity' characterise the nature and behaviour of both Sparta and Athens. True, Herodotus does not use exactly the word πολυπραγμοσύνη,[3] but, speaking of early Sparta, he says that the Spartans, no longer satisfied with keeping quiet (ἡσυχίην ἄγειν), planned to attack the Arcadians (1.66.1); in another passage the same restlessness of Sparta is called πλεονεξίη[4] (7.149.3). What is particularly striking in Herodotus' moulding of the image of Sparta is that we can hardly find a unitary picture of this city. Herodotus disorients his audience, insinuating among other things that national stereotypes are not fixed and that even when the Spartans reflect one stereotype, they were not always so in the past nor will necessarily be so in the future. So Cleomenes, as Spartan king, appears more interested in the Asiatic enterprise and attracted by wealth than we would expect. Furthermore, the Spartans appear ready from the beginning to look eastward, as they respond favourably to Croesus' call for military action against the Persians (1.69.1)—in apparent contrast with the later (Thucydidean) stereotype. However, the same stereotype may show, so to speak, an inverse truth: even if the Spartans appear keen to get involved in an Asiatic expedition, they will nevertheless be too busy fighting with Argos to reach Croesus when they have the opportunity to do so (1.82.1). Athens, too, for her part, disorients the reader when she shows her weakness, inactivity and foolishness during the tyrannical age (1.59–64); this clearly contrasts with the image we get from the later narrative of the Persian wars (from book 5 onwards). Possibly some generally accepted and stereotyped views about Sparta and Athens had already formed at the time of Herodotus

2 See Carter (1986): 26–51.

3 We find in Herodotus the verb πολυπρηγμονέειν as well as its equivalent πολλὰ πρήσσειν in the sense of meddling and plotting (3.15.2; 5.33.4).

4 On the use of this term in Thucydides' work see Ehrenberg (1947): 49–52. In Thuc. 4.73.4 the Athenians strangely impute τόλμα ('daring'), normally their own preserve, to the Peloponnesians. Cf. Rood (1998): 66, note 13.

(at least *in nuce*);[5] however, the historian offers different alternative readings of those, leaving the issue open.[6]

For Thucydides, *polypragmosyne* is something peculiarly Athenian, and it refers to the city's dynamic foreign policy, a quality of which the Athenians were proud and for which they were blamed by others.[7] Furthermore, a neat opposition between Athenian and Spartan behaviour can be traceable in the historian's work. The Corinthian speech, urging Sparta to declare war in 432 BC (1.70.2–5; 8–9), and giving a set of variations on the theme of the Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη and how it is never satisfied, is emblematic of this contrast between the active character of the Athenians and the conservatism of Sparta:

> 2. The Athenians are innovative and swift to conceive and fulfill in action their designs; you are swift to keep what you have, form no new designs, and not even accomplish in action what is necessary; 3. again, they are daring beyond their power, risk-takers beyond their judgement, and in danger full of hope; your manner is to do less than your power allows, to mistrust even what your judgement confirms, and to imagine that you will never be released from danger; 4. they do not hesitate, you procrastinate;

5 The Herodotean passage 8.132 might be a good sample of the cautious behaviour of Sparta: representatives from Ionia went to Sparta, begging the Spartans to free Ionia, but only with great difficulty could they persuade them to advance as far as Delos, because the Greeks had little experience of Asia. Cf. Pelling (2007 b): 191–192.

6 Cf. Pelling (2007 b): 179–201. Undoubtedly we find already in Herodotus that peculiar characterisation of Spartan people—closely echoing Tyrtaeus' ethic—as a compact aristocratic society with a great feeling for freedom and respect for laws that explains its great resilience in war. The Spartans, in general, are depicted throughout Demaratus' speech to Xerxes (7.102.2; 104.4–5) in a way that foreshadows what will in fact happen at Thermopylae (7.209). Nevertheless—as often happens in Herodotus—Demaratus' idealising perspective on Sparta also leaves room for its reversal, such as when the narrative's heroic tone in reference to Leonidas' acting for glory (he perceived that the allies were not eager or willing to share in the danger, so he ordered them to depart, 7.220) is interrupted by an unpleasant remark on his behaviour: Herodotus notes that the Thebans and Thespians alone stayed at the king's side, the Thespians willingly but the Thebans unwillingly and reluctantly; for indeed Leonidas detained them as hostages (7.222). Thus that paradigm (like all paradigms in Herodotus' narrative) does not fit ideally when compared to the whole elusive spectrum of human behaviour: not all Greeks at Thermopylae acted heroically, some of the Three Hundred Spartiates did not die but lived on, and, moreover, episodes of bad fame happened too (7.229–230). So Baragwanath (2008): 64–78.

7 The Athenians, proud of their πολυπραγμοσύνη, proclaim it as principle of foreign policy, as it results from the cynical appeal to the Camarinians to make use of those advantages which the πολυπραγμοσύνη and the general character of the Athenians can provide (Thuc. 6.87.3).

> they stay away from home, you stay at home, for they think they might make an acquisition by their absence, you think you might harm what is secure by an attack. 5. In victory over the enemy they follow up as far as they can, in defeat they fall back the least possible extent. [...]
>
> 8. Thus they toil in trouble and danger all the days of their lives; they gain scarcely any benefit from what they have because they are always trying to make acquisitions, and because they regard doing what is required as a festival, and calm without activity as a disaster no less than toil without leisure. 9. To sum them up, one might rightly say that it is their nature to take no rest (ἡσυχία ἀπράγμων) themselves and to allow none to others.[8]

As has been maintained, echoes and confirmations of the Corinthian portrayal of the Athenian character can be found throughout the Thucydidean narrative, where the opposition between Athenian and Spartan conduct is striking also from a lexical point of view: the Athenians, ἄοκνοι and παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταί (1.70.3–4) and the Spartans ὀκνηρότεροι and ἀτολμότεροι (4.55.2–4).[9] We can add that close to the end of the *Histories*, at 8.96.5, Thucydides reaffirms exactly the same contrast: '… The Spartans proved to be quite the most remarkably helpful enemies that the Athenians could have had. For Athens, particularly as a naval power, was enormously helped by the very great difference in the national characters—her speed as against their slowness, her enterprise as against their lack of initiative …'

Thucydides makes great politicians such as Pericles (2.40.2), Cleon (3.37.2 ff.), and Alcibiades (6.18.2 ff.) denounce ἀπραγμοσύνη, even if with different nuances. For under Pericles' leadership the Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη was turned

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8 Transl. T. Rood (1998): 43–44.

9 Thuc. 4.55.2: in the aftermath of Pylos, 'in warfare the Spartans became more hesitant than ever, caught in a struggle at sea for which their military structures were not prepared, and against the Athenians at that, with whom not to attempt a thing was always to fall short of their expectations of achievement;' 8.96.5: 'they [*Athenians and Spartans*] were different in character, the one side swift and enterprising, the other slow and undaring.' Cf. Rood (1998): 44. Furthermore, the narrative economy of the *pentecontaetia* (1.89–117) throws light on the characters of the Athenians and the Spartans. In fact, the speed of rhythm of the second half of the *pentecontaetia* (1.98–117) gives the impression that the constant activity and natural energy of the Athenians is more important than the precise strategic value of any action, and is also expressive of Athenian growth and qualities. The Spartans, by contrast, avoid risks, with their habitual concern for safety (107), and also after a victory at Tanagra, they quickly go back home, while the Athenians show resilience and speed of action (108); Rood (1998): 235–237.

into the useful and inspiring activity of a people that was politically and spiritually alive. Pericles criticised different kinds of *apragmones*: those (probably members of the upper classes, or *chrestoi*) who simply refrained altogether from political activity (2.40.2), and those who were involved in politics, but endeavoured to direct foreign policy towards a non-aggressive, quietist approach (2.63.2).[10] This picture of Pericles and Athenian democracy stresses the difference between his political action and that of his successors;[11] Cleon's and Alcibiades' speeches recall the imperialistic ideas of Pericles' earlier years, but abandon the policy of moderation and wisdom which, in Thucydides' opinion, had characterised the Periclean age.[12]

It seems that in the fifth century public opinion was prepared to discuss the appropriateness of a daring policy, both in reference to Sparta and to Athens. Activism is made attractive to Greek listeners not only in reference to Athens (as Thucydides shows), but also to Sparta, which is encouraged to be daring; Herodotus makes it clear through Aristagoras' words (5.49):

> All you have to do is capture Susa, and your wealth will then undoubtedly challenge that of Zeus! Now take your land here. It is not very big or particularly fertile; and since it has a limited amount of space, you have to take the risk of fighting with your equals the Messenians, not to mention the Arcadians and the Argives. Desire for gold and silver can certainly move a man to fight and die, but your enemies here do not have any gold or silver at all. When you could easily make yourselves the rulers of all Asia, how could you choose another option?[13]

We can perceive echoes of this debate in genres that express either the Athenian perspective (tragedy) or a strong opposition to Athens' activism (consider comedy,[14] for instance), but unfortunately nothing specifically about Sparta. In Attic tragedy, as is well known, Athens and Athenians are represented with general sympathy, and Euripides' *Suppliant Women* gives a highly idealised[15] picture of democracy and its dynamism, and criticises the cautiousness of other

10 Carter (1986): 26–51.

11 Ehrenberg (1947): 48; Rood (1998): 142.

12 The Athenian naval imperialism of the years of peace (the 440s) was to serve a purely defensive policy of ἡσυχάζειν.

13 Transl. by R. Waterfield.

14 Cf. De Ste Croix (1996): 52–53.

15 However, we find also hints of scepticism concerning the way democracy operated in practice; cf. Pelling (1997 b): 213–235.

states.[16] It seems that both theatre and history captured and represented voices of the contemporary debate on the qualities of a city and her foreign policy. However, it must be noticed that the discussion on *polypragmosyne*/*apragmosyne* is mostly conducted on the level of an individualistic and moralistic outlook, both in Euripides and in comedy.[17]

Though we have picked out interesting traces of Spartan boldness throughout the Herodotean work,[18] the issue of activism, as developed by Thucydides, has become a peculiar feature of Athens' foreign policy and is expressed in a 'crystallised' form, that is, a binary opposition between *polypragmosyne* and *apragmosyne*. This reading is neither completely reliable nor consistently supported by the narrative of events,[19] and is partially mirrored in contemporary theatre. But what about the *HO*?

In the *HO* activism and conflict are the keywords of the chapters on the Corinthian war and its prelude (16–18 and 7): οἱ βέλτιστοι καὶ γνω|ριμώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν at Thebes were in dispute over politics, and one faction was led

16 When the Theban herald charges Theseus and his polis of 'exaggerated activism' (πολλὰ πράσσειν), the Athenian claims that especially through those πόνοι Athens had gained much happiness (576–577). A further exaltation of Athenian dynamism is in the words of the old queen Aethra, that seem, moreover, to allude to the hesitant character of Sparta: 'Do you see how fiercely your city looks on her revilers when they mock her for want of counsel? Yes, for in her toils she grows greater. But states whose policy is dark and cautious have their sight darkened by their carefulness' (321–325). True, the reference might be directed to a broader spectrum of cities (αἱ δ' ἥσυχοι σκοτεινὰ πράσσουσαι πόλεις) that feared for their safety—and not to Sparta alone—, all the more if we consider Pindar's verses on *hesychia* as a reflection of the anti-Athenian feelings that were widespread among those Greeks belonging to the Boeotian aristocratic society whom Pindar might have wished to please. Cf. Venezia (2007): 267–279.

17 See Ehrenberg (1947): 53–56. Fifth-century oratory does not help us much, since most of the occurrences of *hesychia* (no occurrence of *polypragmosyne*) pertain to the sphere of personal conduct ('living a quiet life'). Lysias [3] 20, 30; [7] 1; [9] 5; [13] 78; [22] 3; [26] 5; [28] 8; [29] 6.

18 Above, pp. 90–91.

19 Rood (1998): 236. The *pentecontaetia* suggests that the Corinthians' speech, describing the Spartans as 'not even accomplishing in action what is necessary' (1.70.2), is too strong, because, though the Spartans were 'not swift to go to war,' they did so when 'compelled' (1.118.2); moreover, they perceived the menace represented by Athens (118.2), which the Corinthians accuse them of ignoring (1.69.3; 70.1). Cf. Debnar (2001). On the other side, though ἡσυχάζειν seems a characteristic that does not pertain to Athens, the Athenians in 424 'kept quiet' and lost Megara, gained by the Peloponnesians (4.73.4); and, also, Nicias, after Gylippus' arrival in Sicily, did not lead the Athenians against him and the Syracusans, but 'kept quiet' near his own wall (6.3.3).

by Ismenias, Antitheus and Androcleidas, the other by Leontiades, Astias and Coeratadas. They were both, probably, rival *hetaireiai* within the same oligarchic group.[20] Throughout the narrative, activism in itself does not appear as a negative aspect of the foreign policy of a state, though its aims, in the author's view, are to be carefully investigated and weighed. People may go to war on the condition that their motivation is 'to act for justice' and if an intervention is a sort of 'just war.'[21] The judicial terminology, found in the text (ἀδικεῖσθαι, δίκην λαμ]||βάνειν, 18.4; δῷ δίκ[η]ν, 20.3)[22] referring to war crimes, makes it evident that one's own interests can leave open the possibility of supporting opposing courses of action, that is, the decision to intervene or not in order to punish a single individual[23] or an entire population. So after the Spartans were asked by the Phocians for help against the Locrians, who in turn were supported by the Boeotians, the Spartans sent envoys to Boeotia to persuade the Boeotians not to make war on the Phocians and solve the issue instead through a diplomatic meeting (εἴ τι ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίζουσ[ι δίκην λαμ]||βάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς συμμάχοις [ἐκέλευον / 'if they thought that they were wronged in any way, they ordered them to obtain justice from them in a meeting of their allies,' 18.4); however, the Boeotians, who had enjoyed good relations with the Locrians, sent the Spartan envoys away and marched against the Phocians, mainly because 'that people had set up the whole deceitful business with actions of this sort' (πα]||ροξυνόντων αὐτοὺς τῶν καὶ τὴν ἀπ[άτην καὶ τὰ πρά]||γματα ταῦτα συστησάντων, 18.4). The expression τὴν ἀπ[άτην καὶ τὰ πρά]||γματα ταῦτα is striking because it is referring here to the political action conducted by Androcleidas' and Ismenias' group; also the references to 'deceitful business' and 'actions of this sort' reinforce the narrator's statements on the causes of this war. In fact, a little earlier, and in a manner that recalls the Thucydidean model,[24] after stressing the true motivation of the war, that is, the anti-Spartan activity at Thebes led by Androcleidas and Ismenias to overthrow the Spartan empire (18.1), the narrator discloses the pretextual motive that led to the Phocian conflict: this

20 On the groups operating at Thebes see Cook (1988): 57–85.

21 Cf. Siegel (1981): 257–265, Podoksik (2005): 21–42, Bertoli (2009): 7–30.

22 This judicial language echoes the Thucydidean vocabulary of accusation and calls for punishment for war crimes: ἀντιδοῦναι δίκην (3.66.3), ἐς δίκην σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παραδόντες (3.67.5); both passages refer to the charges that the Thebans moved against the Plataeans.

23 At the time of the Caunian revolt (19–20), the leader of the rebels, a Carpasian man, was punished for his crimes: τοῦ δὲ ἁ[νθ]ρώπου τοῦ Καρπασέως κτλ. ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν Μεσ|σηνίω[ν] τινὲς τῶν τῷ Κόνωνι κτλ. ὅπ[ως] ἂν ὧν ἐξήμαρτεν | δῷ δίκ[η]ν (20.3, ll. 586–590).

24 Fornis (2007): 187–218. See Pelling (2000): 82–94.

group could not attack the Spartans openly because neither the Thebans nor the Boeotians would ever be persuaded to make war on the Spartans; this is why Androcleidas persuaded certain men among the Phocians to launch an attack on the territory of the western Locrians (18.2).

Like the Boeotians, many other Greek cities had reasonable motives to go to war against Sparta: the Argives hated the Spartans because they treated their enemies as friends among their citizens (7.2); the Corinthians wished to bring about a change in their foreign policy (7.3). And the narrator's voice intervenes to support this picture: after voicing the common opinion regarding the origin of this war, he suggests the true motivation: 'some say that the money from him [*Timocrates*] was the cause of concerted action by these people and some of the Boeotians and some in the other cities previously mentioned. But they do not know that all had long been ill-disposed towards the Spartans' (7.2). Moreover, to enforce this statement the narrator introduces an excursus on the Decelean war, concluding that 'it was for these reasons much more than on account of Pharnabazus[25] and the gold that those in the cities I have mentioned had been incited to hate the Spartans' (7.5).

Athens, for her part, shows her complete irresponsibility in looking to a policy of conquest, which is not pursued for the good of all but only for the selfish interests of one party. The narrative displacement elucidates the narrator's point of view on Athenian motives, and the deliberate delay with which the narrator explains the true reasons of Athenian activism increases the reader's perception of their impact: chapter 7.2 starts with the Athenian *demos*, who, encouraged by those supporting Epicrates and Cephalus, took the position opposed to Sparta; a discussion then follows on the *prophasis* and *aitia* of this war, and finally the account ends by coming back to the subject of Athenian activism, so as to indicate the true cause of the city's involvement in the war:

> They took this position of opposition to Sparta under the encouragement of those supporting **Epicrates and Cephalus** (πα]|ροξυνόντων), for these men were keen to involve the city in war, and had this intention not when they had dealings with Timocrates and took the gold but already a long time before that. And yet some say that the money from him was the cause of concerted action by these people and some of the Boeotians and some in the other cities previously mentioned. But they do not know that all

25 According to Xenophon, Tithraustes sent Timocrates to Greece with the money (*Hell.* 3.5.1).

> had long been ill-disposed towards the Spartans, looking out for a way that they might make the cities adopt a war policy. For the Argives and the Boeotians hated the Spartans because they treated as friends their enemies among the citizens; and those who hated them in Athens were the people who desired to turn the Athenians from tranquillity and peace (τῆς ἡ|συχίας καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης) and lead them towards war and a vigorous foreign policy (π[ολ]υπρα[γ]μονεῖν), so that it might be possible for them to obtain money from the public treasury.

This Athenian *polypragmosyne* is an element that emerges from a chaotic social and political context, as shown, moreover, by numerous cries and voices throughout Athens after the Demaenetus affair was known by all. The lively polyphony of focalisations seems aimed to stress the weakness and incompetence of the *demos* in making decisions. For, at the very beginning the people were instructed by the group of Thrasybulus, Aesimus and Anytus (ἐδίδα|σκον, ἐπείσθησαν) to keep their distance from Demaenetus' activity, aimed, as it was, against Sparta, and they followed that advice (6.2):

> Thereupon [*after the Demaenetus affair became public*] there was a great outcry. Those of the Athenians who were well-born and cultivated were indignant, saying that they would destroy the city by beginning a war with the Spartans. The councillors were alarmed by the outcry and called the people together, making out that they had no share in the affair. When the people were assembled, the party of the Athenians supporting Thrasybulus, Aesimus and Anytus got up and instructed them that they risked great danger unless they absolved the city from responsibility.

But subsequently—as we have seen—the people made the decision to get involved in a war against Sparta, under the encouragement of the supporters of Epricates and Cephalus (πα]|ροξυνόντων, 7.2).

We can suggest that the Thucydidean characterisation of the Athenians as a whole is adopted here, but it is woven into a new, different emphasis on the texture of popular politics. In other words, the *HO* adapts the Thucydidean categories by applying them in a particular way to the internal divisions in Athens, and thus the *HO*'s characterisation no longer applies to Athens as a whole but to the particular foreign policy of the *demotikoi*.

True, the fickleness of the *demos* comes out sometimes in Thucydidean narrative, too, but it looks as if that inconstancy represents in Thucydides a peculiar aspect of the character of the Athenians, seen as a whole. Surely, in

the Pylos episode (425 BC) the Athenian masses appear easy to be persuaded (Cleon in that period was a demagogue and had the greatest influence with the masses, so he persuaded them not to accept a Spartan peace offering),[26] and, despite their murmurs of discontent with Cleon, they engage him as general of a new expeditionary force sent to aid the Athenians at Pylos. In so doing, according to Thucydides, they behaved 'in the way that crowds usually do:' οἶον ὄχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖν (4.28.2–3). Furthermore, we can notice that after the second year of war (430 BC), public opinion is tilting against Pericles; nevertheless, not long afterwards, the Athenians re-elect him to the generalship, 'as is the way with crowds:' ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὅμιλος ποιεῖν (2.65.4).

With terms such as *homilos*, *plethos* and *ochlos* Thucydides refers to the people as a whole, and not to popular groupings. That is, 'the way of crowds' is the way in which all Athenians behaved. In addition, we also read that Pericles is well aware that 'the Athenians were behaving exactly as he had expected that they would,' that is, they all had changed their spirit, influenced by the recent happenings (2.59.3). And a similar evaluation of Athenian fickleness is found also in the Epipolae episode of 413 BC, where Nicias expresses his judgement on the inconstancy of the character of the Athenians (7.48.4). Thus, the fickleness of all Athenians, according to Thucydides, becomes in the *HO* the fickleness only of the *demos* (and not of the entire citizenry!), and the *demos* alone is responsible for Athenian *polypragmosyne*.

Initially, a rumour (ὡς λέγεται,[27] 6.1) about Demaenetus' secret agreement with the Athenian council had aggravated the situation and increased fears about Athenian stability, and this critical moment is well expressed in the text by two protests reflecting opposite perspectives: one of the upper classes and the other of the *demotikoi*:

> 6.2 Those of the Athenians who were well-born and cultivated (γνώ]ριμ[οι κ]αὶ χα|ρίεντες) were indignant, saying that they would destroy the city by beginning a war with the Spartans. The councillors were alarmed by the outcry and called the people (τὸν δῆμον) together, making out that they had no share in the affair. […]

26 δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος· καὶ ἔπεισεν … (4.21.3). It is tempting here to recall Herodotus' passage on the gullibility of Athenian democracy (5.97–98). Of course, in the Pylos narrative the Athenians are vindictive and fickle as well as gullible.

27 The expression presumably reports what is still said in the Oxyrhynchus historian's own day.

> 6.3 […] Those of the Athenians who were moderates and men of property (ἐπ⟨ι⟩εικεῖς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες) were happy with the existing situation; but the masses, who favoured the popular side (οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοί), although they were then in a state of fear and, persuaded by those who advised them, sent envoys to Milon, the harmost of Aegina, to tell him how he could punish Demaenetus who had not acted with the city's approval.

The Demaenetus affair (6.1) did not occur at the very beginning of Athenian hostilities against Sparta, for we learn at 7.1, through a deliberate delay in the narrative, that the democrats were in the habit of sending weapons and crews to the ships under Conon;[28] and also that ambassadors such as Hagnias, Telesegorus and (Epi?)crates had been sent to the King and had then been captured by the Spartan navarch Pharax and put to death.[29] This delay, which is also a digression,[30] seems to be a stylistic device, a means to stress a crucial and confused historical moment, reinforcing the impression of chaos and speed. It is interesting that the bipolar configuration (γνώ]ριμ[οι κ]αὶ χα|ρίεντες / ἐπ⟨ι⟩εικεῖς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες and τὸν δῆμον / οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοί) found in the chapters on the Demaenetus affair (6.2–3) occurs in Diodorus (13.53.1–2) as well, where almost similar terminology is used to recall the judgement of the Oxyrhynchus historian on the *polypragmosyne* of Athens, guilty of making selfish profit with public money. The context is different, though—the Spartan peace offering of 410 BC, after the battle of Cyzicus:[31]

> 1. After the Laconian had made these and similar representations, the sentiments of the most reasonable men among the Athenians (οἱ μὲν ἐπιεικέστατοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων) inclined toward the peace, but those who made it their practice to foment war and to turn disturbances in the state to their personal profit chose the war (οἱ δὲ πολεμοποιεῖν εἰωθότες καὶ τὰς δημοσίας ταραχὰς ἰδίας ποιούμενοι προσόδους ᾑροῦντο τὸν πόλεμον).

28 Cf. Isocr. [4] 142, Dem. [42] 31.

29 Cf. Harpocr. s.v. Ἁγνίας, Androt. *FGrHist* 324, F 18, Philoch. *FGrHist* 328, F 147, Isae. [9] 8. De Sensi Sestito (1979): 22.

30 See Bruce (1967): 12–13.

31 See chh. 4.4, 7.2, 7.3. Cf. Lehmann (1978): 77. According to this scholar, Diodorus is here following the *HO*. Krentz (1982): 142–143 suggests that chapters 34.3–40 of the *AP*, showing the same binary opposition (*gnorimoi* and *demotikoi*) found in the Oxyrhynchus historian, come from the *HO*. Cf. Bleckmann (1998): 402–404. See 7.3.

2. A supporter of this sentiment was, among others, Cleophon, who was the most influential leader of the populace at this time (μέγιστος ὢν τότε δημαγωγός).[32]

The term ἐπιεικής is one of the words used by Aristotle in the *Athenaion Politeia*[33] to contrast with δῆμος or πλῆθος, and it denotes a member of the upper classes,[34] while δημαγωγός indicates the leader of a popular faction.[35] The word δημαγωγός (and its cognates) that first appears in the fourth century[36] can be found twice in both Thucydides and Xenophon, who normally revert to the term προστάτης.[37] Presumably the dual terminological schema found in both the *HO* and Diodorus does not do justice to the complexity of the Athenian political debate, in which many different clubs (*hetaireiai*) and close political followers (οἱ περὶ τόν) played an incisive role.[38] As is well known,

32 Transl. by C.H. Oldfather.

33 εὔποροι in contrast with δῆμος or πλῆθος recurs in 28.2.

34 Arist. *AP* 26.1. Cf. 28.1, 36.2, *Pol.* 3.1282 a 25–27; 5.1308 b 27–28. Richards (1891): 184. The term ἐπιεικής is also used in reference to the 'respectable' men to be found in both the upper and the lower classes, ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων (*AP* 26.1). Its meaning is not political but moral, denoting the better sort of men in the lower and upper classes, who would most likely serve on campaigns and risk their lives under the system of selective call-up (cf. 28.2). The word is used in a moral sense regularly in Aristotle's *Ethics*, and sometimes in the *Politics* and the *Rhetoric* (i.e. *Pol.* 2.1267 b 5–9; 1273 b 3–7). See Rhodes (1981): 322–329.

35 The fourth-century orators use the word δημαγωγός occasionally as a synonym of ῥήτωρ or πολιτευόμενος (i.e. Lys. [25] 9; [27] 10) and there is no evaluative implication in that use. Aristotle differs from his contemporaries in applying the word to a particular kind of leader, of whom he disapproves completely: he associates δημαγωγός/δημαγωγοί with an extreme form of democracy, in which the *demos* considers itself above the laws (see *Pol.* 2.1274 a 14; 4.1292 a 4–37; 5.1304 b 26). Cf. Zoepffel (1974): 79–82.

36 The older word for a political leader was προστάτης, which is the term regularly used by Herodotus. Cf. Zoepffel (1974): 69–90. It would be interesting to deepen the perspective of Theopompus of Chios, who wrote on Athenian demagogues (*FGrHist* 115, FF 85–100). According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, he was eyewitness to many events and also in contact with the most important and famous people of that time, such as philosophers, generals and demagogues (Dion. Hal. *ad Pomp.* 6 = T 20). Cf. Flower (1994): 26–41.

37 Thuc. 4.21.3, of Cleon; Thuc. 8.65.2, of Androcles; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.27, of the opponents to the Thirty; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7, of the leaders of Mantinea, whose power was broken when Sparta split the city into her component villages. Cf. Xen. *An.* 7.6.4.

38 Krentz (1982): 46 ff. Cf. Gorman (2001): 201–213. The scholar discourages us from following Radt's suggestion. According to Radt (1980): 47–58 the periphrasis οἱ περί + proper name (X) is *always* inclusive (in the sense that it includes X as well) indicating someone with his

political groups, typically grounded on ties of family and friendship (*philia*), easily changed their opinions and coalitions on personal grounds and in connection with the 'changeable balances' of foreign politics. They had no definite and clear political plans, aiming mainly at control of their city, and this makes it very difficult to understand the exact reasons for many political decisions and, also, to know the personalities that inspired them.[39] Think, for example, of the controversial position of Theramenes in an important debate of that period (he is said to have delayed the peace agreements with Sparta in 404 BC in order to bring Athens to her knees[40]), and the presumed remoulding of his image in a 'democratic' sense by his followers after the restoration of democracy in 404, as the so-called *Theramenes papyrus* might suggest;[41] or consider, also, the fact that Anytus, who appears among the leaders of Thrasybulus' group in the *HO* (6.2), is mentioned by Aristotle among Theramenes' followers (*AP* 34.3), and there are many other examples of similar changeable balances.[42]

The picture drawn till now makes it clear that the Thucydidean view of the daring foreign policy of Athens, which is considered a feature of the city as a whole, comes under the scrutiny and analysis of the political groupings appearing in the *HO*, thus becoming more a feature of what the *demotikoi* were doing, or are represented as doing by the author. This picture gives, however, a simplified and perhaps not fully consistent view of more complex realities.

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followers, people surrounding him or belonging to his circle, whereas οἱ περί + pronoun is exclusive. Radt proposes that belonging to the same genre or category is a criterion to individuate inclusivity. Gorman shows that any specification of the referents (whether they belong to different species, the same species, or whether they are quite indeterminate) does not necessarily help to clarify a given occurrence of οἱ περί τινα (p. 205). In addition to this, sometimes X is so relevant that the periphrasis οἱ περί + X means simply X alone (this occurs frequently in Polybius, Diodorus, Strabo, and Plutarch). Cf. Pelling (1988): 137 and (2011 b): 309.

39 Perlman (1963): 327–355; Cook (1988): 57–85.

40 Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.17; Lys. [12] 68. Cf. Bearzot (1997): 1–66.

41 Bearzot (1979): 195–219; (1985): 86–107; (1991): 65–87; (2012): 293–307. For my view of the matter see ch. 4.4 and Appendix, *1. A New Supplement for Lines 31–32 of the Theramenes Papyrus* (*P. Mich. 5982*).

42 Followers were not only active politicians but also orators and authors of partisan writings. We can suspect that many differently inspired 'propagandistic' works circulated in that period, disseminated by the sort of partisan writers whom the *AP* once calls *demotikoi* (18.5). Cf. Rhodes (1981): 232–233.

5.2 A Fourth-Century Debate?

Leaving aside the issue of the *HO*'s literary response to previous historians, let us think about the historical plausibility of the picture it gives of Athens. It is possible that the Oxyrhynchus historian, in giving his portrayal of Athens, has Thucydides in mind; it is also possible, however, that he reflects the atmosphere of his own times as well. The idea of Athens' extraordinary activism does not fit well with the period of the Corinthian war, but seems fully justified by the debate of a much later period.

After Athens rebuilt a new system of alliances (the second league is founded in 378/377 BC), in the course of time she attempted to extend her influence in the north and made bilateral alliances with Greek states and confederacies, most of which were products of the growing of fear of Philip among the Greeks.[43] Timotheus' intervention in Macedonia and the Chalcidian peninsula were examples of the former.[44] Athenian support of Argaeus—a pretender to the Macedonian throne against Philip (359 BC)[45]—and the alliance with the Chalcidian league[46] might be seen as part of a broader scenario where Athens and the loyal league members were about to unite against Thebes, the Persians,[47] Philip and a small number of rebellious allies and former allies of Athens who transferred their allegiance to new leadership (Thebes, Persia or Macedonia) or pursued ambitions of their own.[48] Though in the real world Athens lost Amphipolis (357 BC)[49] and her activism in the north was due mostly to the necessity of opposing the allies' defections,[50] in the view of a strand of

43 Such as the alliance with Phocis in 356 and that with Opuntian Locris in 356/355; Cargill (1981): 93–96.

44 In the area of Macedonia and the Chalcidice, in a series of campaigns he took Methone, Pydna, Torone and Potidaea (Dem. [4] 4; Isocr. [15] 113; Dinarch. [1] 14; Diod. 15.81.6). The king of Macedonia, Perdiccas, fought successfully with Amphipolis against the Athenian forces led by Timotheus in 360/359 (Aeschin. [2] 29).

45 Diod. 16.3 ff.

46 Dem. [2] 6. The Chalcidian league had once been a member of the second Athenian league; Cargill (1981): 168–169.

47 After the peace of 367 the Persians were pursuing a pro-Theban policy.

48 Cargill (1981): 172–179.

49 Philip is successful in attacking Amphipolis two years after he took over the kingdom of Macedonia. The Athenians had founded the colony in 437/436, had lost it in 424, and had been trying to recover it since 368 through Iphicrates. Cargill (1981): 167.

50 On the crisis of Athens in Macedonia and in the Chalcidian area at the time of Timotheus see Bianco (2007): 51 and Cargill (1981): 167 and 182–183. Important elements are the unsettled condition of Macedonia after the death of Amyntas and the involvement of

contemporary public opinion it was Athens' 'imperialistic' aims, her moral decline and mistreatment of the allies[51] that caused their defections from the league (leading up to the so-called Social war, 357–355 BC).[52] So, for Isocrates, who wrote *On the Peace* in the middle of negotiations to end the Social war (355 BC),[53] Athenian activism was to be abandoned and, in order to rid herself of present evils, Athens needed to learn that ἡσυχία and σωφρονεῖν were far more useful and profitable than πολυπραγμονεῖν, 'justice more than injustice, care for her own affairs more than the desire for other people's possessions.'[54] There is a certain amount of debate over which moment in Athens' history Isocrates regards as the beginning of the corruption. Recently it has been maintained that in *On the Peace* Isocrates suggests that the entire period from 478 BC onwards is to be condemned (74).[55] It is non-relevant here to ask ourselves why the period of Athens' greatest power, that is, the early years of the Delian league up to and including the battle of Eurymedon or the peace of Callias, is dismissed in *On the Peace* as decadence, while elsewhere Isocrates depicts the same events as the pinnacle of success (i.e. 7.80; 4.118–200).[56] For in each speech the orator uses historical patterns and gives readings chosen primarily to fit the subject under discussion, which is, of course, related directly to the occasion on which the speech itself is delivered. On the other hand, as has been noticed,[57] it is striking that in *On the Peace* all the historical examples of the 'imperialistic' behaviour of Athens refer to the fifth-century empire and to the years of the Social war and never to the (mis)treatment of the second league's allies. This may mean that Isocrates did not intend to criticise Athens' behaviour in the age of the second league;[58] or, preferably, that the speech is clearly about the Social war, but also about Athens' imperialistic attitude in general, and that even

Thebes in the north. Furthermore, after the Persian King supported Thebes in 367, the Athenians were beset by enemies on all sides. This situation of crisis can easily explain the ensuing period of Athenian assertiveness, when the city did not resort to any mistreatment of the allies who defected (Social war).

51 Modern scholarly approach to this issue is highly controversial; see Seager (1967): 95–115, Cawkwell (1976): 270–277, Griffith (1979): 127–144, Cargill (1981): 166–188, Cawkwell (1981), 40–55, Jensen (2010).

52 The first allies to defect were Chians, Coans, Rhodians and Byzantines. Certain states were detached from Athens by the tyrant Alexander of Pherae; Cargill (1981): 169–170.

53 Cf. Diod. 16.22.2; Davidson (1990): 21.

54 Isocr. [8] 26; cf. 58.

55 Davidson (1990): 23.

56 Davidson (1990): 24.

57 Cargill (1981): 176–177; Davidson (1990): 30.

58 Cargill (1981): 177.

though the orator might have had the second league in mind, he did not provide any historical pattern because he aimed to put far greater stress on that process of moral degeneration. For Isocrates, morality requires self-control; not to be imperialistic means to be self-controlled. We find *sophrosyne* as the opposite of *polypragmosyne* and *hybris*, and it is what distinguished the Spartan conduct of affairs before they built a naval empire (104). When the advantages of an empire are presented so blatantly as material goods, money, slaves, and luxuries, as they are in *On the Peace*, it is a small step to seeing imperialism as a concession to pleasure, and the renunciation of an empire as self-restraint.

For his part, Demosthenes, who supports the idea of an interventionist foreign policy for Athens, reads the first allies' defections (by Chians, Byzantines, and Rhodians) in the Social war solely as a result of the initiative of Mausolus of Caria (15.3; 27; 351/350 BC); in so doing he seems to simplify historical realities for some reason, perhaps a mere contingency, which however prevents his contemporaries from understanding fully the complexity of the forces at stake. Perhaps, though, Demosthenes chose voluntarily to pass over the theme of the allies' disaffections: in a sort of partisan outburst he might have wanted to conceal the general opposition to Athens' foreign policy. Some years later, in the *Fourth Philippic* (341 BC), in denouncing the πολυπραγμοσύνη of Athenian demagogues, he implicitly calls upon the Athenians to adopt his own version of πολυπραγμονεῖν, which ideally should involve all Athenians, and condemns the lack of an active foreign policy.[59] Both orators, Demosthenes and Isocrates, pursue completely different ideas for the immediate future of Athens and give reflections and expressions of the lively debate that had been developing around Athens' foreign policy of the 350s.

Coming back to the *HO*, let us answer, then, some important questions. Is Athenian *polypragmosyne* a danger for Athens in the 390s? In her general weakness of that moment, did Athens have the stamina to embrace a renewed policy of conquest? Probably not, and probably the Oxyrhynchus historian is not merely simplifying the politics but also overstating the activism of the *demotikoi*'s foreign policy. Admittedly, several Athenian interventionists in the Corinthian war may have been charged later with appropriation of public money,[60] since the same Epicrates mentioned in the *HO* was taken to trial

59 Dem. [10] 70. Demosthenes talks about those people (demagogues) who advise the Athenians to 'keep quiet' (ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν), while these men themselves cannot keep quiet among the Athenians. The men who advise people to be ἀπράγμονες are criminals, Demosthenes asserts, who take advantage of people's ἀπραγμοσύνη and ἡσυχία, while the city lacks security in simply τὰ αὑτῆς πράττειν (72). See Ehrenberg (1947): 58–59.

60 Valente (2014): 29–34.

with a similar charge.[61] Nevertheless, the verisimilitude of such an energetic and interventionist foreign policy seems unrealistic and the theme appears out of place: the topic seems, in fact, not to make historical sense in the age of the Corinthian war.[62] It might reflect, instead, the terms of the later debate with which Demosthenes' and Isocrates' warnings fit well, related as it is to a different political scenario. In this context, in fact, the political terminology and the moral questioning of Athenian *polypragmosyne* become fully justified and make real historical sense. All things considered, the moulding of the narrative itself, by showing the 'irresponsibility' of Athens in looking to a policy of conquest, may have implications for dating the work; we suggest ascribing the *HO* to the second half of the 350s or a bit later—346 at latest. In fact, from internal textual evidence it has been possible to provide the *terminus ante quem* of 346 BC for the composition of the work.[63]

The *HO* may well be retrojecting a later debate on Athenian *polypragmosyne* to the age of the Corinthian war, thereby emphasising that its seeds go back a long way. My own suspicion is that the Oxyrhynchus historian is overdoing this; however, the other possibility is that he was right, and the seeds do go back a long way. The text might also reflect accurately themes that were the object of discussion well before Philip's rise: it might reflect the characteristics of an earlier debate, and be suggesting how Athenian political debate could get stuck in a timewarp, and fail to react to changing political circumstances.[64]

61 Lys. [27] 9–10.

62 So Griffith (1979): 127–144. The fact that, according to Xenophon, in 395, just before the outbreak of the Corinthian war, Theban ambassadors at Athens said that the Athenians were ready to recover their *arche* (*Hell.* 3.5.10) has been discredited as unreliable. It may be evidence of what Xenophon thought the Thebans could have said, Griffith (1979): 127; this passage could also be read as Xenophon's ironic treatment of Athens' imperialistic ambition, Tuplin (1993): 61. Similarly, Spartan hegemony and the menace it represented for the Greek mainland, as reported in the *HO* (21.1), has been judged unrealistic in the age of the Corinthian war, for only after the occupation of Cadmea (382) did Sparta endanger the freedom of Greek cities. Bruce (1960): 86; Perlman (1964): 74–77; Gonzales (1995): 189–190. *Contra* Lendon (1989): 313; Valente (2014): 56.

63 See above, ch. 3.1.

64 In Demosthenes, for example, we find a similar sort of difficulty, or perhaps the refusal (for some reason) to react to changed circumstances. The *Third Philippic* [9] is particularly telling, for we find earlier debates reflected into Demosthenes' own time. When Olynthus was surrendered to Philip (348), he sacked the city and enslaved the inhabitants, selling both men and property as booty (Diod. 16.53.3). It was not the first act of barbaric cruelty, for he had sold the Potidaeans into slavery eight years earlier (Diod. 16.8.5), and he may well have dealt the same way now with other Chalcidians; but, Demosthenes is surely

If we accept the retrojection hypothesis, arguments that with all probability were widespread at the time the *HO* was written were greatly pre-dated. We cannot yet say whether this was a deliberate literary device and that the Oxyrhynchus historian was aware of the anachronism. His aim may have been to make a political point or perhaps just to make the subject matter more engaging and relevant to his audience. But it also could demonstrate the failure of his historical imagination and that the Oxyrhynchus historian was unaware of the anachronism.

5.3 *Multa per Aequora* … Sea Power and Athenian Motivation

The discussion of Athenian motivation in the last section makes clear the multiple scales, or layers, through which the text can be read, and, in particular, suggests that the reading should lead us to reflect on the hiatus between the time of the events, that is, the Corinthian war, and the time in which our author wrote.

The Oxyrhynchus historian's paradigm of Athens, seen as a busybody city thanks to the active foreign policy of the *demotikoi*, needs to be reconsidered in the light of the peculiar way in which the Athenian general Conon is portrayed in the text. Can this activism, or *polypragmosyne*, be referred more broadly to fourth-century Athenian foreign policy? How far should we consider Conon himself—a quite ambiguous and controversial personality in the presentation of the fourth-century orators—an expression of the dynamism the Athenian democrats demonstrate in the course of the narrative of the Corinthian war?

Though it is indubitable that the *demotikoi*, probably those connected with the *hetaireia* of Epicrates, had already dispatched arms and sailors to assist Conon before the Demaenetus affair, (and had also sent a mission to the Great King, led by certain ambassadors who had the misfortune to be arrested and subsequently executed by the Spartan navarch Pharax, 6.1), the image of Conon does not seem immediately and directly linked to the Athenian internal politics of the time. True, we find again at chapter 8.1–2 that after a skirmish between the Spartan harmost of Aegina, Milon, and Demaenetus, the latter

exaggerating when seven years later (341) in the *Third Philippic* he lists the wrongs done by Philip against the Greeks and maintains that, after the conquest of Olynthus, he destroyed the Chalcidian cities so ruthlessly that it would not be easy for someone coming to them to say whether they had ever been inhabited (26). He seems to offer themes that were widespread at the time of his writing, even though they were not necessarily fully reliable. See Ryder (2000): 57–58.

sailed off to join Conon's forces. Nevertheless, throughout the narrative of Conon's campaign we find no hint of *polypragmosyne* or any criticism of his conduct.

Conon had been acting against Sparta on his own personal initiative, that is, without an official mandate by Athens and on behalf of the Persians.[65] Probably he enjoyed the support of his own *hetairoi*[66] and also that of a large number of mercenaries coming from different countries (Phoenicians(?) and Cilicians(?)[67] 9.2; Cypriots, 20.1; Messenians, 20.3; Greeks, 20.5; Carians, 20.5).

The motives of Conon's action in Asia are well expressed in the text through the episode of the overthrow of the Rhodian government. By the use of the participle βουλόμενος/βουλόμενοι the narrator usually shows his interest in people's motivations, especially in cases where these are not apparent.[68] So the Athenian general, with the pretext (προφασιζόμενος) that his soldiers should not become lazy and unfit for the war, reviewed them each day at the harbour, but the true motivation in his mind (βου[λόμε]νος δέ) was (15.1):

> to raise the morale of the Rhodians with the idea that if they saw them there in armour they might engage in action immediately. When he had accustomed them all to seeing the review, he himself took twenty of the triremes and sailed to Caunus, not wanting to be there at the overthrow of

65 On Conon see Barbieri (1955), Seager (1967): 95–115, March (1997): 257–269.

66 From Lysias [19] 12–13, 19, 28, 34–35, we learn that Conon was a patron of Athenian citizens. This is the case of Aristophanes, a politician who was active in the 390s. The oration was delivered by the brother-in-law of Aristophanes, who, together with his father Nicophemus, had been executed (probably in Cyprus) on charges which remain unclear, but which were serious enough to warrant confiscation of his property in Athens. Furthermore, Aristophanes' relatives were suspected of withholding part of the property. The aim of this oration is to prove to the court that the property of Aristophanes was not as substantial as some people had imagined and that, considering all the expenses Aristophanes had incurred in the years before he moved to Cyprus, little of this fortune had remained. Cf. Stylianou (1988): 463–471. According to Lysias' oration Aristophanes was sent on an embassy to Sicily by Conon, to persuade Dionysius I to conclude a marriage alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus. The delegation was sent in 394 or 393 and Aristophanes' colleague Eunomus (presumably another friend of Conon), quoted in the oration, is otherwise attested as a naval commander in 389/388 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.5–9). Associates of Conon might have also been his lieutenants Hieronymus, Nicophemus, and Leonymus. P. Oxy. V 842, 15.1, 20.5; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.8; Diod. 14.81.4; Lys. [19] 12 f., 36. Cf. Seager (1967): 103–104.

67 Cf. Diod. 14.79.8.

68 See 18.1; 19.1; 21.1–2. Cf. also the uses of λεγ[όντων (6.2), φοβηθέντες (6.3). Bruce (1967): 15.

> the government. He had commanded Hieronymus and Nicophemus, his lieutenants, to take care of the situation.

As is clear, the text is proleptic of what is going to happen, telling the reader in advance that some Rhodians were in the know of the plot (cf. 15.2), and that they were going to overthrow their oligarchic government (cf. 15.2). Conon knows that the *diaphthora* is coming, and he is giving instructions to Hieronymus and Nicophemus to 'take care of it,' orchestrating his own absence: thus he appears as the man who is pulling all the strings. This impression is reinforced by the narrative of the revolt itself, which is viewed through the eyes of those Rhodians who were plotting against the state. That is reflected in the only direct speech present in the text. It is put in the mouth of a certain Dorimachus, a Rhodian, who 'got up on the stone where the herald made announcements, and, shouting out as loud as he could, said: "citizens, let's go for the tyrants as quickly as we can!"' (15.2). Conon returns to the scene again only when the constitutional 'order' has been definitely re-established. In other words, he is staying out of it and avoiding the immediate blame, even though he is not as unmanipulative as all that, since he planned the overthrowing of the government before his leaving; this might be considered as expression of the narrator's admiration for his political and diplomatic skills.

The chapters on the mutiny of the Cypriot land forces under Conon's command at Caunus and the consequent disorders at Rhodes (19.1–20.6) suggest that Conon's responsibilities are understated throughout the narrative by the narrator's voice and the numerous focalisations occurring in the text. Digressions, as we have shown elsewhere (ch. 2), are privileged places where the narrator expresses his own reading of events and tries to persuade the audience of the reliability of his statements. The narrator is interested, as he makes clear, in enquiring into the longer-standing causes of events rather than those that are immediate and deceptive. So the excursus on the Great King's reluctance to provide due remuneration to those in his service, which goes back to the epoch of the Decelean war and is inserted on the occasion of Conon's visit to Tithraustes and Pharnabazus during the Spartan *navarchia* of Cheiricrates in 396 BC[69] (19.1–2), has been considered of particular significance, because the King's practice would constitute the chief cause of the mutiny described in the following sections (19.3 ff.).[70] In addition to that, I believe that this analepsis is also the key to interpreting Conon's conduct and the Oxyrhynchus histo-

69 De Sensi Sestito (1979): 36.
70 Bruce (1967): 15.

rian's view of Conon's motivations (19.1–20.6). In fact, the main argument of this digression is that because of the King's conduct, the triremes of the Persians' allies at the time of the Peloponnesian war 'would often have been disbanded had it not been for the energy of Cyrus' (εἰ μὴ διὰ **τὴν Κύρου** | **προθυμίαν** 19.2, l. 544).[71] There is a striking parallelism between Cyrus' way of operating at that time and that of Conon now: this is shown by the narrator's remark at the end of the story that Conon had 'justly' repressed with violence both the Cypriot revolt and the Rhodian disorders through his energy (διὰ Κόνων[α | καὶ] **τὴν ἐκεί-νου προθυμίαν** ἐπαύσατο τῆς ταραχῆ[ς, 20.6, ll. 639–640). At this point we should ask ourselves what meaning this parallelism could have.

Many clues suggest that while the King was individually responsible for the situation (βασιλεὺς αἴτιός ἐστι⟨ν⟩, 19.2, l. 545), Conon's actions were entirely aimed at finding a solution to the problem of the payment of his mercenaries (βουλόμενος δὲ συμμεῖξαι τῷ Φαρναβάζῳ κα[ὶ] τῷ | Τιθραύστῃ καὶ χρήματα λαβεῖν ἀνέβαινεν ἐκ τῆς | Καύνου πρὸς αὐτούς, 'wishing to communicate with Pharnabazus and Tithraustes and to get money, he went up from Caunus to them,' 19.1, ll. 534–536). Two of Conon's speeches—transmitted indirectly by the narrator—demonstrate his concern for the issue and also that he presents his arguments carefully in order to get the best possible result: 'when he arrived in the presence of Tithraustes and said that there was a risk of everything falling apart for lack of money, and that it was not right that those fighting on behalf of the King should fail for this reason' (19.3); and 'Conon came to Leonymus, the commander of the infantry, and said to him that he was the only one who could save the King's campaign. For if he gave him the Greek garrison, which guarded Caunus, and as many Carians as possible, he would put an end to the disturbance in the camp' (20.5). Furthermore, the moulding of chapter 20 is entirely founded on a rhythmic succession of polyphonic voices which emphasises the faultless conduct of Conon in juxtaposition with the Cypriots' absolute misunderstanding of the happenings.[72] The rebels were persuaded by some who spread false rumours that Conon was not intending to give them the pay that was due (ἀναπεισθέντες οὕτω τινῶν | διαβαλλόντων, ὡς αὐτοῖς μὲν οὐ μέλ-λουσιν ἀπο|διδόναι τὸν μισθὸν τὸν ὀφειλόμενον, 20.1, ll. 564–566); Conon replied that all would receive their pay equally (ἀλ[λ]ὰ πάν|[τας ἔφη τὸν μισθὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἴση]ς κομιεῖσθαι, 20.2, ll. 578–579); then, later, because they thought that he 'had made all the arrangements for the distribution of the pay in an improper

71 The remark about Cyrus is considered as a pivotal element of the ring-composition structure of the *HO*. McKechnie-Kern (1988): 172.

72 Cf. Bruce (1962): 13–16. Isocr. [4] 142.

way, they embarked on the triremes—and this was the reason, as some said: they proposed to take the people from Rhodes and sail to Cyprus' (αὐτοὶ δὲ πεπεισμ[έ]|νοι πάντα π[αρὰ τὸ προσῆκον τ]ὸν Κόνωνα π̣α̣ρε̣|σκευάσθαι περ[ὶ τὴν τοῦ μισθοῦ] διάδοσιν ε[ἰσέ]β[αι]|νον ε[ἰ]ς τὰς τρ[ιήρ]εις ἐπ̣[ὶ ταύταις τ]αῖς πράξεσιν, ὥς γέ | τινες ἔλεγον, [μ]έλλον[τες τοὺς ἐκ] τῆς Ῥόδου παρ[α]λα|βόν[τε]ς εἰς Κύπρον πλε[ῖν, 20.3). Though the rest of the narrative (20.4. ll. 598–602) appears unclear because some lines of the papyrus are missing, this embedded focalisation makes evident the atmosphere of false suspicions and deceptive advice associated with the conduct of the rebels. To sum up, the narrative seems to absolve Conon from any reprovable conduct, as we also learn that he had no part in the attempt of his bodyguards, the Messenian mercenaries, to capture the Cypriots' general (a Carpasian); they acted without Conon's consent, though it also appears that they had good reason for wishing to punish the Carpasian man for his crimes: ([οὐ] μετὰ τῆς ἐκείνου γν[ώ]μης, ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐν | τῇ πόλε[ι] κατασχεῖν αὐτόν, ὅπ[ως] ἂν ὧν ἐξήμαρτεν δῷ | δίκ[η]ν, 'without Conon's approval, as he was in the gateway on his way out, wishing to keep him in the city so that he would be punished for his crimes,' 20.3, ll. 588–590). Thus the topic of just punishment for war crimes recurs again in the text.[73]

The association with Cyrus and the 'just' conduct of Conon seems to refer to the general's complete autonomy from his motherland, freelancing in the service of the King. For the text is clear on this point: Conon asked Leonymus for troops, saying that only this could save the King's campaign (20.5, l. 615), and at the end of the whole episode the narrator explicitly mentions that the army of the King was prevented from disbanding by Conon's intervention (τὸ μὲν οὖν βασι|λικὸν στρατό[πεδον οὕτ]ως εἰς μέγαν κίνδυνον | προελθὸν διὰ Κόνων[α καὶ] τὴν ἐκείνου προθυμίαν | ἐπαύσατο τῆς ταραχῆ[ς, 'and so the army of the King, having come into great danger, ceased from disorder on account of Conon and his energy,' 20.6, ll. 638–640). According to this reading, the digression (19.1–2) seems indeed to anticipate the future development of the story, as well as its end, and the figure of Conon, seen as a new Cyrus, appears to have been constructed with a view of the events whose balance is probably over-weighted towards the Persian side so that we can see the positive and negative aspects of the campaign from the Persian viewpoint.

It would not be weird to conjecture that the account might also have been moulded on the basis of Persian sources (either written or coming from informants).[74] It would indeed be plausible to suspect primarily Persian origins for

73 See above, ch. 5.1.

74 See ch. 3.2.

most of the fourth-century material. It is well known that Greeks of the fifth and, especially, of the fourth century appear to have been fascinated by all Persian things.[75] To some extent, Xenophon, too, might have been acquainted with Persian material if, as evidence shows, there was some sort of Persian epic,[76] including stories of Cyrus, in circulation when he wrote his *Cyropaedia*.[77] The Persian King Cyrus features prominently in the works of Herodotus and Ctesias, as well as in Xenophon's monograph.

Herodotus, for his part, by starting his *Histories* with the Persian expansion in the West, explores the versions (Persian, Phoenician and Greek)[78] of the reasons for the clash between Greeks and Persians that were well-known in his own time. Indeed throughout his narrative he appears to be in continuous dialogue with (what he conceives as) the East, in the sense that even after the fifth book,[79] where the *Histories* turns to Greek subjects, the Persians are a constant referent;[80] furthermore, his way of rendering the East and eastern behaviour throughout the narrative does not rely upon a Greek perspective, and strong distinctions between eastern and western characteristics are often qualified and challenged.[81]

Ctesias of Cnidus, who hands down a tradition somewhat parallel to the Herodotean,[82] seems to depend mostly on Persian sources, though unlike his

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75 See Plat. *Alc.* 1.120 e–123 e. Starr (1975): 48–61; Lévy (1976): 203–205; Lewis (1977); Hirsch (1985): 1–5.

76 It is reported to be an Old Persian epic that unfortunately disappeared leaving very few traces; those that remain are chiefly found in the eleventh-century Iranian tales of the *Shahnameh*. Cf. Gera (1993): 13–22, Shayegan (2012).

77 Higgins (1977): 44; Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2010): 439–453. On the *Cyropaedia* as a 'utopian biography,' see Hägg (2012): 51–66, 65.

78 Respectively, 1.1.1–5.1, 1.5.2 and 1.5.3–12.2.

79 Cf. Asheri (1988): XXIII.

80 Herodotus includes in his *Histories* several biographies of eastern figures, perhaps because the Persian empire itself encouraged interest in single individuals. The 'biographic' character of Herodotus' Persian kings was explained by Homeyer (1962): 75–85 with the use of Persian sources, while Pelling (2007 a): 86 has recently revised this perspective, attributing Herodotus' interest in Persian 'biographic' elements partly to the use of Persian sources and partly to the character itself of Persian history, in the sense that—according to the scholar—Persian dynasts drove events more straightforwardly than the great men of Greece, and, therefore, served clearly and unquestionably as paradigmatic figures.

81 Pelling (1997 a): 51–66. Cf. Flower (2006): 274–289.

82 In his *Persica* Ctesias deals with the history of the succession of three empires: Assyrian, Median and Persian.

predecessor he was judged by scholars as unreliable and untrustworthy.[83] He claims, though, to have consulted the βασιλικαὶ διφθέραι[84] or royal leather records for his *Persica*.[85] It has been suggested that these royal writings were not a dry, annalistic record of events, but rather a sort of royal epic, 'une littérature d' amusements' containing more than a simple chronicle of Achaemenid royal activities.[86] This, moreover, could be relevant for the criticisms that modern scholars have made of the presumed unreliability of Ctesias and his continuous interest in court intrigues. Ctesias' work might reflect his personal experience as physician at the Achaemenid court, where, in addition to literary sources (i.e. Hellanicus and Herodotus), he also had direct access to official documents and tales of eyewitnesses, in particular to those of Parysatis, the mother of Cyrus the younger and the King Artaxerxes II.[87] Probably he was chiefly interested in amusing his Persian or Greek-Persian audience.

5.4 Cnidus According to the Oxyrhynchus Historian: a Solely Persian Success

Oratory of the fourth century[88] and later Greek tradition[89] considered the battle of Cnidus (394) as the starting point for the rebirth of Athens' sea power. Given the state of the *HO*'s fragments, we cannot say if the Oxyrhynchus historian's narrative also dealt with the battle of Cnidus. At any rate, the reading of that event was not univocal and shadows were cast over that presentation relatively early. Xenophon and Lysias, for instance, do not conceal the 'Persian implication' of the Athenian victory at Cnidus.[90]

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83 Ctesias was charged with plagiarism from Herodotus, as well as from Hellanicus. Cf. Jacoby (1922): 2032–2073. Momigliano (1969): 181–212. Cf. Lévy (1990): 125–157. For a revision of this common opinion, see Lenfant (2004): VII–CCVII.

84 *FGrHist* 688, F 5 = Diod. 2.32.4 (cf. F 5 Lenfant); cf. Anonymous, *De Persia* 696, F 3–11.

85 The existence of written royal Persian chronicles of the Achaemenid age is hypothesised on the basis of the books of Esther (6.1. cf. 2.23) and Ezra (4.15). For royal inscriptions see Kent (1953), Frye (1976), Mayrhofer (1978).

86 Christensen (1936): 117 ff. However, Ctesias' use of royal writings seems suspect to scholars. Cf. Lenfant (2004): XXXVI–XXXIX.

87 *FGrHist* 688, T 8, F 15 (cf. T 8, F 15 Lenfant). See ch. 3.2.

88 Isocr. [9] 56; Dinarch. [1] 14; Dem. [20] 68–74.

89 Trog. *Prol*. l. 6; Nep. *Con*. 4.4–5; Iust. 6.4.

90 Xen. *Hell*. 4.8.1–3; Lys. [2] 58–60. Isocrates, for his part, gives an ambiguous evaluation of the battle of Cnidus, for in his *Evagoras* [9] 56 he maintains that after Cnidus the Greeks were freed and Athens established herself as hegemon of the allies, through the

Part of Athenian public opinion may have overstated the role of Conon in restoring the hegemony of Athens through his Asiatic campaign and the rebuilding of Piraeus' fortifications in the aftermath of his victory at Cnidus:[91] we can find hints that he was associated with Themistocles and with the fifth-century imperialistic experience, outdated though this now was.[92] And this particular reading may have led some scholars to present Conon's foreign policy as well as that of the Athenian democrats (Cephalus, Agyrrhius, etc.) as an expression of the old cliché of fifth-century imperialism, in comparison with a new panhellenic ideal that Thrasybulus would follow.[93] Other parts of Greek tradition denied, however, Conon's contribution, and even cast doubt on whether the rebuilding itself of the Long Walls was his doing. Lysias, for instance, in his *Funeral Oration*, written for the Athenian fallen of the Corinthian war, locates this episode in an anachronistic way as one of the best achievements of the democratic counter-revolutionaries in 403/402 BC.[94]

In any case, the Persian matrix of Conon's appointment was not passed over in silence, and his role of freelancer, as the Oxyrhynchus historian seems to suggest, was probably well known at his time. Indeed Ctesias, a writer who

generalship of Conon; while in the *Panegyricus* [4] 119 he presents a view of the battle at Cnidus that is as negative as its portrayal in Lysias' *Funeral Oration* [2] 58–59. Both texts regard, in fact, Athens' defeat at Aegospotami as the prelude to further disasters for the Greeks, and represent Cnidus as a defeat of the Greeks at the hand of foreigners, thereby suppressing the fact that the Persian fleet at Cnidus had been led by the Athenian commander Conon. Todd (2007): 159–160. Cf. Lys. [33] 5. Cf. Diod. 14.39. Plut. *Artax*. 21.

91 Modern scholarship, too, emphasised the role of Conon in rebuilding Athens' sea power: Cawkwell (1976): 270–277 and Fornis (2008): 33–64. As for the attitude of Athenians to Conon and Pharnabazus, it has been suggested that the Athenians wanted to ignore the Persian involvement in Cnidus, and replaced his contribution with Evagoras' but they were not in doubt about Conon and his role in restoring the hegemony of Athens. So Lewis-Stroud (1979): 180–193.

92 Dem. [20] 72–74. According to Demosthenes, Conon's way of building the wall was better that that of Themistocles, because the latter acted in secret, the former by defeating the people (Spartans) who stood in his way. Clearly, the orator overlooks the fact that in 479–478 the Spartans, though opposed to the prospect of Athens' refortification, were still formally allied to Athens, while in 394 they were at war. Cf. Thuc. 1.89–93, Diod. 11.39.1–40.4, Plut. *Them*. 19.

93 So Accame (1956): 241–253 and (1966). Against this view some scholars agree that it is impossible to notice substantial differences between Thrasybulus' action and that of Conon or Agyrrhius, both before and after the Corinthian war. See Seager (1967): 115 and Perlman (1968): 266–267. On Thrasybulus and Conon see also Cawkwell (1976): 270–277 and Strauss (1984): 37–48.

94 Lys. [2] 63.

paid attention to Persian royal history and was personally involved in the affair which led to the engagement of Conon (398 BC),[95] attests a close epistolary correspondence between Conon and the King. Later, again through letters, Conon would complain (in vain) about his financial situation in Asia, asking the King for money to pay his mercenaries (395 BC).[96] The general impression is that Ctesias played a relevant role, not just that of mere intermediary, sender of letters and scrivener, but that of a supporter of Conon who carried some influence with the King.[97] Of course, we cannot speak of him as a genuine 'supporter' similar to Conon's *hetairoi*, but probably Conon benefitted from that changing of balance that had been reflected in the deterioration of Ctesias' relations with Sparta.[98] Although Xenophon's statement—that Pharnabazus was navarch of the Phoenician ships while Conon led the Greek fleet (*Hell.* 4.3.11–12)—suggests that at least officially Conon's fleet was presented as Greek, Conon's ships and equipment were presumably those furnished by the Cypriot king, Evagoras,[99] and with all probability he was also followed by his own supporters and collaborators. We suspect that also Ctesias (other than Evagoras) may have played some role in recruiting these forces. Furthermore, after the battle of Cnidus, Pharnabazus and Conon sailed against the allies of Sparta, leading many cities to expel the Spartan garrisons and to join οἱ περὶ Κόνωνα,[100] but while some of the cities preserved their freedom, those who had joined οἱ περὶ Κόνωνα clearly passed under the control of the Persians.[101]

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95 *FGrHist* 688, T 7 c (cf. T 7 c Lenfant). T 7 d = Plut. *Artax.* 21.4 (cf. T 7 d Lenfant): [...] ὁ δὲ Κτησίας αὐτὸν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ βασιλέα φησὶ προσθεῖναι τὴν λειτουργίαν αὐτῷ ταύτην [...]; FF 30, 32 (cf. FF 30, 32 Lenfant). March (1997): 267. Cf. Philoch. *FGrHist* 328, FF 144–145. Other personages who lived at the court of Artaxerxes, and with whom Conon was probably very close, are Zeno the Cretean and Polycritus the Mendaean (T 7 d, F 31; cf. Lenfant).

96 Iust. 6.2.12–13. Cf. Diod. 14.81.4; Nep. *Con.* 3.2–4.

97 *FGrHist* 688, T 7 c; F 30 (cf. T 7 c, F 30 Lenfant). Lenfant (2004): XIV.

98 *FGrHist* 688, T 7 c, F 30 (cf. T 7 c, F 30 Lenfant).

99 Cf. Isocr. [4] 141. De Sensi Sestito (1979): 26. Relations that Athens established with Evagoras are not easy to define. Probably in the year 412/411 BC the Athenians honoured the king with a decree, which survives in a very mutilated state (IG I^3 113). According to Giuffrida (1996): 619, it seems plausible that these honours were granted on the occasion of negotiations conducted by Evagoras in the Athenian interest during the years 413–411; they probably included a grant of citizenship (Dem. [12] 10; cf. Isocr. [9] 54). Cf. also my paper (2010): 23–43. For proposals of later datings of the coming to power of Evagoras in Salamis, see Spyridakis (1935): 46–50, Grégoire-Goossens (1940): 206–227, Costa (1974): 40–56, Lewis (1977): 130, note 133, Cataldi (1983): 287–314. Cf. also Tuplin (1983): 170–186, Lenfant (2004): XIII.

100 Diod. 14.84.3.

101 Diod. 14.84.4. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1–2; Seager (1967): 101.

The process of overestimation of Conon's activity, found in a part of Greek tradition, seems not to have concerned the *HO*, where—as we have shown—Conon's political conduct appears independent and unlinked to that of the Athenian democrats.[102] If this reading is right, it might also represent evidence of the Persian component of the Oxyrhynchus historian's source/s.

5.5 Conclusion

The *HO*'s view of fourth-century Athenian imperialistic ambitions shows peculiar and original traits, and differs notably from the view—held both by contemporaries and by later authors—that the renaissance of Athens' sea power in Greece came about thanks to the action of Conon.

The Oxyrhynchus historian appears aware of Thucydides' narrative. He takes over Thucydidean categories of political language, which, however, he slightly modifies. The Thucydidean notion of *polypragmosyne*, a feature of Athens as a whole, comes into the analysis of the political groupings described in the *HO* and becomes a feature of what the democrats are represented as doing. Furthermore, the Oxyrhynchus historian's political terminology and the moral questioning of Athenian *polypragmosyne*, though referring to the outbreak of the Corinthian war, make historical sense only later, after the rise of Philip. So the moulding of the narrative, which shows the irresponsibility of Athens in looking to a policy of conquest, also has implications for the identification of the date of composition of this work, that is, the second half of the 350s.

The *HO*'s paradigm of Athens, seen as a busybody city thanks to the active foreign policy of the democrats, is at odds with the peculiar way in which the Athenian general Conon is portrayed in the text. The process of overestimation of Conon's activity, found in a strand of Greek writers, is absent in the *HO*, where Conon's political conduct appears independent and unlinked to that of the Athenian democrats.

Finally, as regards the account of Conon's campaign, it seems fair to advance the suggestion that the *HO* might rely on written sources, or even on informants; in particular, the account might be moulded on either Persian materials, such as letters, reports, official documents, or stories disseminated widely by word of mouth.

102 Conon had several supporters in Athens; the majority of them had different, if not opposite, political ideas and aims; so Strauss (1986): 136. Whether or not Demaenetus was among his followers is, moreover, controversial. Seager (1967): 104.

CHAPTER 6

Terra Marique ...

This chapter offers some observations on features regarding the perception that the Oxyrhynchus historian and Xenophon had of hegemonic developments in Greece. It focuses on the *HO* and Xenophon's *Hellenica* seen against Thucydides' *Histories*. Despite the continuing centrality of the sea in fourth-century Greek thought, new forms of political power, such as federations, are now directing the interest of the two historians mainly towards land hegemony. This explains well the long excursus on the Boeotian constitution which the Oxyrhynchus historian inserted within the narrative of the Corinthian war (395–387 BC).

Besides, the examination of the toponyms ocurring in the *HO* gives evidence of a peculiar interest in land scenarios; this picture comes particularly from the narrative of Spartan activities conducted by Agesilaus on the Asiatic mainland. Broadly speaking, the general arrangement itself of the narrative material of the *HO* hints at this new historical trend.[1] There emerges what we can call 'Decelean war-motif,' that is an extended treatment of the period characterised by Spartan occupation of Decelea during the last phases of the Peloponnesian war (from 413 BC onwards). This topic appears three times in the *HO*, twice within the narrative of the Corinthian war (P. Oxy. V 842, 7.4; 17.3), and along with that war it forms a narrative pattern that is found in Xenophon's *Hellenica* too (3.5.5–9).

6.1 Decelea, or the Supremacy of Land over Sea

Three times in the 760 lines of the *London papyrus* the Oxyrhynchus historian mentions the narration of the Decelean war, which belongs to a lost section of the *HO* where the historian had dealt extensively with it ('as I have said earlier,' 7.4, l. 59). Two references occur in the context of the outbreak of the Corinthian war (7.4 and 17.3), and the third mention is an analepsis that has been inserted into the account of Conon's journey to Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, aimed to get money for the payment of soldiers (19.1).[2]

1 If we follow Meyer's suggestion of a tripartite structure of the *HO* (Seekrieg, Landkrieg, Griechenland), land scenarios occupy the two thirds of the whole work. Meyer (1909): 64.

2 See above, 5.3.

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The *HO*'s text gives the impression of an extensive treatment and an unusual emphasis on the Decelean war. This raises important questions: can we speak in terms of a 'Decelea-topic,' that is an extended treatment of the Decelean war introducing themes of particular importance to the whole narrative of the *HO*? What is its peculiar meaning? Does the Oxyrhynchus historian mirror Xenophon's narrative of the background of the Corinthian war?

Some clues coming from the *HO* suggest that the 'Decelean war-motif' was one of a certain importance, and, moreover, the use of that subject seems to foreshadow a new historical view. Speaking of the Corinthians, who wanted to bring about a change of policy in Greece and therefore were in favour of making war against the Spartans, the narrator presents the case of the Corinthian Timolaus, the only man who was opposed to Sparta on private grounds (others had political reasons for opposing to her), and who had pro-Spartan feeling during the period of Spartan occupation of Decelea. The personal affair of Timolaus gives way to an excursus on the Decelean war (7.2–5). But contrary to readers' expectations, the 'private grounds' are not stated throughout that digression; we should note, moreover, that it relates military events that involved Timolaus and that are unmentioned by Thucydides.[3] It is true that possibly 'the author did not know the details, but made an inference from Timolaus' previous friendship with the Spartans, which is strongly emphasised by the words outstanding pro-Spartan;'[4] nevertheless it is probable too that the historian's main concern was to include a further mention of the Decelea-topic within the narrative. In addition, the two main places where the Decelean war-motif is inserted are relevant too; they both are connected with the narrative of the outbreak of the Corinthian war. For later (17.3), in the account of the conflict between Phocians and Boeotians that caused the outbreak of the Corinthian war (16–18), the narrator explains that that war was due to the activism of the pro-Athenian group in Thebes, led by Ismenias, Antitheus and Androcleidas; then he goes back a long way till the epoch of Spartan fortification of Decelea,[5] when it was instead a pro-Spartan party (led by Leontiades) which held power at Thebes. This excursus gives occasion to deal with Theban prosperity of that time, which is expressed in terms of military and territorial strengthening and contrasts with the extreme weakness of Athens in the same period.[6] Here again

3 Thucydides does not mention Timolaus in the context of the occupation of Decelea. He hints at Polyanthes (7.34.3). Xenophon and Pausanias claim that Timolaus along with Polyanthes received the Persian gold (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1; Paus. 3.9.8).

4 McKechnie-Kern (1988): 136.

5 Cf. Thuc. 7.19.

6 Cf. Thuc. 7.27.

the Decelea-topic, involving Thebes and Boeotia, appears to fit a continental context, that of mainland Greece. This suggests further considerations.

The account of Spartan fortification of Decelea is contained in the seventh book of Thucydides' *Histories* and is moulded through a continuous changing of perspective from Decelea to Sicily, that is, from a land scenario to a sea one, which seems to mirror Athenian hegemonic aspirations at sea. To some extent, Thucydides' disposition of his material suggests a sort of balanced play between land (Sparta) and sea (Athens) powers. Differently, Xenophon's association of the same subject (Decelea) to the account of the outbreak of the Corinthian war (*Hell.* 3.5.5–9) is striking, because, on the one hand, it seems to anticipate the Oxyrhynchus historian's arrangement of his material:[7] in other words, the Oxyrhynchus historian could reply to (or even mirror) Xenophon's narrative. On the other hand, this may suggest that Thucydides' balanced interest in sea and continental contexts is not found in fourth-century historians, who give instead much more attention to continental scenarios and related happenings.

According to Xenophon, a little before the Corinthian war broke out a meeting was held at Athens with ambassadors coming from Sparta and Thebes (*Hell.* 3.5); as a result of this assembly a Greek coalition was gathered against Sparta. In Xenophon's account of those talks the Decelea-topic does not make much contribution to elude readers' expectations about what is going to happen; but it does play an important role in persuading the internal audience. In fact the reader knows well from the beginning that the Athenians wanted to participate in that war, for it is clearly told in the text that they 'were ready enough for the war in any case, as they thought that empire (*arche*) was their own prerogative' (*Hell.* 3.5.2). The example of what happened at Decelea contributes to clarify Spartan and Theban motivations to the internal audience (*Hell.* 3.5.5 and 8). The Spartans, recalling that Thebes' conduct was hostile to their policy during the Decelean war, are glad to have a pretext (*prophasis*) for campaigning against her.[8] The Thebans, for their part, use those Spartan accusations as arguments to defende themselves against the charge of past misconduct towards Athens. This is clear from the sentence 'when the Spartans asked us to join them

7 On my idea that Xenophon's *Hellenica* is slighlty earlier than the *HO* see ch. 3.

8 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.5: 'The Spartans were glad enough to have a pretext for a campaign against the Thebans, since they had been angry with them for some time. First, the Thebans had claimed the tithe due to Apollo at Decelea; they had refused to follow the Spartans against Piraeus and were accused of having persuaded the Corinthians also to refuse. The Spartans also remembered that the Thebans had not allowed Agesilaus to sacrifice at Aulis and had thrown down from the altar the victims that had been sacrificed already; and they had failed to join Agesilaus on his campaign in Asia' (transl. by R. Warner).

in attacking Piraeus, the whole city said no' (*Hell.* 3.5.8); which echoes the Spartan charge that the Thebans did not follow the Spartans against Piraeus (3.5.5).[9] The Thebans go on and stress the high moral value of an eventual intervention by Athens in favour of Thebes: the Athenians should fairly go to war and help Thebes especially in memory of internal divisions that the Spartans had caused in Athens (ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καταστήσαντες ὑμᾶς εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς ἔχθραν τῷ δήμῳ, 3.5.9); it is worth noting the sentence **δίκαιον** εἶναι νομίζομεν βοηθεῖν ὑμᾶς τῇ πόλει ἡμῶν, because it shows that it would be fair enough for Athens to go to war (3.5.8).

Some of the charges that the Thebans made against the Spartans in Xenophon's *Hellenica* (they supported oligarchies in every city and set up their own helots as governors, threatening their free allies as though they were slaves)[10] are mirrored in the *HO*. Here the Spartans are charged with supporting and treating as friends oligarchs who were active in many cities of the Greek mainland (7.2). But the Oxyrhynchus historian goes further, and, as if playing with the issue of responsibilities, gives two opposite versions: according to the Boeotians, the Corinthian war was caused by Spartan activism, but, for the Spartans, that war originated from a Theban conspiracy which later involved many Greek cities.[11] Besides, the *HO* seems to reply to Xenophon's text. For Xenophon the Thebans charge Sparta, among other things, also with greedy and arrogant behaviour, πλεονεξία πολὺ εὐκαταλυτωτέρα (*Hell.* 3.5.15); the Oxyrhynchus historian defines Athens as a busy-body city, which desires *polypragmonein*, to turn from tranquillity and peace towards a vigorous policy of conquest (7.2.43–47).[12]

In Xenophon's narrative the Thebans forecast that Athens would recover her *arche* in order to persuade the Athenian audience to go to war against Sparta. The word *arche* (along with the verbal form *archesthai*, which here refers to what is seen as the Athenians' prerogative, νομίζοντές τε αὐτῶν ἄρχεσθαι, 3.5.2) is a term of Thucydidean memory; it is used by Xenophon in this context in reference to the Athenian empire and suggests, moreover, a sharp contrast with the Spartan empire, which is instead connotated as ethically unjust (*pleonexia*). But what kind of empire do the Thebans prospect for Athens now? Probably a sort of hegemonic power, completely new for the time, which is to be held by a naval hegemon over vast countries: 'As you [*Athenians*] know, when you had your empire, your authority was confined to countries that were accessible

9 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.8–16.
10 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.9 and 3.5.12.
11 See chh. 3.1 and 8.
12 Cf. Ehrenberg (1947): 49–50.

by sea; but it could now be exercised everywhere—over us, and the Peloponnesians, and those who were subject to you before and even over the King himself with his enormous resources. As for us, you know yourselves what good allies we were to the Spartans. But you can expect us to be altogether stouter allies to you than we were then to them. For now it is not a question of helping islanders or Syracusans or strangers; it is in defence of Thebes herself that we are taking up arms.'[13] Apart from the unrealistic idea of conquering the King's territories, the passage is interesting for the many issues it raises, as we shall see shortly. The perspective of the speaker is clearly of someone who looks at the Athenian empire from a continental point of view; according to this vision the sea is rather a limit, an obstacle to reaching further countries.

6.2 The Sea as a Barrier

The concept of the sea as a boundary, a river delimiting the whole *oikoumene*, takes its theoretical shape through the reflection of the Ionic thinkers, who were influenced by Greek archaic poetry (Homer, Hesiod) and by Babylonian 'science.'[14] The notion of the river as a limit as well as the topic of the crossing of rivers or branches of sea, such as the Hellespont, are significant motives in Herodotus' narrative; here the idea of crossing of boundaries often hints at the *hybris* of an aggressor and is applied in particular to cases conerning Lydian and Persian territories. Croesus' campaign against Persia begins with a description of the crossing of the river Halys (1.75–2.86.1).[15] Before Cyrus the elder entered the country of the Massagetae, the question was raised whether or not to cross the river Araxes to give battle to the queen of Massagetae; for the King had received a message from the queen that warned him off crossing that river (1.206–207).[16] The idea of the sea as a barrier, if not even as an enemy, can well

13 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.14.

14 Scheliha (1931): 18–42, Fritz (1967): 48–76, Marzolff (1994): 347–362. For the Herodotean polemic against the Ionic notion of Ocean, seen as a river which flows around the whole world, see 2.21.1; 4.8.2; 4.36.2.

15 Myres (1953): 83.

16 Croesus, as adviser, begins by describing the wheel of fortune in all human affairs (general *gnome*), thereby implying that he cannot give advice on whether Cyrus will be victorious (i.e. he refuses to pronounce upon the question of general advice), and finally advises crossing the river, since this will save the empire even if Cyrus should be defeated (specific advice, which is accepted). Hdt. 1.207. A definite pattern of advice has been noticed within Herodotus' narrative, and in its full form it consists of three main parts: gnomic sayings

be exemplified by the advice given by Artabanus to Xerxes at the Hellespont, warning him off the dangers of that branch of sea: 'As for the sea, there is no harbour anywhere, as far as I can tell, with the capacity to shelter this fleet of yours in the event of a storm and so keep your ships safe. In any case, you do not need just one such harbour, but a lot of them, all along the coastline you will be sailing past. Since there are no adequate harbours, then, it is important to see that chance controls men rather than men controlling chance' (7.49).[17] The preparations for Xerxes' campaign emphasise the river motif through the story of the canal near Mt. Athos and the account of the bridging of the Hellespont (7.22–25 and 33–37). Finally, at Plataea the battle itself begins with the crossing of the Asopus, which separated the Greek military position from that of the Persians (9.59.1).

As Horden and Purcell have noticed, the earliest texts on which the history of Mediterranean narratives depends—Herodotus, Thucydides, and their precursors—are explicitly concerned with the settling of disputes on political demarcations through warfare:[18]

> The Greek historians of the fifth century BC had already conceived of the past as a sequence of 'sea-powers' or thalassocracies, with the secret of imperial success residing in control of the connecting medium. The prime example was Athens in the fifth century, binding together many dozens of scattered settlements across the Aegean Archipelago and on the inaccessible coasts of that sea, by virtue of being, as a contemporary put it, 'the Power that rules the Sea' ([Xenophon] *Constitution of the Athenians*).
> p. 24

Connectivity and isolation are two faces of the same coin (the sea). The sea gives power to one state through connectivity, while its islands are not penetrable by another state (insulation). So a big power exploits the connectivity; at the same time the insulation of individual islands, which are subject to that state, prevents them to have somewhere else to turn. In theoretical terms insularity is closely connected with sea powers, in the sense that the Aegean islands for

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embodying a certain view of the world, a general warning often of a negative kind and a specific advice dealing with a practical problem and usually embodying a positive plan. Cf. Immerwahr (1966): 74–75. Land and sea are read by Pelling (1991): 136–140 as elemental forces, which Xerxes faces, something supernatural, or even magical.

17 Transl. by R. Waterfield. In the course of the speech Artabanus points out also the dangers coming from land.

18 Horden-Purcell (2000): 18–22. Cf. Momigliano (1990): 29–53.

their particular geographical configuration were thought as naturally depending upon a thalassocratic state.

It is very telling that Thucydides includes a digression on the succession of thalassocracies within his *archaiologia*: this suggests that past events are conceived in the light of the historian's understanding of his own times, that is on the basis of the paradigm of the rise and fall of the Athenian empire.[19] The mention of Agamemnon, who could not have power at sea if he, as *epeirotes*, did not hold a fleet (1.9.4), is striking because it is the first attestation of that contraposition between people living in countries and islanders which recurs throughout Thucydides' narrative. Moreover, this suggests the idea of an almost 'natural' subjection of islands and islanders to continental powers. In fact, the weakness and lack of self-sufficiency of islanders is frequently associated to the strength of a sea hegemon.[20] This conceptual linking of insularity with weakness and the idea of a weak position of the islands forming the political network of the Aegean area are first attested in Herodotus (8.111).[21] And further evidence on this topic comes from the Old Oligarch. The author draws direct links between the state of insularity and the lack of self-sufficiency and self-determination, especially in relation to the possibility of forming territorial unions as ways to resist a sea power: 'those subject to a naval power are unable, in so far as they are islanders, to unite the city-states. The sea separates them, and the holder of supremacy is just master of the sea' (2.2).

The sea with its network of islands has been understood, thus, with reference to either connectivity or isolation that it causes. The islands are extremely important and dangerous at the same time, because they create an ideal bridge between lands; therefore they may be used as bases for military expeditions. The most famous episode expressing such an understanding is Demaratus' advice to Xerxes to occupy Cythera as the only way to destroy Sparta: 'There is an island off the coasts called Cythera, and Chilon, the wisest man ever born

19 We learn that initially it was Minos who ruled the sea (1.4); later the Carians and Phoenicians occupied the Aegean islands (1.8). Agamemnon is presented as ruling many islands (1.9.4, recalling Hom. *Il.* 2.108); finally, after the mythical times, Polycrates is said to have subdued islands (1.13.6). Cf. Hdt. 3.122.2. It is controversial whether or not any Minoan thalassocracy really occurred, and whether the relative tradition found also in Herodotus (3.122.3) might imply any historical reliability. However, aside from that, Thucydides while speaking of the mythical age is retrojecting there his fifth-century understanding of the nature of the Athenian empire and its economical grounds, such as the control of islands and the repression of piracy which made offshore sailing safe. Bearzot (2009): 104.

20 Constantakopoulou (2007): 101–102.

21 Constantakopoulou (2007): 113–114.

in Lacedaemon, once remarked that the Spartiates would be better off with the island at the bottom of the sea rather than sticking out of it. He was always expecting trouble from it—in fact, exactly the kind of trouble I am describing. I do not mean that he foresaw your expedition, but he was worried about anyone sending a convoy, no matter who. So your men should use the island as a base from which to make that worry real for the Lacedaemonians. With their own private war on their doorstep, there is no danger of them coming to help while the rest of Greece is being conquered by your land army …' (Hdt. 7.235).[22] Cythera was for Sparta what the islands of the Saronic Gulf were for Athens.[23] Probably the acme of speculation on sea connectivity is to be found in the fourth century and in the reflection of the Old Oligarch: 'and if we are to recall smaller advantages too, it is through the rule of the sea that the Athenians have been quick to research the varieties of good living, mixing with different peoples in different places: whatever is pleasurable in Sicily or in Italy, in Cyprus or in Egypt, in Lydia or Pontus or the Peloponnese, or anywhere else, it is all gathered into one place—through the rule of the sea' (2.7).

But let us turn, in particular, to the concept of the sea as a barrier. The sea provides islanders with a sense of distance and self-defence, so that they may fear enemies only from sea (κατὰ θάλασσαν).[24] Herodotus shows clearly this view about islands, seen as secure places, in the account of the conquest of Asia Minor first by the Lydians and then by the Persians.[25] Though the historian might echo facts and debates that took place at the time of the subjugation of Asia Minor, Herodotus' vision appears to be rather close to that kind of 'island rhetoric' which the Athenians adopted during the Archidamian war.[26] Presumably inspired by the example of the Second Persian war, when they moved their children and wives to the neighbouring island of Salamis (Hdt.

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22 Transl. by R. Waterfield. It took time, however, before the use of Cythera as a base for offensive against Sparta came into effect, and that happened during the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. 4.53–56). On the importance of Corcyra and Cythera in Thucydides' narrative see also Bearzot (2009): 102.

23 In the fifth century Aegina became a 'dangerous island.' Plutarch relates that Pericles called Aegina the 'eyesore of Piraeus' (*Per.* 8.5), and the same expression is used by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1411 a 15). Cf. Strabo with reference to another off-shore island, Psyttaleia (9.1.14 c 395). For further examples of 'dangerous' islands see Constantakopoulou (2007): 118–119.

24 Thuc. 3.39.2.

25 He particularly states that when the Lydians first started to subjugate the Ionian cities of Asia Minor, the islanders did not fear; they were at first indifferent to events on the mainland (1.143.1).

26 Cf. Constantakopoulou (2007): 121–123.

8.60 b), the Athenians in the 450s started the process of insulation of their *asty*, by building new walls running from the *asty* to the harbour, the Piraeus.[27] This project was probably the starting-point of a wide debate on the perception that the Athenians had of their own space. The Long Walls, in providing security from external attacks, suggest the image of Athens as that of an island. Safety becomes an essential component of that self-image as an island. Pericles, who asserts the importance of sea power, says: 'if we were an island, could any be more invulnerable than us?' (Thuc. 1.143.5).[28] The Old Oligarch maintains that the only disadvantage for Athens is indeed not to be an island: 'if the Athenians ruled the sea as islanders, they were able to do harm, if they wanted to do so, without being injured themselves, as long as they ruled the sea, thus without having their own country devastated and without having to be assailed by the enemies' (2.14–16). The metaphor of 'Athens-island' shows perhaps its 'extreme' form in Themistocles' words, which represent Athens herself as a ship. When the Corinthian Adeimantus accused him not to have any *polis* (ἄπολι ἀνδρί), Themistocles replied that his *polis* and land were the men on board his ships (Hdt. 8.61.2).[29]

Spartan occupation of Decelea has been rightly read as the final stage of the process of insulation of Athens. Thucydides' remark that, as a result of the Decelean occupation, Athens 'instead of a *polis* became a fortress (φρούριον)' (7.28.1) suggests, in fact, that the previous stages of her insulation did not modify the structure of the *polis* (*chora* and *asty*), while now Athens has lost one of her components, and namely her *chora*.[30] Besides, we have just suggested that in Thucydides' narrative the Decelea-topic appears as closely connected with Sicily (above); now it is possible to better define that pattern (Decelea

27 Cf. Constantakopoulou (2007): 143.

28 At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, Pericles promoted a defensive strategy. Instead of confronting the enemy outside the walls to protect their countryside, the Athenians stayed inside their walls and ignored the devastation of their *chora*. The consequence of this kind of strategy was the abandonment of Attica and the concentration of the rural population within the walled *asty*. Cf. Thuc. 1.143.3–5, 2.13.2 and 65.7.

29 In so answering he seems, moreover, to dissociate the concept of *polis* from that of countryside of Attica. It has been suggested that Themistocles' original plan consisted in a complete evacuation of the *asty* and in the transfer of the whole population to Piraeus; therefore, the construction of the Long Walls, which included the Athenian *asty* in the wall circuit, is a sort of modification of Themistocles' original strategic plan (Cf. Thuc. 1.93.7). So Constantakopoulou (2007): 141.

30 Constantakopoulou (2007): 150–151. The scholar has emphasised that 'this final stage of insulation of Athens was *not* the result of an internal Athenian decision, but rather imposed on the Athenians from the circumstances of war.'

~ Sicily), by suggesting that an 'almost-island,' Athens, entered into conflict with an 'almost-mainland,' Sicily. In Thucydides' view the island of Sicily is a *sui generis* place for size, numbers of inhabitants, and territorial unity: it shows the peculiar characters of a land power, other than those typical of a sea power.[31] And in spite of its size—says Thucydides—the island is separated from the mainland *only* by two miles of sea;[32] it comes, thus, close to being a country. It seems to me that it is indeed with this picture in mind that Thucydides compares the Sicilian expedition with the Peloponnesian war.[33] In other words, Sicily would be almost like the Peloponnese itself. The 'Decelea = Athens (island) ~ Sicily (mainland) = Peloponnese pattern makes the two hegemonic powers in Greece, Sparta and Athens, similar to each other and closely related.

While for Thucydides the Decelea-topic is expression of the last phase of the insulation process of Athens which a land hegemon (Sparta) forced upon her, in the *HO*, as well as in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, the topic seems rather connected with a probable underestimation of insularity and sea hegemony. Xenophon's statement that the war that is going to break out (the Corinthian war) is something greater even than the Sicilian expedition is indeed illuminating, because, on the one hand, a continental war is clearly considered a much more difficult enterprise than a war at sea, and, on the other hand, Thucydides' Decelea ~ Sicily pattern seems to be questioned and definitely abandoned (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπὲρ νησιωτῶν ἢ Συρακοσίων οὐδ' ὑπὲρ ἀλλοτρίων … *Hell.* 3.5.14): it is replaced by a new one, that of Decelea ~ Thebes. The Decelean pattern appears, in fact, as occurring in the Oxyrhynchus historian's text to emphasise and give reason for the growth of Thebes: 'The Thebans had advanced greatly towards complete prosperity as soon as the war between Athens and Sparta began. For when the Athenians began to move against Boeotia, those who lived in Erythrae, Scaphae, Scolus, Aulis, Schoenus, Potniae and many other such places which had no walls, were gathered into Thebes and doubled her size. 4. And indeed it happened that the city fared even better when, with the Spartans, they fortified Decelea against the Athenians. For they bought up the slaves and the rest of the stuff captured in the war for a small price, and, since they lived in the neighbouring areas, they carried home all the equipment from Attica, starting with the timber and the tiles of the houses' (17.3–4).


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31 Thuc. 4.59–64. 6.33–34. 6.86.3. Cf. Bearzot (2009): 109.

32 Thuc. 6.1.2.

33 Thuc. 6.1.1.

Why then should the Oxyrhynchus historian go back to the Decelean war here again, at this stage of the narrative (17.3–4), if he had already dealt with the topic previously? Presumably because, with the benefit of hindsight, he realised that the last phases of the Peloponnesian war, following the occupation of Decelea, led to a change in the balance of powers that allowed a continental power like Sparta to hold hegemony over both the Aegean Sea and the Greek mainland. Statistical data show that the *HO* gives peculiar attention to land scenarios; which confirms this new historical perspective. The examination of the toponyms recurring in the *HO*'s texts (the *Cairo papyrus*, the *Florence papyrus* and the *London papyrus*)[34] demonstrates that only a small percentage (even though considerable) refers to sea operations (17%), while the biggest portion of toponyms comes from both the Asiatic scenario (35%, Agesilaus' Asiatic campaign) and the Boeotian (35%):



Without any doubt some of fifth-century patterns go on to be still actual in the fourth century too. And the sea appears not to have completely lost its attractiveness as a topic of debate. The famous exultant shout of Xenophon's soldiers as they caught sight of open water after a long march back through the mountains of eastern Anatolia—'thalatta, thalatta' (Xen. *An.* 4.7.24)—is a clear proof of the understanding of the Black Sea as a medium for connecting people.

Also for the Oxyrhynchus historian the sea—here the Sea of Marmara—is a network of communications, if it allows Agesilaus, who reached the coast

34 Greek terms and expressions have been then grouped according to broad geographical patterns as far as possible; but note the concept of 'Hellas,' which is hard to categorise.

from the inland territory of Asia, to transfer safely the booty elsewhere (Cyzicus) and to put in touch various comparts of the Greek army that were located in Asia (22.4). If the sea is understood as a means to stock up with supplies (22.1), the river looks like a kind of helpful fellow-traveller guiding Agesilaus' army in its march. Agesilaus' march throughout the Asiatic mainland follows a path which is parallel to the course of the Rhyndacus river (22.3). In other cases the crossing of a river (the Sangarion) may be exhausting for the soldiers (22.2), or even dangerous; this is the case when Agesilaus encamps behind the Maeander river, and makes a sacrifice asking the god whether he should cross the river or not, and, thus, whether he should go ahead with his march or lead his army back (12.3). The river motive here, as in Herodotus, hints at a demarcation line, the crossing of which would mean indeed the starting-point of an aggression. The same topic can be found in Xenophon's narrative too (5.3.3), where a surprising nuance is found: the river as a boundary zone maintains the role of limes even though its bed has dried up (4.2.15)! Like the sea, the river may become dangerous too, especially when it flows within a city. The Spartan military intervention against Mantinea in 385 BC shows that the city was conquered after the Spartans stopped the outflow of the river; the level of the water rose above the foundations of the houses and above those of the city wall. At the end of the story, Xenophon gives a warning for the future: 'it was a campaign which taught people at least one thing, and that is not to let a river run through the walls of one's city' (5.2.4–7).

Turning to the sea, the Aegean scenario in Xenophon's *Hellenica* shows considerable complexity.[35] The motive of 'dangerous island' forming a bridge between lands and a base for military expeditions recurs both in the *HO*'s and in Xenophon's narrative.[36] At the time of Spartan occupation of Decelea, Athens was damaged by enemy devastations of the islands that sided with her (P. Oxy. V 842, 7.4). Aegina was the base of the Spartan harmost, Milon, in the period preceding the Corinthian war (8.2), and in 389 BC the Spartan Eteonicus carried out raids against Athens from this island (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.1–2). The island of Rhodes, under the control of Conon, was so sensitive to the events of the mainland (disorders occurred against Conon's leadership at Caunus) that it consequently revolted too (20.3–4). Conon used Melos and Cythera as bases against Sparta (*Hell.* 4.8.7–8).

35 The first two books, and especially the fourth book; but see also the naval operations of 376/375 at the end of book 5 (5.4) and at book 6 (6.2).

36 This echoes Thucydides' vision of sea hegemony.

The case of Corcyra is particularly interesting, as the island is well situated for leading operations towards the Gulf of Corinth; it is, moreover, a good base for raids on Spartan territory, on Epirus, and for journeying along the coast route from Sicily to the Peloponnese (*Hell.* 6.2.9). The omphalic position of Corcyra within the Mediterranean area, as appears in Xenophon's narrative, might suggest that the island had been replacing the centrality of Athens in the perception that Greeks had of their physical space. It is true that Xenophon's passage on the coastal route from Corcyra to Sparta and Sicily (*Hell.* 6.2.9) may echo, even *verbatim*, both the Corcyrean speech (1.33 and 36) and the following Athenian response (1.44), as given by Thucydides. In fact Xenophon's statement that 'no other state except Athens herself could produce more ships and more money than Corcyra' (6.2.9) recalls very closely Thucydides 1.33: 'we [*the Corcyreans*] are, after you, the greatest naval power in Hellas.' Furthermore, the Corcyrean ambassadors, after listing those advantages that Athens would get by allying with the island, add that 'Corcyra lies in an excellent position on the coastal route to Italy and Sicily, and is thus able to prevent naval reinforcement coming from there, or going from the Peloponnese to these countries' (Thuc. 1.36). In this way Xenophon's understanding of Corcyrean insularity might appear as already prefigured by Thucydides' narrative. Nonetheless the views of the two historians are pretty different. For, according to Thucydides, after the Corcyreans (and the Corinthians) deliver their speeches, the Athenians believe that it is time to intervene, especially in consideration of the fact that Corcyra lies 'very conveniently on the coastal *route to* Italy and Sicily' (Thuc. 1.44). According to Xenophon, for the Corcyreans their island is particularly important because well situated for the coast *route from* Sicily to the Peloponnese (εἰς Πελοπόννησον *ἀπὸ* Σικελίας παράπλου, 6.2.9). The shift in direction suggests also a shift in perspective. It looks as if the axis of Mediterranean is conceived now, in Xenophon's times, as shifted towards west, from Athens to Corcyra.

This is not surprising if we consider that the rhetoric itself of 'the island of Athens,' found in Thucydides, had been fading in the course of the fourth century. In the narrative of the last phases of the Peloponnesian war (the first two books of the *Hellenica*) Xenophon uses Agis' thoughts and words to make it clear that Sparta had to intervene as soon as possible to stop the dangerous consequences of the insulation of Athens: 'from Decelea Agis could see the ships carrying grain that were constantly sailing in to Piraeus, and he remarked that there was no use in his men going on spending so much time in cutting the Athenians off from their land unless it were possible also to control the sources from which food was being brought in to them by sea' (*Hell.* 1.1.35). And as a result of that war, the Thucydidean paradigm is completely reversed: the island of Athens is finally besieged by land and sea (*Hell.* 2.2.10).

Admittedly, Thucydides' rhetoric on sea hegemony occurs near the end of Xenophon's *Hellenica*,[37] and it is at best exemplified by the *topos* of 'Athens-island.' The Athenian complete dependence on sea is emphasised throughout a speech that Procles of Phlius delivered at Athens after the first invasion of the Peloponnese by Epaminondas (369 BC). Athens is described as surrounded with islands that are weaker than her: πλεῖσται γὰρ πόλεις τῶν δεομένων τῆς θαλάττης *περὶ* τὴν ὑμετέραν πόλιν οἰκοῦσι, καὶ αὗται πᾶσαι ἀσθενέστεραι τῆς ὑμετέρας (*Hell.* 7.1.3). Furthermore, the suggestion that in naval actions the Athenians would risk wives, children, and even the whole state (7.1.7) seems to recall indeed Themistocles' conception of his *polis* as well as the metaphor of 'Athens-ship.' Despite these echoes, however, fifth-century rhetoric on sea power is unfitting to Xenophon's times, because it is now related to the idea that Athens and Sparta ought to share the supreme command (sea command would be given to Athens and land control to Sparta). This idea is however unrealistic, for it does not suit the policies that were adopted by Athens and Sparta in the late 370s; it is also anachronistic in recalling the Cimonian rhetoric of the lame Greece without one of the two legs (Athens and Sparta) and Leptines' warning of a blind Greece if deprived of one of the two eyes (Athens and Sparta).[38]

Aside from the old-fashioned rhetoric on sea power echoed in the last two books of Xenophon's *Hellenica*, the sea often appears as a limit in Xenophon's narrative. This is apparent especially when the issue about Athenian supplies is under discussion. The Athenian dependence on sea suggested by Procles' speech itself (though it is delivered with a different mood, and a different aim, that is to emphasise the importance to holding sea hegemony) gives the extent of the limits imposed by the sea, especially in war times (*Hell.* 7.1.1–11). Further examples come from the first two books of the *Hellenica*: Agis blocked Athenian grain supplies by sending Clearchus to Byzantium and Chalcedon (1.1.35); Lysander in the Hellespont intercepted the Athenian merchant ships coming out of the Pontus (2.1.17) and occupied Lampsacus, an Athenian ally 'full of wine and grain and other supplies' (2.1.19); the Athenians at Aegospotami were depending on Sestus to stock up with supplies (2.1.25). Furthermore, being an island may also mean being mostly poor. Xenophon mentions islands as example of poverty in comparison with the mainland, which is instead an

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37 At the end of book 6 (6.5.33–49) and at the beginning of book 7 (7.1.1–14) Xenophon deals with issues related to land and sea hegemony and, particularly, with the idea of a division of responsibilities between Athens (a sea power) and Sparta (a land power). Athens is described as the city for which the exercise of naval power is something naturally ordered.

38 See below, ch. 7.

effective source of wealth: 'as for money'—says Polydamas of Pharsalus—'we surely should be likely to enjoy a greater abundance of it, for we should not be looking to *little islands* (νησύδρια) for our revenues, but drawing upon the resources of peoples of the continent (ἠπειρωτικὰ ἔθνη). [...] It is by drawing upon the resources, not of the *islands*, but of a continent, that the King of the Persians is the richest of mortals' (6.1.12).

Important features of fourth-century debate over hegemony have emerged thus far. A bivalent understanding of the sea is indeed noteworthy: the sea is seen as mainly a limit; otherwise, it may be a sort of connecting network. Besides, the Decelea ~ Thebes pattern suggests that great attention is now addressed to land scenarios by both the Oxyrhynchus historian and Xenophon. Although the sea has not lost its attractiveness yet and is still important in Xenophon's reflection on issues of hegemony, new themes and topics emerge, which are connected with new forms of continental power. This last aspect will be dealt with in the next section.[39]

6.3 τὸ συμπολιτεύειν: Thebes versus Boeotia?

As we have seen in the first section, the excursus on Theban prosperity refers to the period of the Decelean war (17.3); it is part of a broader ring composition narrative on the dispute between Boeotians and Phocians (16–18).[40] That conflict gives an opportunity to the Oxyrhynchus historian to speak of the Boeotian institutional system at the time of that war (16).

The management of both local affairs and federal policy is explained throughout two sections which are correlated by parallelisms: εἶχεν δὲ τὰ πράγματα τότε κα[τὰ τὴ]ν | Βοιωτίαν οὕτως κτλ. and τὸ δὲ τῶ[ν Βοι]|ωτῶν τοῦτον ἦν τὸν τρόπον συντεταγμένον κτλ. (ll. 383–384 and 391–392). In Boeotia all cities were governed through four councils that were concerned solely with local policy, and formed a sort of local government restricted to property classes, possibly even just to the hoplite class.[41] Each of these, in rotation, acted as a probouleutic body, which brought proposals before the other three, and resolutions adopted by all four councils became finally valid.[42] As regards federal policy the

39 See also ch. 7.

40 See ch. 2.

41 Bruce (1967): 158.

42 The text suggests, in fact, that the three councils voted separately and that one negative vote was sufficient to prevent the adoption of any measures. Bruce (1967): 103.

whole area was arranged in eleven divisions,[43] each of them providing one boeotarch, sixty councilors, one thousand hoplites and one hundred cavalry. In proportion to the number of its magistrates, each community shared in the common treasury,[44] paid taxes, and appointed jurymen.[45] It is common opinion today that the Boeotian federal council was a four-part type as the local councils (though the Oxyrhynchus historian is silent on this matter),[46] even though its decisional procedure might have been quite different from that of the local councils. For the supreme authority seems, in fact, to be held only by the boeotarchs, who moreover do not appear to conduct any probouleutic action.[47] The four-council system was oligarchic, and its nature is made clear by the provision that not all citizens could serve on the councils, but only those who met what the Oxyrhynchus historian vaguely describes as 'a certain property qualification.'[48]

It is interesting to notice that some aspects of the constitutional history of Athens in the last part of the fifth century and the first half of the fourth seem to be inspired by the Boeotian model. According to Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia*, sponsors of antidemocratic changes in Athens during the confused days of the 411 oligarchic coup proposed an arrangement closely reminiscent of the Boeo-

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43 Thebes (which included Plataea, Scolus, Erythrae, and Scaphae), Orchomenus, Hysiae(?), Thespiae (with Eutresis and Thisbae), Tanagra, Haliartus, Lebadea, Coronea, Acraephnium, Copae, Chaeronea. Seven of them (Thebes, Haliartus, Coronea, Copae, Thespiae, Tanagra, Orchomenus) are known from Thucydides 4.93. Some changes, however, took place in the course of time (447–395), for we know that until after 424 Chaeronea was subjected to Orchomenus, and there are also doubts about the independence of Hysiae. In fact, Meyer (1909): 95 thought that Hysiae depended on Orchomenus in 395. Cf. Paus. 9.24.3, Étienne-Knoepfler (1976): 215–233, Lérida Lafarga (2007): 569–570. Furthermore, 'Hysiaens' might indicate the inhabitants of Hyettus, in the north of lake Copais, rather than the inhabitants of Hysiae, near Plataea. Cf. McKechnie-Kern (1988): 157.

44 That τὰ κοινά (l. 409) refers to the federal treasury was first maintained by Glotz (1908): 271–278.

45 P. Oxy. 842 16.2–4.

46 McKechnie-Kern (1988): 157. Cartledge (2000): 397–415. The Thucydidean passage 5.38.2 ('the boeotarchs communicated these resolutions to the four councils of the Boeotians which have supreme authority'), which concerns the alliance between Boeotia, Corinth, Megara and Chalcis of 421/420, led the first editors of the papyrus to misinterpret the organisation and functions of the federal council, and to assume that the supreme authority rested with the state councils, which Thucydides refers to (and not with the federal council). Cf. Bruce (1967): 158–159.

47 Thuc. 5.36–38. Orsi (1974): 54–58.

48 Cf. Larsen (1955 a): 1–6.

tian federal system, that would have provided a four-council system, in which each council would have sat in turn.[49] This has been thought to be a feature of a theory-based system, that is to say, the Boeotian confederacy and Athenian four-council plans were 'part of a more extensive oligarchic movement' widespread all over Greece.[50] Yet, it is difficult to be sure of this, especially in consideration of the fact that the Aristotelian *boule* does not always have full powers (unlike the Boeotian); furthermore, the Athenian oligarchic constitution seems to have preserved deliberative procedures that were typical of Cleisthenes' democratic system.[51] In addition, the second Athenian league (378–337 BC), that was inspired by the 'democratic' principles of *autonomia* and *eleutheria* of Greek cities—which means for each state self-determination in constitutional and international affairs[52]—, appears to have modelled its legal organisation on the federal legal system of the Boeotian confederacy. The presumable existence of a joint tribunal of the Athenians and the allies (κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθην[αίο]ις καὶ τ[οῖς] συμμάχοις)[53] seems, in fact, to recall the system of federal judges mentioned in the *HO*, who were sent proportionally to the federal council (16). Note also the mention of the *synedroi* of the allies in the decree of the second Athenian league (ll. 43–44), and the technical term, *synedria*, used to name the Boeotian councils in the *HO* (ll. 412–413).[54] In speculative terms the text of the *HO* might have been a source of inspiration for Aristotle and his circle;[55] yet it may well be that the inspiration came from real life and experiences, not just from historiographical writings; for the Athenians sought models for new institutional patterns and solutions to re-affirm in acceptable ways (to their allies) the city's 'renewed' hegemonic aspirations in the fourth century. Moreover, including in her second league also federal states, Athens seems to give her own response to that difficult issue whether federalism might be consistent with the autonomy of city-states.[56]

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49 Arist. *AP* 30.3. This system was not implemented and was intended for the future (Arist. *AP* 31.1).

50 Larsen (1955 b): 47. Cf. Sordi (1968): 74, Lérida Lafarga (2007): 527. Cf. Thuc. 4.76–96.

51 Arist. *AP* 44–45. Cf. Lanzillotta (2001): 123–124.

52 Accame (1941): 4.

53 Cargill, ll. 57–58. The text of the decree of Aristoteles (second Athenian league) hints at judicial measures against any violation of the agreement. See TOD *GHI* II, 123, p. 65.

54 Cf. Bruce (1967): 163, Orsi (1974): 45–48, Cargill (1981); TOD *GHI* II, 123.

55 Lanzillotta (2001): 123–124. Prof. Dreher pointed me out that the *HO*'s expression τῆς ἡ|συχίας καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης καὶ [πρ]οαγαγεῖν ἐπὶ κτλ. of the passage on Athenian *polypragmosyne* (7.2; see ch. 5.1) recalls closely lines 10–11 of the decree of the second Athenian league: ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν.

56 Dreher (1995): 171–200; Bearzot (2004): 73–84.

For his part, the Oxyrhynchus historian appears as influenced by a political vocabulary redolent of Thucydides,[57] that he uses together with technical terms typical of Boeotian institutions: not just *synedria* but also *boule* and *bouleutai* (ll. 412, 433, 405), and not just *boiotarchos, boiotarches* but also *archontes*, archon[58] (ll. 394, 399, 404, 408).[59] The word 'boule' might appear as a generic word, not technical, for it was used since the Homeric age to indicate any council of elders.[60] Newertheless its use made by Athenian historians[61] casts light on the ambiguity of the meaning of this term. Such an ambiguity is found, for instance, in Xenophon's *Hellenica*. Relating the civil war set off by the oligarchs of Sicyon (367 BC), when the Boeotian confederacy was of 'democratic' type,[62] the historian narrates the story of the Sicyonian Euphron. After obtaining a force of mercenaries from Athens, he seized power at Sicyon, even though a Theban governor still held the acropolis. Realising that so long as the Thebans were in the acropolis, he could not control the city, he got together money and went to Thebes to bribe the Thebans and make them banish the aristocrats from Sicyon. But the Sicyonian oligarchs heard of his plans and set out for Thebes as well. Here they saw him associating in a most friendly way with the Theban officials (*archontes*), and murdered him on the acropolis while the Theban officials and the council (*boule*) had been holding a session there. The officials brought this criminal action before the council, and demanded the right to inflict on the Sicyonians capital punishment (*Hell.* 7.3.1–12). According to Xenophon, thus, a *boule* and *archontes* held power at Thebes. If this passage is referring to the Boeotian federal council (and not to the Theban city-council, as the majority of scholars maintains),[63] then it is clear that those words are not properly used here. It would rather enforce our suspect that Xenophon might

57 Thucydides uses *boule* and *boulai* with reference to the Boeotian confederacy as it was after 447 (5.38.2).

58 The singular form archon is quite problematic, for it was judged by the first editors a synonym for boeotarch, but was explained later as 'arconte federale.' See Orsi (1974): 45–48.

59 Cf. Roesch (1965): 126–128, Orsi (1974): 29–30, Lérida Lafarga (2007): 543 and 549 ff. At chapter 15.2 the Oxyrhynchus historian calls *synedria ton archonton* the oligarchic assembly that sat at Rhodes before the Athenian coup.

60 Hom. *Il.* 2.53; cf. *Od.* 3.127.

61 See the Athenian council of 500 created by Cleisthenes (Hdt. 9.5; cf. Aristoph. *Vesp.* 590, Antiph. [6] 40), Argos' council (Hdt. 7.149), and Thebes' council (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.29).

62 The Boeotian confederacy inclines toward oligarchy from 447 to 387/386, while from 378 it inclines more toward democracy. Cf. above, ch. 3.1, Cartledge (2000): 397–415, Beck (2000): 331–344.

63 Orsi (1987): 125–144.

have overstated and emphasised Theban responsibilities (compared to those of the federal government) throughout his narrative. A reader who applies to the chapter of the outbreak of the Corinthian war (395 BC, *Hell.* 3.5) easily notices that, according to Xenophon, the most responsible for that war were especially 'the Thebans' (3.5.3). But, to be precise, in that period Thebes was part of the Boeotian confederacy, as it was from 447 BC to 387/386 BC, therefore politically the city could not act alone. Furthermore, with reference to the period of the 'democratic' confederacy (after 378 BC), Xenophon uses rarely the word *Boiotoi*,[64] and in any case he does so without giving the term any political connotation.[65]

The *HO*'s statement 'depending on the number of its magistrates, each community shared in the common treasury, paid its taxes, appointed jurymen, and shared equally (μετεῖχον κτλ. ὁμοίως) in public burdens and benefits' (16, ll. 408–411) has been judged as controversial, for the text appears to combine in 'a strange and artificial way [...] the preponderance of Thebes with the claim to equal standing.'[66] Indeed, the degree of dependency of Boeotian cities is difficult to define. An attempt of classifying cities from the archaic to the classic period has been suggested by Hansen, who, according to criteria such as 'autonomy' and possession of own territory, distinguishes between 'certainly,' 'probably,' and 'possibly' *poleis*, and *komai*.[67] Furthermore, he believes that there existed a sort of hierarchy among *poleis*, and that the top position was held by Thebes (sovereign city). Only sovereign cities ('large' *poleis*) would provide boeotarchs, councillors, soldiers, and jurymen, whereas cities depending on a sovereign one ('little' *poleis*), and whose territory was comprised within that large *polis*, would not be represented in the federal council.[68]

Though Bruce assumed that also after 427 BC, when Thebes controlled four wards (against the previous two),[69] the confederacy was well-balanced in terms

64 *Hell.* 5.4.34 and 62; 6.1.10; 6.3.19; 6.4.4 and 9; 6.5.23 and 51; 7.4.36; 7.5.4.

65 *Hell.* 6.4.4 and 9; 6.5.23 and 51; 7.4.36; 7.5.4. Orsi (1987): 125–144.

66 Ehrenberg (1969): 123.

67 Hansen (1996 a): 73–116.

68 Hansen (1996 a): 74–77. In particular, in reference to chapter 16 of the *HO*, the scholar maintains that in the period between 446 and 386 Acraephnium, Copae, Chaeronea, Haliartus, Hyettus (Hysiae?), Lebadea, Orchomenus, Plataea, Coronea, Tanagra, Thebes and Thespiae were *poleis*; before 446 also Scolus, Erythrae, Scaphae, and Thisbae were *poleis*; so Hansen (1995): 13–63. The issue of local and federal citizenship for small towns and *komai* is controversial. Cf. also Lérida Lafarga (2007): 530–531.

69 Thebes would probably gain the right to appoint two further boeotarchs after the capture of Plataea in 427, so that she controlled two wards for the city, and two for Plataea, Scolus,

of administration of power,[70] from the *HO*' text it is clear that Boeotian policy was the policy of the ruling party in Thebes.[71] In fact the narrator explicitly ascribes the conflict between Phocians and Boeotians (as well as the Corinthian war, 16–18) to the Theban plot of the pro-Athenian group led by Androcleidas and Ismenias; there is also further evidence, coming from the narrative displacement of the sixteenth and seventeenth chapters, that reinforces this reading. In a circular way the description of the confederal structure and related competencies starts with Thebes, which is the first city to be listed among the eleven divisions (Θηβαῖοι μὲν τέτταρα⟨ς⟩ συνεβάλλοντο, δύο μὲν ὑπὲ[ρ τῆς]| πόλεως, δύο δὲ ὑπὲρ Πλαταιέων καὶ Σκώλου καὶ Ἐ̣ρ̣[υ]θρῶ[ν] | καὶ Σκαφῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τῶν πρότερον | μὲν ἐκείνοις συμπολιτευομένων, τότε δὲ συντε|λούντων εἰς τὰς Θήβας, 16.3, ll. 394–399), and ends with the statement that the council and the common assemblies of the Boeotians sat on the Cadmea (τὸ μὲν | οὖν ἔθνος ὅλον οὕτως ἐπολιτεύετο, καὶ τὰ συνέδρια | {και} τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἐν τῇ Καδμείᾳ συνεκά|θιζεν, 16.3, ll. 411–413). Furthermore, the seventeenth chapter, recalls the preceding (16) by referring to the Theban *stasiasmos* and adopting similar phrases (Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Φωκεῖς τούτου τοῦ θέρους εἰς | πόλεμον κατέστησαν. ἐγένοντο δὲ τῆς ἔχθρας αὐτοῖς | [α]ἴτιοι μάλιστα τῶν ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις τινές· οὐ γὰρ πολλοῖς | [ἔ]τεσιν πρότερον ἔτυχον εἰς στασιασμὸν οἱ Βοιωτοὶ | προελθόντες, 16.1, ll. 379–383, and, ἐν δὲ ταῖς Θήβαις ἔτυχον οἱ βέλτιστοι καὶ γνω|ριμώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρη|κα, στασιάζοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους, 17.1, ll. 414–416). Chapter 17 then goes back to the Decelean times, when another party (pro-Spartan) controlled Thebes; it ends with a sentence that provides readers with a synthesis of that deliberate comparison between Boeotian and Theban affairs which is found throughout the narrative of both chapters 16 and 17: τὰ μὲν ο]ὖν πράγματα τὰ κατ[ὰ | τὰ]ς Θήβας καὶ τ[ὴν Βοιωτίαν εἶχεν] οὕτως (17.5, ll. 464–465).

Thebes controlled the places, called *choria*, that were formerly in the Plataean sympolity (Scolus, Erythrae, Scaphae and some others),[72] and that now

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Erythrae, Scaphae and some other small towns, which along with Plataea had previously formed one single state. Bruce (1967): 105 and 158. Cf. Lérida Lafarga (2007): 560 ff.

70 Bruce (1967): 163.

71 Demand (1982): 37–38; McKechnie-Kern (1988): 157–158.

72 The period in which these towns became subject to Thebes is difficult to establish. However, the chapter on the Decelean war (17) gives some help. Here it is told that the inhabitants of Scolus, Erythrae and Scaphae, 'as soon as the war between Athens and Sparta began' (17.3) and fearing an invasion by Athens, migrated to Thebes along with peoples of Aulis, Schoenus and Potniae; this has led scholars to suggest 431 or, alternatively, 427 as possible dates for their subjection. Cf. Bruce (1967): 106.

were subjected to her (τότε δὲ συντε|λούντων εἰς Θήβας, 16.3). It is interesting here the use of the word *sympoliteia*, that—unlike *synteleia*, which refers to dependency of a little locality towards a bigger one, without any possibility of self-determination[73]—hints at a new concept of federal association made (at least in programmatic terms) on equal grounds.[74] It appears for the first time in Xenophon's *Hellenica* in reference to the Olynthian confederacy[75] and gives us a clue for further considerations. Xenophon provides us, in fact, with precise information about that federal system and its institutional aspects: federal citizenship and common laws,[76] sharing of incomes from markets and harbours,[77] shared rights of *epigamia* and *enktesis*,[78] military alliance.[79] In comparison with the polis-system the *koinon* has, thus, higher resources, a broader territory, a stronger military and demographic power. But aside from those guarantees of shared rights, the issue that a citizen of Acanthus raised before Spartan assembly in the 380s, concerning Olynthus' menaces against Thracia,[80] shows that

73 *Sympoliteia* and *synteleia* originally and theoretically refer to distinct political structures, though in the epoch of the forming of the Boeotian confederacy of 378 they appear rather as complementary features of the process of political unification of Boeotia. See Beck (2000): 331–344.

74 Cf. Lérida Lafarga (2007): 565–566. The Greek term used to name federal associations before the fourth century is *ethnos/genos* or *koinon*. Cf. Consolo Langher (1996): VIII–XVIII.

75 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12–19. The historian does not distinguish between the foundation of the confederacy and its expansion in 382. The Chalcidian league existed presumably already in the archaic period (Arist. *Pol.* 2.1274 b 23 ss.), but it is attested with certainty in 479 (Hdt. 8.127) and in 432 (Thuc. 1.58.2). See De Salvo (1968): 47–53, Consolo Langher (1996): 11–65.

76 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12.

77 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.16.

78 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.19.

79 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.13.

80 However, Cligenes is aware that, despite the initial imposition suffered by the Chalcidian cities, the federacy might definitely lead all adherent cities to advantageous conditions because of solidarity and reciprocal dependency: 'the cities which have been forced against their will to share a common citizenship with Olynthus will soon revolt if they see that there is any opposition. But this league may not be so easy to dissolve once the various peoples have become closely bound to each other by intermarriage and by property relationships (which have been already voted) and once they recognise that it pays to be on the side of the winner …' (5.2.18–19). A similar situation is, moreover, envisaged by the speech that Jason of Pherae delivered to Polydamas of Pharsalus: 'if you were under compulsion, you would be planning to do all the harm to me you could, and I on my side should be wanting to keep you as weak as possible. But if I persuade you to join me of your own accord, obviously we shall both do whatever we can to strengthen each other' (*Hell.* 6.1.7).

the Chalcidian league was however a coercive system, resulting from the expansionism of Olynthus.[81] Was Olynthus, then, like Thebes?

The parallelisms noticed in chapters 16 and 17 of the *HO* (above) between Boeotian and Theban affairs might be explained with the narrator's aim of distinguishing Boeotian responsibilities from those of Thebes: the federal system would have been a very well balanced one if it had not been undermined internally by the expansion of Thebes. The Thebans' expansionist goals are, moreover, well exemplified by their claim to represent the Boeotian confederacy as a whole on more than one occasion, when Greek talks for a common peace took place in 386, 375, and 371 BC.[82] And, for his part, Xenophon is well aware of Thebes' hegemonic aspirations, and in particular of her responsibility in causing the outbreak of the Corinthian war; he expresses a political evaluation which is quite similar to that given by the *HO*:

> In Thebes the leading men were well aware that the Spartans would never break their treaties with their allies, unless someone committed an act of war first. They therefore induced the Opuntian Locrians[83] to levy money from some territory of which both they and the Phocians claimed to be the owners. The Theban view was that, if this happened, the Phocians would invade Locris, and in this they were quite right.
>
> *Hell.* 3.5.3

> They [*those with Androcleidas and Ismenias*] thought that it would be difficult to attack them openly, since neither the Thebans nor the Boeotians would ever be persuaded to make war on the Spartans, who were supreme in Greece. This was the trick they used to lead them into war: they persuaded certain men among the Phocians to launch an attack on the territory of the western Locrians.
>
> P. Oxy. V 842, 18.2

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81 Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12–19. The contraposition between federal-system and *polis*-system is expressed well on a terminological level through the opposition (in Cligenes' words) between συμπολιτεία and αὐτοπολῖται. The latter is in fact a hapax indicating the aspirations of Acanthus to be governed by her own laws: βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι καὶ αὐτοπολῖται εἶναι (5.2.14). Bearzot (2004): 48–49.

82 In 386 Agesilaus forced the Thebans to concede autonomy to the Boeotian cities. Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.7–9. In 375 and 371 (before Leuctra) Thebes was excluded from the peace agreements. Cf. Xen. 6.2.1; 6.3, Diod. 15.38, 15.50.4. Cf. Orsi (1987): 125–144, Bearzot (2004): 93–107. As for scholarly disagreement on the concept of *autonomia* in reference to the status of Boeotian cities, see Keen (1996): 113–125 and Hansen (1996 b), 127–136.

83 The eastern Locrians.

It is, thus, possible to infer that the Oxyrhynchus historian is replying to Xenophon's evaluation of Theban growth and giving a more detailed account of the activism of the leading party at Thebes by inserting a broad digression on the causes of the Corinthian war (16–18). Probably he feels the necessity to clarify the issue of responsibilities and to distinguish Thebes' political action from that of the confederacy.

6.4 Conclusion

The examination conducted thus far gives new evidence on issues pertaining to sea and land hegemony. The picture drawn in this chapter shows that the Oxyrhynchus historian and Xenophon distance themselves from Thucydides' reading of the Athenian empire and Athens' hegemonic aspirations.

Historical patterns have changed: Thucydides' Decelea ~ Sicily pattern, which is expression of Athenian hegemonic aspirations at sea, is abandoned and replaced by a new one, that of Decelea ~ Thebes. The association of the same subject (Decelea) within the account of the outbreak of the Corinthian war is proof that both the Oxyrhunchus historian and Xenophon give an unprecedented attention to continental scenarios and related happenings.

The sea is seen as a barrier, a network of communications, a means to isolate people, a limit. This conclusion is due to a broad examination of some historiographical patterns (the sea and the river seen as a barrier, the importance of thalassocracy, the 'insulation' of Athens, etc.); some of them go back a long way till the Ionic thinkers and characterise several passages of Herodotus' *Histories*; others are very telling especially in reference to Thucydides' view of Athens. Admittedly, these patterns are still valuable to the Oxyrhynchus historian as well as to Xenophon: the sea has not lost its attractiveness at all, if Xenophon even mirrors the old-fashioned rhetoric on the importance for a state to holding sea hegemony. Nonetheless, the sea shows now its ambiguous nuances in connecting and isolating people. The Decelea ~ Thebes pattern suggests that great attention is addressed to land scenarios; new themes and subjects emerge as well, such as federations and other forms of continental power.

6.5 Analytical Description of the Toponyms Occurring in the *HO*

Occurrences:

Toponym	Occurrences
HELLAS	3
ATTICA	
Aegina	3
Athens	2
Attica	2
Decelea (Attica, 2+1 adj. Decelean war)	2
Piraeus (Attica)	1
Thoricus (Attica)	1
SPARTA	
Pylos	1
Sparta	1
BOEOTIA	
Acraephnium	1
Aulis	1
Boeotia	5
Cadmea (Thebes)	1
Chaeronea	1
Copae	1
Coronea	1
Daulis	1
Elatea (the plain round)	1
Erythrae	2
Eutresis	1
Haliartus	1
Hyampolis	1
Hysiae	1
Lebadea	1
Locris	2
Orchomenus	1
Parnassus (Mount)	1
Pedieis (the plain round)	1
Phanotis	1
Phocis	2
Plataea	1
Potniae	1
Scaphae	2
Schoenus	1
Scolus	2
Tanagra	1
Thebes	7
Thespiae	1
Thisbae	1
ASIA MINOR	
Apia (the plain of)	1
Cappadocia	1
Cayster (river and plain)	1
Celaenae	2
Cilicia	2
Cius in Mysia	1
Dascylium	1
Ephesian territory/ Ephesus	3
Gordium	1
Hellespont	2
Lake Dascylitis	1
Leonton Cephalae	1
Lydia	3
Maeander (river and plain)	2
Magnesia	1
Miletou Teichos	1
Mysia	2
Mysian Olympus	2
Paphlagonia	2
Phrygia (Greater/ Hellespontic)	8
Priene	1
Ryndacus (river)	1
Sangarion	1
Sardis	3
Thebes (the plain of, in Asia)	1
THRACIA	
Amphipolis	1
Thasos	1
IONIA, SYRACUSE, EGYPT?	
Caunus (8+2 adj. Caunian, with reference to a river and a lake)	8
Clazomenae	1
Coressus (harbour)	1
Cyprus	1
Cyzicus	2
Kilbian (plain)	1
Notion	1
Phoenicia	1
Rhodes	4
Sinope	1
Syracuse	1

Occurrences grouped according to geographical areas		Percentage[84]
Hellas	3	2.30 %
Attica	11	8.46 %
Sparta	2	1.53 %
Boeotia	45	34.61 %
Asia Minor	45	34.61 %
Thracia	2	1.53 %
Ionia, Syracuse, Egypt?	22	16.92 %

84 The percentage is approximate, since I give only the first two numbers of the decimals.

CHAPTER 7

Historiography and Hegemony

This chapter arises from the previous and discusses further aspects of Greek debate about hegemony. There are themes that were shared by both historians and orators, and there is a common interest in land scenarios and land hegemony that makes the Oxyrhynchus historian's view very close to Xenophon's. Traces of such an interest can be found again, later, in Diodorus Siculus. Might Diodorus have read his fourth-century sources, directly or indirectly? Do the three historians reflect the terms of a genuine debate, independently? Both the possibilities may be true, and the second suggestion, of course, would not be excluded if the first were right.

Diodorus is particularly important in that he allows us to cast light on the *HO*'s historiographical practice: he gives accounts which have parallels in the *HO*; he resorts to a kind of vocabulary and uses narative patterns which are also traceable in the Oxyrhynchus historian's text. Here we intend to focus on a particular aspect, that is a certain tendency of Diodorus' narrative to simplify the language of politics and to give generic labels (i.e. *oligoi* ~ *polloi*) to the parts at stake in politics. This feature has its roots in Greek historiography, and especially the Oxyrhynchus historian adopts such a way of simplifying the language of historiography.

7.1 Sparta, or the Undisputed Hegemony

Xenophon seems to develop the idea that a state holds hegemony only if it holds sea and land power at the same time. Several instances suggest this assumption. The historian makes the Spartan Callicratidas say to Conon: 'I am going to put a stop to your fornication with the sea. It belongs to me' (*Hell.* 1.6.15).[1] The fact the Sparta has sea and land control is clearly brought out by the case of Corcyra (375 BC): 'the Corcyreans were now in a desperate position. Because of the enemy's superiority on land, they were getting no food in from their farms, and because of his naval superiority they were importing nothing by

1 In the harbour of Mytilene (Lesbos) Conon is cut off from land and stopped at sea by Callicratidas (*Hell.* 1.6.16–19). It seems that the Spartans have fulfilled their hegemonic potential: this is testified by the dispute over leadership on sea that arose between Callicratidas and Lysander's friends (*Hell.* 1.6.4–6).

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sea' (*Hell.* 6.2.8). Even after the Spartans lost their sea hegemony in the battle of Cnidus (394 BC), they continued to be perceived as a menace at sea by the Athenians: 'it now (390 BC) appeared to the Athenians (νομίσαντες) that the Spartans were once again growing powerful on the sea …' (*Hell.* 4.8.25). Echoes of this theme can be found in Isocrates and in later writers. The orator says in his *Panathenaicus* that the Spartans 'made peace with the man who had led an army against them and who had purposed to annihilate both these cities utterly and to enslave the rest of the Hellenes—with such a man, I repeat, though *they could easily have conquered him on both land and sea*, they drew up a peace for all time …' (157–158).[2] Polybius, listing the states that contended for sypremacy in Greece, mentions Sparta as the only power which held an *undisputed* hegemony (ἀδήριτος), consisting in land and sea control.[3] Furthermore, Spartan victory at Aegospotami is recalled by Diodorus as one that happened both on land and at sea.[4]

In Xenophon's discussion about hegemony one suggestion is particularly striking: it is easy especially for a land power to get control over sea; sea hegemony to some extent appears as a 'natural consequence' of holding land power. This is what the argumentation of Jason of Pherae shows:

> 10. As for the Athenians, I am quite sure that they also would do anything to become allies of ours, but I myself am not in favour of entering into friendly relations with them, because, in my view, I should find it even easier to take over power on sea than on land, 11. and I think that the following considerations will show you that my calculations are reasonable. It is from Macedonia that the Athenians get their timber, and, with Macedonia under our control, we shall clearly be able to build many more ships than they can. And as for manning these ships, it seems reasonable to suppose that here, too, we, with our large population of first-rate serfs, will be in a better position than the Athenians. The same is true with regard to supplying the crews. Is it not likely that we, who have so much corn that we export it abroad, shall be better able to do this than the Athenians, who have not even enough for themselves unless they buy it elsewhere? 12. Financially, too, it seems clear that we shall be in the stronger position; we do not look to wretched little islands for our revenues but can draw upon the races of a continent; for, once there is a Lord of Thessaly, all the

2 The peace of Antalcidas (386).

3 Polyb. 1.2.3. Cf. Diod. 14.10.1 and 13.1.

4 Diod. 11.60; Plut. *Mor.* 464 e.

> peoples around us pay tribute. And I am sure you know that the reason why the King of Persia is the richest man on earth is that he gets his revenue from a continent and not from islands. Yet I think that it would be easier to subdue him than to subdue Greece. For I know that in Persia everybody except for one man is educated to be a slave rather than to stand up for himself, and I know to what extremities the King was brought by comparatively small forces—the one that marched with Cyrus and the one with Agesilaus.[5]
>
> *Hell.* 6.1.10–12

The passage is part of a more extensive speech (6.1.1–16) that Polydamas of Pharsalus delivered at Sparta, as proxenos of that city. His town was menaced by the expansionism of Jason of Pherae, which was directed against the Thessalian *koinon*, therefore Polydamas asked Sparta for help. This extract offers a speech that Jason had previously delivered to Polydamas (a speech within another speech). Jason's argumentation emphasises the superiority of a land power, in terms of number of populace, military resources, supplies and control over sea. According to this view, being no more than a sea power means weakness, the necessity of importing supplies and raw materials, and dependence on poor islands.

Polydamas makes clear Jason's political aims around 375 BC:[6] to get support from Pharsalus and the cities depending on her in order to become *tagos* of Thessaly.[7] Polydamas goes back home without the Spartan support he has asked for, and after the battle of Leuctra (371 BC) Jason will be elected as *tagos*.[8] At that time Jason goes to Boeotia and, as ally of Thebes, plays the role of moderator between the parties at stake (Thebes and the anti-Theban coalition),

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5 Transl. by R. Warner.

6 Sordi (1958): 169–177; Momigliano (1966): 424 f. Some scholars assign the speech to 371. So Accame (1941): 93 ff.; Mazzarino (1966): 367–368.

7 Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.8. It is not clear whether the subjection of Macedonia has happened at the time in which the speech is delivered, or whether it is rather a plan for the future: we find in fact the present participle *ἔχοντες* μέν γε Μακεδονίαν … πολὺ δήπου πλείους ἐκείνων [*the Athenians*] ἱκανοὶ ἐσόμεθα ναῦς ποιήσασθαι (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11). Isocrates speaks of a temporary control over Macedonia by Thessaly ([5] 20). Cf. Arr. *An.* 7.9.4. What is clear from Jason's own words is that he has already got numerous Thessalian and Epirotan allies, as well as an alliance with the Boeotian confederacy (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5; 7; 10).

8 Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.18; 7.4.28. In 373 Jason is *symmachos* of Athens (Dem. [49] 10); but the alliance is soon broken (cf. Polyaen. *Strat.* 3.9.40 on a presumable truce between Jason and Iphicrates), and Jason's name is erased from the stele of Nausinicus. Cargill (1981): 84 ff.

discouraging all from further fighting.[9] His policy recalls that of the Persian King in the past: Jason prevents Thebes from annihilating Sparta 'with the aim of keeping the two powers in opposition so that each one of them should need his help' (*Hell.* 6.4.25). And indeed, Jason's later plans of invading Greece seem to be foreshadowed in Polydamas' speech: 'Yet I [*Jason*] think that it would be easier to subdue him than *to subdue Greece*' (6.1.12). Jason is very close to the fulfillment of his plans against Greece when, returning from Leuctra, he destroys Heraclea's fortifications; an explicit satement about Jason's goals is made by the narrator (6.4.27):

> Clearly this was not because he was under any apprehension that, with this pass open, anyone might march against his own dominions; what he really had in mind was the possibility of some power seizing Heraclea and her narrow pass and so being able to impede him from marching wherever he wanted to in Greece.

The pre-eminent personality of Jason probably drew the attention of Xenophon's contemporaries, and this may explain why Xenophon felt the necessity to digress from his main narrative for an entire chapter to make Jason explain his motivations through his own words (*Hell.* 6.1.19). Jason's story shows well that the old dualism Athens-Sparta is to be abandoned. This is a very good point, because it appears to contradict the Thucydidean rhetoric concerning the importance of being a sea power that we have just found in the last two books of Xenophon's *Hellenica* (see above, ch. 6).

Yet there is no contradiction if we approach the issue in different terms. In the fourth century both historians and orators used historiographical patterns which did not necessarily fit specific circumstances and/or audiences. Greek debate about the preeminence of a sea power or a land power gave life to various patterns on the issue of hegemony. Let us take the cases of Lysias[10] and Isocrates:[11] they continue to emphasise the theme of an enduring superiority of Athens due to her control over sea; this theme is not actual anymore in the fourth century and echoes closely Herodotus' arguments.[12] Or think of Xenophon who makes the unrealistic old Cimonian rhetoric revive. It becomes important thus to question to what degree *events* overturned those paradigms,

9 Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.20–25; Diod. 15.54.5.

10 [2] 44.

11 [4] 93–94; 98; 139–141.

12 Hdt. 7.139 and 9.7.11.

and *how* the Athenian audience still thought about them. For there is a mismatch between events and the representations that both historians and orators made of them. Perhaps the most striking proof of this mismatch is to be found in Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, which in the 380s exhorts Athens to lead a crusade against the Persians.[13] Given the King's peace (peace of Antalcidas, 386 BC) and the fact that Athens is at the head of a panhellenic alliance—the second Athenian league—made in respect of that peace agreement, Isocrates' protreptic statements appear highly unfitting to his times in terms of feasibility.

The last part of Xenophon's *Hellenica* (from book 6.3 to book 7.1) forms what scholars have called the 'Athenian section,' an account mainly focused on Athens, which emphasises the hope for a rapprochement between Athens and Sparta.[14] This section offers that 'national' characterisation of Athens as a city that thanks to her magnanimity assists the wronged and oppressed, victims of aggressions; the topic is in fact redolent of the image of the city given by Herodotus in his eight book.[15] The speeches contained in this Athenian section have been widely studied, and two main approaches have been taken: scholars have debated whether they fit the occasion in which they are delivered, and thus whether they are reliable from a historical and political perspective;[16] differently, the speeches have been considered as expression of Xenophon's moral and philosophical outlook.[17] Most scholars agree that the notion that Athens and Sparta ought to share hegemony would reflect Xenophon's own political view: from being an ardent supporter of Sparta the historian would gradually have come to cherish the idea of an Atheno-Spartan co-operation; he would give Athens the credit for this new political agenda.[18]

Yet, the two speeches delivered by Procles of Phlius that come from this presumed Athenian section (*Hell.* 6.5.38–48 and 7.1.1–11) show at best the extent of that mismatch between politics and historiographical representations of them. The register adopted sets straight how unrealistic that rhetoric of co-operation is when measured against the realities of the 370s, and this also makes it hard to assume that the proposal of co-operation between Athens and

13 Cf. Flower (2000): 65–101.

14 Schepens (2001 b): 81.

15 Hdt. 8.142.3. Cf. Gray (1989): 110–111.

16 Cf. Schepens (2001 b): 81–96. This section has been also studied according to the perspective of historiographical intertextuality: Marincola (2011): 1–31, Baragwanath (2012): 317–341, Pelling (2013 b): 13–16.

17 Gray (1989): 112–131.

18 Cf. Schepens (2001 b): 96. See also Luppino-Manes (2000): 161–192.

Sparta, in the form of its historiographical representation, was one supported warmly by Xenophon himself.[19] For the true course of events will not see an enduring development of that policy of rapprochement; although immediately after the first speech of Procles was delivered the Athenians decided to send Iphicrates to the Peloponnese in aid of Sparta (once the Thebans had invaded the Peloponnese after the battle of Leuctra[20]), nevertheless his intervention resulted in utter failure (*Hell.* 6.5.49–52). Furthermore, after the second speech delivered by Procles, though the Athenians were initially enthusiastic about his proposal (the Athenians, having command of the sea, should turn over the Spartans the supreme command on land), nonetheless they voted for an unrealistic proposal: Cephisodotus suggested to Sparta and Athens to share hegemony in turn for five days each (*Hell.* 7.1.12–14). So a further question is to be raised now, that is, how might Xenophon's contemporary readers respond to that rhetoric?

Procles' speeches (*Hell.* 6.5.38–48 and 7.1.1–11) are delivered within a short distance of time and on the occasion of two meetings, the one more informal,[21] the other formalising the alliance between Athens and Sparta.[22] The speeches should be read together as a rhetorical piece written according to a model drawn from epideictic oratory.[23] The first speech contains in fact *exempla* from the Athenian mythical and 'national' tradition, while the second offers realistic-pragmatic hints to pursue a real policy.

The pragmatic section occupies Procles' second speech. It suggests that Athens and Sparta should share the supreme command, but this appears highly unrealistic and anachronistic and recalls closely the Cimonian rhetoric of the lame Greece without one of the two legs (Athens and Sparta),[24] as well as

19 Cf. Luppino-Manes (2000): 179.

20 The Athenians called a meeting of the assembly according to a resolution of their council because they were concerned about the Spartans. It happened that there were Spartan and other Peloponnesian ambassadors in Athens who could attend the meeting and make their view known.

21 Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33–48.

22 Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.1–114.

23 Luppino-Manes (2000): 168.

24 Plutarch, quoting the poet Ion of Chios as his source, relates that Cimon on the occasion of Sparta's request for aid to Athens against her helots in revolt (the third Messenian war) exhorted his citizens 'not to suffer Hellas to be crippled (χωλήν), nor their city to be robbed of her yoke-fellow (ἑτερόζυγα)' (*Cim.* 16.8). The metaphor χωλός-ἑτερόζυξ is well known to Aeschylus. He uses it in the *Persians* with reference to the two women (symbolising Greece and Persia) under Xerxes' yoke, who appeared in Atossa's dream (*Pers.* 181–197). The notion of a dual hegemony, which Athens and Sparta ought to share always standing together and

Leptines' warning of a blind Greece if deprived of one of the two eyes (Athens and Sparta).[25] For the Athenians on sea would risk their wives, children, and the entire state, just as much as the Spartans would if they met with one defeat on land (*Hell.* 7.1.6–7, and 10). The Cimonian idea of a concerted action between the two cities is, moreover, foreshadowed, even before Procles' speech, by the words of the Spartan ambassadors (6.5.34):

> They referred to those happy days when the two were acting in concert, reminding their audience of how together they had driven back the Persians and of how, when Athens was chosen by the Greeks to be the leader of the naval forces and the guardian of the common funds, Sparta had supported this decision; and of how Athens on her side had given her support to the unanimous choice of all the Greeks that Sparta should act as leader by land.

This sense of political unrealism contributes to the intellectual climate into which the proposal fits, hinting at a teleological vision of history. Procles' belief, 'this division of responsibility seems to be not merely a human expedient but something ordained by providence and by the way things are' (*Hell.* 7.1.2), is followed by two sections of parallel narration that deploy a spectrum of arguments, first for Athens' leadership at sea, then for Sparta's land control. In favour of Athens' sea command are her coastal position and proximity to weaker naval powers (islands), the harbours, the fleet, the tradition of seamanship, and the experience (7.1.3–7). For the Spartans' leadership Procles gives as arguments their inland position, their education system designed to produce soldiers, their training in obedience, their ability to muster a big force quickly, and the attraction of this for their allies (7.1.8–11). It looks as if the future, which here means resilience and salvation, is something that has been pre-ordered by both gods and nature.

The timeless character of this speech brings it close to the epideictic genre,[26] and along with the mythical *exempla* that occur in Procles' first speech (6.5.45–47) takes it back to a broader repertory of Athenian *praxeis*, presumably stimulated by the outcome of the Persian wars: these deeds were recalled

protecting each other as the true leaders of Hellas (Hdt. 9.26–28 and 60), dates after the battle of Plataea (479 BC) and is consistent with the Cimonian ideology (462 BC) traceable in Plutarch's passage. Flower (2000): 80 ff. Cf. also Pelling (2007 a): 95–96.

25 Arist. *Rhet.* 1411 a 4 f.

26 On the issue concerning literary genres in ancient times see Marincola (1999): 281–324.

by historians,[27] philosophers,[28] poets,[29] and orators[30] in both epideictic and funeral speeches.[31] They form a sort of mythical 'catalogue' which includes a mythical pattern and a historical component. The mythical pattern is substantially unaltered through time: the Amazons (sometimes associated with Eumolpus' Thracians), Adrastus, and the Heraclides; the historical component accommodates changes in the course of time, nevertheless it constantly begins by mentioning the Persian wars.[32]

Procles' first speech (6.5.38–48) can be divided in three sub-sections. The first consists of an acute political analysis about the realistic danger of a Theban attack against Athens once Sparta is out of the way (38–40). Here there is much deeper awareness of political realites in comparison with some chapters later, where Procles proposes the rhetorical image of 'Athens-island' (7.1.3). The notion of self-interest and advantage is the key for reading this first sub-section: συμφορώτερόν γε μεντἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βοηθήσαιτε ἐν ᾧ ἔτι εἰσὶν οἳ συμμαχοῖεν ἂν ἢ εἰ ἀπολομένων αὐτῶν μόνοι ἀναγκάζοισθε διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Θηβαίους … ('Also it would be more to your interest to help yourselves while there are still people to fight at your side than to wait until your potential allies are destroyed, and then be forced to fight the final battle against the Thebans entirely by yourselves'). Afterwards, the *exemplum* of Thermopylae is introduced to show Spartan fidelity to the alliance with Athens (second sub-section, 41–44). Finally Athens appears as the city that helps the victims of injustice (third sub-section, 45–47):

> 46. Now that is a fine story that is told about your ancestors—that they refused to allow the Argives who died in the famous expedition against the Cadmea to remain unburied. But you would be doing something finer still in not allowing these living Spartans either to be humbled or to be destroyed. 47. That was a fine action, too, of yours when you checked the arrogance of Eurystheus and saved the lives of the sons of Heracles; but it would be a finer one still if you saved not only the founders of the state but the whole state as well. […]

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27 Hdt. 9.27. Cf. Kierdorf (1966): 100–104, Loraux (2006): 103–117, Todd (2007): 149–157.

28 Plat. *Menex*. 239 b–c.

29 Aeschylus' *Persians* and Euripides' *Heraclides* and *Suppliant Women*. Cf. Macleod (1983): 140–158. Pelling (1997 b): 213–234, Bowie (1997): 39–62.

30 Lys. [2] 11–19; Dem. [60] 8; Isocr. [4] 54–70. Cf. Isocr. [6] 16–43.

31 Kierdorf (1966): 83–110. The scholar does not clarify what exactly he means with the expression 'Tradition des Katalogs der athenischen πράξεις' (p. 84), whether a written or an oral tradition.

32 Kierdorf (1966): 90.

The myth of the Heraclides shows that as in the past Athens had already saved the Spartans' ancestors, now again the Athenians intend to renew that ancient friendship by helping the Heraclides' descendants menaced by Thebes (45–48). Moreover, as in Isocrates' speeches,[33] also here the two mythical accounts (of the Seven against Thebes and of the Heraclides) suggest that after the Persian wars the Athenians helped Greek peoples *against* other Greek peoples in the common cause of freedom. Despite the fact that the myth of the Amazons (who at the head of the Scythians were trying to extend their dominion over Europe) belongs to that mythical pattern (Amazons-Adrastus-Heraclides), here it has been omitted; it presumably does not suit Xenophon's argumentation. In fact the myth of the Amazons might be understood by Greek audiences as recalling the two Persian invasions of Greece; it may also foreshadow new Persian attacks on Athens and Greece: this myth supports the idea that the Athenians *alone* acted in behalf of *all* Greeks.[34] But Xenophon is mainly concerned with the theme of a common cause of Greeks *against* other Greeks (Athenians and Spartans against Thebans). Thus the theme of the Persian wars, though mentioned, is differently conceived: it is reduced to the sole historical sample of Thermopylae to demonstrate Sparta's reliability in making effective the envisaged common co-operation (41–44).

History, tragedy, and oratory agree that Athenian generosity and compassion for the weak and oppressed are chief features of the 'character' of Athens. History and Attic oratory in dealing with that mythical pattern (Amazons-Adrastus-Heraclides), tend to replace the national heroes of Athens' remote past with a collective subject, 'the Athenians.' The ethnonym might be felt by the Athenian audience as closer to it than national heroes, hinting, as it does, at recent events. Perhaps a sort of civic ideology developed too, as we can deduce from the *epitaphios logos*.[35] Athenian funeral speeches, celebrating the war-dead, tend indeed to praise the city as a whole rather than any individuals. So whereas, for instance, in Euripides' play the war between Athens and Eleusis culminates in the tragic disappearance of the Athenian king Erechtheus,[36]

33 See below.

34 Isocr. [4] 68; Lys. [2] 21; Aeschyl. *Pers*. 233; Dem. [60] 10.

35 On the issue of how tragedy and *epitaphioi logoi* fitted into the Athenian civic ideology cf. Pelling (1997 b): 224–235 and Bowie (1997): 52.

36 Frr. 351–361 Nauck. In mythical times Athens went to war against Eleusis, which appealed to the Thracian king Eumolpus, son of Poseidon. The Athenian king Erechtheus killed Eumolpus in battle, but Poseidon to take revenge on that fact made the ground split with his trident, so that Erechtheus was swallowed up by earth. Cf. Lycurg. [1] 98; Isocr. [12] 193; Demar. *FGrHist* 42, F 4. Cf. Austin (1967): 11–67.

orators celebrate the heroic behaviour of the Athenians before Eumolpus' Thracians, without mentioning the name of the former king of Athens.[37] It is the Athenians who gave the Heraclides decisive help and not the mythical king Demophon who is celebrated in Euripides' *Heraclides*;[38] and it is again Athens, and not the mythical king Theseus, that won glory in the war against the Amazons or recovered the bodies of the seven chiefs fallen at Thebes.[39] Furthermore, the oration that, according to Herodotus, the Athenians delivered just before the battle of Plataea[40] lists a collection of inspiring mythical examples which fitted Athenian civic ideology; these themes are found also in fourth-century funeral speeches, and in particular in Lysias' *Funeral Oration* and Plato's *Menexenus*, as well as in Isocrates' *Panegyricus*:[41]

> Let us start with the Heraclides, whose champion the Tegeans remind us they killed on the Isthmus; all the Heraclides were doing was trying to avoid being enslaved by the Mycenaeans, but every Greek state to which they came refused them shelter, until we took them in; and then with their help we put an end to the brutal reign of Eurystheus, once we had defeated the armies of the people who inhabited the Peloponnese in those days. In the second place, let us take the Argives who had marched against Thebes with Polynices, and who lay there dead and unburied; it is our proud claim to have marched against the Cadmeans, recovered the bodies, and buried them in our own land, in Eleusis. Then there was the successful campaign of ours against the Amazons when they came from the river Thermodon and invaded Attica.[42] [...]
>
> HDT. 9.27

Aristotle considers the Athenian support for the Heraclides as one of three mandatory themes in an Athenian eulogy of Athens, in a sentence which puts the Heraclides third after the battles of Salamis and Marathon.[43] Surely at the time in which Xenophon wrote his audience no longer found the myth dis-

37 Isocr. [4] 68–70; Dem. [60] 8.
38 Lys. [2] 11–16; Isocr. [4] 54–60; Dem. [60] 8.
39 Lys. [2] 4–6; Isocr. [4] 54–60; Dem. [60] 8; Plut. *Thes.* 26 ff.; 29.4–5; Paus. 1.2.1; Euripides' *Suppliant Women*; Diod. 4.28; cf. 4.57.6.
40 This leaves no doubt to the ancient character of this pattern that spread at least as early as 430, that is when Herodotus' *Histories* was presumably published.
41 Todd (2007): 152–153.
42 Transl. by R. Waterfield.
43 Arist. *Rhet.* 2.22.6, 1396 a 12–14.

quieting in the way that about half a century before the audience of Lysias' *Funeral Oration* did. In Lysias' times the myth offers ambiguous nuances, for it hints at the link between the sons of Heracles and the Spartans and their the role played during the Peloponnesian war ('they [*the Athenians*] could not know what sort of men the boys themselves [*the Spartans*] were going to turn out to be,' 2.13). Nor would Xenophon's audience see any longer the Euripidean paradox that Eurystheus' Argives might eventually be allies,[44] while the descendants of those Heraclides would turn into bitter and ungrateful foes.[45] Now Xenophon's audience had probably in mind the most recent happenings after Leuctra that led Messene to regain her independence, and that made the myth of the return of the Heraclides resound in Isocrates' *Archidamus* (16–33, 364 BC). The peace talks of 367 BC between Thebes and some Peloponnesian states intended to impose the acceptance of Messene's independence to the other Peloponnesians. Disposed to comply with this demand a few Peloponnesians, led by the Corinthians, met in congress at Sparta to urge a different course.[46] Isocrates chose Sparta as the setting of his *Archidamus*. Archidamus, the son of the ruling king Agesilaus, rose in the assembly exhorting the Spartans to die rather than to abandon Messene, their rightful and hereditary possession, since the Heraclides had offered them that land. A clear echo of this is found in a passage of Xenophon's *Hellenica* which refers to the same talks: 'but for themselves, they [*the Spartans*] said they would never submit to the loss of Messene—the land *handed down to them* by *their fathers*' (*Hell.* 7.4.9).[47]

It seems thus plausible that Xenophon is influenced by rhetorical *topoi* circulating in his times and shares with Isocrates some of the main themes of the *Panegyricus* and *Archidamus*. In the *Panathenaicus* (343 BC) a Spartan sympathiser and ex-pupil of Isocrates blames the master for having restricted the

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44 But for a different audience Eurystheus might have been standing as proxy for the Peloponnesian league and, thus, for Sparta ('Eurystheus, together with those who at that time controlled the Peloponnese,' Lys. [2] 13). Cf. Todd (2007): 224.

45 Eurip. *Heracl.* 1032–1036. Cf. Pelling (1997 b): 227.

46 Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1–11. Cf. Malkin (1994): 33–45.

47 The myth of the Heraclides seems to retain its popularity still in the epoch of Philip. According to an inscription of the Achaean league, after the battle of Chaeronea (338 BC) Philip was presumably involved in an arbitration between Sparta and Megalopolis on the Sciritis and the Aegytis, which in the inscription are said to belong to the Arcadians since the return of the Heraclides: κ[αὶ ὅτι ἔκριν]αν οἱ δικασταὶ [γενέσθαι τὰν Σκιρ]ῖτιν καὶ τὰν Αἰγῦτιν Ἀρ[κάδων ἀπὸ] τοῦ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας εἰς [Π]ελοπόννασον κατελθεῖν. This is however the hypothesis of the editor, for the name of Philip is missing; see Piérart (2001): 27–41 and *Syll.* 665, ll. 34–35.

topics of his argumentation to Athens alone, and for having told those *fables* which *fall easily from the lips of everyone* (εἰ μὲν περὶ μόνης αὐτῆς ποιήσει τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ μυθώδη περὶ αὐτῆς ἐρεῖς ἃ πάντες θρυλοῦσιν, 237). It is clear that the ex-pupil refers here to the stories concernig Eumolpus' Thracians, the Amazons, and Eurystheus which Isocrates has just mentioned a few chapters before (193–194).[48] That mythic pattern, which appears also in the *Panegyricus* (56–60 and 68–70), offers themes that presumably were over-stressed by contemporary orators: the Spartan sympathiser says that Isocrates' speech appears similar to speeches composed by others (ὅμοια φανεῖται τὰ λεγόμενα τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων γεγραμμένοις, 237).

7.2 Diodorus and the Debate on Hegemony

The terms of Greek debate on collaborative developments recur again in Diodorus. This might be explained either with the fact that Diodorus derived directly or indirectly from the Oxyrhynchus historian and Xenophon, or with the assumption that all independently mirror the terms of a genuine debate.[49] In fact, although the possibility for an enduring Atheno-Spartan co-operation demonstrated to be highly unrealistic in the 370s, the debate on sharing hegemony, which presumably originated soon after the end of the Persian wars, still continues to be a matter of great importance in the fourth century BC and later.

The speech that the ephorus Endius (Diod. 13. 52–53) delivered at Athens after the Spartan defeat of Cyzicus (410 BC) contains a peace proposal which depicts Athens' internal politics in a similar way as the *HO* does.[50] We have already drawn attention (chh. 4.4 and 5.1) to a section of Diodorus' account of the defeat of Cyzicus (13.53.1–2) and noticed a sort of bipolar configuration of the Athenian political debate which finds parallels in a passage of the *HO* on

48 For the narrative devices used in the *Panathenaicus* see Gray: (1994 a), 223–271 and (1994 b): 99, note 14. See also Appendix, *2. History, Oratory and Their Audiences*.

49 Cf. Diod. 13.52.3–8. See also 11.50.1–8: in a meeting of the assembly the younger men of Sparta in 475 BC claimed that Sparta ought to hold both sea and land hegemony. They reminded the assembly of an ancient oracle that had warned Sparta to be aware of a lame hegemony, without sea or land power (Diod. 11.50.4). This passage might even adumbrate a pre-Cimonian ideal which dates back to the epoch of the Persian wars (cf. Hdt. 3.3 and 9.27).

50 Cf. Ruschenbusch (1981): 316–326, Sacks (1990): 93 and (1994): 213–232. Pesely (1985): 320–321 maintains that Endius' speech echoes that of Pericles (Thuc. 1.140–144). Cf. also, Parmeggiani (2011): 468, note 337.

Athenian politics: Diodorus' οἱ μὲν ἐπιεικέστατοι … οἱ δὲ πολεμοποιεῖν εἰωθότες καὶ τὰς δημοσίας ταραχὰς ἰδίας ποιούμενοι … and the Oxyrhynchus historian's γνώ]ριμ[οι καὶ χα|ρίεντες / ἐπ⟨ι⟩εικεῖς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες / πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοὶ (P. Oxy. v 842, 6.2–3).

Similarly, Endius' words appear to recall some of the themes which are common to the arguments given by both Procles and Jason in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, such as (a) the idea that for Athens safety/ruin comes entirely from the sea, (b) the topic of the poverty of islands, and the notion that (c) land hegemony is more profitable than sea control:

(a) ὑμεῖς δὲ τῆς θαλάττης ἐκβληθέντες οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἡγεμονίας πεζῆς, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ἀναστάσεως ἀγωνιᾶτε / 'if you are driven from the sea, contend, not for the supremacy on land, but for survival' (Diod. 13.52.6) ~ ὅτι ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἅπασα ὑμῖν ἤρτηται σωτηρία / 'all your safety depends upon the sea' (Procles, Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.6)
ὑμεῖς δὲ πολίτας ἔχετε τοὺς πλείστους ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν / 'you have on board crews most of whom are citizens' (Diod. 13.52.6) ~ ἀλλὰ μὴν τάς γε τέχνας τὰς περὶ ταῦτα πάσας οἰκείας ἔχετε / 'you likewise possess as peculiarly your own all the arts and crafts which have to do with ships' (Procles, Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.4)

(b) ὑμῖν δὲ οἱ πενιχρότατοι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην / 'for you the most poverty-stricken people of the inhabited world' (Diod. 13.52.4) ~ καὶ χρήμασί γε εἰκὸς δήπου ἡμᾶς ἀφθονωτέροις χρῆσθαι μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας, ἀλλ' ἠπειρωτικὰ ἔθνη καρπουμένους / 'then as for money, we surely should be likely to enjoy a greater abundance of it, for we should not be looking to little islands for our revenues, but drawing upon the resources of peoples of the continent' (Jason, Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.12)[51]

(c) ἡμεῖς μὲν ἅπασαν τὴν Πελοπόννησον γεωργοῦμεν … / 'as for us, we till the entire Peloponnese' (Diod. 13.52.4) and ἔπειθ' ἡμεῖς μὲν κατὰ θάλατταν πολεμοῦντες σκάφεσι πολιτικοῖς μόνον κινδυνεύομεν, ὑμεῖς δὲ πολίτας ἔχετε τοὺς πλείστους ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν. **τὸ δὲ μέγιστον**, ἡμεῖς μὲν κἂν κρατηθῶμεν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν πράγμασι, τήν γε κατὰ γῆν ἡγεμονίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἔχομεν / 'in the second place, when we make war at sea, we risk losing only hulls among resources of the state, while you have on board crews most of whom are citizens. And, what is the most important, even if we meet defeat in our actions at sea, we still maintain without dispute the mastery

51 Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.3: πλεῖσται γὰρ πόλεις τῶν δεομένων τῆς θαλάττης περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν πόλιν οἰκοῦσι, καὶ αὗται πᾶσαι ἀσθενέστεραι τῆς ὑμετέρας.

> on land' (Diod. 13.52.6) ~ [*the Spartans*] οἰκοῦσιν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ· ὥστε τῆς γῆς κρατοῦντες καὶ εἰ θαλάττης εἴργοιντο, δύναιντ' ἂν καλῶς διαζῆν / 'they dwell in the interior; hence, so long as they are masters of the land, they can lead a comfortable existence even if they are shut off from the sea' (Procles, Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.8)

The similarities between the two authors are striking, especially in reference to the opinion that even though Sparta suffered loss at sea, nevertheless the city would continue to flourish (κατὰ γῆν ἡγεμονίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἔχομεν/ἂν καλῶς διαζῆν). In addition, the opposition ἡμεῖς/ὑμεῖς in Endius' speech, which is often set in a strong position at the beginning of the sentence, aims to impress Endius' audience with the natural order of things (recalling perhaps Procles' claim ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ μᾶλλον ἢ θείᾳ φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ διωρίσθαι, *Hell.* 7.1.2)—that is, the weakness of a sea hegemon contrasted with the superiority of a land power—and, thus, to persuade the Athenians to come to terms with Sparta.

The uncertainty about chronology (410/409 BC according to Diodorus, 411/410 BC for Philochorus,[52] or 408/407 BC according to Androtion[53]) makes it difficult to understand the precise mood of the times which Endius' proposal refers to. Furthermore, Aristotle's evidence makes things more complicated, since it assigns the episode to a different moment, that is, the aftermath of the battle of Arginusae (406 BC, *AP* 34.1–2).[54] Scholars have judged Diodorus' and Aristotle's accounts as very close in reference to the idea of making peace and maintaining the *status quo*,[55] the intervention of the Athenian demagogue, Cleophon, against Endius' proposal, and the disastrous effects of the Athenian decision to refuse that alliance.[56] However, it would not be surprising if the

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52 *FGrHist* 328, F 139.

53 *FGrHist* 324, F 44. Cf. Luppino-Manes (2000): 139 ff. is inclined to accept Androtion's dating, especially in consideration of the fact that only after Spartan conquest of Megaris (Diod. 13.65.1) could Sparta return Decelea to Athens, as Endius' speech suggests, τὰ δὲ φρούρια τὰ παρ' ἀλλήλοις καταλῦσαι (Diod. 13.52.3).

54 Luppino-Manes (2000): 123–124.

55 ἔπειτα βουλομένων Λακεδαιμονίων ἐκ Δεκελείας ἀπιέναι καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἔχουσιν ἑκάτεροι εἰρήνην ἄγειν / 'when the Spartans were willing to evacuate Decelea on terms of both parties retaining what they held, and to make peace,' *AP* 34.1 ~ βουλόμεθα πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἄγειν εἰρήνην, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὰς μὲν πόλεις ἔχειν ἃς ἑκάτεροι κρατοῦμεν, τὰ δὲ φρούρια τὰ παρ' ἀλλήλοις καταλῦσαι / 'we want to be at peace with you, men of Athens, and that each party should keep the cities which it now possesses and cease to maintain its garrisons in the other's territory,' Diod. 13.52.3.

56 μετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἔγνωσαν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν / 'they realised their mistake not long afterwards,'

same narrative pattern were apllied to different episodes and times. Aeschines, for instance, mentions the refusal of a peace offering and the Athenian Cleophon as the responsible for that refusal ([2] 76), but unfortunately he does not date the episode. Therefore, though scholars believe that these assumed peace talks (the one would take place after the battle of Cyzicus and the other after the battle of Arginusae) should be reduced to a single episode,[57] the theme of 'pacification' might have become a sort of *topos* that fitted any circumstances well, one we expect to see developed in different contexts whatever the historical truth. Alternatively, there might have been several episodes in which Cleophon spoke against peace proposals.[58]

What is particularly noteworthy is the fact that, presumably after the battle of Cyzicus, Sparta could rely upon a number of moderate citizens at Athens, who probably aimed to lead their city and were in favour of Sparta. In fact, according to Aristotle's account of the installation of the Thirty (404 BC), while the oligarchs (*gnorimoi*) who belonged to clubs along with the exiles were eager for oligarchy, and the *demotikoi* wanted to preserve democracy, the notables (*gnorimoi*) who did not belong to any club, such as Archinus, Anytus, Clitophon, Phormisius and their leader, Theramenes, aimed to restore the ancestral constitution (*AP* 34.3). Unfortunately, because of a sort of language simplification found in historical works, through Diodorus' evidence we cannot

AP 34.2 ~ μετενόησαν ὅτε οὐδὲν ὄφελος / ' [*the Athenians*] repented of it when it could do them no good,' Diod. 13.53.3. Luppino-Manes (2000): 125–126.

57 Rhodes (1981): 424–425. See Bleckmann (1998): 402 and Rood (2004 a): 383–390.

58 The theme of pacification in the face of the strong opposition of the democrats led by Cleophon appears as a sort of fourth-century historiographical *topos*. At any rate, this does not necessary impugn the historicity of the Diodorean meeting after Cyzicus, since more than one episode might have really occurred, and have been related by using the same narrative cliché. Diodorus might have even moulded that historical account according to Thucydidean stylistical patterns; and he might also have injected there some topics related to a later debate, that on land hegemony, which—as we have seen—was central to the thought of both the Oxyrhynchus historian and Xenophon. In fact, if Diodorus appears to write with Thucydides in mind, nevertheless through Endius' words he expresses the idea, less developed in Thucydides, that a sea hegemon may be week if contrasted by a land power. I am pretty happy with the suggestion made by Rood (2004 a): 383–390. For this scholar the close intertextual similarities between the Diodorean account of the aftermath of Cyzicus and Thucydides' account of the Athenian response after Pylos orchestrated by Cleon (4.21, and further other Thucydidean passages) do not deprive Diodorus' report of its historical reliability. See also Bleckmann (1998): 402, who, instead, in denying the trustworthiness of Diodorus' account, speaks of 'ein künstliches Gegenstück,' an artificial, literary counterpart of Thucydides' narrative.

identify those persons who formed a pro-Spartan group at Athens. In fact, the historian assigns both democrats and moderates to a single group, and he does so in Endius' passage (Diod. 13.53.1–2) as well as later, with reference to the peace talks of 404 BC: οἱ γὰρ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ὀρεγόμενοι τὴν παλαιὰν κατάστασιν ἔφασαν δεῖν ἀνανεοῦσθαι, καθ' ἣν παντελῶς ὀλίγοι τῶν ὅλων προειστήκεισαν: οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι δημοκρατίας ὄντες ἐπιθυμηταὶ τὴν τῶν πατέρων πολιτείαν προεφέροντο, καὶ ταύτην ἀπέφηναν ὁμολογουμένως οὖσαν δημοκρατίαν / 'for those who were bent on oligarchy asserted that the ancient constitution should be revived, in which only a very few represented the state, whereas the greatest number, who were partisans of democracy, made the government of their fathers their platform and declared that this was by common consent a democracy' (Diod. 14.3.3). According to Diodorus, thus, all together, moderates and democrats, appealed to the traditional constitution of their forefathers.[59]

7.3 Political Realities and Historiographical Simplifications

It has been suggested that the episode of Endius' embassy fits the period following the battle of Cyzicus, when the Athenian oligarchs led by Pisander and connected with king Agis failed in their attempt to move on Athens from Decelea (Thuc. 8.71.2). And because the king ascribed all responsibilities for this failure to the Spartan government (8.71.3), it would be plausible that a new deal was at stake with the forming of a sort of Sparta-Athens axis.[60] Presumably this new deal was warmly supported at Athens by the notables, that is οἱ μὲν ἐπιεικέστατοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων of whom Diodorus speaks (13.53.1). Despite that, however, the historian simplifies the picture of the political divisions occurring at Athens near the end of the fifth century (cf. *AP* 34.3, above).

From Endius' passage (13.52–53) it is clear that Diodorus adopts some fourth-century labels; the phrasing of Endius' speech shows in fact the historian's familiarity with fourth-century words: think, for example, of the word *demagogos*, that first appears in the fourth century, or the superlative of *epieikes*, *epieikestatoi*, which is used with the same political meaning as that given by Aristotle: a category of peoples that contrast with the *demos*.[61] However, it is

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59 See ch. 4.4 and Appendix, *1. A New Supplement for Lines 31–32 of the Theramenes Papyrus* (*P. Mich. 5982*).

60 Especially if we accept Endius' hostility towards Agis and consider his kinship with Alcibiades. Luppino-Manes (2000): 133–134. Endius was son of Alcibiades. Mei (1997): 1026.

61 Differently, Thucydides, as well as, later, Xenophon, prefers the word *prostates* to indicate the champion of the *demos*. Diod. 13.53.1–2; 14.4.2; 16.32.2; 17.36.1. Cf. Zoepffel (1974): 69–90.

undoubtedly true that, although Diodorus is a Greek historian, he writes in the Caesarian age and therefore shares with his contemporaries a mode of analysis typical of Roman historians. Inspired by reading Greek historical works, Roman historians tend to simplify political realities reducing them to schematic and binary patterns. In Roman historiographical practice the Greek stereotypical *oligoi* ~ *demos* pattern is used to explain the history of party divisions at Rome between senate and people. Polybius makes the senate and the people two of the three vital factors (aristocracy, democracy and monarchy) of his vision of the Roman mixed constitution.[62] Similarly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus in describing the history of the early and middle republic follows the *boule-demos* antithesis. Cassius Dio adopts that schema as a favourite device for analysing late republican history. Sallust's view of the two main parts of the state (*pauci* and plebs) omits other categories, such as that of the equites. This is moreover close to Plutarch's representation of Roman politics.[63]

The Thucydidean vocabulary shows that the stereotypical opposition *oligoi* ~ *polloi/demos* was already adopted in the fifth century BC, often (though not always) with reference to Athenian politics. The last phases of the Peloponnesian war, that saw the allies' defection from Athens, are a good example (even if not the only one)[64] of how that categorisation, despite the fact that it simplified certain phenomena, could help a reader to understand political settings in states other than Sparta and Athens: *hoi oligoi* were mostly Spartan supporters, while *hoi polloi* were pro-Athenians. As Thucydides shows, in Greek cities' domestic policy the prevalence of the one part over the other relied upon the external support that it received.[65]

This binary opposition (*oligoi* ~ *polloi/demos*) which expresses moreover a view of Greekness as torn between the two main powers (Athens and Sparta)

Occurrences of *epieikes* (and cognates) in Diodorus pertain mainly to the ethical sphere, what is good and appropriate to circumstances, in terms of behaviour or speeches (1.93.4; 2.55.4; 5.34.1; 9.10.2; 11.59.3; 12.76.2; 14.105.3; 17.4.9; 31.9.4–7; 32.4.3; 37.13.2). See above, ch. 5.1.

62 He is, whilst a Greek historian, a Roman historian, in that his work is concerned with explaining the growth of Rome.

63 As has been noted, very few Roman writers applied the *boule-demos* schema so constantly and exclusively as Plutarch did. Pelling (2011 a): 208–236.

64 Take the statement (found within the Mytilenaean debate) that 'in all the cities the democracy [*demos*] is friendly to you [*the Athenians*]; either it does not join in with the oligarchies [*oligoi*] in revolting, or, if it is forced to do so, it remains all the time hostile to the rebels …' (Thuc. 3.47.2). Or consider the two factions, *oligoi* and *demos*, at war in Corcyra in 427 (3.74; 3.82). Still, think of the opposition led by the Argive *demos* against the *oligoi* in 418 (5.82). See ch. 8.5.

65 Cf. My article (2010): 23–43. Cf. Sancho-Rocher (1990): 195–215.

and as organised politically according to one of the two models is found in the Oxyrhynchus historian's text. Here we read that during the Decelean and the Corinthian wars, many cities were divided into pro-Athens (ἀττικίζοντες) and pro-Sparta (λακωνίζοντες) factions.[66] Furthermore, the dual schema (*gnorimoi kai charientes / epieikeis kai tas ousias echontes ~ demos / polloi kai demotikoi*) describing the groups operating at Athens before the Corinthian war echoes closely Thucydides' way of representing political realities. As in the case of Thucydides' terminology, in the *HO*, too, this binary schema does not do justice to the complexity of the political debate of the epoch, in which many different clubs (*hetaireiai*) and close political followers, οἱ περί τινα, were pretty relevant.[67] Scholars have maintained that party divisions such as that between the faction of Thrasybulus, Aesimus and Anytus (*hoi epieikeis*, 1.2) and the group led by Epicrates and Cephalus (*hoi polloi kai demotikoi*, 1.2) recall similar divisions between the Many and the Few. This association has been rightly considered as a very rough one, relying too much upon the modern concepts of Right, Centre and Left.[68] Strauss, for example, mentions Thrasybulus' political history to prove the ambiguity of the *HO*'s terminology; he explains: 'I question the classification of Thrasybulus as *epieikes kai ousias echon*. Compared to a Cleon or a Cleophon, Thrasybulus might have seemed like a spokesman of the Few, but he was no more so than Pericles had been. As a working hypothesis, let us assume that by *hoi polloi kai demotikoi*, P [*the HO*] means politicians in the tradition of Cleon, Hyperbolus, and Cleophon, who offered the *demos* fiery rhetoric (probably attacking the Three Thousand), state pay, and promise of speedily restoring the empire: in short, men whose style and sometimes substance were more populist (for want of a better word) than Thrasybulus' (p. 91). The scholar traces the existence of at least six groups in the immediate post-Peloponnesian war (those of the two Thrasybuli, of Steiria[69] and the Collytan, of Agyrrhius, Andocides, Archinus, and of Epicrates and Cephalus): six factions that competed for political power at Athens.[70] Politicians often changed, partially or totally, their opinions and coalitions on personal grounds and in connection with the 'changeable balances' of international politics. Take the case of Epicrates, for example, who according to the Oxyrhynchus historian was the leader of the

66 See 7.3; 17.1; 18.1.

67 Krentz (1982): 46 ff. See ch. 5.1.

68 Strauss (1986): 90–120.

69 Bearzot (1997): 328–329, maintains that the evidence from Lysias [13] 80–81 seems to dissociate Aesimus' activity from those of Thrasybulus and Anytus.

70 Strauss (1986): 92–104.

'populist many' in 395 BC (1.3), but later is found as fellow-ambassador of Andocides in the peace talks of 392/391 BC at Sparta.[71]

Furthermore, the Oxyrhynchus historian's statement that the Athenian supporters of the *status quo* in 395 BC, at the time of the Demaenetus affair (aimed to support secretly Conon in Asia), were 'the men of breeding and property' (1.3) is approximate and unsatisfactory. There were, in fact, many Athenians both of wealth and of good breeding also in Conon's faction. Demaenetus himself might be a good example, for he belonged to the rich clan of the Bouzygids.[72] Probably, as has been maintained, 'the men of breeding and property' who opposed the Demaenetus affair at Athens and the Boeotian alliance, were the former Three Thousand, the ex-men of the City, who had been politically active at the time of the Peloponensian war.[73] From Xenophon we learn in fact that Theban ambassadors spoke at Athens on the eve of the Corinthian war in favour of forming an anti-Spartan coalition; they emphasised that those who in the past had belonged to the 'party' of Piraeus (ὅσοι τῶν ἐν ἄστει ἐγένεσθε, that is, the democrats) ought to be enthusiasts for that alliance, implying perhaps that *only* or *especially* the actual ex-men of the City (oligarchs) needed still to be persuaded.[74]

Many Athenian leaders were also professional orators, or had fame as such (Andocides, Agyrrhius, Cephalus, Thrasybulus of Collytus),[75] and broadly speaking all politicians needed to possess some rhetorical skills. It is possible that the influence of oratory over politicians and the practice of rhetorical techniques determined that oversimplification of political language which flowed into historiography and that simplified the reading of political life. The use of binary schemas was connected to a certain tendency to generalise rather than to identify the individual features of a state, whether they be democratic or oligarchic specificities. It reflects a desire to concentrate on the principles and essentials at stake, so as to draw lessons from different circumstances of the past and to apply them to the needs of orators' own times. So it may seem to Lysias more natural to use the term *plethos* especially in relation with the second-person plural of the possessive pronoun, *hymeteron*, to denote 'your

71 On Epicrates of Cephisia see Simon (1997): 1121.

72 Aeschin. [2] 78. Cf. Strauss (1986): 136.

73 Strauss (1986): 110–113.

74 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.8–10. It is possible that at that time the ex-men of the City were still politically active in Athens; eventually this was due to Archinus, who in 401 had given the chance to everyone guilty of murders and involved in the regime of the Thirty to be reintegrated into the life of the restored democracy. Bearzot (1997), 9–10.

75 Strauss (1986): 96–104.

democracy:' this refers, in fact, to that vague ideal of democracy for which many Athenians had fought rather than to any specific institution or form of government. An exemplary case (among others) was surely that of Eucrates, brother of Nicias, who was put to death by the Thirty in 404 BC for opposing the establishment of oligarchy. He is recalled by Lysias to his *audience* as one who gave evidence of loyal devotion to *their* democracy, τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον (18.4–5). This usage bearing ethical nuances would induce *all* Athenians to feel and perceive themselves as distant from the enemy, the Thirty, and from the oligarchy seen as a whole.[76]

7.4 Conclusion

Xenophon supports his main idea that Athens and Sparta ought to share hegemony through arguments that were well known to his audience, and were, presumably, used by orators as well. Not only did common themes circulate among historians and orators, but they also shared a particular way of understanding specific contexts—contemporary political divisions, political institutions, states holding hegemonic power, land and sea power—that tended to simplify political terminology so as to bring out broader meanings. Labels such as *plethos/demos* and *oligarchia*, for example, do not denote particular institutional bodies; they are very general terms that can endorse particular ethical meanings and nuances in every specific context, and induce the audience to think in the same terms as those the orator or the historian desires. This way of reading historical happenings seems something that historians learned from orators.

Xenophon's evaluation of land hegemony recurs in Diodorus' narrative. Diodorus' language (esp. Diod. 13. 52–53) shows a bipolar configuration of Greek politics, the opposition between *demos* and *oligoi*. This is a sort of crystallisation of the political language, mainly due to a gulf between real events and peoples' perception of, and to a tendency to generalise rather than to identify the individual features of a state, whether they be democratic or oligarchic specificities. Moreover, the tendency to simplify political realities, reducing them to schematic and binary patterns, is very frequent in Roman historiography and biography.

76 Lysias tends to use the definite article with the word ὀλιγαρχία when he is referring to that regime. Cf. Todd (2007): 691. Generally speaking, very rarely orators used the word *plethos/demos* to denote a particular institutional democratic body. Cf. Todd (2007): 620.

The Thucydidean vocabulary shows that the stereotypical opposition *oligoi~polloi/demos* was already adopted in the fifth century, especially with reference to Athenian politics, and was intended to explain political settings in states other than Sparta and Athens: *hoi oligoi* were mostly pro-Spartan citizens, while *hoi polloi* were Athenian supporters. This binary pattern (*oligoi~polloi/demos*), which expresses a view of Greekness as torn between the two main powers and does not do justice to the complexity of the political debate of the epoch, is found in the *HO* too. Here we learn that during the Decelean and the Corinthian wars many cities were divided into pro-Athens (ἀττικίζοντες) and pro-Sparta (λακωνίζοντες) factions.

CHAPTER 8

Historical Causation

The HO's narrative is soaked in the political language used by Thucydides which tells the history of Athens and her internal factions. Terms such as *polypragmoneo, hesychia, eirene*, *demokratia*, *stasiasmos*, *hetaireia*, *attikizo*, or *politeuomai* (P. Oxy. v 842, 7.2; 15.3; 16.1; 16.4; 17.1; 17.2),[1] proper to the semantic sphere of internal conflict, war and peace, are highly reminiscent of Thucydides' political terminology as they occur frequently throughout his narrative.[2]

Furthermore, looking at the HO's text it emerges that the work is also broadly redolent of Thucydides' view of politics[3] and his theory of causation. Therefore, this chapter aims to ask some important questions in order to explore the HO's debt to Thucydides: they concern patterns connected with historical causation, individual and collective responsibilities, covert and uncovert motivations for action, narrative clichés.

8.1 Why Do Things Happen?

As in Thucydides' *Histories*, so also in the HO the narrator tends to impose his single 'monologic' view on readers. But, if compared with his model, the Oxyrhynchus historian shows a more deliberate and unequivocal attempt of affirming his narrative voice: he raises questions that often have univocal answers, and cares that his audience accept those answers without leaving room for doubts. Although the shape of the HO's narrative shows to be influenced by Herodotus' digressive style, not much of Herodotus' explanatory mode is found here. Herodotus' understanding of why things happen is indeed complex and subtle. It embraces the notions of responsibility and perhaps of guilt. On a large scale Herodotus' framework of explanation relies on the idea that human actions, aimed to good or ill, will be balanced by a counteraction in the same mode. The obligations of gratitude and revenge are fundamental human motives for Herodotus, as a chain of obligation and revenge leads back from

1 Cf. Macleod (1983): 116, Hornblower (1991): 455.
2 Cf. Bauer (1913): 7–18.
3 Cf. ch. 5.

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Salamis, Plataea and Marathon to Croesus and thence to Gyges or to the rape of Io. The envy of divinity forms a pattern of supernatural intervention in human life. At the same time 'disruptiveness' (*to tarachodes*) and the recurring idea of 'chance' stress the randomness and unpredictability of divine intervention.[4] All these motives are closely interrelated and the narrator tries to scrutinise them through a polyphony of voices, coming from real informants or supposed to be so. The unresolved relation between the focalisation through the narrator and his explanatory intrusions which open questions up, as well as the lively and detail-filled focalisations found in the *logoi* that Herodotus includes in the narrative, mark perhaps the greatest distance from the monologic voice of the *HO*'s narrator.[5]

Admittedly, there is one case in which a plurality of focalisations and internal audiences comes up in the *HO* too, showing the issue to be ambiguous in its reading, just as it was in the eyes of the internal audience. If the reader should believe in the Boeotians' alleged reasons for the outbreak of the Corinthian war then he/she would think of Spartan activism as the underlying cause; otherwise, if the Spartan reading of that event—as well as the narrator's explanation!—prevailed, as presumably it did in Sparta and among her supporters, the war would originate from a Theban conspiracy promoted by the pro-war party active in the city (7.2–5; 18.4). But where Herodotus is constantly dialogical, showing an intrusive narrator provided with a singular communicative verve, and Thucydides is carefully analytical, the Oxyrhynchus historian gives a quite 'economical' view of events through a sort of 'laconic' way which shows a certain tendency to simplify any story. Therefore, in reading the *HO* it is particularly useful to think in terms of 'focalisation,' or of 'who sees the story:' the viewpoints of people and generals can be caught only through the narrative itself, for in many cases the reasons of the participants are definitely given by the narrator without explanations.

There is one particular Thucydideanism in the text that immediately attracts the attention of the discriminating reader, that is, the *HO*'s constant recourse to a kind of explanatory mode that echoes two words familiar to Thucydides' readers, *prophasis* and *aitia/aition*. The use of these concepts, related as they are to the language of historical causation, shows that the Oxyrhynchus historian is deeply inspired by his model; despite this, however, in some cases he takes distance from Thucydides, giving his personal reading of the *prophasis* ~ *aitia* pattern. And we shall see how.

4 Gould (1989): 64–65 and 79.

5 Baragwanath (2008).

In the fifth century this dual conceptualisation, *prophasis* ~ *aitia*, a binary scheme combining an underlying disposition with an immediate precipitating cause, is found in the language of contemporary medicine, and the use of the two words in the context of that binary opposition is more important than the question of which side of the opposition gets which word. In fact, on the one hand we can notice a certain tendency in Greek conceptualisation to accommodate a multiplicity of causes according to binary patterns,[6] on the other the language itself of medicine offers such a broad spectrum of meanings applied to the word *prophasis* (the first appearing of an illness, observable cause, cause in general, and explanation)[7] that this makes us aware of the deceptive character of any attempt to characterise that pattern (*prophasis* ~ *aitia*) definitively. This is also partially due to modern tendency to find 'exact' translations for Greek terms whose meaning is instead fluid, depending on their manifold uses in different contexts.[8] There is also that emphasis that some scholars put on Hippocratic texts which show that sometimes some illnesses, pains, or affections happen 'without' a *prophasis*: ἐρυσιπέλατα πολλά, τοῖσι μὲν μετὰ προφάςιος, τοῖσι δ' οὔ, or Φιλιστίδι τῇ Ἡρακλείδου γυναικὶ ἤρξατο πυρετὸς ὀξὺς, ἔρευθος προσώπου, *ἐξ οὐδεμιῆς προφάςιος*, still τὸ δὲ ἄφωνον τινὰ ἐξαίφνης γενέσθαι, φλεβῶν ἀπολήψιες λυπέουσιν, ἢν ὑγιαίνοντι τόδε ξυμβῇ *ἄνευ προφάσιος* ἢ ἄλλης αἰτίης ἰσχυρῆς.[9] According to those scholars, if *prophasis* meant 'cause' then an illness without *prophasis* would be an illness without cause;[10] therefore, a clear distinction between *prophasis* and cause would seem consequently strengthened, all the more so if Thucydides himself describing the plague at Athens speaks of an absolutely unexpected phenomenon (τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ὑγιεῖς ὄντας πρῶτον μὲν τῆς κεφαλῆς θέρμαι ἰσχυραὶ καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθήματα καὶ φλόγωσις ἐλάμβανε, 2.49.2). But it is not always so that diseases are without *prophasis*, since sometimes they are without a *clear prophasis*, ἄνευ/ἄτερ προφάσιος φανερῆς,[11] or without *visible* causes, ἄνευ προφάσεων ἐμφανέων.[12] Moreover,

6 Pelling (2000): 85.

7 Robert (1976): 317–342.

8 See for example Schuller (1956): 971–984. Cf. Robert (1976): 333.

9 *Epid.* 3.3.3; *Epid.* 7.1.120; *Acut.* 4.1–2; *Prorrh.* 2. 30. Cf. *Coac.* 316: Ὀσφύος ἄλγημα, *ἄνευ προφάσιος* πυκνὰ ἐπιφοιτέον, κακοήθεος ἀῤῥωστίης σημεῖον, 319: Οἷσιν ὀσφύος ἄλγημα καὶ πλευροῦ ἄνευ προφάσιος, ἰκτεριώδεες γίνονται, 364: καὶ τὰ ἀλγήματα ἀφανιζόμενα *χωρὶς προφάσιος*, ὀλέθρια, 389: δύσπνοοι δέ τινα χρόνον γενόμενοι παύσωνται χωρὶς προφάσιος. Cf. also *Epid.* 1.1.

10 Robert (1976): 325–326.

11 *Aph.* 2.41, 5.45 and 55; *Acut.* 3.70.

12 *Prorrh.* 2.14.26.

the manifold uses of *prophasis* in different Hippocratic contexts lead us to different conclusions. We could assume that the Hippocratics leave the concept of *prophasis* slightly ambiguous, because controversial, in the sense that they are aware that some causes are not wholly absent but only not visible or perspicuous or transparent to their own knowledge: τοῦτο δὲ ὁρέω μαινομένους ἀνθρώπους καὶ παραφρονέοντας ἀπὸ μηδεμιῆς προφάσιος ἐμφανέος.[13]

In Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition *prophasis* can be associated to the subjective domain of 'intention,' 'explanation,' where 'la cause se confond avec l'intention du peuple qui a entrepris la conquête, où la sincérité de l'explication est rigoureusement identique à la vérité de la cause.'[14] *Prophasis* often occurs in contexts in which someone is speaking, therefore it suggests an etymological link with the verb φημί (to say); it means 'explanation,' that is, 'what is proferred as a reason,' true or false or partially true.[15] Alternatively, the derivation of the notion *prophais* from προφαίνω is suggested by the fact that at times a phenomenon that 'precedes' is followed by something else.[16] Sometimes (but not always) in Thucydides an occasion which supplies an excuse or pretext is told *prophasis*, as it is at 1.118.1, where the facts of Corcyra and Potidaea, described as a *prophasis*, are to be taken as the 'occasion' (cf. 1.141.1 and 1.146). Moreover, unlike, for example, Demosthenes, who adds synonyms to specify the meaning of *prophasis* (e.g. προφάσεις καὶ ἀφορμαί), Thucydides often leaves the term slightly unclear and unspecified.[17]

Explaining the Peloponnesian war Thucydides says that after having set out the grounds (*aitiai*) and the elements of rift between the two sides, Sparta and Athens, he finds the truest explanation (*alethestate prophasis*) which was the most unclear in what was openly said: the growth of Athens which frightened Sparta forcing her to go to war (1.23.5–6). Scholars were tempted to interpret this passage as if Thucydides wrote ἀληθεστάτην αἰτίαν instead of ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, thinking that he would mean the true underlying cause.[18] But in that case the historian blames openly Athens, which would be too easy and simple, perhaps. Of course it was the Athenians who were responsible for becoming

13 *Morb. Sacr.* 1.14–15

14 Robert (1976): 333.

15 Cf. Pelling (2012 b): 561–562.

16 Cf. Pelling (2012 b): 561–562. On Herodotus' use of *prophasis* as 'excuse' (or 'pretext') and 'occasion,' see Pearson (1952): 208–209. In Herodotus *prophasis* and *aitia* may have the same meaning, and therefore it is impossible to establish any constant relationship between the two words.

17 Pearson (1952): 216.

18 For the discussion on this point see Pearson (1952): 219–220.

frighteningly great masters of Greeks, who now could even be seen as the slaves of this 'tyrant city;' but here Thucydides is concerned with giving explanations, a plurality of reasons arising by the various parts involved. Furthermore, a kind of hierarchy of motives, a sort of graduation of causes, more or less true, seems to come up in the text. As Pelling wrote, Thucydides' passage may be easily misleading:

> It is *not* saying that there is only one 'true' cause: one explanation is tru*est*, carries most explanatory power, but that does not exclude the other explanations from being true too. [...] The 'truest explanation' makes it clear why there was a war waiting to happen; the 'grounds and elements of rift' explain why it happened in 431 rather than 435 or 427. It is even clear why the one explanation is 'truer,' or at least more powerful, than the other: without the less true explanation (Corcyra and Potidaea), we would still have had a war at some time; without the truer one (Athenian expansion), we should not have had a war at all.[19] [...]

According to Thucydides the *aitiai* were 'openly expressed,' while the *alethestate prophasis* was 'the most unclear in what was said' (1.23.5–6). Thus, what remained unclear was that (a) Athens became great, (b) frightened the Spartans, (c) who were forced to make war. However, while we find a hint at the first point in the speech of the Corinthians (1.71.3–4), in the Spartan debate[20] nothing would lead us to think that there was no other feasible alternative to war, since the Spartans themselves spoke as if there was at least the possibility of refusing to be involved and of deciding either way.[21]

Surprisingly, also the *aitiai* remain unsaid in the mouths of those speakers.[22] True, there was no need for Thucydides to recall the *aitiai* (Corcyra, Potidaea) within the speeches delivered by the Corinthians, the Spartans, or the Athenians, since he had already dealt extensively with them before, throughout several chapters.[23] All this would imply, moreover, the impossibility of sepa-

19 Pelling (2000): 88.

20 Thucydides reports a debate that took place at Sparta on the eve of the war; here Corinthians (1.67.4–72.1), Athenians (1.72.2–78.5), and Spartans (Archidamus, 1.80–85, and Sthenelaidas, 1.86) explained their own reasons. About a month after that assembly, the Spartans appointed a formal meeting of the whole Peloponnesian league, deliberating about the opportunity to make war against Athens.

21 Thuc. 1.80–86. Pelling (2000): 112–113.

22 Cf. Debnar (2001): 30–47.

23 Pelling (2000): 119–120.

rating Thucydides' narrative from his speeches,[24] for in the narrative speeches are themselves 'happenings' which have consequences: they do have the same explanatory force as other types of events. But why does that *prophasis* continue to be unsaid? Because unclear? It was not unclear certainly to those speakers; for if that *prophasis* was unclear in what was *said*, this does not necessarily mean that it was unclear also in their minds. Eventually, it might have appeared unclear to many poeople, and Thucydides, who, moreover, lived far from Athens when he wrote, was particularly concerned with the need to uncover the 'true' explanations lying behind what had been said. It might be possible thus that Thucydides reporting the speeches delivered at Sparta wanted to convey what he himself believed, namely that the *alethestate prophasis* remained unclear to many Greeks, after what the speakers had said openly (ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ), that is to say, after what those Corinthians, Spartans, and Athenians were supposed to have said on that occasion. Furthermore, the superlative ἀφανεστάτην, 'the most unclear,' does not mean that it was wholly unclear, but that some matters got more air-space and achieved more clarity than others.

Thucydides identifies the *aitiai* of the war also with accusations, complaints and quarrels that were in men's mouths on both sides (the Spartan and the Athenian), as is shown by the use of ἑκατέρων and the coupling of *aitiai* with διαφοραί (1.23.5–6).[25] Writing about the war the historian is more concerned to tell how it happened and what it was like, rather than to use technical words with an aspiration to precision. It has been suggested that he was influenced by judiciary terminology and especially by Antiphon, as the contrastive couple φανερόν ~ ἀφανές is one of those particularly frequent in Greek judiciary language.[26] However, in the fourth century the language of causation does not show any narrower or more specialised use of *prophasis* ~ *aitia* in comparison with Thucydides' or Herodotus' practice.[27] In Demosthenes, for instance, *prophasis* may mean either 'excuse' or 'occasion,' and perhaps also 'motive.' However, Demosthenes' reader will notice that *prophasis* is not used by someone who is speaking of himself or of his client: he never says that he or his client

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24 Rusten (2009): 1–28.

25 διότι δ' ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, τοῦ μή τινα ζητῆσαί ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατέστη. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν· αἱ δ' ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἵδ' ἦσαν ἑκατέρων, ἀφ' ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν.

26 Robert (1976): 337.

27 Pearson (1952): 212–215.

has a perfect *prophasis* for prosecution or the best possible in defence, or that the Athenians had a good *prophasis* to go to war against Philip. The negative meaning of the word is pretty clear: no-one is proud of having a *prophasis* or of offering it to someone else.[28]

In Thucydides' passage on the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war (1.23.5–6) *prophasis* is true (or, better, the tru*est* explanation) *de facto* but still ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ. The narrator of the *HO* reverts to the Thucydidean notion of *prophasis* only once, giving its verbal (participial) form, προφασιζόμενος. It means 'to set up as a pretext' and contrasts with the true motivation that follows it (15.1):

> καθ' ἑκά|[στην] ἡμέ[ρ]αν ἐξήτ[αζε τοὺς στρατιώτας] σὺν τοῖς ὅ|[πλοις] ἐν [τ]ῷ λιμέν[ι, **προφασιζόμενος μὲ]ν** ἵνα μὴ ῥᾳ|[θυμο]ῦντες χείρους [γένωνται πρὸς τὸν] πόλεμον, **βου|[λόμε]νος δὲ** παρασκε[υάζειν προθύμους] τοὺς Ῥοδίους | [ἐὰν ἴ]δωσιν ἐν τοῖς ὅ[πλοις αὐτοὺς παρόν]τας τηνικαῦ|[τα τοῖ]ς ἔργοις ἐπιχειρε[ῖν·
>
> Each day he reviewed the soldiers with their weapons at the harbour, the pretext being that they should not become lazy and unfit for the war, but in fact wanting to raise the morale of the Rhodians with the idea that if they saw them in armour they might engage in action immeduately.

This makes it tempting to suggest that in the *HO* there is a sort of tendency to reduce the spectrum of meanings for *prophasis* and to emphasise only one possible meaning, that of 'pretext.' But this could easily turn out to understate the depth of the Oxyrhynchus historian's debt to Thucydides. The narrative of the phase preceding the outbreak of the Corinthian war seems a sort of remoulding of Thucydides' discussion of the causes of the Peloponnesian war (18.2):

> [δι]ανοηθέντες δὲ ταῦτα | περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνόμιζον ἀπὸ μὲν **τοῦ φα|νεροῦ** χαλεπῶς ἔχειν ἐπιτίθεσθαι τούτοις· οὐδέποτε | γὰρ οὔτε Θηβαίους οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους Βοιωτοὺς πεισθή|σεσθαι πολεμεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις ἄρχουσι τῆς Ἑλλά|δος· ἐπιχειροῦντες [δ]ὲ διὰ **ταύτης τῆς ἀπάτης** προάγειν | εἰς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτούς, ἀνέπεισαν ἄνδρας τινὰς Φω|κέων ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Λοκρῶν τῶν Ἑσπερίων κα|λουμένων, οἷς ἐγένετο τῆς ἔχθρας **αἰτία τοιαύτη**. κτλ.

28 Pearson (1952): 212–214.

> This was their analysis of the situation; but they thought that it would be difficult to attack them openly, since neither the Thebans nor the Boeotians would ever be persuaded to make war on the Spartans, who were supreme in Greece. This was the trick they used to lead them into war: they persuaded certain men among the Phocians to launch an attack on the territory of the western Locrians. Enmity between them arose from the following cause. […]

The term φανερόν shows that the goal of attacking the Spartans cannot be openly achieved and consequently *said* in order to involve other Greeks into war. Thebes' desire[29] to overthrow the Spartan empire (βουλόμενοι | μὲν καταλῦσαι τ[ὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶ]ν, 18.1) recalls the Thucydidean 'truest explanation,' which also in Thucydides remained ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, the most unclear, because—as we have suggested above—it was least expressed in what was said at that time. What we do not find in the *HO* are the various degrees of truth traceable in Thucydides' passage (1.23.5–6). For instance, the reason for hostility between Phocians and Locrians is called αἰτία τοιαύτη and in the following section the narrator explains it without leaving room for doubts: those peoples disputed for a land which was a sort of boundary area between Locris and Phocis (18.3). If something must be ἀφανές then it may require (even though not always) a trick, ἀπάτη. So the Thebans reverted to a deceitful business: they persuaded certain men among the Phocians to launch an attack on the territory of the western Locrians (18.2; cf. 18.4); then the Locrians urged the Boeotians to get involved in that affair against the Phocians; this implied, moreover, a Boeotian intevention against the Spartans, supporters of the Phocians (18.4).

But what about the *aitiai*, according to the *HO*? *Aitiai/aitia* are 'grounds' for doing something (the passage just quoted, 18.2), 'allegations' (17.1), the 'explanations' that people had been giving, presumably at the time in which the author wrote (7.2). For the narrator *aitioi*, or people responsible for the Corinthian war, were some among the Thebans (16.1); *aitios* was the King himself, responsible for the desertion of his mercenaries, again, according to the narrator (19.1). There is a constant concern not to leave anything unclear, since the narrator tends to correct explanations that appear untrue to his view. So, for instance, while some say that the causes, αἴτια, of the Corinthian war are to be found in the money that Timocrates granted to some Greek cities to make them go to war against Sparta (7.2), the narrator resorts to a narrative device to confute this: he holds off from saying the motivations for Athens to

29 To be precise, the desire of Androcleidas' party.

make that war (which he had started to discuss) by inserting a digression going back to the times of the Decelean war; through this digression he shows that the true reason lies in the Corinthians' wish to bring about a change of policy (7.2–5).

The theme of historical causation in relation to the outbreak of the war was probably felt as a priority by the author if one considers the number of chapters and the very detailed analysis devoted to this theme (7 and 16–18). As we have shown before (chapter 2), digressions are necessary to clarify things; for, embedded as they are in the narrative, they strengthen and emphasise the point of view of the narrator; the text would suffer for unclarity if they were not where they are.

'Ground,' 'explanation,' 'allegation,' 'culpability:' these are the meanings for *aitiai/aitia/aitios*. But that is not all. There is also a tendency to personalise causes and explanations, either by telling an event through the point of view (intentions and thoughts) of the participants or by using the participial form of verbs expressing 'will,' like βούλομαι, or 'pretext,' like προφασίζομαι (see the passage cited above, 15.1): when οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀνδροκλείδαν, that is, the anti-Spartan party at Thebes led by Androcleidas, wanted (βουλόμενοι) to overthrow the Spartan empire, they thought (οἰόμενοι) that they could achieve easily that. But thinking ([δι]ανοηθέντες) of that, they acknowledged (ἐνόμιζον) that they could not put it before them (Thebans, Boeotians, and others) openly; therefore, they reverted to a trick (18.1–2).

8.2 To Blame or not to Blame … Individual and Collective Responsibilities

Does αἴτιος have the same meaning and nuances as αἴτιον/αἴτια and αἰτία do? In the *HO* while alleged responsibilities, *aitiai* and *aitia*, are adduced by impersonal sides, καίτοι τι|νὲς λέγ[ουσιν αἴτια γενέσθ]αι (7.2), [ο]ἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἰσμηνίαν | αἰτίαν μὲ̣ν εἶχον ἀττικίζειν (17.1), οἷς [*Locrians and Phocians*] ἐγένετο τῆς ἔχθρας αἰτία τοιαύτη (18.2), and sometimes they are refuted by the narrator,[30] the culpability of someone who is *aitios* looks as if ascertained and the *aitios* is also slightly biased by the narrator: take, for example, *ἐγένοντο* δὲ τῆς ἔχθρας αὐτοῖς | *αἴτιοι* μάλιστα τῶν ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις τινές κτλ. (16.1) and τούτων δὲ βασιλεὺς *αἴτιός ἐστι⟨ν⟩* κτλ. (19.2). Similarly, in Xenophon the narrator hints at *aitios* as at someone who is to be blamed. He gets that effect through direct or indirect speeches

30 At 7.2 and 17.1.

charging someone with something: in 407 BC while some people at Athens said that Alcibiades was the best of the citizens and had been banished without just cause (οὐ δικαίως), others maintained that he alone was responsible for their past troubles, *τῶν παροιχομένων αὐτοῖς κακῶν μόνος αἴτιος εἴη* (1.4.13 and 17). After killing Tissaphernes, Tithraustes said to Agesilaus that the man responsible for all their mutual troubles had been justly punished (*αἴτιος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἡμῖν ἔχει τὴν δίκην*, 3.4.25).

The question is big indeed and opens a broad spectrum of issues and connections. The use of the adjective *aitios* with a slight nuance of 'blame' is common to fifth-century historical and medical writings. In the Hippocratic corpus while the neutral substantive *to aition* is used with the meaning of 'that which is responsible for' in a very broad and general sense, *aitios* may refer to people who are responsible for doing something and who sometimes are also biased, either men or gods. So in the treatise *The Art* we read: 'surely it is much more likely that the physician gives proper orders, which the patient not unnaturally is unable to follow; and not following them he meets with death, the cause (τὰς αἰτίας) of which illogical reasoners attribute to the innocent (τοῖς οὐδὲν αἰτίοις), allowing the guilty (τοὺς αἰτίους) to go free' (7.24–25).[31] The polemic seems to be addressed to presumed apologies made by sophists, whose speeches usually tried to overturn the arguments of the accusers in order to vindicate the accused.[32] Blame for people's behaviour is also found in *The Sacred Disease*, 'all these [*remedies*] they enjoin with reference to their divinity, as if possessed of more knowledge, and announcing beforehand (προφάσιας λέγοντες) other causes so that if the person should recover, theirs would be the honour and credit; and if he should die, they would have a certain defence, as if the gods, and not they, were to blame (αἴτιοί εἰσιν)' (1.40–44).[33] This closely resembles forensic speeches in the way that the speaker, after having listened to the therapeutic prescriptions made by his rivals (here not reported), denounces the most subtle device that they use, that is to say, ascribing the whole responsibility to the divinity but advocating also other causes which can allow them to claim credit for an eventual healing.[34]

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31 For the relation of this passage with Gorgias' style see Jouanna (2000): 174.

32 Cf. Gorg. *Hel.* DK 82 B 11 (6). Jouanna (2000): 174.

33 There are many cases throughout the corpus in which αἴτιος, α, ον is referred to inanimate beings or to illnesses and means 'cause', like *aitia*. See, for example, *Aër.* 4.3; 6.2; 9.4; 12.3; 14.2; 16.1; 16.5.

34 In a context in which doctors were in competition with herbalists, drug-sellers, 'purifiers' and sellers of charms and incantations, and anyone could claim to cure the sick, many medical writings were in polemic with that sort of alleged healers. The consequent inse-

Not only do medical writings resort to metaphors coming from the language of oratory, but they also develop a view of causation that recalls the language of politics. In *Ancient Medicine* (16), for instance, the interaction of different forces within human body is often explained with the help of political images, especially those of 'balance of power'[35] and *dynameis*, which mean 'physical forces' working in the body as 'political powers' do in the city. In so doing the work appears to echo a kind of vocabulary that is familiar from Thucydides' historiography onwards. The idea that Thucydides was attempting to do for history what, at the same time, Hippocrates was trying to do for medicine has been rightly abandoned some years ago by Hornblower, as both traditions, the historical and the medical, might have taken similar paths independently.[36] This does not exclude, however, the possibility that they could also influence each other. Thucydides' well-known description of the plague recalls many diseases of the same type described by the Hippocratics, in that it spread unexpectedly;[37] furthermore, Thucydides' use of *aition* with the meaning of 'that which is responsible for' is not dissimilar from the Hippocratics' use, especially when the term explains the causes of physical phenomena: ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ ἐν Πεπαρήθῳ κύματος ἐπαναχώρησίς τις, οὐ μέντοι ἐπέκλυσέ γε· καὶ σεισμὸς τοῦ τείχους τι κατέβαλε καὶ τὸ πρυτανεῖον καὶ ἄλλας οἰκίας ὀλίγας. αἴτιον δ' ἔγωγε νομίζω τοῦ τοιούτου, ᾗ ἰσχυρότατος ὁ σεισμὸς ἐγένετο, κατὰ τοῦτο ἀποστέλλειν τε τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐξαπίνης πάλιν ἐπισπωμένην βιαιότερον τὴν ἐπίκλυσιν ποιεῖν· ἄνευ δὲ σεισμοῦ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο ξυμβῆναι γενέσθαι (Thuc. 3.89.4–5).[38] The cause of the seaquake—a totally impersonal force—is to be found in the earthquake, without which such an accident would have never happened.[39]

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curity felt by doctors about their own position led them to claim the scientific quality of medicine, and to insist on the distinction between doctor and layman. Cf. Lloyd (1978): 9–60.

35 This image goes back to Alcmaeon, according to whom health lies in the *isonomia* of certain powers (*dynameis*) in the body. Lloyd (1978): 29–30.

36 Hornblower (1987): 110–135.

37 Cf. above. Cf. also Robert (1976): 325.

38 'At Peparethus there was also a withdrawal of the sea, but not in this case followed by a surge: and an earthquake demolished part of the wall, the town hall, and a few other buildings. I believe the cause of this phenomenon to be that the sea retires at the point where the seismic shock is strongest, and is then suddenly flung back with all the greater violence, creating the inundation. I do not think that tidal waves could occur without an earthquake' (transl. by M. Hammond).

39 Scholars suggest today that links are also found between Herodotus' *Histories* and contemporary medicine, in the sense that the historian appears to be familiar with Hippocratic methods and background in explaining the causes of diseases. Cf. Thomas (2000): 28–74.

As we have seen in the previous section, there is a pattern in the *HO* expressing the true intentions and thoughts of people along with the specious reasons put forward, that is, the βούλομαι ('will') ~ προφασίζομαι ('pretext') schema. This sharp contrast between true personal motivations and alleged *prophaseis* is already found in Herodotus' narrative. When the Spartan king Leutychides came to Athens and demanded back hostages, the Athenians were unwilling to give them back and made excuses, saying that two kings had given them the trust and they deemed it wrong to return them to one without the other: ὡς δὲ ἀπικόμενος Λευτυχίδης ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπαίτεε τὴν παρακαταθήκην, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι *προφάσις* εἷλκον *οὐ βουλόμενοι* ἀποδοῦναι, φάντες δύο σφέας ἐόντας βασιλέας παραθέσθαι καὶ οὐ δικαιοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἄνευ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀποδιδόναι (Hdt. 6.86.1). For his part, Thucydides says that on the eve of the first Sicilian expedition, the Athenians sent it upon the plea of their common descent, but in reality they wanted to prevent a Sicilian exportation of corn to the Peloponnese and to test the possibility of bringing Sicily into subjection: καὶ ἔπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς μὲν οἰκειότητος *προφάσει*, *βουλόμενοι* δὲ μήτε σῖτον ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἄγεσθαι αὐτόθεν πρόπειράν τε ποιούμενοι εἰ σφίσι δυνατὰ εἴη τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ὑποχείρια γενέσθαι (3.86.4). Again, when the second Athenian expedition to Sicily was expected to happen, Hermocrates' words made clear a similar interplay between Athenian propaganda and true motives: Ἀθηναῖοι γὰρ ἐφ' ὑμᾶς, ὃ πάνυ θαυμάζετε, πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ὥρμηνται καὶ ναυτικῇ καὶ πεζῇ, *πρόφασιν* μὲν Ἐγεσταίων ξυμμαχίᾳ καὶ Λεοντίνων κατοικίσει, *τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς* Σικελίας ἐπιθυμίᾳ, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ ταύτην σχοῖεν, ῥᾳδίως καὶ τἆλλα ἕξειν (6.33.2). Both Herodotus and Thucydides give examples of collective responsibilities: they show the purposes of all Athenians, seen as a whole. Is it right to assert that collective responsibilities are not very relevant for the Oxyrhynchus historian, since the *HO*'s text shows mostly intentions and motives of single individuals, Conon, a small group of politicians, Agesilaus? One may object that it is not possible to make such a claim on the basis of some 20 lacunose pages of fragments out of a work that must have been several hundred pages long. Moreover, there might be a further objection too: in Thucydides both Alcibiades and Cleon appear as very manipulative men who mislead the Athenian people and achieve their goals (5.40–45 and 4.26.3). Despite that, however, Thucydides does not make any individuals *really* responsible for Athenian policy-making. The best example comes perhaps from Pericles. On the eve of the Peloponnesian war the Athenian decision to form an alliance with Corcyra (rather than with Corinth) was controversial and led to a lively debate within the Athenian assembly (1.44.1). Unlike Plutarch,[40] who with reference to that episode credits a collective action

40 *Per.* 29.1. The biographer tends to ascribe collective decisions to single individuals.

to Pericles alone, Thucydides does not attribute to the statesman the decision to go to war. It is true that Pericles' speech assumes forcefulness, as it is reported by the narrator without any answering speech on opposite sides (Thuc. 1.141–145), and this seems to stress the centrality of the politician in dealing with war strategy. Nonetheless this masks that Athens' refusal to meet Sparta's demands was due to the lack of political rivalry within Athens herself at the time of Pericles' government.[41] It also implies that that war was the inevitable result of the growth in Athenian power and that Pericles' resolution was coherent with the necessity of maintaining that power. Conversely, the main protagonists of the *HO* carry personal responsibility for their own military strategies in Asia as well as for their military choices. The reader will notice that, not without irony perhaps, both Conon and Agesilaus are similar in many leading traits to the Persian usurper Cyrus, and are thus associated to an ideal type of man who, not well integrated in his native political system, is viewed with suspicion also among Greek authorities.[42] Only Conon's *prothumia*, as in the past that of Cyrus, saved the King's campaign, and, needless to say, throughout the narrative he is seen as fully involved in Persian affairs, so that the reader might even neglect any implications for Athens of Conon's military activity. Again, especially those among the Mysians who were independent (that is, not subjected to the King) chose to participate in the Spartan expedition of Agesilaus, sharing efforts and maybe objectives.[43] People not well integrated in their political system sided with Agesialus, who, for his part, was criticised by Spartan authorities. As the use of the concept of *polypragmosyne/polypragmoneo* has shown, the Oxyrhynchus historian appears to be mainly interested in telling stories related to individuals and groups responsible for war actions. Responsibilities, previously seen as collective become here mostly individual. Take, for example, Thucydides' concern for the characterisation of Corinthians, Spartans and Athenians, seen as a whole, which emerges from the speeches that he makes them deliver on the eve of the Peloponnesian war.

8.3 Visibility and Clarity in Historical Causation

The reflections so far on historical causation and individuals' responsibilities lead us to go further, and to deepen our exploration: the role played by the

41 From a comic fragment we know that Cleon was active already in 431 BC. Hermippus fr. 47 Kassel. Cf. Rood (1998): 32.

42 14.2; 20.6.

43 21.1.

notions of clarity, visibility, visual language and by the related issue of lack of visibility is here discussed. In fact the language of causation both in Hippocratic texts and in historical ones has shown itself as oscillating between the opposing concepts of φανερόν ~ ἀφανές and related semantic fields (above, 8.1). Φανερόν, σαφές and cognates may be meant in a metaphorical sense with reference to what is distinctly seen and clearly understood, in contrast with specious or unclear reasons, explanations, or motives adduced by speakers. They may also be related to 'visibility' in a more concrete sense, like that conveyed by descriptions of physical realities, such as, for example, battles and ambushes. Our point is to understand how far both meanings are relevant for Thucydides as well as for the Oxyrhynchus historian, and whether the *HO* depends on Thucydidean patterns.

Dionysius, criticising Thucydides' shaping of his narrative, reproaches the historian for having given two causes of the war (διττὰς δὲ ταύτας[44] ὑποθέμενος), the true (τήν τε ἀληθῆ μέν), which was not publicised (οὐκ εἰς ἅπαντας δὲ λεγομένην), that is, the growth of Athenian power, and the false (καὶ τὴν οὐκ ἀληθῆ μέν), which was invented by the Spartans, that is, the Athenian sending of an allied force to help the Corcyreans against the Corinthians. Nevertheless, continues Dionysius, contrary to what he should have done, he did not begin his narrative from the true cause (οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς), but from the other (*De Thuc.* 10.13–18). Yet, as we have seen, it is not so much and not only a matter of opposition between truth and falsehood, true or false causes; the historian develops a rather complex view that implies different degrees both of truth and of clarity. For some reasons the *truest* cause of the war remained the most unclear (ἀφανεστάτην) in what was openly said (1.23); and, moreover, the general aim of Thucydides' writing was to give the reader a *clear insight* (τὸ σαφές)—he does not speak of truth!—of those events for a better understanding of such or similar happenings in the future (1.22). Furthermore, as we shall see, the φανερόν ~ ἀφανές pattern may also explain events.

Besides that evident mismatch between what was openly said to explain the war and real underlying motivations,[45] a similar sort of gulf between words and intentions can be found particularly in those speeches that accompany the political initiatives taken by Alcibiades. Needless to say, all kinds of speech (direct, indirect, free indirect) in all literary genres contain a certain degree of manipulation, and in Thucydides there are plenty of disingenuous discourses. It has been suggested, for example, that book eight differentiates itself particu-

44 τὰς αἰτίας.

45 Thuc. 1.67–86.

larly from the others in that its speeches are manifestly insincere, since speakers try to persuade their audiences through falsehoods, artfully invented.[46] However, rather than discovering the falsehoods that lie behind what is said,[47] or showing clashes between speeches and deeds,[48] we intend to discuss those cases in which more subtle reasons would remain unclear in speeches, if the narrator did not unveil them. So, for instance, though Alcibiades considered that an alliance with the Argives would be really more profitable than siding with the Spartans, it was *especially* for the resentment felt against the Athenians (φρονήματι φιλονικῶν ἠναντιοῦτο, 5.43.2) that he supported the Argive alliance by deceiving the Athenians. They had slighted him by excluding him from the peace negotiations (the peace of Nicias). Therefore he alleged that the Spartans were not to be trusted, since they wanted to be allied of the Athenians to overthrow the Argives and to proceed against the Athenians, once they had been isolated (5.43.3). Later, when Spartan plenipotentiary ambassadors went to Athens and spoke to the *boule* for renewing the peace of Nicias, making moreover good offers to the Athenians, Alcibiades adopted a device (μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοιόνδε τι). He persuaded (πείθει) them not to admit before the assembly that they had come with full powers, with the promise of restoring Pylos to Sparta. But his real intention—says the narrator—was to detach those ambassadors from Nicias, once he had accused them publicly before that assembly of insincere intentions and of never saying the same things (5.45.2–4):

> 2. He persuaded them [*the Spartan ambassadors*], adding his personal guarantee, that if they disavowed the possession of full authority when they appeared before the assembly, he would secure them the return of Pylos (using his own influence with the Athenians as strongly in their support as it had so far been in opposition) and ensure reconciliation in all other matters. 3. His real purpose (βουλόμενος) in these dealings was to distance the Spartan envoys from Nicias and to give himself the opportunity to denounce the Spartans in the assembly as insincere in their professed intentions and never consistent from one statement to the next—and so to achieve alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea. 4. The plan worked. When the envoys appeared before the people and

46 Greenwood (2006): 83–108.

47 Cleon, for example, lies deliberately after bad news from Pylos comes to Athens (Thuc. 4.27); Themistocles dupes the Spartans in order to build the city walls (Thuc. 1.100). See Greenwood (2006): 57–82.

48 Consider the controversial figure of Brasidas, for instance.

> were asked if they had fully authority, they replied that they did not, a statement quite contrary to what they had said in the council. At this the Athenians lost patience, and with Alcibiades inveighing against the Spartans yet more strongly than ever they followed his lead and were ready to bring in the Argive envoys and their colleagues and make an alliance there and then.[49]

Besides, while Nicias' feeling and reasoning (ἀκούσιος μὲν ᾑρημένος ἄρχειν, νομίζων δὲ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ προφάσει βραχείᾳ καὶ εὐπρεπεῖ τῆς Σικελίας ἁπάσης, μεγάλου ἔργου, ἐφίεσθαι) mostly fit the speeches and the strategies of persuasion he adopted in order to dissuade the Athenians from the second Sicilian expedition (6.8.4–14.1), Alcibiades' personal reasons and ambitions (*βουλόμενος* τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὢν καὶ ἐς τἆλλα διάφορος τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν, 6.15.2) are not fully transparent in the arguments deployed throughout his speech. It is true that he appeals to his ancestors, his Olympic prizes, as well as his military achievements, in order to demonstrate that despite his youth he is worthy to command. And, as regards the Athenians' reason for carrying out an expedition of that sort, he shows the insightful view that internal political divisions had weakened Syracuse; her instability was mainly due to the frequent changes in the body of citizens made by the tyrants. Nevertheless, later he offers generic statements that forecast an unrealistc scenario: the Athenians should assist their allies in consideration of eventual menaces coming from western peoples. Furthermore, since the Athenians were not able to exercise a careful stewardship of the limits of their empire they should intervene ('it is necessary to plot against some and not let go our hold upon others, because there is a danger of coming ourselves under the empire of others should we not ourselves hold empire over other people,' 6.15–18.3).

In an analogous way, a mismatch between what was publicly said and people's true intentions can be found in the *HO*. The Thebans connected with Androcleidas' and Ismenias' party wanted to overthrow the Spartan empire; they thought that they could achieve it easily by supposing that the King would support them financially, and that Athenians, Corinthians and Argives would share in that war because of their long-standing enmity towards the Spartans. Yet, reasoning that they could not attack openly the Spartans nor involve the

49 Transl. by M. Hammond.

Thebans and Boeotians openly in a war against Sparta, they resorted to a device. They persuaded some among the Phocians to attack the Locrian territory (18.1–2):

> 1. The party of Androcleidas and Ismenias hastened to engage the people in war against the Spartans, wanting (βουλόμενοι) to overthrow their empire, so that they would not be swept aside by the Spartans because of the pro-Spartan party. They thought (οἰόμενοι) that they would achieve this easily, supposing that the King would provide the money which the envoy from Persia had promised, and that the Corinthians, Argives and Athenians would share in the war, since, being enemies of the Spartans, they would secure the support of their citizens. 2. This was their analysis of the situation ([δι]ανοηθέντες); but they thought that it would be difficult to attack them openly (ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ φα|νεροῦ), since neither the Thebans nor the Boeotians would ever be persuaded to make war on the Spartans, who were supreme in Greece. This was the trick they used to lead them into war: they persuaded (ἀνέπεισαν) certain men among the Phocians to launch an attack on the territory of the western Locrians. Enmity between them arose from the following cause (αἰτία τοιαύτη). [...]

The underlying cause (αἰτία τοιαύτη) of enmity between Phocians and Locrians is used by Androcleidas' men to lead the Phocians to invade Locris, so as to involve in the conflict both the Boeotians, in aid of the Locrians, and the Spartans, who were close supporters of the Phocians (18.3). Here the whole matter was not clear to all sides, and what may have been said openly to the Phocians (ἀνέπεισαν) did not fit the real motives of the speakers.

Furthermore, also in more 'physical' terms visibility plays an interesting role in the *HO*'s text. Visual language accompanies Conon's strategy at Rhodes: each day he reviewed the soldiers with their weapons at the harbour, with the true aim (βου|[λόμε]νος) of raising the Rhodians' morale. According to his reasoning, *by seeing* (ἐὰν ἴ]δωσιν) the soldiers in armour they would in fact be prompter to act and overthrow the oligarchy of the island (15.1, ll. 351–352). His specious statement (προφασιζόμενος)—he wanted in that way to prevent his troops from becoming lazy and unfit for the war—was presumably clear to all. In the account of the democratic putsch at Rhodes, the text puts great emphasis on the Rhodians' sight (ὡς δὲ σύνηθες ἅ]πασιν ἐποί|[ησεν] *ὁρᾶν* τὸν ἐξετα[σμόν, 15.1, ll. 353–354), but, paradoxically, it is indeed the absence of Conon, the man who pulls the strings (βου]λόμενος | *[μὴ π]αρεῖναι* τῇ διαφθο[ρᾷ τῶν ἀρχόντω]ν, 15.1, ll. 355–356), that marks the starting-point of the overthrowing of the Rhodian government.

That visibility and lack of it, connected to theatres of war, has deep roots in Greek literature is undeniable, and the record of quotations and examples might be innumerable. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the Oxyrhynchus historian seems distinctively Thucydidean in shaping his narrative according to the φανερόν ~ ἀφανές pattern connected to battle descriptions and ambushes. Thucydides, for his part, is pioneering in his attempt to explore in rational terms the complex relation between 'seen' and 'unseen.' Let us turn, then, to his reflections on the battle of Epipolae which emphasise the importance of visibility and lack of it (7.44.1):

> The Athenians were now thrown into such helpless confusion that it was not been easy to establish from either side a detailed account of what exactly happened. Events are clearer (σαφέστερα) in daytime operations, but even then the participants have no overall picture, but only a vague knowledge of what was going on in their own particular area. In a night battle—and this was the only one fought between large armies in the whole of the war—how could anyone be certain of anything (σαφῶς)? There was a bright moon, and as happens in moonlight they could see each other (ἑώρων) as human shapes (ὄψιν τοῦ σώματος προορᾶν) from some distance, but without any confident recognition of friend or foe.

These statements might be read as a sort of metatextual allusion to the difficulty that an author faces with when he shapes the narrative in order to give to readers as well as to other writers a bird's-eye view of the events; the narrator recognises the partial outlook of 'who sees the happenings' in ways that go beyond the limits properly related to the conditions of visibility or lack of visibility for the onlookers.

The cognitive element is indeed important in Thucydides' *Histories*. For instance, in the first expedition against Amphipolis (Thuc. 4.81–108) Brasidas based his strategy on the awareness of the *gaze* of the others, of public reception, showing himself moderate and fair (108); the narrator's focus on perceptions reinforces that appearance: Brasidas *seemed* a good man in every respects (4.81.2–3).[50] People's perceptions explain the events of the aftermath of the Athenian capture of Megara's port: the awareness that the Megarians were waiting to *see* which side would win (the Athenian or the Spartan) was one of the

50 As in the speeches on Mytilene (3.13.7; 39.7; 46.2), so also in the speech delivered by Brasidas to the Acanthians (85.5–6) he appeals to the perceptions of others. In order to be received in their alliance, he manipulates the Acanthians by playing with the sense of how other people will perceive them. Cf. Rood (1998): 69–82.

factors that led Brasidas' army to occupy a convenient position and to remain quiet till the Athenians withdrew; another factor was Brasidas' perception that the Athenians might not want to fight, so that the Spartans could gain without battle what they came for (4.73).[51] In the account of the renewed military operations at Amphipolis (5.6–13), visibility is artfully expressed through visual language:[52] Brasidas encamped on high ground (ἐπὶ μετεώρου), not far from Amphipolis, in a place that commanded a view in all directions (κατεφαίνετο πάντα αὐτόθεν), so that the enemy (Cleon) could not move his army without being seen (οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν). Brasidas' expectation—that Cleon would go up against Amphipolis (5.6.3)—turns out to be true (5.7.1),[53] while Cleon's train of thoughts will reveal itself to be wrong. Posting his force on a strong hill before Amphipolis, he thought that he could withdraw whenever he pleased without a battle, as no-one was visible (ἐφαίνετο) on the wall of Amphipolis or was seen coming out by the gates of that city which were closed (5.7.5). The narrative of the battle, shaped between foresight (that of Brasidas) and lack of foresight (of Cleon), is not without paradoxes. As has been noticed, 'everything comes into view while Cleon is looking in the wrong place.'[54] That is, when Brasidas came down from his high hill and was seen (φανεροῦ γενομένου αὐτοῦ) in the city while sacrificing, the news was referred to Cleon, who at the same time had gone forward to get a view (κατὰ τὴν θέαν) of the situation; and because he could not risk a battle without reinforcements he ordered his men to retreat (5.10).

In the narrative of the stand-off at Pylos (4.29–34),[55] the train of Demosthenes' thoughts, grounded on the past experience,[56] comes to be at odds with what follows next. Because the island of Sphacteria was for the most part covered with woods and had no roads—so thinks Demosthenes—the Spartans could attack from an unseen position (ἐξ ἀφανοῦς χωρίου) and inflict damage upon a large army after it had landed; their eventual mistakes would not be manifest (δῆλα) to the Athenians, while those of the Athenians would be totally clear (καταφανῆ ἂν εἶναι πάντα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα) to their opponents (4.29.3). Yet,

51 Cf. Rood (1998): 63–69.

52 Greenwood (2006): 19–41.

53 Note that Brasidas' perceptions come to be true at Megara as well as on this occasion: 'I [*Brasidas*] imagine that the enemy ascended the hill in overlooking (κατὰ θέαν) us and because they could not have expected that anybody would come out for battle against them, and now, with broken ranks and intent upon reconnoitering, are taking small account of us.' (5.9.3–4).

54 Greenwood (2006): 28.

55 Cf. Rood (1998): 26–39.

56 Thuc. 3.97–98.

a little later Demosthenes got a better view of the Spartans at Sphacteria, realising moreover that they were more numerous than he had previously thought. Furthermore, he also found that it was less difficult to make a landing on the island than he had supposed (4.30.3). Unlike those of Brasidas, then, his perceptions reveal themselves to be wrong, since, at the end, the Athenian reinforcement could land even without being seen by the foe (λαθόντες τὴν ἀπόβασιν, 4.32.1), and in the course of the battle it was the Spartans who rather lost sight of what was going on (ἀποκεκλῃμένοι μὲν τῇ ὄψει τοῦ προορᾶν, 4.34.3).

Similarly to Thucydides' view, in the *HO* people's sights and perceptions in battles, including their wrong perceptions, are tools that explain their actions. In the descriptions of the two battles involving Agesilaus in Asia during the Lydian and Mysian campaigns (11.4–5; 21.2), the 'unseen' along with what is 'visible' is a decisive feature in determining future developments and outcomes. In close agreement with Xenocles, who laid in ambush waiting for the barbarians, Agesilaus served as a decoy, leading his army forward in order to draw the attention of the barbarians in mass. To some extent he should foresee what would follow, since we read later that the barbarians all together pursued the Greeks as they were accustomed to doing so (συνα[κολουθήσ]αντες | ὡς εἰώθεσα[ν, 11.4). For his part Xenocles, unseen and possibly without a clear view of what was going on, and basing only on his own assumption (ὑπ]έλαβεν), decided to become visible (ἀνα[στήσ]ας ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας), launching his attack. Agesilaus' decision to continue pursuing the barbarians is made after seeing (κατιδὼν) their disorder (they fled all over the plain) and terror (11.5). Furthemore, there is one example in the *HO* which shows that what is visible may be largely deceitful. In the Mysian campaign Agesilaus posted in ambush most of the Dercylidean mercenaries, and led his army forward. His strategy seems to repeat what he had previously done in Lydia, and thus here too the unseen ambush will be decisive. But what mainly deceives the Mysians turns out to be what is indeed visible to them, that is, their own perception of Agesilaus' march: 'they thought (οἰηθ[έντες) that Agesilaus was going away on account of the loss received on the previous day, and they came out of their villages and began to pursue him with the intention of attacking the rearguard in the same way' (21.2).

One might wonder how distinctively Thucydidean this narrative development can be. Now, there are several cases of descriptions of ambushes in Thucydides' narrative,[57] and one in particular, rich of details, puts analogous stress on visibility and lack of visibility (4.67.1–5). In the account of the Athenian attack on Megara what is 'covered' and thus 'unseen' will be decisive for the good

57 2.81.5; 3.90.2–3; 3.108.1; 3.112.6; 5.56.4; 7.32.2.

outcome of the enterprise. There is a twofold deceit, a twofold ambush: the one comes from the Athenian company that, under cover of night (ὑπὸ νύκτα) after landing near Megara (at Minoa), took position in a ditch (ἐν ὀρύγματι ἐκαθέζοντο); the other is led by the Athenian general Demosthenes, who, with a company of light-armed Plataeans, and in collaboration with some Megarian traitors, set an ambuscade at Enyalius, not far from Megara. During that night no-one perceived (ᾔσθετο οὐδεὶς) what was going on except the men who knew the business (οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ἦν εἰδέναι). Each night they regularly opened the gates of the city, drew a sculling boat on a cart and, putting it out to the sea, sailed to check the area around the harbour. Before daybreak (πρὶν ἡμέραν εἶναι πάλιν), however, they carted the boat back into the fortifications, so that if no boat were visible near the harbour (μὴ ὄντος ἐν τῷ λιμένι πλοίου φανεροῦ μηδενός), their work would pass unnoticed (ἀφανὴς δὴ εἴη ἡ φυλακή) to the Athenians at Minoa (4.67.4–5):

> 4. On this occasion the wagon was already at the gates, and they were opened as usual to let the boat in: seeing (ἰδόντες) their moment (all this was part of the preconcerted plan) the Athenians charged out from their ambush, running fast to reach the gates before they could be shut again and while the wagon was still between them to prevent their closing. At the same time their Megarian collaborators killed the guards on the gates. 5. The first to run inside (at the point where the trophy now stands) were the Plataeans and border-guards with Demosthenes.

The trick of the boat that on a cart goes through the city gates allowing the enemies to come into the fortifications from the shore seems, moreover, a far-away Homeric echo. Similar emphasis on night operations, when the lack of visibility conceals men and movements, can be found in a fragment of the *Florence papyrus*. The damaged state of its preservation allow us to say with certainty only that we are dealing with a clandestine night exchange of messages between a man named Myndos, or coming from the Carian town Myndos, and an Athenian harmost, who was on guard at the walls of a city, whose name is unknown. The man who was outside the city laid low in the wood; the Athenian, after taking over his guard duty, sent signals to that man, who then came out from the forest, and the two communicated through messages tied to a rope (PSI XIII 1304, 5.2):[58]

58 For scholarly discussions about chronology, see Cf. Mariotta (2001): 167–174.

> For with him … 2. in the temple of Demeter and Persephone, which is [near?] the walls … through the … had happened … the wood … but he stood about at night and kept quiet for some time having hidden himself in the wood. But when the Athenian was standing at his post he, letting down a rope over the wall, would make a sign that he had taken over the guard duty, either by calling or by throwing a stone, and the Myndian coming out the wood first of all would take and keep any note that might have been let down by him; then he would himself attach another note to the rope.

This set of actions, that may be also part of an ambush or at least a preparation phase, adds auditive elements to the Thucydidean visual pattern: the Athenian gave signals to the man by calling him or throwing a stone (ἢ φθεγξάμενο[ς ἢ λί]|θῳ βαλών); this is in fact unknown to Thucydides' descriptions of ambushes and battles, where visibility predominates. Possibly the *Anabasis* of Xenophon would open the way for a further development of that pattern. There is one example of ambush accompained with aural aspects other than with visual perceptions and people's thoughts. In a day-time ambush the brightness of bronze-shields makes men particularly visible. In the course of the action a Mysian man who had led the attack against the Greeks is heard shouting for help by his men, who consequently came out to pick him up and assist him: οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι Κρῆτες (ἁλίσκεσθαι γὰρ ἔφασαν τῷ δρόμῳ), ἐκπεσόντες ἐκ τῆς ὁδοῦ εἰς ὕλην κατὰ τὰς νάπας καλινδούμενοι ἐσώθησαν, ὁ Μυσὸς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν φεύγων *ἐβόα* βοηθεῖν· καὶ ἐβοήθησαν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἀνέλαβον τετρωμένον, *An.* 5.2.31–32.

8.4 Thebes, or Intra-Greek Hostility

The Oxyrhynchus historian's account of the Theban responsibilities in leading the Greeks to war (18.1–2) is interesting for more than one reason. It recalls the language of causation as well as the notion of 'visibility' in historical developments, both reminiscent of Thucydides' narrative. In addition, it reminds us of the analogous reading that Xenophon himself gives of the causes of the outbreak of the Corinthian war (*Hell.* 3.5.3). We have already suggested (ch. 6) that the Oxyrhynchus historian, possibly in response to Xenophon's narrative, tries to clarify the responsibilities concerning *especially* the Thebans on the eve of the Corinthian war; the insertion of a digression on the Boeotian constitution appears to be coherent with the authorial intent of distinguishing the Theban responsibilities from those of the rest of the confederate cities. We have shown that Xenophon, for his part, is aware of Thebes' hegemonic

aspirations just before the outbreak of that war, and that some events (i.e. the account of the coup of Sycion led by Euphron in 367 BC) suggest that the historian puts emphasis on the Theban responsibilities throughout his narrative.

Now it is time to ask whether we are dealing indeed with a sort of narrative cliché on the Thebans. The question is to find out whether a shared stereotypical view of Thebes, that might go back a long way, is particularly a feature of historiographical rhetoric, traceable in several authors in a way that transcends references to specific contexts or contingencies.

The issue of responsibilities in the *HO*'s text seems to hint at features typical of the 'character' of the Thebans: they are seen as a manipulative people who pull the strings behind the scenes. The plan of a Phocian attack on the Locrian territory is secretly devised by the Thebans (a party) in order to involve the Greeks in that conflict (18.1–2). In some ways this is reminiscent of Thucydides' account of the Theban attack on Plataea of 431 BC (2.1–6). Both accounts involve a small-scale furtive attack that escalates into a full-scale war (the Peloponnesian war there, the Corinthian here); in Thucydides too, like in the *HO*, the Thebans acted in secret with some people who could facilitate the achievement of their goal: a furtive attack was launched by those Thebans who plotted in connection with some Plataeans. The entry of the Thebans into Plataea was, in fact, due to the party of those Plataeans who, led by Naucleides, sought to use their political power as a means to get control over their city; this happened at the expense of their political enemies. Naucleides negotiated, on the Theban side, with Eurymachus, son of Leontiades (2.2–3):

> 2. The Thebans were invited and the gates opened to them by a group of Plataeans, Naucleides and his party, who for motives of personal power wished to eliminate their opponents among the citizens and align the city with Thebes. 3. Their agent in this was one of the most influential men in Thebes, Eurymachus the son of Leontiades.

It is interesting to notice that the same Eurymachus is mentioned by Herodotus in relation to the story of the surrender to Xerxes of the Theban contingent at Thermopylae. Leontiades, the Theban leader of that military force, was the first to be branded with the King's marks, and his son was later killed by the Plataeans (7.233.2). Here Herodotus does not give a full and detailed account of the attack on Plataea; he is rather interested in telling the story of Eurymachus' death. The historian alludes to it presumably because the Plataean episode was perceived as a quite familiar and recent event. However, by way of connecting Eurymachus' family with Leontiades, he might also imply some sort of

continuity not only in the unfortunate fate of both,[59] but also in their character and behaviour. That Herodotus gives some negative examples of Theban conduct is shown, moreover, by the fact that some of the Thebans before the battle of Thermopylae are described as staying at Leonidas' side 'reluctantly' and 'unwillingly' (7.222); and the choice they made to survive by handing themselves over to the Persians (7.233) is given by the narrator not without blame.[60] Besides, Thebes' mythical history is for Herodotus a sort of negative paradigm that may explain intra-Greek hostilities. Such is the case, for instance, of the legendary hostility between the two brothers, Eteocles and Polynices, which is at the origin of the historical hostility between the two kings, Cleomenes and Demaratus, at Sparta: one of the Heraclides, ancestors of the Spartan kings, descended indeed from Polynices (6.52.2–8).[61] Furthermore, Herodotus' account of Polynices' expedition with the Argives against his brother Eteocles (9.27.2–4) seems to foreshadow and explain both the Greek response to Thebes after her attack on Plataea and the hostility between Athens and Thebes in Herodotus' own day.[62]

The references that both Xenophon and Isocrates make to this same mythical episode, that is the Argive expedition led by Polynices against Thebes (*Hell.* 6.5.46: τῶν μὲν οὖν ὑμετέρων προγόνων καλὸν λέγεται, ὅτε τοὺς Ἀργείων τελευτήσαντας *ἐπὶ τῇ Καδμείᾳ* οὐκ εἴασαν ἀτάφους γενέσθαι, and *Paneg.* 55: οὗτος μὲν ἐκ τῆς στρατείας τῆς επὶ Θήβας δεδυστυχηκώς, καὶ τοὺς *ὑπὸ τῇ Καδμείᾳ* τελευτήσαντας αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ δυνάμενος ἀνελέσθαι …), may suggest that the theme reminded their audiences of the most recent episode of the Athenian liberation of the fortress of Thebes, the Cadmea, from the Spartan garrison of 379 BC (*Hell.* 5.4.1–18). All the more so if, as has been suggested, in moulding his account of the liberation of Cadmea (*Hell.* 5.4.1–9), Xenophon appears to have followed the mythological pattern of the 'Seven against Thebes,' differing slighlty from Greek tradition on that subject: not twelve returners to Thebes (as in Plutarch), but seven, and no mention of Pelopidas, replaced with the collective and common effort of the seven heroes willing to return home.[63] What is particularly striking in Xenophon's depiction of Theban behaviour throughout book five is that it resembles the picture offered by the Oxyrhynchus historian: the Thebans appear ready to persuade or corrupt others, and to foment hostilities among other Greeks (18.1–2). After the liberation of the Cadmea, the Thebans feared

59 Rubincam (1981): 47–49.

60 See Baragwanath (2008): 226.

61 Baragwanath (2008): 173–174.

62 Flower-Marincola (2002): 153–155.

63 Schmitzer (1998): 123–139; Pelling (2013 b): 13–16.

for their own safety and wanted to avoid the accusation that they alone made war against Sparta;[64] therefore they corrupted Sphodrias, the Spartan governor of Thespiae, in order to lead him to invade Attica and, consequently, to make the Athenians go to war against the Spartans (*Hell.* 5.4.20):

> On their side the Thebans also were alarmed at the prospect of having to fight against the Spartans entirely by themselves. So they thought out the following plan. By a bribe, so it was said, they induced Sphodrias, the Spartan governor at Thespiae, to invade Attica, so that he might force Athens into war with Sparta.[65]

Here it is not so much or not only a matter of mere responsibilities, but we are possibly also dealing with a stereotypical view of the Thebans, that is a reading which shows them as a particularly selfish people, who cause divisions among Greeks. This characterisation appears, moreover, to be in line with poetic (think of Euripides' *Suppliant Women*), rhetoric as well as philosophic evidence. In Plato's *Menexenus* the Thebans (identified generically with the Boeotians) along with the Corinthians and the Argives are mentioned as having handed the Greeks of the mainland over to the Persians (386);[66] and it is also possible to glimpse here the old charge of medising (245 c). A few Isocratean statements about Theban behaviour show further developments of the image of Thebes as a selfish city: 'the Thebans in the former circumstances in all their embassies would plead the cause of freedom and independence; but now that they believe they have secured licence for themselves (νομίζουσιν αὑτοῖς ἄδειαν γεγενῆσθαι),[67] disregarding everything else, they have the effrontery to speak in defence of their private gain and of their own acts of violence, and they assert that it is to the advantage of their allies that the Thebans should have our country …' (*Plataicus* [14] 24–25). According to Isocrates, although the Thebans accused the Spartans of having occupied the Cadmea, Thebes' dominion over Greece (*pleonexia*) was not different from that of Sparta ([14] 19–20). The passage suggests a sort of ideal association between Sparta's and Thebes' behaviour, for the notion that the Thebans are selfishly interested in their own safety echoes a similar idea expressed by Lysias with reference to the

64 The Athenians punished their two generals who were involved in the plot, when they saw that the Spartans were now going past Attica and invading the country of Thebes (*Hell.* 5.4.19).

65 Transl. by R. Warner.

66 Dušanić (2005): 115.

67 373 BC.

Spartans: at the time of the Persian wars they built a wall across the Isthmus and, happy with their own safety (καὶ ἀγαπώντων μὲν τῇ σωτηρίᾳ), left the Athenian request for help in abeyance.[68] Moreover, for Isocrates the Corinthian war was due to the *hybris* of the Thebans, who revealed themselves as unfaithful and untrustworthy towards both the agreements and their benefactors. This appears to be in accordance with the Oxyrhynchus historian's view (*Plataicus* [14] 27–29):

> 27. When the Corinthian war broke out because of their overbearing conduct (ὕβριν) and the Spartans had marched against them, though the Thebans had been saved by you [*Athenians*], they were so far from showing their gratitude for this service that, when you had put an end to the war, they abandoned you and entered into the alliance with the Spartans.[69] [...] 28. The Thebans, though they dwelt in a city of such importance, did not have the fortitude even to remain neutral, but were guilty of such cowardice and baseness (εἰς τοῦτ' ἀνανδρίας καὶ πονηρίας ἦλθον) as to give their solemn oath to join the Spartans in attacking you, the saviours of their city. For this they were punished by the gods, and after the Cadmea was captured, they were forced to take refuge here in Athens. By this they furnished the crowning proof of their perfidy (μάλιστ' ἐπεδείξαντο τὴν αὑτῶν ἀπιστίαν); 29. for when they had again been saved by your power and were restored to their city,[70] they did not remain faithful for a single instant, but immediately sent ambassadors to Sparta, showing themselves ready to be slaves and to alter in no respect their former agreements with Sparta.[71] [...]

Isocrates' audience of the *Plataicus* (371 BC) may have in mind the very recent invasion of Plataea by Thebes (373 BC). Furthermore, the theme of the occupation/liberation of the Cadmea is contemporary enough to look as historically valuable in itself; however, it may also be a 'rhetorical' theme; after all, the priority of the speech is to make a plea for an Athenian intervention against Thebes. Thus the topic of the Cadmea comes over as especially credible for its mix of recent historical memory and appeal to a comfortably familiar rhetorical stereotype. It is not coincidental that we read a sort of presentism in other Isocratean hints at the Cadmean fortress, with the echo of a distant legend

68 Lys. [2] 42–46; cf. Hdt 9.7–8 and 7.139.

69 386 BC.

70 379 BC.

71 Transl. by Larue Van Hook.

given by the recent memories (ὑπὸ τῇ Καδμείᾳ, [4] 55 and [14] 52–53):[72] these references are made in close association with the saga of the Seven against Thebes, within speeches, such as the *Panegiricus* and the *Plataicus*, that solicit a military intervention by Athens.

The topic of the liberation of the Cadmea reminded Greek audiences of the previous occupation of the fortress, along with the decisive role that on that occasion was played by the Thebans. They acted as instigators and provocateurs of the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25–36).[73] The division in factions at Thebes is shown by Xenophon in relation to the events preceding the putsch of the Cadmea: the polemarchs Leontiades and Ismenias were at variance with one other and both of them were leaders of political clubs; this is highly familiar and coherent with the analogous picture that the Oxyrhynchus historian gives of Theban politics. Are, then, the Thebans instigators and provocateurs, concerned only with their own interest?

Yes, they are. Or, at least, they are represented in that way. They are used to corrupting people: think of the case of Sphodrias (above, *Hell.* 5.4.20), for instance, or that of the Locrians, who received Theban money to attack the Phocians (the *casus belli*) just before the Corinthian war broke out (*Hell.* 3.5.3). But the Thebans are also particularly manipulative in order to achieve their political goals. The assistance that Theban ambassadors offered to Athens—in defence of the victims (τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις) of Spartan imperialism (*pleonexia*)—is presented by Xenophon through a speech that the Thebans delivered at Athens on the eve of the Corinthian war; their assistance is presented as a means for Athens to recover her old empire. It is not difficult here to see the fallacious game of the speakers who, while assigning to Thebes that role which was traditionally held by Athens—of the city that defends the oppressed, wronged, and victims of injustice[74]—, try to conceal Thebes' true intention to make her own profit from that war (*Hell.* 3.5.10; 14; 15):

> 10. Now we are all aware, men of Athens, that you would like to get back the empire which you used to have. Surely this is most likely to happen if you go to the help of all victims of Spartan injustice. […] 14. It is not likely, then, that if you come forward in your turn to take the lead of all those who have been so obviously injured, you will become much the greatest

72 Cf. Isocr. [12] 171–172. On the two versions of the Athenian intervention in recovering the Argive fallen (Athens would fight, according to the *Panegyricus*, or would use diplomacy, according to the *Panathenaicus* and *Plataicus*), see Gray (1994 b): 83–104.

73 Cf. Riedinger (1991): 173–180.

74 See above, ch. 7.1.

> power that has ever existed? […] 15. These, then, are our proposals. Please, believe us, Athenians, when we say that in our opinion we are inviting you to take a course which promises much more benefit for Athens than for Thebes.

Furthermore, Leontiades' invitation to the Spartan Phoebidas to occupy the Cadmea (383 BC) falls in the time of a religious festival (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.26–29), just as the Theban attack on Plataea of 431 BC did (Thuc. 3.56.2).[75] The Thebans thus take advantage of holiday times to surprise their enemy. The rhetoric used by Leontiades can be put in close relation with that of the Theban ambassadors (above), with some striking thematic correspondences: 'rêve d'empire chez les Athéniens, patriotisme et goût de la gloire chez Phoibidas, souci de sécurité chez les Lacédémoniens; le même art aussi de minimiser, ou même de taire, les avantages personnels qu'ils en retireront, le même art enfin d'entraîner le partenaire dans une aventure incertaine, en taisant les risques, la force de Sparte pour les Athéniens, la colère de la cité pour Phoibidas, celle des dieux, dans la perspective de Xénophon pour les Lacédémoniens.'[76] Admittedly, this kind of rhetoric might also fit with every sort of protreptic discourse aimed to minimise risks and exaggerate the advantages coming from an unpredictable military intervention. But what is particularly interesting in both cases is that the Theban rhetoric chiefly contributes to the modelling of the Thebans' character, developing a sustained picture which is also fully consistent with their actions.[77]

The Oxyrhynchus historian's audience presumably bore all that in mind, and they may also have thought of more recent historical developments, especially in consideration that Thebes was acting now in complete unison with Philip.[78] The Athenian general mood toward the Thebans was largely hostile at the time in which the Oxyrhynchus historian wrote.[79] In the fifties, when the Athenian allies left the league, starting the so-called Social war (357–355 BC), Greece was seized with anti-Persian fever, and alarming rumours of Persian armaments spread widely. The Thebans, who had medised in 480 BC and had negotiated a new alliance with the Persians under Pelopidas in 367 BC, were now considered as potential allies of the King on his expected return. Demosthenes delivering a speech to the Athenian assembly surprises everyone by doubting that Thebes

75 See Hornblower (2007): 141.

76 Riedinger (1991): 176.

77 Riedinger (1991): 176: 'Aux Thébains qui parlent, font exactement pendant les Thébains qui agissent, ceux qu'on voit dans deux manœuvres de provocation.'

78 Dem. [5] 20.

79 See chh. 3, 5 and 6.

would really betray the Greek cause in the case of a new invasion by the Persians (*On the Navy* [14] 33–34):[80]

> 33. Now, if anyone expects the Thebans to take his side, it is difficult to speak to you about them, because you have such a hearty dislike of them (διὰ γὰρ τὸ μισεῖν αὐτοὺς) that you would not care to hear any good of them, even if it were true; but yet, when dealing with grave matters, one must not on any pretext pass over an important consideration. For my part, I believe that the Thebans are so little likely to join the King in an attack on Greece that they would pay a large sum, 34. if they had it, to get a chance of expiating their former sins against the Greeks (τὰς προτέρας ἀναλύσονται πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἁμαρτίας). If, however, some think that the Thebans are fated always to be on the wrong side, at any rate you all know this, that if the Thebans stand by the King, their enemies are bound to stand by the Greeks.[81]

Though orators' moods were easily changeable in the course of time—think of Isocrates' unconsistent views, for example—and a potential menace might also become a potential ally,[82] it is clear that a stereotypical view about the Thebans had been affecting and disquieting Greek opinion (in particular, at Athens) for a long time; so that it became quite familiar to consider them as a people stained by the mark of medism and selfishness. Therefore, about two centuries later Polybius (4.31.5–6) censures the Thebans for medising out of fear during the Persian wars, and criticises Pindar for approving their decision to remain inactive.[83]

8.5 *Stasis*, or the Dimension of Internal Conflict. What Awareness of Thucydides?

The *HO*'s narrative resorts to a kind of political language that fits the semantic sphere of internal political conflict, and is highly reminiscent of Thucydidean

80 Cf. Shrimpton (1971): 310–318.

81 Transl. by J.H. Vince.

82 In the speech *For the People of Megalopolis* [16], Demosthenes supports an alliance with Thebes to arrest Spartan *pleonexia* (21).

83 However, Polybius is incorrect in his treatment of Pindar by quoting F 109, because the remaining two lines of Polybius' quotation (known from Stobaeus) show that the poem did not refer to the Persian wars, but to internal strives. So Hornblower (2004): 60–63.

terminology. The language of conflict is beyond any doubt intimately related to themes of historical causation, individual and collective responsibilities. It is, moreover, interesting to understand to what degree Thucydides' reading of Greek *staseis* can be found in the *HO* and in Xenophon: they seem to share the Thucydidean pattern which shows Greek cities as torn between *oligoi* and *demos*.

The Oxyrhynchus historian describes the democratic revolution that took place at Rhodes in 395 BC as follows (15.2–3):

> 2. They [*Hieronymus and Nicophemus, Conon's lieutenants*] bided their time during that day, and when the soldiers were there for the review on the following day in the usual fashion, they led some under arms to the harbour and others to just outside the market place ([ἔξω τῆ]ς ἀγορᾶς). Those of the Rhodians who were in the know, when they realised it was time to undertake the deed, gathered with daggers in the market place (εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν), and one of them, Dorimachus, got up on the stone where the herald made announcements, and, shouting out as loud as he could, said 'Citizens, let's go for the tyrants as quick as we can!' As he was shouting for support, the rest rushed with daggers to the meeting of the magistrates and killed the Diagorean family and eleven of the other citizens, and having done this they gathered the mass of the Rhodians into an assembly, 3. and as soon as they were assembled, Conon came back from Caunus with the triremes. Those who had perpetrated the massacre overthrew the existing constitution and set up a democracy, and made a few of the citizens exiles. So this was the outcome of the revolution (ἐπανάστασις) in Rhodes.

The account is moulded in a way that might remind us of the plot of Cinadon, even though that remained unfulfilled (*Hell.* 3.3.4–11). In both cases the *agora* is the pre-established place for conspiracy, where the putsch is expected to start, and where conspirators plan to gather.[84] In Xenophon the ephors are acquainted with the affair by an informer, who tells them that he had been taken by Cinadon to the edge of the market place (ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον τῆς ἀγορᾶς) and had been told to consider all people in the *agora* as potential allies (τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας συμμάχους πλέον ἢ τετρακισχιλίους ὄντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, *Hell.* 3.3.5). A further noteworthy aspect is the extent of anonymity: the informer, the

84 This is a longstanding *topos* occurring in different contexts to represent a Greek *stasis* (see Plut. *Lyc.* 5.4).

ephors, the other conspirators are unnamed just as the Rhodian plotters, the magistrates and the killed citizens are; the only personalities which emerge are Cinadon, on the one side, and Dorimachus, on the other. The massacre of the oligarchic family at Rhodes can be associated with the even more bloodthirsty expectations of Cinadon, who would have been glad to eat the Spartiates alive (ὅπου γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τις λόγος γένοιτο περὶ Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐδένα δύνασθαι κρύπτειν τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἡδέως ἂν καὶ ὠμῶν ἐσθίειν αὐτῶν, *Hell.* 3.3.6). By hinting at cannibalism as expression of the man's ferocity, Xenophon might have in mind the case of the Potidaeans, as related by Thucydides: besieged by the Athenians, after great suffering 'they even tasted each other'—which is, moreover, the first example of cannibalism in the classical age (καί τινες καὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγέγευντο, Thuc. 2.70.1).[85]

It has been rightly noticed that Thucydides, Xenophon and the Oxyrhynchus historian show great interest in dealing with Greek internal conflicts.[86] The point here is to understand whether and to what extent both Xenophon's *Hellenica* and the *HO* might share aspects of Thucydides' view of *stasis*. The Thucydidean narrative offers to the reader an extraordinary set of *staseis* and *prodosiai* happening in concomitance with external attacks, in which local interests are closely interwoven with those of the two hegemonic powers, Athens and Sparta. In a very few cases Thucydides deals with social-economic grounds of a local revolution,[87] and *staseis* are mostly seen as moments of conflict between *demos/plethos* and *dynatoi/oligoi*, whose social contexts are generally treated in a stereotypical way. This has been explained by scholars as a result of Thucydides' political 'ideology,' which would lead him to represent internal conflicts as seditions caused and fomented mainly by contrasts of ideological nature.[88] In coherence with his historiographical project and dealing with the biggest conflict ever—the Peloponnesian war—Thucydides' main concern is to show oscillations between Athens and Sparta by their respective allies, and to clarify the allies' aligning with the one side or the other. The most exemplary case is offered by the account of the Corcyrean *stasis* (3.82–84), as it shows that:

> [...] everywhere there were internal divisions such that the democratic leaders called in the Athenians and the oligarchs called in the Spartans.

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85 Hornblower (2010): 29. Also Herodotean patterns (temporal formulas) have been found within the account of Cinadon's plot; see Gray (1989): 39–45. As for Arcaic times the desire to eat someone raw is first attested in Hom. *Il.* 22.346–347: Achilles wishes he had the courage to eat Hector's flesh after cutting it.

86 Gehrke (1985): 9.

87 Thuc. 8.21; 5.4.2–4; 4.84.1–2 and 88.1–2. Moggi (1999): 41–72. Cf. Fisher (2000): 83–123.

88 Moggi (1999): 49–54.

> In peacetime they would have had neither the excuse nor the will to invite this intervention: but in time of war, when alliances were available to either party to the detriment of their opponents and thereby their own advantage, there were ready opportunities for revolutionaries to call in one side or the other.
>
> THUC. 3.82.1

Greece appears as torn between Spartan and Athenian supporters still in the *HO* and in Xenophon's *Hellenica*. We have already shown that the Oxyrhynchus historian hands down a picture of Athens and Sparta as that of cities eager to support their own partisans.[89] The Theban *stasiasmos* which happened a few years before the outbreak of the Corinthian war (16.1) can be considered the underlying cause of the war itself, as some years later the Theban party of Androcleidas will engage the people in that war against the Spartans (18.1),

> Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Φωκεῖς τούτου τοῦ θέρους εἰς | πόλεμον κατέστησαν. ἐγένοντο δὲ τῆς ἔχθρας αὐτοῖς | [α]ἴτιοι μάλιστα τῶν ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις τινές· οὐ γὰρ πολλοῖς | [ἔ]τεσιν πρότερον ἔτυχον εἰς **στασιασμὸν** οἱ Βοιωτοὶ | προελθόντες.

> This summer the Boeotians and the Phocians went to war. Those chiefly responsible for the bad relations between them were some people in Thebes. Not many years previously there had been political conflict in Boeotia.
>
> 16.1

The two Theban factions of Androcleidas and Leontiades were involved respectively in Athenian and Spartan politics, as the former sided with the Athenians (*attikizontes*), while the latter supported the Spartans (*lakonizontes*):

> Ἐν δὲ ταῖς Θήβαις ἔτυχον οἱ βέλτιστοι καὶ γνω|ριμώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρη|κα, **στασιάζοντες** πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ἡγοῦντο δὲ τοῦ μέ|ρους τοῦ μὲν Ἰσμηνίας κα[ὶ] Ἀντίθεος καὶ Ἀνδροκλ⟨είδα⟩ς, | τοῦ δὲ Λεοντιάδης καὶ Ἀσίας καὶ Κο⟨ιρα⟩τάδας, ἐφρό|νουν δὲ τῶν πολιτευομένων οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Λεοντι|άδην **τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων**, [ο]ἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἰσμηνίαν | αἰτίαν μὲν εἶχον **ἀττικίζειν**, ἐξ ὧν πρόθυμοι πρὸς | τὸν δῆμον ἐγένοντο ὡς ἔφυγ⟨ε⟩ν·

89 Ch. 5.

> In Thebes the best and most notable of the citizens, as I have already said, were in dispute with each other about politics. One faction was led by Leontiades, Astias, and Coeratadas. Leontiades' party supported the Spartans; Ismenias' party was accused of supporting the Athenians, arising from their support for the *demos* when it was in exile.
>
> 17.1

This political setting goes back at least to the time of the Decelean war, when Leontiades' party was in power at Thebes (17.3). The peculiar attention that the Oxyrhynchus historian pays to Theban parties struggling for power is something already emerged from the Thucydidean narrative of the assault on Plataea (2.1–6). As we have said, Thucydides usually leaves the impression that politics all over Greece are dominated by supporters of Spartans or Athenians, and that any change in that balance favours the one side or the other;[90] yet in the Plataean case (2.1–6) the historian abandons his tendency to generalise according to the *oligoi* ~ *demos* pattern and enters for a while into Theban internal politics (2.2–3):

> 2. The Thebans were invited and the gates opened to them by a group of Plataeans, Naucleides and his party (οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ), who for motives of personal power wished to eliminate their opponents among the citizens and align the city with Thebes. 3. Their agent in this was one of the most influential men in Thebes, Eurymachus the son of Leontiades.

The historian names the people involved in that affair. In Thucydides the expression οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ usually carries the nuance of what could be a temporary physical presence of people around someone (here Naucleides); however, here it might hint at the abstract idea of 'the group of followers,' foreshadowing the standardised οἱ περί τινα form that in the *HO* clearly designates political groups or *hetaireiai*.[91]

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90 See ch. 7.3.

91 P. Oxy. v 842, 17.2. In Thucydides the expression οἱ περί τινα mostly means 'troops' under someone (4.33.1; 5.13; 6.97.3; 8.28.4; 8.105.2–3), or 'fellow-ambassadors' (5.21; 8.67.1); in two cases it clearly indicates a political group set up around someone (5.46.4; 8.98.1). Also Xenophon uses the formula οἱ περί τινα with the meaning of partisans (*Hell.* 3.2.27; 5.3.13; 5.4.49; 6.4.18; 6.5.7) as well as of troops (2.4.6; 3.4.13; 3.4.20; 4.4.9; 4.5.15; 5.1.12; 5.1.26; 6.5.26; 7.2.14; 7.4.15). Cf. Thuc. 3.82.7, where the historian uses the term ξύνοδοι with reference to political groups of citizens that were active within Greek cities at the time of Corcyra's disorders.

It seems that Xenophon too echoes the Thucydidean picture of a continuing havoc caused in Greece by *staseis* as well as the interplay between internal and external forces. This is found, for instance, in his account of the occupation of the Cadmea: the Theban fortress was occupied by the Spartan Phoebidas, who acted in conjunction with the pro-Spartan party of Leontiades at Thebes (*Hell.* 5.2.25–36, 383 BC). Furthermore, the narrative of the disorders occurred at Elis (*Hell.* 3.2.21–31, 402/401 BC) as well as at Phlius (*Hell.* 5.2.8–10; 5.3.10–17; 5.3.21–25, 384 BC) shows even more clearly that the Thucydidean explanatory model of internal divisions and external support is adopted by Xenophon as a tool for explaining revolutions.[92] Elis was attacked by the Spartans, because she had concluded an alliance with Athenians, Argives and Mantineans and had committed some impious acts against the Spartans (21–23):

> 27. […] In the city was Xenias, the man of whom they say that he measured out the money he got by his father by the bushel, and he and his party (οἱ περὶ Ξενίαν) were anxious to get the credit for bringing the city over to the Spartans. So, while the country was being ravaged and Agis' army was in the neighbourhood of Cyllene, Xenias and his friends, with swords in their hands, rushed out of a house and began a massacre of their opponents. After killing a man who looked like Thrasydaeus, the leader of the democratic party (τοῦ δήμου προστάτῃ), they imagined that it was really Thrasydaeus whom they had killed, and so the democratic party lost heart and put up no resistance, 28. while the murderers assumed that there was nothing more to be done, and those who shared their views (οἱ ὁμογνώμονες αὐτοῖς) came out and paraded under arms in the market place (εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν). In fact, however, Thrasydaeus had been drinking and was still sleeping it off, and as soon as the people realised that he was not dead they crowded round his house on all sides, as a swarm of bees crowds round its leader. 29. Thrasydaeus put himself at their head; there was a battle in which the democrats were victorious, and those who had tried to seize power by violence fled to the Spartans.
>
> *Hell.* 3.2.27–29

The *stasis* is reported in detail and the topic of the *agora* as the canonical place where to make a revolt start occurs once again. The narrative makes it clear that the city was afflicted by internal divisions, for some sympathised with Sparta,

92 Fisher (2000): 110–111.

others with Athens, and the two groups were led respectively by Xenias and Thrasydaeus. The Thucydidean pattern is, thus, found also here.

However, the case of Phlius gives evidence that historical realities were much more complex than the *oligoi* ~ *demos* pattern shows. The pro-Spartan exiled Phliasians asked Sparta to help them to be restored (*Hell.* 5.2.8–10). Personal factors are much more important than political ones: the exiles had many relations and friends inside Phlius and, moreover, were also supported by others who wished for a change of government (*καὶ γὰρ* **συγγενεῖς** *πολλοὶ ἔνδον ἦσαν τῶν φευγόντων καὶ ἄλλως* **εὐμενεῖς**, *καὶ οἷα δὴ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι* **νεωτέρων τινὲς ἐπιθυμοῦντες πραγμάτων** *κατάγειν ἐβούλοντο τὴν φυγήν*, *Hell.* 5.2.9). Hence the Phliasian democracy agreed to receive the exiles, but since the restoration of their property caused endless disputes, the exiles appealed again to Sparta (*Hell.* 5.3.11). Agesilaus agreed with those complaints especially because the followers of Podanemus had been friends of his father (τῷ μὲν πατρὶ αὐτοῦ Ἀρχιδάμῳ ξένοι ἦσαν οἱ περὶ Ποδάνεμον) and were now among the restored exiles; on the other hand, the partisans of Procles were friends of his own (αὐτῷ δὲ **οἱ ἀμφὶ** Προκλέα, *Hell.* 5.3.13). Similarly, it was also personal grounds that, according to the Oxyrhynchus historian, influenced the Corinthian Timolaus to set aside his pro-Spartan disposition and share the Greek cause against Sparta (the Corinthian war), while other Corinthians wished to bring about a change of policy (τῶν δὲ Κορινθίων | οἱ **μεταστῆσαι τὰ πρά[γμ]ατα** ζητοῦντες *κτλ*. Τ[ιμό]|λαος δὲ μόνος αὐτοῖς διάφορος γεγονὼς ἰδ[ί]ων ἐγ|κλημάτων ἕνεκα, πρότερον ἄριστα διακείμεν[ος] | καὶ μάλιστα **λακωνίζων**, 7.3).

From the evidence thus far it is clear that the Thucydidean pattern appears to be unsatisfactory, because it cannot fit more complex realities. All the more so as there are cases in which the Thucydidean model has become 'paradigmatic;' it has been readapted to a kind of narrative of exemplary character. Thucydides' view of Greek politics has given way to further developments that have nothing to do with real policies, but show, instead, moral *exempla* of good and bad collective behaviour. This is the case of the *Cyropaedia*, where Xenophon deals with the theme of *stasis* and decadence after Cyrus' death to show a great distance both temporal and moral between the Persians under Cyrus and those of Xenophon's own times. The parallel with Thucydides' analysis of the Corcyrean revolution is striking, and many Thucydidean motifs recur, such as betrayal of oaths and mutual distrust (Thuc. 3.82.7; 83.2; *Cyr.* 8.8.2f), devaluation of kinship bonds (Thuc. 3.82.6; *Cyr.* 8.8.27), injustice and illegality (Thuc. 3.82.6; 82.8; *Cyr.* 8.8.5; 8.8.27), impiety (Thuc. 3.82.8; *Cyr.* 8.8.27).[93]

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93 So Nicolai (2010): 279–289.

8.6 Conclusion

The Oxyrhynchus historian's narrative is striking in that the work is broadly redolent of Thucydides' view of politics as well as of his theory of causation. There is one particular Thucydideanism in the text, that is, the constant recourse to a kind of explanatory mode that echoes two words very familiar to Thucydides' readers: *prophasis* and *aitia/aition*. The language of causation is helpful in clarifying the issue of people's responsibilities; examples from the *HO* and Athenian authors have shown that there was a kind of shared stereotypical view about the Thebans: they are portrayed as a particularly selfish people who caused divisions among Greeks.

Reflections on historical causation and people's responsibilities have led us extend our examination to the role played by clarity, visibility and visual language (as well as by the correlated notion of lack of visibility).[94] The language of causation both in Hippocratic texts and in historical ones shows itself as oscillating between the opposing concepts of φανερόν ~ ἀφανές and related semantic fields. This pattern refers to what is distinctly seen and clearly understood, in contrast with specious or unclear reasons, explanations or motives adduced by speakers. It may also be related to 'visibility' in a more concrete sense, like that conveyed by descriptions of physical realities, such as, for example, battles and ambushes.

The language of conflict is beyond any doubt intimately related to the theme of historical causation, and the *HO*'s debt to Thucydides' view of individual and collective responsibilities is noteworthy. Thucydides' reading of Greek *staseis* can be found not only in the Oxyrhynchus historian's narrative but also in that of Xenophon; their works seem to share the same Thucydidean pattern of seeing Greek cities as torn between *oligoi* and *demos*.

94 Greenwood (2006).

CHAPTER 9

'Moralism' in Historiography

The terminology connected with the language of causation throughout the *HO* shows the narrator's tendency to attribute blame to peoples and their political actions.[1] Consequently, this gives us good reasons to talk in terms of morality. We need to clarify those aspects related to the moral view conveyed by the narrative. How does morality work in the *HO*? Can blame be considered as part of a broader inspirational and 'moralistic' historiographical project? Are there any precedents or models? These are some of the questions addressed by this chapter. Other questions concern the exploration of patterns of 'morality' and 'moralism' in the narrative of Xenophon (*Hellenica*), Theopompus and Ephorus; the last two are, moreover, potential candidates for the authorship of the *HO*. This approach can be helpful in showing parallels and differences.

9.1 The *HO* and Thucydides: What 'Moralism'?

The *HO*'s account of the run-up to the Corinthian war (7 and 16–18) is characterised by a continuous interplay between specious reasons and hidden responsibilities. Despite the shared opinion according to which the causes (αἴτια) of the Corinthian war consisted in the money that an emissary of the King, Timocrates, granted to some Greek cities to lead them to war against Sparta, the true reason for going to that war is ultimately to be found in Spartan imperialism. For their part, those Greek cities that participated in that conflict had good reasons to engage in war against Sparta (7.2):

> Some say[2] that the money from him [*Timocrates*] was the cause of concerted action by these people and by some of the Boeotians and some in the other cities previously mentioned. But they do not know that all had long been ill-disposed (δυσμενῶς ἔχειν) towards the Spartans, looking out for a way that they might make the cities adopt a war policy. For the Argives and the Boeotians hated (ἐμίσουν) the Spartans because they

1 Cf. ch. 8.

2 The expression τινὲς λέγουσιν (7.2) seems to indicate some who spoke at the time in which the author wrote.

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> treated as friends their enemies among the citizens (τοῖς ἐναν[τίοι]ς τῶν πολιτῶν | αὐτοῖς ἐχρῶντο φίλοις).

Other than Sparta, Athens is to be blamed too for an irresponsible imperialistic policy; besides, her politicians conducted a demagogic policy. Some of the Athenians were in the habit of supporting Conon in Asia, with weapons and ships (7.1), as they intended to turn their city to a policy of conquest (7.2):

> And those who hated them [*the Spartans*] in Athens were the people who desired to turn the Athenians from tranquillity and peace and lead them towards war and a vigorous policy (πο|λεμεῖν καὶ π[ολ]υπρα[γ]μονεῖν), so that it might be possible for them to obtain money from the public treasury.

We have already raised doubts on how reliable this assumption may be, as it does not seem to correspond to any real vigorous political course that Athens started pursuing in these years (the 390s).[3] To some extent the triggering cause of the outbreak of the Corinthian war is implicitly related to the policy of the Athenian democrats, who, according to the Oxyrhynchus historian, were supported by the Theban party of Androcleidas and Ismenias ([ο]ἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἰσμηνίαν | αἰτίαν μὲν̣ εἶχον ἀττικίζειν, 17.1), that is the people most responsible for engaging other Greek cities in that war against the Spartans (18.1–2). It is possible to find a good deal of blame also in the narrator's portrait of this Theban faction, whose policy seems characterised much more by personal ambition in struggling for power than by a genuine will to support Athens and the democrats (17.1):

> In Thebes the best and most notable of the citizens, as I have already said, were in dispute with each other about politics (στασιάζοντες πρὸς ἀλλή-λους). One faction was led by Ismenias, Antitheus and Androcleidas, the other by Leontiades, Astias, and Coeratadas. Leontiades' party supported the Spartans; Ismenias' party was accused of supporting the Athenians, arising from their support for the *demos* when it was in exile. However, they were not concerned for the Athenians (οὐ μὴν ἐφρόν||[τιζον] τ̣ῶ̣[ν Ἀ]θηναίων), but … when … they chose rather … being ready to do evil (κακῶς ποιεῖν ἑτοίμους).

3 Ch. 5.

As we have noticed, the way in which the Oxyrhynchus historian deals with the Theban *stasiasmos*—seen as the result of internal division among the citizens, who are torn between Athens and Sparta—finds its roots in Thucydides' particular view of Greek politics (ch. 8). Now, it is time to ask how far the Oxyrhynchus historian's moral judgements and his readiness to make moral evaluations recall Thucydides' use of terms referring to moral contexts and aiming to clarify historical courses and developments.

The narrator of the *HO* is not a 'moralist,' in the sense that he does not employ any persuasive rhetoric to explore ethics and to point ethical truths.[4] Yet the embedded praise-and-blame scheme resulting from the Oxyrhynchus historian's understanding of war causation and peoples' responsibilities to a certain degree might also be a way to convey ethical insights and, possibly, advice for the future. Being extraordinary concerned with clarity, and tending to impose his own perspective and to correct views that appear contrary to his opinion, the narrator turns to explanations which embed examples of reproachful behaviour. So, it was Spartan harsh treatment of Greek cities and not the money of the Persian King that caused the war; still, it was the competition for leadership at Thebes and the renaissance of Athenian imperialistic aspirations that started the war. Even though explanations, underlying and triggering causes are closely interwoven with moral implications, and the grounds for this or that course are to be found in the behaviour of people who are more or less commended, the narrative seems to put much more emphasis on the explanatory factor than on the inspirational.

To some extent morality acts in a similar way as it does in Thucydides, where morality chiefly 'explains' things. Moral issues are interwoven with didacticism, and with the need to provide the reader with ethic lessons and paradigms,[5] especially when a debate on imperialism is at stake.[6] Thucydides' tendency to generalise on human nature and men's behaviour has been sometimes judged as 'moralising,' but throughout the narrative ethical arguments seem rather concerned with 'morale' than with 'morals.'[7]

A distinction needs to be made between ethical judgements we find in speeches (here we find most of them) and those which are in the narrator's

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4 On 'moralism' see Duff (1999): 66–71, Pelling (2011 a): 237–251.

5 Generalising comments are characteristic of Thucydides; they mostly fall into a number of broad categories: statements about the nature of war, about the behaviour of states, about the psychological basis of empire, and more specifically about political or ideological issues concerning the Athenian empire. Cf. Meister (1955): 78ff., Hammond (1973): 49–59.

6 On moral claims made to justify Athenian rule see Pelling (2012 a): 306–310.

7 Rutherford (1994): 57.

own voice or implied by his narrative. The fact that most ethical judgements are especially found in speeches shows that in the *Histories* there is more interest in tracing the way that people think and speak than in presenting Thucydides' own moral judgements (or at least presenting them explicitly). Perhaps the most telling case is offered by the Mytilenaean debate, a meeting which took place in Athens in order to reconsider a previous decision to put to death all Mytilenaean males, after the city had revolted against the Athenians (3.37–48). Cleon attacks his audience and the speakers who urge reconsideration of that decision. Throughout his speech he refers to ethical reasons, and assimilates the idea of *dikaion* to what is considered *xympheron* for Athens. Cleon certainly thinks he can teach his audience a lesson on how to rule (3.40.6; 8):

> 6. Those who do harm to another without justification most often press their attack all the way to his destruction, wary of the danger from an enemy left standing: they know that the survivor of a gratuitous attack is the more bitter for his experience than an opponent in open and equal war. [...] 8. Punish them as they deserve, and set a clear example (παράδειγμα) to the rest of the allies that the penalty for revolt will be death. When that is understood, you will be less distracted from the enemy by the need to fight your own allies.[8]

Cleon alternates general statements on how the relation between rulers and ruled works and precise instructions for avoiding disturbances in the future. When an unexpected piece of good fortune comes strongly and suddenly, it inclines cities to overstate their own condition; this is what happened to Mytilene, and what might happen again to other allies if the Athenians do not vote for an exemplary penalty against the rebels and their city (3.39.5–6):

> 5. We should never have treated the Mytilenaeans with greater regard than the others, and then we would not have seen this degree of presumption: it is general human nature to despise indulgence and respect an unyielding stand. [...] 6. Consider now the effect on our other allies. If they see you applying the same sanctions to secessions forced by the enemy and to deliberate revolts, do you not think that all will revolt on the slightest pretext, when the reward for success is liberation and the penalty for failure nothing very drastic?

8 Transl. by M. Hammond.

Also Diodotus, who supports the opposite view (moderation towards the rebels) in comparison with Cleon's proposal, still exploits the same rhetoric about human nature, individual and collective mistakes, as well as the same notion of practical advantage for Athens (ξυμφέρον, χρήσιμον, χρησίμως, 3.44.2–4; 45–46). Diodotus is displaying to the audience what is the wise course for the Athenians rather than the just one, which means again, as in Cleon's speech, being concerned with Athenian self-interest (περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας, 3.44.1):

> 2. If a city does start a revolt and then recognises that there is no chance of success, she can come to terms when she is still able to refund our expenses and continue to pay tribute in future. But if we go the other way, do you not think that all will make more thorough preparations than they do at present? […] 4. So rather than judging the offenders by the strict letter of the law, to our own detriment, we should seek to ensure by moderation in our punishment that in time to come we still have the financial resource of allied cities capable of their contribution.
>
> THUC. 3.46.2; 4

Diodotus' moral lesson looks more elaborate than that of Cleon, and in this sense his didacticism comes up even more clearly. He appeals to poverty that through necessity leads people to presumptuous pride and to the greed for having more; hope, desire and fortune are additional ingredients, which determine courses of actions that cannot be prevented at all, for there are no effective deterrents against them (3.45). Paradoxically the only case in which Diodotus turns to the theme of justice is indeed with reference to a false argument. If the Athenians destroy the people of Mytilene, that is the democratic faction, who had no share in the matter (this, in fact, is untrue, since the *demos* too joined the revolt along with the oligarchs),[9] they would first commit the injustice (ἀδικήσετε) of killing their benefactors; and, since the Athenians treat guilty and innocent in the same way, this would lead any future rebels elsewhere to have on their side the democrats in their cities (3.47.3). Diodotus leaves open another possibility too, that is, Athens' alienation of the people of Mytilene (καὶ εἰ ἠδίκησαν, 3.47.4); but he uses both the possibilities to the same aim, to enforce the lesson that he is giving: 'for the maintenance of our empire I consider it much more expedient to tolerate injustice done to us than to justify, as we could, the destruction of people we would do better to spare' (3.47).

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9 Connor (1984): 87–88.

Are, thus, ethical arguments, embedded in broader contexts, aimed to explain and give instructions? Yes, they are, at least to Thucydides' internal audience. Thucydides' speakers are using ethical language to offer practical teaching on how to act; that is, ethical judgements convey advice for the future. In Cleon's case the ethical language is strong, and large part of his speech is based on what he sees as expediency; in Diodotus' case the ethical approach is less strong than in Cleon's, but it may be felt as potentially strong enough in his audience's mind. Besides, both Diodotus and Cleon rather than weighing people's wrongdoing or good behaviour seem mainly disputing for the prize for being the best teacher of imperialism, one who gives insight especially on how to preserve it. Cleon himself and later Diodotus too are embodying thus the sort of practice that Cleon has just decried at 3.38, where he criticises the agonistic rhetoric of a man who would speak in favour of the Mytilenaeans by resorting to dubtful sophisms.

It is noteworthy that the Melians too use the same rhetoric as the Athenians do, and intentionally and expressly resort to arguments connected with the *xympheron* rather than to those pertaining to justice (ἀνάγκη γάρ, ἐπειδὴ ὑμεῖς οὕτω παρὰ τὸ *δίκαιον* τὸ *ξυμφέρον* λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε, 5.90), though the Melians' arguments are not felt as the natural ones to make in such a predicament: the Melians do so because the Athenians have insisted on it. In the course of the dialogue the discussion focuses on the issue of how to preserve the Athenian empire, whether through the acceptance of the allies' neutrality and freedom (the Melians' view) or by denying it (the Athenians' view):

> *Mel.* Do you not think that our alternative offers you security? Since you have diverted us from talk of justice (δικαίων λόγων) and want us to follow your doctrine of expediency (ξυμφόρῳ), we must try again by another route and state our own interest (χρήσιμον), which might convince you if it happens to coincide with yours. At present there are several neutrals: do you want to make enemies of them all?
>
> THUC. 5.98

Both sides, thus, speak the same language of interest and advantage, and the moral implications of the dialogue are tools of intellectual enlightenment which convey also a sort of 'moral' lesson. The dialogue teaches that a weak state should not trust in hope and fortune (101–103; compare this with Diodotus' speech), or in allies' loyalty (106). The Melians appeal to the Spartans' own interest (τῷ ξυμφέροντι αὐτῶν) in helping them: by abandoning Melos, her colony, Sparta would appear faithless in the eyes of her allies (106). But, as the Athenians make clear, moral claims such as justice and honour involve danger

(τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν μετὰ κινδύνου δρᾶσθαι), which the Spartans are generally loath to face, while interest goes hand-in-hand with safety (τὸ ξυμφέρον μὲν μετ' ἀσφαλείας εἶναι, 107). And in the following chapters up to the end of the dialogue the Athenians point out to the Melians how Spartan self-interest works (109–111).

How morally questionable this approach to history might have appeared to the ancient reader, as it does to the modern one, is controversial,[10] and raises a further and important question: could Thucydides' readers draw moral conclusions from the juxtaposition of Cleon's and Diodotus' conflicting advice, or from the Athenians' and Melians' rhetoric? Has Thucydides' *Histories* the practical goal to instruct future leaders and generals on how to make right moves, to say right things, and to avoid mistakes?[11] As Hunter's insightful analysis of Thucydides' narrative shows, 'there are two ways human beings can learn. Either the *paradeigma*, the example of others, teaches them, or, if they refuse to draw that lesson, they must learn the hard way. Then time and experience will be their teachers.'[12] People can learn from history. And this is the case, for example, when the Syracusans, while waiting for the arrival of the Athenian expedition under Demosthenes and Eurymedon (413 BC), made innovations in their fleet in the same way as the Corinthians did before engaging their squadron at Naupactus (7.36.2 and 34).[13] So within Thucydides' narrative people learn from examples/experiences. It may be true that *also* Thucydides' readers learned from the examples/experiences given in the *Histories* and applied those lessons to real contexts which they happened to be in. A reader experienced in military tactics may have assumed that the Syracusans learned from the Corinthians and, at the same time, may have learned a bit more in practical terms from that reading. A reader experienced in politics may have found insightful (even though not just) the arguments displayed by both Cleon and Diodotus. It is true that it might be hard for a reader of the Mytilenean debate to draw practical conclusions on how to behave in similar circumstances in the future; however, that may be due to the fact that Thucydides himself, acknowledging that it is difficult, wanted to allow readers to make up their own mind.

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10 Cf. Pelling (2012 a): 306.

11 Cf. Rutherford (1994): 54. Of course, there are several other cases in which Thucydides appeals to moral issues: the appalled nature of the narrator's voice over Mycalessus at 7.29; the judgement on Nicias, where his motives at 7.48 may get less criticism than we expect (esp. 7.86); Alcibiades' moral excesses.

12 Hunter (1973): 80.

13 Hunter (1973): 85–94.

Let us turn now to a further case which shows clearly that moral elements in Thucydidean narrative contribute to explain events. The *stasis* at Corcyra is due to a political faction that was determined to draw Corcyra away from the alliance with Athens towards alignment with Corinth; therefore this party came into conflict with the Athenian supporters in Corcyra (3.70). This gives way to the historian’s reflection on psychological and moral implications of that event. The origin of the *stasis* is traced back to personal factors such as people’s self-aggrandizement (*pleonexia*) and ambition (*philotimia*, 3.82.8). As has often been observed, this analysis resembles Thucydides’ description of the plague, which follows a similar narrative pattern.[14] Nevertheless in the case of the description of the pestilence more emphasis is put on the afflictions produced by the disease than on the innate disposition of the Athenians. The plague caused a series of bold actions within the city (ῥᾷον γὰρ ἐτόλμα τις …) as well as the suspension of any human and divine conventions and restraints (2.53.1–4). Of course, there is some innate disposition to react in this way (2.47–48), but at least such an innate nature does not look to have a distinctively *Athenian* tinge. In the case of Corcyra the innate character of the Athenians is, instead, emphasised: the account tells in fact about human nature displaying Thucydides’ tendency to generalise about it. Self-aggrandizement and ambition come gradually up as manifestations of human disposition, as they are ultimately not seen as passing moods, externally imposed by crises or afflictions (3.84.2):[15]

> With all life thrown into chaos at this time of crisis for the city, human nature triumphed over law: it had always been inclined to criminal breaking of the laws, but now it revelled in showing itself the slave of passion, a stronger force than justice, and the enemy of anything higher.

Just as in Thucydides, so also in the Oxyrhynchus historian morality chiefly enhances our understanding. Moral examples may also teach, and they might be meant by the historian as a means to deliver a legacy for future generations of leaders and generals. Yet it seems that Thucydides’ narrative conveys ‘moral’ lessons in ways that clarify why things needed to develop in a particular way; we find a kind of historical necessity absent in the *HO*. Of course we are not implying that everything is neatly predetermined in Thucydides’ view; for a degree of probability, predictability, and even steerability of historical and political

14 Connor (1984): 99.

15 Connor (1984): 102.

processes may in fact clash with unforeseeable chance and unpredictable human nature, which give life to a train of events that go beyond any original planning.[16] The Oxyrhynchus historian is interested in explaining why things are as they are. There is no concern for that Thucydidean view tending to generalise about human behaviour and psychology. The Oxyrhynchus historian seems to elaborate an approach that, in reading the past, has its main focus in matters of immediate contingency. So, for example, the Athenians' activism (*polypragmosyne*), though it recalls closely Thucydides' characterisation of that people (ch. 5), is not so much a matter of generalisation, nor does it give room for a broader reflection on human nature: the Athenians are not seen as a whole, or as acting always in that way; not all are well disposed or prepared to adopt an aggressive policy, but only a few among them ([ο]ἱ δ' [ἐ]ν ταῖς Ἀθήναις, 7.2, ll. 43–44). If the Oxyrhynchus historian's moral outlook may have been aimed to give political advice or injunctions that should be put into effect, it does not seem to convey any general ethical truth about human *phusis*; morality is *mainly* an explanatory means by which the narrator clarifies and expounds how and why certain historical courses took place in a specific way.

9.2 'Moralism,' 'Morality,' and Moral Lessons

Any discussion of 'morality' in the *HO* inevitably invites us to turn to other contemporary authors who are usually set in a particular intellectual context, where a peculiar concern in instructing the reader in virtues and in giving moral *exempla* is found. I refer to Xenophon (*Hellenica*), Theopompus, and Ephorus. The modern category of 'moralism,' currently applied by Pownal to some of fourth-century historians,[17] might appear as an overstatement of this peculiar historical trend—a matter of over-generalisation perhaps. Nonetheless, we can think of the brand 'moralism' as generically referring to a broad range of individuals' and peoples' good and bad doings that are praised or blamed. In this sense, then, authors such as Theopompus, Xenophon, and Ephorus show a peculiar concern in instructing the reader in virtues and in giving moral *exempla*. The concept of 'moralism' is indeed interesting and helpful to us, as it can provide a basis for a fuller understanding and definition of the character of the *HO*, when this text is seen against the development of other fourth-century historical works. Furhtermore, by showing the manifold mean-

16 Cf. Stahl (2003).

17 Pownall (2004). Cf. Marincola (2007): 171–179.

ings and nuances related to the notion of 'moralism,' especially throughout the works of Theopompus and Ephorus, it will be possible to throw further light on the authorship issue of the *HO*, since those historians are generally considered as potential candidates for the authorship.

Moral consciousness, a certain awareness of what is good and bad in terms of moral behaviour is given throughout Xenophon's *Hellenica* either by the narrator's voice or by what people are supposed to say or think. Moral elements in Xenophon show how people behave and how they should behave as well; and this paves the way for finding throughout his narrative a twofold kind of 'moralism,' descriptive and prescriptive:[18] the former shows when a certain type of behaviour is just illustrated, while the latter gives implicit or explicit protreptic indications on how someone should behave.

Even though Xenophon prefers to teach virtue by *exempla*, there are a few cases in which the narrator comments explicitly upon what he judges as good or bad behaviour. This is the case when the death of the Spartan Teleutias at Olynthus, due to his rash decision to launch an attack against the Olynthians, leads the narrator to generalise upon human conduct. Disasters such as this teach a lesson about anger: it is wrong to punish anyone, even a slave, in anger; especially in dealing with enemies it is utterly and entirely wrong to act under the influence of anger, that is, without deliberation (ὀργή ~ γνώμη, *Hell.* 5.3.7). There is also explicit praise in describing the conduct of good leaders involved in military operations, such as Agesilaus (4.3.19), Iphicrates (6.2.32),[19] Chabrias and Callistratus (39). Noble deeds performed by the Phliasians showing their fidelity to Spartan cause deserve the narrator's praise as well (7.2.2; 16; 7.3.1).

Several examples of descriptive moralism can be found in Xenophon's narrative. They teach that a morally good commander is also a successful one, while a bad general deserves wholly his fate. Self-control and sense of duty or lack of these are key aspects of Xenophon's description of good or bad generals' behaviour as well. The Spartan Diphridas, who succeeded Thibron in leading the campaign against the satrap Struthas in Asia Minor (391 BC), was successful. The reason for this seems to lie in the fact that, unlike Thibron, he fulfilled his duties, was a more organised and enterprising commander, and, above all, was not distracted by bodily pleasures (*Hell.* 4.8.22):

18 Pelling (2011 a): 239; cf. Duff (1999).

19 But see 6.5.51 where the narrator, who does not conceal to have praised Iphicrates, criticises his action.

> Diphridas had just as attractive a personality as Thibron, and as a general he was both more efficient and more enterprising (μᾶλλόν τε συντεταγμένος καὶ ἐγχειρητικώτερος στρατηγός). He was not the slave of bodily pleasure (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναί) and he always stuck to the job in hand.

On the contrary, Thibron was used to doing his raids against the enemy in a disorderly and overconfident manner (ἀτάκτως καὶ καταφρονητικῶς), and was unconcerned with the safety of the men under his command, neglecting his duties and pursuing his own pleasures. It is not a coincidence that Thibron was killed along with the flute player Thersander, with whom he was engaged in throwing the discus (4.8.18–19): because of his delay in helping his forces he met failure at the hands of Struthas.

Self-control and total devotion to one's own duty seem to be the key qualities that led Jason to fulfill his expansionist project in Thessaly, and to extend his influence all over Greece (6.1.8–13; 6.4.19–32):

> 15. He will not think it right to rest until he has reached the point for which he set out and done all that had to be done. And he has trained his men to behave in the same way, although he also knows how to gratify the feelings of his soldiers when they have won some success as the result of extra hard work. So all who follow him have learned this too—that one can have a good time also, if one works for it. 16. Then, too, he is more self-controlled (ἐγκρατέστατος) than any man I know with regard to all bodily pleasures (τὸ σῶμα ἡδονῶν). These never take up his time and prevent him from doing what has to be done.
>
> *Hell.* 6.1.15–16

Also the Spartan Dercylidas had fulfilled his duties in Asia better than his predecessor Thibron had done: 'and from the very beginning his conduct in the command showed a marked contrast to that of Thibron. He led his army through friendly country all the way to the Aeolis, in Pharnabazus' territory, and his troops did no harm to the allies on the march' (3.1.10; cf. 3.2.1; 399 BC). Yet in 389 BC, while operating in Aegean, he was replaced by Anaxibius not through any fault of his own, but because Anaxibius had friends in high places (4.8.32). Now the reader's expectations are not disappointed by the outcome of that new engagement: it was Anaxibius' inability, and his disregard of omens and gods that led the Spartans to an unsuccessful result (4.8.32–39). On the contrary, Teleutias' conduct shows that pity for gods and concern for one's soldiers are indeed proper to a good general and lead to positive outcomes

(5.1.14–24). Moreover, Alcibiades' extravagance and neglect of duty (δι' ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀκράτειαν) was judged by many at Athens to be the main cause of the Athenian failure at Notion (1.5.16–17; 407 BC); and Mnasippus' bad warfare management (6.2.16), along with the inability to restrain the excesses of his soldiers, seems mostly responsible for his defeat at Corcyra (6.2.6–24, 373 BC):

> There were magnificent houses, too, which he [*Mnasippus*] destroyed, and well-stocked wine-cellars on the country estates. The result was, so it was said, that his soldiers got such a taste for luxurious living (εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν) that they would drink no wine unless it had a fine bouquet.
>
> *Hell.* 6.2.6

Sometimes Xenophon's narrative looks to the Herodotean model, especially when the theme of divine retribution for impious actions is at stake. In this case the narrative shows a sharp uplifting intent (prescriptive moralism).[20] The warning signal lying behind the description of times of prosperity and indicating that nemesis is soon to fall upon offenders forms a pattern that puts Xenophon and Herodotus in close relation. The narrator's evaluation of Spartan success against Phlius and Olynthus of the 380s appears in Xenophon as a warning that foreshadows Sparta's later misfortune (παντάπασιν ἤδη καλῶς καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς κατεσκευάσθαι / 'Thus it appeared that now at last Spartan supremacy had been well and truly established,' 5.3.27): those Spartan achievements only apparently are a means to corroborate Spartan hegemony that by that time seemed fully and securely established. This recalls Herodotus' similar statement on Croesus' military achievements that foreshadow his impending fate (κατεστραμμένων δὲ τούτων καὶ προσεπικτωμένου Κροίσου Λυδοῖσι, ἀπικνέονται ἐς Σάρδις ἀκμαζούσας πλούτῳ ἄλλοι τε οἱ πάντες ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος σοφισταί, οἳ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτύγχανον ἐόντες, ὡς ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἀπικνέοιτο / 'when these peoples had been subdued and while Croesus was increasing the Lydian empire, Sardis was at the height of her prosperity and was visited on occasion by every learned Greek who was alive at the time,' 1.28.1–29.1).[21] An even clearer case might be the way Herodotus leaves that topic at 1.34.1, where it is said that a *nemesis* from Heaven is about to overtake Croesus. In the chapter that follows Xenophon's statement about Spartan momentary prosper-

20 For Herodotus' influence on Xenophons' *Hellenica*, see Gray (1989).

21 Transl. by R. Waterfield (slightly modified). Pownall (2004): 68.

ity (5.3.27) the narrator explicitly says that the Spartans wholly deserved their fate, and namely a divine retribution for having seized the Cadmea, the fortress of Thebes, breaking the King's peace (*Hell.* 5.4.1):

> Many examples could be given both from Greek and foreign history to show that the gods are not indifferent to irreligion or to evil doing (ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι). Here I shall mention only the case which occurs at this point in my narrative. The Spartans had sworn to leave the cities independent, and then they had seized the acropolis of Thebes. Now they were punished by the action of these men, and these men alone, whom they had wronged (ὑπ' αὐτῶν μόνων τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν), although before that time they had never been conquered by any nation on earth.[22]

Herodotus' explanatory mode, embracing the notions of responsibility and guilt of those who break a previous equilibrium and may touch off an act of divine intervention which sets a new order, seems mirrored in Xenophon's treatment of people who are punished by gods for their wrongdoing. Supernatural intervention in human life shows throughout the *Hellenica* a counteraction that balances a previous disruptiveness. The Spartan seizure of the Cadmea, so vigorously denounced by the narrator (5.4.1) is perhaps the peak of a series of similar offences committed by the Spartans, for which the gods will punish them at Leuctra about a decade later. After the peace talks of 371 BC preceding that battle the Spartans did not heed the advice of their fellow citizen, Prothous, to disband their army in Boeotia, as they had sworn to do in those talks (6.3.18–19); instead, they began military operation against that territory. The narrator underlines the soundness of Prothous' proposal, showing that the deity was leading Sparta on to destruction (*Hell.* 6.4.2–3):

> 2. By doing this, he said, it seemed to him that they would be most likely to win the favour of the gods (τούς τε θεοὺς εὐμενεστάτους εἶναι) and also provoke the least possible discontent from the cities. 3. However, when the Spartan assembly heard this from him they considered that he was talking utter nonsense. It looks as though they were already being impelled by some divine power (ἤδη γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον ἦγεν).

22 Transl. by R. Warner.

This is not *in itself* an act of divine punishment, rather of divine leading on into crime that will lead to punishment.[23] However, it may be that the gods only intervene in this way because of previous human transgressions, even though that is left implicit.

Moreover, the death of Lycomedes, the leader of the Arcadian confederacy, is also due to divine intervention in human affairs. He is a victim of chance. The narrator comments that Lycomedes perished at the hand of the deity (δαιμονιώτατα ἀποθνῄσκει). After negotiating an alliance with the Athenians, he left Athens, embarked on a ship, and agreed with the sailors that they should put him ashore at the point that he would choose himself (*Hell.* 7.4.3; 362 BC). Then he chose to land at the spot where some Arcadian exiles happened to be. All this seems a pointer to the reader, who certainly recalls that Lycomedes' ambition had been responsible for the excessive arrogance and the downfall of his fellow Arcadians at the hands of the Spartans some years before, in 368 BC (ἄλλως φιλότιμος, οὗτος ἐνέπλησε φρονήματος τοὺς Ἀρκάδας, 7.1.23–32). The mention of the Arcadian exiles at the conclusion of Lycomedes' story is not without significance. In the same way as he had led the Arcadians to their downfall he is now led by them to ruin. Without any doubt the cultured reader recognises Lycomedes' *hybris* as the main reason for his later punishment.

In the course of the Corinthian war the Corinthians who had taken the money from the King and were the most responsible for that war made plans for a massacre of fellow citizens, realising that unless the peace party of Corinth were suppressed there was a strong likelihood that Corinth would revert to her previous alliance with Sparta (4.4.2–3; 393 BC). This action is followed by divine vengeance upon the guilty, who are characterised by the narrator as utterly sacrilegious (ἀνοσιώτατοι) for their impious action (ἀσέβεια). Moreover, later the Corinthian exiles asked the Spartans for help against their fellow citizens, and for the Spartans this was an extraordinary opportunity given to them by the god beyond any expectations (ἔδωκε γὰρ τότε γε ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς ἔργον οἷον οὐδ' ηὔξαντό ποτ' ἄν, 4.4.12).

All these examples give moral teaching, as to say, 'in negative' form: they clarify what must not be done, in order to prevent such or similar outcomes. Further cases of protreptic moralism through negative *exempla* show what would happen to anyone when he behaves in the same way as some people do. So everyone would learn from the story of Meidias' usurpation of Mania's satrapy that the person who acts in that way incurs the reversal of his fortune,

23 There are Homeric precedents, especially the story of Athena who inspires Pandarus to break the truce in Hom. *Il.* 4.

losing what he had illicitly appropriated (3.1.20–28). Moral teaching also comes from the dialogue between Agesilaus and Lysander; the former, belittled by the personal ambition of Lysander, who has exerted power over his own followers in Asia, deposes him on that charge (3.4.7–10). Lysander and with him the reader are taught the lesson that friends (people of the same political group) are meant to increase each other's power, not to diminish it.

Prescriptive moralism in Xenophon can also be expressed in a 'positive' way, when it gives explicit indications for actions to be taken for the future. Callistratus' words at the peace talks of 371 BC, aiming to persuade Spartans and Athenians to share their hegemony, are clearly using a moralising paradigm that comes from people's common experience (*Hell.* 6.3.16–17):

> 16. Personally, I do not admire the athlete who after constantly winning in the games and after having won a great reputation is so fond of competition that he never stops until all his training ends in defeat. Nor do I admire the gambler who doubles his stakes after one lucky throw. 17. I observe that most people of that sort end up by having nothing at all. Should not we also recognise this fact, and never become involved in a fight where one either wins or loses all? Should we not rather become friends while we are still strong and still successful?

Good teaching and bad teaching may also be juxtaposed, so as to explain and clarify the particular course of an event. Procles' speech, delivered after the battle of Leuctra,[24] urges the Athenians to accept the proposal to divide the responsibilities for leadership in the newly-formed alliance between Athens and Sparta (*Hell.* 7.1.2–11). The ideas that Procles expresses appear as morally superior to the self-interest espoused later by Cephisodotus' speech, and Procles' reference to the gods puts him on a higher moral level (ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ μᾶλλον ἢ θείᾳ φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ διωρίσθαι / 'in my opinion this division of responsibility seems to be not merely a human expedient but something ordained by providence and by the way things are,' 7.1.2; ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν δέδοται ὑμῖν [*Athenians*] εὐτυχεῖν ἐν τούτῳ / 'and from heaven, too, you have been granted success in this,' 7.1.5; ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκέ ποτε αὐτοῖς [*the Spartans*] κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπικρατῆσαι … / 'when in the end heaven gave them the control of the sea …,' 7.1.6). The contrastive reading of the two speeches uncovers the fecklessness and incompetence of the Athenian *demos* (μετεπείσθησαν): the people will be led by demagogues like Cephisodotus into deciding

24 See above, ch. 7.1.

for the wrong course, voting that each part should hold the supreme command in turn for periods of five days at a time (7.1.12–14).

In some cases moral judgements put emphasis on the explanatory factor rather than on that descriptive or inspirational, and in so doing Xenophon seems to share the Oxyrhynchus historian's way of dealing with 'morality' that—as we have shown—has a precedent in Thucydides' narrative. There are in fact cases in which blame and moral arguments appear to explain particular historical courses. Perhaps the most telling case is given by the section on the outbreak of the Corinthian war; here an embedded focalisation shows that the Spartans were very happy to start a war against the Thebans, as they had suffered several offences at the hands of the Thebans (*Hell.* 3.5.5):

> The Spartans were glad enough to have a pretext (ἄσμενοι ἔλαβον πρόφασιν) for a campaign against the Thebans, since they had been angry with them for some time. First, the Thebans had claimed the tithe due to Apollo at Decelea; they had refused to follow the Spartans against Piraeus and were accused of having persuaded the Corinthians also to refuse. The Spartans also remembered (ἀνεμιμνῄσκοντο) that the Thebans had not allowed Agesilaus to sacrifice at Aulis and had thrown down from the altar the victims that had been sacrificed already; and they had failed to join Agesilaus on his campaign in Asia. The Spartans calculated (ἐλογίζοντο), too, that this was just the right moment for leading an army against Thebes and putting an end to Theban insolence (παῦσαι τῆς εἰς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεως).

Blame is here a tool that explains why that war started, according to the Spartan perspective. Similarly, moral reasons too are put in the mouth of the Theban ambassadors who went to Athens on the eve of that war. Moral factors come into question to emphasise the reasons of the other side, the anti-Spartan coalition: according to the Thebans the main reason why the Athenians should join the war was to get back their empire by going to the help of all the victims of Spartan injustice (τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀδικουμένοις βοηθοῖτε, 3.5.10), given that Spartan dominion was greedy and arrogant (ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων πλεονεξία πολὺ εὐκαταλυτωτέρα ἐστὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας γενομένης ἀρχῆς, 3.5.15). Sparta was hated by most of her subjects either in the Greek mainland or in Asia Minor (καὶ νῦν γε, ἂν φανεροὶ γενώμεθα ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ὑμεῖς συνασπιδοῦντες ἐναντία τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, εὖ ἴστε, ἀναφανήσονται πολλοὶ οἱ μισοῦντες αὐτούς / 'so now if people see Thebes and Athens falling into line together against Sparta, you can be quite sure that those who hate Sparta will soon show themselves in full numbers,' 3.5.11). Argives, Corinthians, Arcadians, and Achaeans were unhappy, as they did not get any

share of power, glory and money in return for their military service provided to Sparta; as for the islanders, ex-allies of Athens, they had received a double measure of servitude, that is, governors as well as decarchies (12–13). Moral considerations provided by both sides form a sort of narrative premise that gives reason for the involvement of each of them in that war.

Moral grounds also explain the reason why a group of Athenian and Theban conspirators cooperated in liberating the Cadmea from Spartan control: the bad doings of the polemarch Archias, the tyrannical rule of Philippus (τὰ περὶ Ἀρχίαν τε τὸν πολεμαρχοῦντα καὶ τὴν περὶ Φίλιππον τυραννίδα) and the hate felt by Archias' secretary, Phillidas, for the state of affairs in Thebes (μισοῦντα αὐτὸν ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ τὰ οἴκοι, 5.4.2).

Xenophon represents moral charges made by peoples as closely connected with the true motivations which caused specific historical developments; in so doing he shares with the Oxyrhynchus historian Thucydides' general approach to moral issues. Furthermore, Xenophon's narrative seems to recall the approach to politics held by two Thucydidean leaders, Cleon and Diodotus. These, debating justice, focused on what appeared to them as advantageous to their city, or rather, to their own party.[25] Similarly, Sphodrias' acquittal was due to Archidamus' love for Cleonymous, Sphodrias' son, but the absence of his guilt was not proved (consider Archidamus' words to Agesilaus: εἰ μηδὲν **ἠδίκει** Σφοδρίας, ἀπέλυσας ἂν αὐτὸν οἶδα: νῦν δέ, εἰ **ἠδίκηκέ** τι, ἡμῶν ἕνεκεν συγγνώμης ὑπὸ σοῦ τυχέτω, 5.4.31; and public opinion about Sphodrias' guilt: μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον εἶναι, 32). According to a shared opinion among the Spartans the matter should be evaluated on the ground whether or not it produced good results for Sparta, that is, something honourable and advantageous for the state (Agesilaus' reply to Archidamus: οὐκοῦν ἂν μέλλῃ **καλὰ** ταῦθ' ἡμῖν εἶναι, οὕτως ἔσται, 31). The rightness of the decision to acquit Sphodrias, according to the narrator, will be proved later by his honourable downfall at Leuctra while fighting for his city (*Hell.* 5.4.33):

> While he lived, all his actions were those of a good and noble Spartan (ὅσα **καλὰ** ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ), and at Leuctra, after falling three times, he died first of his citizens and deep in the enemy ranks fighting for his king with Dinon the polemarch.

To some extent the notion of justice, just or good behaviour, implies a certain degree of ambiguity. So we see the paradox of the restored Phliasian exiles who

25 See above, ch. 9.1.

are damaged by those who should give them justice (τίς αὕτη δίκη εἴη ὅπου αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δικάζοιεν, *Hell.* 5.3.10; 381 BC); or, again, we find betrayers who deny the charge of betrayal on moral grounds, and are acquitted for not having betrayed their countrymen (*Hell.* 1.3.18–19). As for the latter, some Byzantines were persuaded by the Athenians to leave their alliance with Sparta and to give their city to Athens (1.3.16, 408 BC). One of the Byzantine betrayers, Anaxilaus, was put on trial at Sparta but was later acquitted (ἐπαγόμενος θανάτου ὕστερον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι διὰ τὴν προδοσίαν ἀπέφυγεν, 18–19). He denied the charge of betrayal on the ground that he was not a Spartan (Βυζάντιος ὢν καὶ οὐ Λακεδαιμόνιος, 19); it was because he saw women and children dying of hunger that he had admitted the enemy into the city, and not because he had been bribed or because of his hatred for the Spartans (οὐκ ἀργυρίου ἕνεκα οὐδὲ διὰ τὸ μισεῖν Λακεδαιμονίους, 19).

Similarly, the appeal to the notion of justice shows something insincere in reference to the incident preceding the Corinthian war, as reported by the *HO*. An indirect speech delivered by the Spartans shows them aware of Theban responsibility in orchestrating the Phocians' assault against the Locrian territory; nevertheless, they told the Boeotians to obtain justice from the Phocians, if they found the Phocians responsible and guilty as charged (18.4):

> The Spartans, though they thought (νομίσαντες) the story was unworthy of belief, sent envoys and told the Boeotians not to make war on the Phocians, but if they thought that they were wronged in any way (εἴ τι ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίζουσ[ι), they ordered them to obtain justice (δίκην λαμ|[βάνειν) from them in a meeting of their allies.

Further cases of 'ambiguous justice' are offered by Xenophon's narrative. 'Justice' may refer to what is seen by the one side as a just action or conduct; it leaves some room, however, for discussions that are made on the same action by the other side. So Alcibiades may be either guilty or innocent, depending on how people judge his conduct. When Alcibiades went to Athens from the exile (407 BC) dense crowds of people gathered to see the 'great Alcibiades' (*Hell.* 1.4.13):

> He, it was said, was the best citizen they had got and alone had been banished not because he deserved it (οὐ δικαίως φύγοι) but because of the intrigues of people who were inferior to him in power, who lacked his abilities to speak and whose only political principle was their own self-interest.

The following part of this passage (omitted here) shows that Alcibiades was a victim of injustice because of his political enemies; it justifies his conduct of the years of his exile as well as the favours accorded to Spartans and Persians. Yet, continues the narrator, this was only one view, since there were others in Athens who maintained that he alone was responsible for all their past troubles (αἴτιος εἴη) and that presumably he would also be the chief cause of further perils in the future (17). Similarly, a series of charges and self-defences are offered by the two sides of the debate on the conduct of the Athenian generals at Arginusae; and it is left unclear who started that chain of mutual accusations (1.7.4–8; 2.3.35). Theramenes may be either προδότης of his city or εὐμενὴς δικαίως, depending on the perspective of who judges the event, the accuser or the (self)defender (2.3.29; 43). Even killing someone may be a matter of δίκαιον ποιεῖν, if the victim is manifestly unrighteous, or evidently a traitor, or is attempting to become a tyrant and enslaving and banishing people absolutely innocent of any wrongdoing (7.3.7–8). Euphron of Sycion, for instance, was and did all that (ἔνοχος ἦν, 8):

> 9. Now suppose he had come out openly against you [*the Theban officials*] with an army, you would actually have been grateful to me for killing him. As it is, he came with money instead to be used for bribing you and persuading you to put him back again in power in our city; then how can it be right for me to be put to death for giving him the punishment due to him? (τούτῳ ἐγὼ τὴν δίκην ἐπιθεὶς πῶς ἂν δικαίως ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἀποθάνοιμι;) And when one is made to do something by force of arms, one is injured certainly, but at any rate not shown up to be bad (οὐ μέντοι ἄδικοι); but when one is bribed to act against the right, one is not only injured but also disgraced. 10. Certainly, if he had been an enemy of mine, but a friend of yours (ὑμῖν δὲ φίλος), I should be the first to admit that it would have been wrong of me to kill him in your city.
>
> *Hell.* 7.3.9–10

The speech delivered by Euphron's murderer, appealing to the principle that death is the just punishment for crimes, hints at that popular view of *dikaiosune* which consisted in rendering good to one's friends (*philoi*) and ill to one's enemies (*echthroi*). *Dikaiosune* is, here, related to the idea that friendship means doing something that a person likes, while doing something that he/she does not like may mean to become his/her enemy.[26] Furthermore, retaliation

26 Cf. Xen. *An.* 7.7.46; Plat. *Resp.* 331 e–332 a. Cf. Dover (1974): 180–187.

for being wronged or in defence of anyone wronged is a matter of justice as well. That is, there are circumstances in which justice might also bring harm. This has already been shown by Diodotus' speech, where the speaker argues that it is not in the interest of the assembly to be 'strict judges,' since it can be more advantageous to accept injury than, with just reason, to punish and harm those who did wrong (ὥστε οὐ δικαστὰς ὄντας δεῖ ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τῶν ἐξαμαρτανόντων ἀκριβεῖς βλάπτεσθαι, Thuc. 3.46.4).[27]

9.3 Theopompus: 'Moralism' versus 'Morality'?

We should now ask whether or not examples of 'blame' in Theopompus' narrative show similarities with the *HO*. According to the Oxyrhynchus historian, blame is part of a view of 'morality' that we have called 'explanatory;' this subcategory of moralism, found also in Thucydides' as well as in Xenophon's historiography, uses moral/immoral examples and behaviour as tools that explain why certain outcomes were as they were. Even so in the *HO* (as well as in Thucydides and in Xenophon) 'blame' and moral reproaches do not seem to be part of a broader 'moral' texturing of the work as they are supposed to be in that of Theopompus.

Needless to say, in consideration of the state of the evidence, any attempt to give general statements on 'fragmentary' historians like Theopompus may appear hazardous, or misleading, or at least far from satisfactory. In fact later traditions have re-created and 'constructed' Theopompus and not merely quoted him, in the sense that they have given a literary patina to what they thought of him and his relative works. Yet it is hard not to be tempted to catch the character and flavour of Theopompus' historiography through Dionysius of Halicarnassus' statements on his style and work (T 20[28] = *ad Pomp.* 6).

According to Dionysius, Theopompus knew the habits and the ways of the 'characters' of his history; he liked to tell how they spent their lives, and how they organised their time (6.4–5). And this implies that they were unquestionably relevant to the narration of historical events. If we base ourselves on Dionysius' reflections, what a historian such as Theopompus does is not to consider only external events, as most did, but to bring out the inner psychology of the people: by investigating feelings in their hearts and apparent virtues and

27 Cf. also Thuc. 2.30, where there is a case in which an arbitrator suggests that a solution which is 'advantageous to both parties' is to be preferred to a strictly just solution that might create lasting ill-feeling.

28 All quotations of the fragments in this chapter are from Jacoby's edition.

undetected vices, he reveals their human nature; digging beyond events and actions, he lays bare the character of people about whom he speaks (6.7). This, to some extent, is close to the similar view made by Plutarch near the start of the *Life* of Nicias.[29] Plutarch claims that he will not treat the matter in the same way as historians did in the past (Thucydides and Philistus), but he will resort to material which 'escapes the notice of the majority' to understand 'character and manners' (ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς κατανόησιν ἤθους καὶ τρόπου παραδιδούς, 1.5).

For Dionysius Theopompus would be like a doctor who treats only the diseased parts of the body, leaving the healthy parts untouched; his searching investigation might be compared to the examination of souls who go to Hades (6.8). Moreover, from the assumed relation between Theopompus' and Isocrates' works one should infer that Theopompus indeed considered historical matters as tools of moral edification: 'It [*Th.'s style*] differs from the style of Isocrates for its bitterness and tension on some subjects whenever he discusses feelings and especially when he denounces cities or generals for bad plans and wicked practices—he is heavy on those subjects'[30] (6.9).

In consideration of Dionysius' evidence is it fair to define Theopompus as a 'moralistic' historian? The question cannot have univocal answers, especially in consideration of the fact that most of Theopompus' fragments come from Athenaeus,[31] and, consequently, what we have of the historian is chiefly what has been filtered by Athenaeus himself because of his erudite and literary interests. Eventually it is possible to catch and explain the kind and extent of moralism that may have characterised the texture of the *Philippica*.

Reading Theopompus' fragments we get the impression that the historian never says 'act like this,' nor 'avoid that.' He sketches characters without any explicit exhortation to act differently, or any imperatives enjoining good behaviour. As in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, so also here prescriptions come to the reader indirectly and mostly from the negative paradigms that are offered by the narrative itself. Plutarch warns his readers that since Theopompus prefers to criticise than to praise (ψέγει γὰρ ἥδιον ἢ ἐπαινεῖ) his complimentary words should be taken particularly seriously.[32] We can thus expect that in Theopompus' works instances of moral praise were less fully represented than those of blame; that is, possibly lessons of what we would call 'protreptic'

29 Cf. Duff (1999): 22–30.

30 Trad. Shrimpton.

31 The largest number of citations of Theopompus' works comes from Stephanus of Byzantium, followed by Athenaeus.

32 *Lys*. 30.2.

moralism[33] were given through negative *exempla*. From the results of wrong actions, or better, those characterised as such by the narrator, the reader would learn that, for example, those who live in luxury may die of violent death (F 114), or the man who betrays his own country may end like Cillicon who was maimed in one hand (F 111), or those who live in democracy (δημοκρατεῖσθαι) behave in dissolute ways through the inflow of wealth (F 62, 99, 121);[34] that those who usually indulge in excessive drinking, like the Sicilian tyrants, will be slain by lasting drunkenness, or will fall ill, like Dionysius the younger who went blind (cf. F 186; 283).[35]

Dionysius' statements on the character of Theopompus' historiography show that the greatest accomplishment in his historical writing would be the ability not only to see what is obvious to most (τὰ φανερὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς) but also to examine even the hidden causes of actions (τὰς ἀφανεῖς αἰτίας) and those who are performing them as well as the feelings of their souls (*ad Pomp*. 6.7–8 = T 20). Dionysius' mention of *aphaneis aitiai* sounds like an echo of Thucydides 1.23.6, though this is not necessarily a direct one: Theopompus himself might, for instance, have echoed Thucydides at some point. However, aside from presumable literary echoes, Dionysius' reference to *aphaneis aitiai* suggests a view of historical causation which is pretty different from that of Thucydides and the Oxyrhynchus historian. In fact, innate or deliberate human dispositions are to be included in the field of hidden causes of action. It does seem that selfish and/or base desires, such as moral incontinence (*akrasia*), greed, and personal ambition (*philotimia*) are hidden motives that Theopompus frequently ascribes to individuals. It is not merely the fact that people enjoy pleasures that Theopompus is objecting to, since he is not averse to pleasures, rather he reproaches men's incontinence. So Pisistratus, whose munificence according to the historian will later be imitated by Cimon (cf. F 89), is appreciated for his moderation (μετρίως ἐχρῆτο ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, F 135 = Athen. 12 pp. 532 f–533 a). The view appears similar to that which Plutarch expresses in relation to Lysander (2.1):

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33 Pelling (2011 a): 237–251.

34 In Theopompus there is a sort of correlation between forms of government and standards of morality, and democracies and tyrannies are seen as the most pernicious political systems. Cf. Flower (1994): 78–83. Shrimpton suggests that Theopompus was influenced by Plato's thought, and gave therefore a view according to which the nature and type of individuals and developments were paralleled by their constitutions; that is, for Theopompus there is analogy between people and their respective societies. Shrimpton (1977): 138–144.

35 Some stories may have had an anecdotic flavour already at the time of the historian, or a bit later; for instance, the expression μὴ σύ γε Θειογένης κόψῃς χέρα Κιλλικόωντος will become proverbial (Theop. *FGrHist* 115, F 111 = Callim. fr. 227 Schn.).

> But Lysander was reared in poverty, and showed himself as much as any man conformable to the customs of his people; of a manly sprit, too, and superior to every pleasure (κρείττονα πάσης ἡδονῆς), excepting only that which their good deeds bring to those who are successful and honoured.[36]

This similarity between the two leaders seems, moreover, confirmed by Theopompus' own words about Lysander, as related by Athenaeus (F 20 = Athen.[37] 12 p. 543 b–c):

> Almost all authorities report that Pausanias and Lysander were notorious for their addiction to luxury. This is why Agis said about Lysander, 'Here is a second Pausanias that Sparta is producing.' But Theopompus in book X of his *History of Greece* says the opposite about Lysander, claiming that 'he liked hard work (φιλόπονος) and was able to serve both private citizens and kings, since he could control himself and was not a hedonist of any sort (τῶν ἡδονῶν ἁπασῶν κρείττων). Though he obtained power over almost all of Greece, at any rate, it is impossible to point to a single city where he became involved in sexual escapades or got drunk or attended parties when he should not have (οὔτε πρὸς τὰς ἀφροδισίους ἡδονὰς ὁρμήσας οὔτε μέθαις καὶ πότοις ἀκαίροις χρησάμενος).'

People are criticised by Theopompus for their incontinence and wantonness, and for the extent of their excesses (think of Illyrians, Etruscans, Thessalians, etc.). Incontinence may be of different sorts and involve either individuals or a collectivity. It may concern either the private or the public sphere. Many people gave public banquets, but the difference between Cimon's munificence and that of Eubulus or of the *demos* of Taras, for example, is one of manner and of degree (F 100 = Athen. 4 p. 166 d–e):

> Theopompus in the tenth book of the *Philippica*, from which some people separated the last part where there is a discussion on the Athenian demagogues, says that Eubulus the demagogue was a profligate; he used this phrasing: 'he [*Eubulus*] has outdone the people of Tarentum in profligacy and greed to such an extent that, whereas the only matter in which they failed to exercise self-control was feasts, the Athenians have spent their revenues on mercenaries.'

36 Transl. B. Perrin.

37 Greek text G. Kaibel. Transl. S.D. Olson (revised).

The euergetism of Cimon (ἔπειτα τὴν οἰκίαν παρεῖχε κοινὴν ἅπασι· καὶ δεῖπνον αἰεὶ εὐτελὲς παρασκευάζεσθαι πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις [...] F 89), who offered free banquets to everyone who wanted as well as all products of his lands, is presented as a sample of moderation in political behaviour, while other forms of donation (especially of money) made by democratic politicians (i.e. Eubulus) are censured as tools of moral degeneration (F 99).

Now not only do many extant fragments develop the theme of individual and collective lack of self-control (*akrasia*/*akolasia*), but they also give the impression that Theopompus' reading of historical causation is closely related to that theme: that is, some fragments suggest a direct connection between peoples' lack of self-control with consequent wrongdoings and negative outcomes. Underlying and triggering causes of events cannot therefore be clearly distinguished, as they are embedded together within this relation. Moreover, peoples who are guilty of excesses, to some extent, are shown to deserve their fate. So the Celts, aware of the Ardiaeans' lack of self-restraint, and making war against them, took advantage of that weakness. They prepared a sumptuous meal for them putting into the food an herb that had the effect of purging the bowels. As a result some of the Ardiaeans were killed, others threw themselves into a river (F 40 = Athen. 10 p. 443 b–c):

> 'The inhabitants of Ardia,' he claims, 'own 300,000 *prospelatai*, who resemble helots. They get drunk and have parties every day, and are completely undisciplined when it comes to food and drink (πρὸς ἐδωνὴν καὶ πόσιν ἀκρατέστερον). When the Celts, who were aware of the Ardians' lack of self-discipline (ἀκρασίαν), were at war with them, therefore, they sent around orders to all their soldiers to prepare the most fantastic dinner possible in their tents, but to add to the food an herb with a medicinal quality that caused it to disturb the intestines and empty them out. After this happened, some of the Ardians were captured by the Celts and executed, while others lost control of their bowels and threw themselves into the rivers.'

Similarly Philip (F 162)—and possibly the Syracusan Dionysius the elder as well (F 134)—encouraged the laxity and moral weakness of their enemies to prevail over them[38] (F 162 = Athen. 6 p. 260 b–c):

38 The distinction between those who maintain power by corrupting others and those who are defeated because of their own indulgence is a key motive traceable throughout the *Philippica*. Pownall (2004): 166; see also Connor (1967): 143–146.

> Theopompus in the twentieth sixth book of the *Histories*: 'Philip knew that the Thessalians were undisciplined (ἀκολάστους) and lived dissolutely, he used to throw parties for them (ἀσελγεῖς συνουσίας), and did his best to entertain them any way he could by dancing, celebrating, and putting up with all kinds of bad behaviour (πᾶσαν ἀκολασίαν). (He was a natural buffoon, who got drunk every day and took pleasure in habits that tended in that direction and in the so-called 'jolly' people who tell jokes and act amusing.) He won over more of the Thessalians who spent time with him by holding these parties than by giving them presents.'

The lack of self-control may thus undermine political life; this is moreover, shown by Charidemus' example (F 143 = Athen. 10 p. 436 b–c):

> In his description of Charidemus of Oreus, whom the Athenians made a citizen, he says: 'because he openly led a depraved existence, to the extent that he was constantly drinking and in a stupor, and he went so far as to seduce free women. He became so reckless that he attempted to ask the Olynthian city council for a boy who was good-looking and graceful [...].'

The climax shows a progression from private incontinence (drinking) to mischief with negative social implications (debauching respectable women), to the ultimate degradation: taking one's depravity into the world of politics.

To some extent Theopompus' moralising view may be exploiting a pre-existing pattern, already found in Xenophon: self-control = positive outcome ~ lack of self-control = negative outcome.[39] However, Theopompus' historiographical practice shows inconsistencies which have attracted the attention of both ancient and modern scholars. Polybius found a clamorous inconsistency between Theopompus' preface to the *Philippica*, where the historian states that Philip's excellence induced him to undertake that work, and the rest of the narrative, where he reproaches Philip for his incontinence towards pleasures and for corrupting peoples (F 225 a = Poly.[40] 8.9.2–13):

> 2. He shows him [*Philip*] to have been first so incontinent (ἀκρατέστατον) about women, that as far as in him lay he ruined his own home by his passionate and ostentatious addiction to this kind of things; 3. next a most wicked and mischievous man in his schemes for forming friend-

39 Above, ch. 9.2.

40 Transl. W.R. Paton.

> ships and alliances; thirdly, one who had enslaved and betrayed a large number of cities by force or fraud; 4. and lastly, one so addicted to strong drink (ἀκρατοποσίας) that he was frequently seen by his friends manifestly drunk in broad day-light. 5. Anyone who chooses to read the beginning of his forty-ninth book will be amazed at the extravagance (ἀτοπίαν) of this writer. Apart from other things, he ventured to write as follows. I set down the passage in his own words: 6. 'Philip's court in Macedonia was the gathering place of all the most debauched and brazen-faced characters in Greece or abroad, who were there styled the king's companions. 7. For Philip in general showed no favour to men of good repute who were carefully of their property, but those he honoured and promoted were spendthrifts who passed their time drinking and gambling. 8. In consequence he not only encouraged them in their vices, but made them past masters in every kind of wickedness and lewdness. 9. Was there anything indeed disgraceful and shocking that they did not practise, and was there anything good and creditable that they did leave undone? Some of them used to shave their bodies and make them smooth although they were men, and others actually practiced lewdness with each other though bearded. 10. While carrying about two or three minions with them they served others in the same capacity, 11. so that we would be justified in calling them not courtiers but courtesans and not soldiers but strumpets. 12. For being by nature manslayers they became by their practices man-whores.' 13. In a word he continues 'not to be prolix, and especially as I am beset by such a deluge of other matters my opinion is that those who were called Philip's friends and companions were worse brutes and of a more beastly disposition than the Centaurs who established themselves on Pelion, or those Laestrygones who dwelt in the plain of Leontini, or any other monsters.'

According to Polybius, Theopompus states in his preface that he undertook to write the *Philippica* because Europe had never before brought forth such a man as Philip (διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε τὴν Εὐρώπην ἐνηνοχέναι **τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα** παράπαν οἷον τὸν Ἀμύντου Φίλιππον, 8.9.1); but despite this claim the historian goes on and censures Philip openly. The usual translation or meaning of τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα is something like 'so great man' or 'such a great man,' but, as Connor has persuasively demonstrated, the phrase is deliberatively ambiguous. The use of τοιοῦτος as a qualifying adjective denotes quality, but that quality can be either positive or negative, depending on the context;[41] moreover, if we look

41 Flower (1994): 99–100 gives the example of Herodotus' description of Cypselus, where the

at the extant fragments, Theopompus uses τοιοῦτος in a pejorative sense and never to praise someone.[42] Does Theopompus play with the readers' expectations, leaving 'such a man' unqualified so as to clarify its meaning through the narrative itself? It is plausible to explain this assumed incongruence of judgement on Philip by supposing that Polybius misunderstood Theopompus' taste for irony and satire.[43] However, there are also other explanations. It is possible that Polybius disagreed totally with Theopompus' principles of historiography, his style and peculiar arrangement of historical material. He might also have manipulated and altered the original plan of the historical stuff that he consulted.[44] Polybius starts his discussion on Theopompus' historiography at a point within a section pertainig to Philip V; he says that anyone who writes *Histories* concerning kings risks praising (ἐγκωμιάζειν) or falsely blaming (λοιδορεῖν ψευδῶς) his subject; instead it would be fair—continues Polybius—to give an evaluation which is coherent either with what other authors previously wrote, or with one's own choices in life (τὸν ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς προγεγραμμένοις ἀεὶ καὶ τὸν πρέποντα ταῖς ἑκάστων προαιρέσεσι λόγον ἐφαρμόζειν, 8.8.7). The criticism of Theopompus follows (the passage above, 8.9.1–13); after this Polybius returns to the inconsistency between the promise of noble things implied by the introduction of the *Philippica* and the scurrility of the rest of the work: one should disapprove of such a bitter feeling and the lack of restraint; Theopompus would deserve, in fact, blame for using a language which contradicts the initial statement on the subject in question (μαχόμενα λέγει πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ πρόθεσιν); besides he falsely accuses Philip and his friends (8.10.1–2).[45] Theopompus is clearly criticised for the falsity of his statements, but that is not all. Bitterness (πικρία, 8.10.1 and 12), impudent loquacity, and evil-speaking (ἀθυρογλωττία, 8.10.1, κακορρημοσύνη, 8.10.3) are further key aspects of Theopompus' way of writing, according to Polybius. His criticism of Theopompus might be refer-

tyrant is told to have proved to be 'such a man;' the following narrative shows clearly the negative meaning of τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ, since a list of brutal acts follows.

42 Connor (1967): 137–139.

43 Connor (1967): 133–154, Shrimpton (1977): 123–144. Cf. Murray (1946): 149–170.

44 It has been noticed that Polybius is not coherent in his judgememnts on the value of Theopompus' historiography: with reference to the issue of autopsy, for instance, Theopompus is attacked as untrusworthy in one passage and is considered as a model for historians in another (Polyb. 12.25 f = T 32; 12.27.8–9 = F 342). Bearzot (2005): 55–71.

45 It has been suggested that Polybius' defence of Philip and his companions of book 8.10 was strongly influenced by his own political sympathies; as a loyal Arcadian he saw Philip as a benefactor of Greece and the Peloponnese against Spartan dominion. Walbank (1967 a): 1–12.

ring to stylistic features as well: Polybius might also be complaining that that kind of accusations against Philip do not fit the genre of eulogy and its style (μαχόμενα λέγει). It is not coincidental that the same kind of criticism—to say something that contradicts expectations of some sort—comes also from an author interested in stylistical issues, such as Longinus. He complains that Theopompus' description of the Persian campaign of 344 BC against Egypt failed to produce a tribute to the enormous wealth and power of the Persian King: instead of going from the humble to the sublime he did the opposite, showing a hyperbolic praise followed by a meagre conclusion (*De subl.* 43.1–2 = T 42 and F 263).

In ancient works, and especially in biographical writings, private life was an essential part of a man's personality. The biographic genre did not separate private from public sphere, as we do today. Theopompus' peculiar view of peoples, full of alleged inconsistencies, might anticipate some aspects that will be found in later constructions of *bioi*, where 'integrated' characters show general traits and personal qualities that cluster together. The technique of gradual redefinition, typical of ancient biographers, consists in starting with a general truth about a personage, and in correcting it gradually by complementing and re-defining it, so that at the end we find a much more singular portrait than at the beginning. This does not mean that the personage becomes different, but it is only that the initial definition does not fit him fully.[46] So it is possible that Theopompus started his work by saying that Philip of Macedonia was that sort of man whom Europe had never seen before, yet he re-defined progressively the character of his personage by adding further and different elements. Of course, seen in isolation and out of context, many of Theopompus' statements about peoples and individuals appear highly contradictory; and this is so perhaps also because we cannot appreciate wholly Theopompus' way of employing antithesis.[47] So, we learn through a laconic sentence that the demagogue Callistratus was ἐπιμελής as well as incontinent in pleasures (πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἡδονὰς ἦν ἀκρατής, τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων [ἦν] ἐπιμελής, F 97 = Athen. 4 p. 166 e), or that Eubulus was ἐπιφανέστατος, ἐπιμελής and φιλόπονος, and he weakened his city through public distributions of money as well (ἀργύριόν τε συχνὸν πορίζων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις διένειμε, διὸ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τῆς τούτου πολιτείας ἀνανδροτάτην καὶ ῥαιθυμοτάτην συνέβη γενέσθαι, F 99 = Harpocr. s.v. Εὔβουλος).

46 Plutarch's Lysander, for example, did not become unspartan progressively, he was already initially an unspartan figure, but only not wholly defined as such. Pelling (2011 a): 283–333 has found and described this ancient technique of constructing personages. Cf. Candau Moron (2000): 453–478.

47 Cf. Pownall (2004): 167–175.

According to fragment 81, Philip sent Agathocles, one of the Thessalian slaves, to destroy the Perrhaebians. Agathocles was dissolute and accompanied Philip in his drinking bouts, dancing and making jokes. Then, the narrator adds that Philip joined those kinds of men with whom he wasted the greater part of the time in hard drinking and buffoonery and also took counsel with them over the most serious matters (οἷς διὰ φιλοποσίαν καὶ βωμολοχίαν πλείω χρόνον ὡς τὰ πολλὰ συνδιέτριβε καὶ συνήδρευε περὶ τῶν μεγίστων βουλευόμενος, Athen. 6 pp. 259 f–260 a).

For Theopompus a person may be *akrates* as well as *epimeles* or *philoponos*, or even *philotimos*. So for Theopompus Cimon is moderate to a certain extent, but nonetheless a clear example of the *philotimos*, the man whose actions are based on personal ambition and desire from prominence (F 89).[48] Criticism of this type runs through many of the fragments of the *Philippica*, as *philotimia*, ambitious rivalry, leads Nicocles and Straton to their bad ends (F 114), and Zopyrus to his self-inflicted disfigurement (F 66). Flower has suggested that Theopompus considered φιλοτιμία and φιλονικία as traits of Agesilaus' character too.[49] This is inferred from the account of Agesilaus' assumed bribery of the Thebans which caused their withdraw from Laconia, as related by Plutarch (Plut. *Ages*. 32.8 = F 323; 370 BC); here Plutarch is skeptical about Theopompus' testimony (all other sources did not relate that episode), and adds that all sources agreed that Agesilaus saved Sparta at that time, and managed affairs safely, because he put aside his innate passions: ambition and contentiousness (33.1 = F 323).[50] Theopompus' approbation of Agesilaus' virtue—of which the king himself was proud, according to the historian (F 321)—might be only one aspect (among others) of the historian's contruction of Agesilaus' personality, where there would be also room for personal ambition and other selfish, or less honourable, motives. Part of Theopoompus' construction of Agesilaus-as-personality may reflect, moreover, a consolidated literary tradition which, echoing a well-known Spartan stereotype, goes back a long way to Herodotus' narrative. Let us consider, for example, the following passage given by Athenaeus, who cites Theopompus (F 22 = Athen. 14 p. 657 b–c):

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48 As Wade-Gery (1938): 129–134 noticed, fragment 89 is not so much a tribute to disinterested benevolence, for it gives the portrait of a skillful politician, whose generosity is the key to his popularity and political power.

49 Flower (1994): 173.

50 However, these are distinctive aspects of Plutarch's own characterisation of Agesilaus too, developed throughout the *Life* and coming out also in passages that may well be independent from Theopompus. Cf. Russell (1995): 75–94.

> Theopompus mentions grain-fattened geese and calves in book XIII of the *History of Philip* and book XI of the *History of Greece*, where he calls attention to the Spartans' discipline where the consumption of food is concerned, writing as follows: 'as Agesilaus was approaching, the Thasians sent him herd-animals of all kinds and well-fed cows, as well as pastries and every type of snack. Agesilaus accepted the sheep and goat and the cows, but initially failed to notice the pastries and the snacks, since they were covered up. But when he saw them, he ordered the Thasians to take them away, saying that Spartans were not allowed to consume food of this sort. When the Thasians insisted, he said: "Take it and give it to them," pointing towards the helots, as a way of saying that he much preferred that the helots be ruined by eating this food than that he and the other Spartans who were there be.'

The narrative pattern is not wholly new, as the account seems modelled on the Herodotean prototypical tale of Pausanias' reaction to Mardonius' luxurious dinner preparations (9.82).[51] The topic of Spartan frugality recalls also Xenophon's account of Spartan wintering in Asia during Agesilaus' campaign of 395 BC (*Hell.* 4.1.16, ἐνταῦθα μὲν δὴ διεχείμαζε, καὶ αὐτόθεν καὶ σὺν προνομαῖς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ λαμβάνων). The anecdote of Spartan generals' frugality at dinner is later used by Aelianus with reference to the Ionic campaign of Lysander (*v.h.* 3.20). This was thus a well-known pattern, widespread in ancient times. Furthermore, the story of Agesilaus who refuses pastries and any kind of sweets given him by the Thasians is adopted later by Plutarch, who re-adapts the same pattern to Agesialus' Egyptian campaign, where the stress on the laconic way of living is still more evident: the old king appears, in fact, as lying in some grass by the sea covered with a cloak that was coarse and mean (*Ages.* 36.4–6).

Theopompus and to some extent also Xenophon distance themselves from the Oxyrhynchus historian's historiographical practice in following the self-control = positive outcome ~ lack of it = negative outcome pattern. Besides, Theopompus' *syngraphe* shows outcomes that are compromised by very negative elements, even if they can coexist in themselves with positive ones perhaps without a real contradiction. This sort of 'moralistic' approach to history clashes with the *HO*'s practice, according to which 'moral' elements are a means to explain results and responsibilities.

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51 Jacoby II B *Comm.* p. 357.

9.4 Praise/Blame in Ephorus?

Aware of the hazard of using modern categories and applying them to ancient works, in this section we aim to clarify and deal with possible kinds of 'moralism' traceable in Ephorus' narrative and to understand whether his narrative shows patterns already found in the *HO* ('explanatory' moralism), Xenophon's *Hellenica* ('descriptive,' 'prescriptive' and 'explanatory moralism') and Theopompus' works ('descriptive' and 'prescriptive moralism').

Is Ephorus a moralist? The issue is huge, and dangerous as it deals closely with the aims and interests of the indirect tradition that preserved parts of his work. Diodorus in particular is relevant, as the *Bibliotheke* is filled with sentiments of moral utility; and because Diodorus uses Ephorus extensively it was quite natural among scholars to assume that he drew ethical assessments from Ephorus.[52]

German scholarship of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries elaborated the view that the categories of praise and blame were applied to historiography at the time of Ephorus and were connected with the practice of demonstrative oratory;[53] this view was shared later by other scholars.[54] There are two main Ephorean passages which scholars usually emphasised and took as proofs of Ephorus' assumed 'moralism:' Polybius' reference to Ephorus' *epimetrounta logon*, which has been meant as a kind of critical appraisal[55] (12.28.10–11 = T 23) or eulogy,[56] and Strabo's statement that Ephorus was accustomed to resorting to paradigms of human conduct (*paradeigmata poieisthai*, 7.3.9 = F 42). Concerning Polybius' testimony, the phrase ἐπιμετρῶν λόγος was explained with the patterns of praise and censure contained in Diodorus' narrative; in so doing the didactic function and moralistic texture of the *Bibliotheke* were projected directly onto Ephorus' narrative, and were considered, therefore, as chief characteristics of Ephorus' work. Furthermore, we must stress that Polybius' treatment of Ephorus may be misleading or difficult to pin down, as it is embedded within his criticism of Timaeus, whose historiographical method and aims are the main subject of Polybius' attacks, reasoning, and discussion. So we read, for example, that Ephorus himself (along with Theopompus, moreover) is crit-

52 Cf. esp. Jacoby *FGrHist* 70, T 23, II C *Comm.* p. 38; Pédech (1961): 148; Walbank (1967 b): 411. *Contra* Sacks (1990): 23–54; Parmeggiani (2011): 49–55 and *passim*. Recently Pownall (2004) has suggested that Ephorus' work uses moral categories in giving historical explanations.

53 The issue is discussed by Chávez Reino (2005): 19–54.

54 See, for instance, Fornara (1983): 108 and Flower (1994): 175.

55 Fornara (1983): 108–112.

56 Scheller (1911): 48–50, Laqueur (1911): 342–343.

icised for lack of political and military experience (12.25 f), but then he is appreciated for his direct experience of things in contrast with Timaeus’ bookish knowledge (12.27.8–9). That is, Ephorus’ historiographical method remains highly elusive, if we follow Polybius’ evidence. Polybius emphasises the necessity of first-hand experience for a historian, and shows the common opinion about what were usually considered as requisites for rhetorical and historical compositions (12.28.8–11):

> 8. In the preface to his sixth book he [*Timaeus*] says that ‘some people suppose that more genius, industry, and preparation are required for rhetorical than for historical composition.’ And that ‘this opinion had been formerly advanced against Ephorus.’ 9. Then because this writer had been unable to refute those who held it, he undertakes himself to draw a comparison between history and rhetorical compositions: a most unnecessary proceeding altogether. In the first place he misrepresents Ephorus. 10. For in truth, admirable as Ephorus is throughout his whole work, in style, treatment, and argumentative acuteness, he is more powerful in his digressions and statements of his personal views: in fact, whenever he is adding anything in the shape of a commentary or a note (δεινότατός ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς **παρεκβάσεσι** καὶ ταῖς ἀφ’ αὑτοῦ **γνωμολογίαις**, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅταν που τὸν **ἐπιμετροῦντα λόγον** διατίθηται). 11. And it so happens that his most elegant and convincing digression is on this very subject of a comparison between historians and speech-writers.[57]

What does exactly Polybius mean with the phrase ἐπιμετροῦντα λόγον? As has been noticed, the expression in question ‘no designa un contenido concreto, sino más bien un continente, un mecanismo de exposición o componente del discurso historiográfico, o mejor aún, una dimensión distinta de la simple dimensión narrativa;’ yet it has been usually identified by scholars with a ‘contenido concreto.’ In other words, the phrase has been wrongly identified with a specific narrative form, the eulogy; and, consequently, it has been commonly maintained that Ephorus’ work was characterised by eulogies and by the recurrent pattern of praise or blame.[58]

The expression ἐπιμετροῦντα λόγον recurs other times in Polybius’ *Histories* (7.7.7; 15.34.1; cf. 35.1), and refers to the usual practice among historians to fill up their narrative with deeds that are not worthy of mention in order to

57 Transl. by E.S. Shuckburgh (slightly modified).

58 Chávez Reino (2005): 40–41.

manipulate historical truth. This happens when the subject is circumscribed and narrow, so that historians make small things great for the lack of facts; it happens also when historians lack their own judgement (7.7.7). According to Polybius, length, exaggeration, and sensational elements diminish the quality of narrative (15.34.1):

> I am quite aware of the miraculous occurrences and embellishments which the chroniclers of this event have added to their narrative with a view of producing a striking effect upon their hearers, making more of their comments on the story than of the story itself and the main incidents (πλείω τὸν ἐπιμετροῦντα λόγον διατιθέμενοι τοῦ συνέχοντος τὰ πράγματα καὶ κυρίου).

With reference to 12.28.10 the phrase ἐπιμετροῦντα λόγον may well indicate extensive parts of Ephorus' work which included personal judgements in digressive form. Though Polybius' reference to Ephorus' fondness for *parekbaseis* and *gnomologiai*[59] might suggest that the narrative was characterised by a sententious style, nevertheless that tendency would be eventually only one aspect of the character of the writing as a whole: the historian is indeed *most* powerful (δεινότατός ἐστιν) when he inserts digressions and personal judgements, and, generally speaking, *whenever* he adds parts of some length in which he expresses his view (12.28.10); therefore, one should not expect this practice everywhere in the narrative. It is thus possible that what Polybius says of Ephorus, praising his method (12.28.10–11), does not refer exactly to the character of Ephorus' narrative as a whole, especially in consideration that Polybius is replying here to the charges that Timaeus had moved against Ephorus.[60]

Things become more complicated when we consider the debate lying behind Polybius' statements on Ephorus' historiographical method. The issue at stake is the different kind of equipment required by historical writings and epideictic speeches. According to Polybius, Ephorus would make remarks on the difference between historians and speech-writers in a convincing way (εὐχαριστότατα καὶ πιθανώτατα περὶ τῆς συγκρίσεως εἴρηκε τῆς τῶν ἱστοριογράφων καὶ λογογράφων, 12.28.11); this is said against Timaeus' statement, according to which Ephorus could not give a satisfactory answer to those who had the idea that more industry, training and talent was required by epideictic writings than historical. Thus, the relation between history and oratory at the time of Ephorus

59 Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1394, 19.
60 Cf. Chávez Reino (2005): 35–39.

and Timaeus was quite controversial, something very different from common scholarly opinion according to which fourth-century historiography was a kind of epideictic or demonstrative oratory.[61] In modern scholarly opinion, in fact, Ephorus, following Isocrates' teaching about moral utility, would show models of good behaviour (*paradeigmata poieisthai*) and use praise as a tool of moral improvement for the reader; his *Histories* would aim at setting forth paradigms, or inspirational models, that incite people to virtue.[62] And fragment 42 is usually mentioned as a proof of Ephorus' use of paradigms in his work (= Strab. 7.3.9):

> [...] Now the other writers, [*Ephorus*] says, tell only about [*Scythian*] savagery, because they know that the terrible and the marvellous are startling, but one should tell the opposite facts too and make them patterns of conduct (παραδείγματα ποιεῖσθαι), and [*Ephorus*] himself, therefore, will tell only about those who follow 'most just' habits, for there are some of the Scythian nomads who feed only on mare's milk, and excel all men in justice.[63] [...]

Whether we translate *paradeigmata poieisthai* with 'pattern of conduct,' that is a moral paradigm (Sacks), or whether we follow Fornara's reading (Ephorus' would provide 'a paradigm or model [of what is good instead of bad]')[64] which shows that Ephorus is here correcting a distortion occurred in the ethnographical tradition, the weight of oratory in Ephorus' work remains something unclear and unspecified. Besides, the belief that the emphasis on paradigmatic and praiseworthy deeds will benefit readers seems close to the approach of Strabo and his contemporaries.[65] From Dionysius' *Roman Antiquities* it is clear that he envisaged the historical genre as programmatically[66] encomiastic (1.1.23; 2.1). A

61 Fornara (1983): 108–109. The same idea that Philistus of Syracuse, a fourth-century historian, follower of Thucydides, provided 'bulletins of praise and blame' (p. 108) cannot be asserted with certainty. Dionysius of Halicarnassus says that Philistus is trivial and paltry whatever his subject may be, whether he is describing sieges or settlements, or dispensing praise or censure. This statement is not sufficient in itself to show that the historian organises his material according to the pattern of praise and blame (*ad Pomp.* 5 = *FGrHist* 566, T 16 a–b).

62 Fornara (1983): 110.

63 Transl. by Sacks (1990): 28.

64 Fornara (1983): 110–111.

65 See Sacks (1990): 28–29.

66 In fact many of the cases that Dionysius treats in the narrative can hardly be seen as

bit later, Lucian too in *How to Write History* takes for granted the nobility (τὸ κάλλος) of the historian's subject-matter (45); and from the extent of the part devoted to the topic of praise (7–14) it seems that he, like Dionysius, expected that any historical works had an encomiastic slant.[67]

The discussion so far shows that Ephorus' disposition to digress and moralise or, better, to moralise through digressions cannot be firmly stated in light of Polybius' and Strabo's evidence (Polyb. 12.28.8–11, Strab. 7.3.9). Diodorus, for his part, is of little aid, since his moralistic judgements may coincide with those of Ephorus, but only to the extent to which they are compatible with his own historiographical concerns and aims.[68] Nor is it possible to speak in terms of praise and blame with reference to Ephorus' historiographical method. It is true that the historian might approve people's behaviour in some cases and disapprove of it in others, but that cannot be simply considered as a proof of the fact the narrative constantly deploys the praise ~ blame pattern.[69]

A certain tendency to put in connection luxurious, violent, impious people with negative outcomes and frugality and simple lifestyle with positive ones can be found in Ephorus' fragments. It seems that, as in the previous cases of Theopompus and Xenophon, so also here moral prescriptions on how to behave eventually come to the reader indirectly, through the *exempla* given by the narrative itself. Fragment 183 (Athen 12.26. p. 523 e) shows that so long as the Milesians avoided moral decay they were powerful, and were able to defeat the Scythians. Because of their military lifestyle the Pelasgians not only gained great glory but also spread all over Greece, including Crete, Thessaly, and the Peloponnese (F 113 = Strab. 5.2.4). In the following part of fragment 42, already mentioned above, we read that since the nomad Scythians were frugal in their lifestyle and not money-getters, they were orderly towards one another—they had all things in common, their wives, children, the whole of their kin and everything—and remained also invincible and unconquered by outsiders. The Aetolians remained unconquered due to their military valour and a simple way of life in a rugged territory that was unattrac-

positive: his early Romans often behaved very badly, and it took skill and diplomacy to calm things down. The long treatment of Coriolanus in books 6–8, for instance, is highly moralistic, but hardly encomiastic.

67 Woodman (1988), 40–42.

68 So Sacks (1990): 35, 'an interesting case is his assessment of Epaminondas (XV 88). Diodorus probably drew upon either non-Ephoran traditions or his own resources in shaping part of the eulogy, and the emphasis on the moderate behavior (ἐπιείκεια) is a tell-tale sign of Diodorus' intrusion.'

69 Pownall (2004): 133–142.

tive to any conquerors (F 122 a = Strab. 10.3.2). The reasons for Spartan good social order lay in the harmony (ὁμόνοια) which arose from the elimination of greed (πλεονεξία) and luxury (τρυφή) in favour of a communal lifestyle (F149 = Strab. 10.4.16). On the contrary, the Phocian commanders who stole the offerings made at Delphi by Alcmaeon and Menelaus met appropriate fate: their wives betrayed them, after dressing in the jewellery that belonged to the women of the donors (F 96 = Athen. 6 p. 232 d). Perpetrators of offences may come to a bad end too: the arrogant Corinthians were defeated by the Megarians as a result of their oppressive behaviour (F 19 = Schol. Plat. *Euthyd.* 292 e).

In addition, with due caution, we may find it plausible that *tryphe*[70] is for Ephorus something that determines the course of events. However, we rely only on Diodorus' text, and namely on those passages of the *Bibliotheke* that are usually considered as coming from Ephorus, and where references to *tryphe* appear just twice. One case refers to the Spartan regent Pausanias who is condemned for following the luxurious habits of the Persians and thus for causing the loss of Spartan hegemony (11.46.1–3); the other example involves Sparta again, and refers to her decadence due to *tryphe* and to a case of corruption by money that happened four hundred years after Lycurgus' reform (7.12.8).[71] Presumably, this point later became a commonplace, as it figures largely in Plutarch's *Lysander*.

Other evidence suggests, however, that Ephorus might well have given some sort of explanations in terms of *personal motives*, where moral themes are implicit or even absent. Personal reasons lead both Pharnabazus' action and that of Pericles (FF 196, and 70), according to Ephorus, or better to what Diodorus ascribes to Ephorus' report; the content of fragments 196 and 70 recalls the description of Spartan loss of power due to those peoples who held power at Sparta (Diod. 11.46.1–3 and 7.12.8, already quoted). The examples of Pharnabazus and Pericles show a certain tendency of the historian to simplify the relation of cause and effect and to concentrate on the reasons of single personalities and/or peoples. This can be said, for instance, of that explanation according to which people who are militarily active and morally incorruptible maintain their autonomy. So, the natural state of Boeotia, the fertility of the soil, surrounded by three seas, and the great number of harbours made that territory naturally well suited to hegemony (F 119 = Strab. 9.2.2):

70 Cf. Gorman-Gorman (2007): 38–60.

71 Cf. Sacks (1990): 49.

> but those who were from time to time its leaders neglected careful training and education, and therefore, though they at times achieved success, they maintained it only for a short time, as is shown in the case of Epaminondas; for after he died the Thebans immediately lost the hegemony, having had only a taste of it; and that the cause of this was the fact that they belittled the value of learning and of intercourse with mankind, and cared for the military virtues alone (αἴτιον δὲ εἶναι τὸ λόγων καὶ ὁμιλίας τῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὀλιγωρῆσαι, μόνης δ' ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρετῆς).[72]

In this case, however, we are dealing with Strabo's phrasing which shows the content of Ephorus' account on Boeotia rather than with Ephorus' own words. Again, Ephorus' account of the causes of the Peloponnesian war (F 196 = Diod. 12.38),[73] as presented by Diodorus (αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν τοῦ Πελοποννησιακοῦ πολέμου τοιαῦταί τινες ὑπῆρξαν, ὡς Ἔφορος ἀνέγραψε, 12.41), focuses on personal grounds too. Diodorus ascribes to him the story of the charge of embezzlement of public money made against Pheidias and Pericles; this charge would make Pericles think it 'advantageous to himself to involve the city in a major war;' in this way he would not be asked to give an explanation to the Athenians for the use of that money. The charge against Pericles and his entourage echoes similar statements made by Aristophanes,[74] and it has been maintained that Ephorus, like all those who did not grew up in classical Athens, failed to understand the character of the political comedy of Aristophanes' time.[75] Yet, aside from the clearly anecdotic character of the story, we do not know what Ephorus may have thought of his sources, and why he chose Aristophanes rather than Thucydides in giving that account. Another instance of personal motivations concerns Alcibiades, the same person who had suggested to Pericles the trick 'you should be seeking some means not how to render but how not to render an accounting' (F 196 = Diod. 12.38),[76] and who was later victim of a plot against his person planned by Pharnabazus. Alcibiades, learning of Cyrus' planning against his brother, Artaxerxes, went to Pharnabazus and told him everything, asking for someone who would conduct him on a mission to the King. But Pharnabazus preceded Alcibiades in revealing the plot to the King,

72 Transl. by H.L. Jones.

73 Cf. F 193 = Schol. Aristoph. *Nub.* 859.

74 *Pax* 603–606; 609–611; *Ach.* 530.

75 Dover (1988): 45–52, 50.

76 This comes in Plutarch's *Alcibiades* too, though here there is no explicit mention of Ephorus.

and arranged Alcibiades' murdering on the road to Susa. The cause of Alcibiades' killing, according to Ephorus' account, is to be found in Pharnabazus' desire to play up to the King (F 70 = 14.11.1–4). In all these examples, which show personal-leves explanations, a morally negative judgement is likely to be implicit in the author's own mind.

There are, moeover, cases in which personal and collective motivations are conncted with aetiological explanations that have nothing to do with 'moralistic' views. Think of the Doliones who attacked the inhabitants of Thessaly and Magnesia, since they had been driven out by them (διὰ τὸ ἀπελασθῆναι, F 61 = Schol. Apoll. 1.1037). Other times historical explanations remind us of the flavour of Herodotus' narrative. So Agamemnon invited Diomedes and Alcmaeon to take part in the Trojan expedition because he feared (δείσαντα μὴ) that they both might subdue the Argolis in his absence; and though Diomedes was persuaded to take part in that expedition, Alcmaeon refused to heed the invitation. And this is the aetiological reason why the Acarnanians alone refused to share in the expedition with the Greeks (F 123 = Strab. 10.2.25).

Furthermore, inner and personal reasons explain people's actions in a way that recalls Theopompus' historiographical method, as described by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (the historian investigates feelings, and more than on events and actions he focuses on the character of people about whom he speaks; cf. above).[77] From Ephorus' own words we learn about Dercyllidas. Athenaeus reports that the historian in book 18 said that the Spartan Dercyllidas was called Skyphos,[78] and then he gives his exact phrasing (F 71 = Athen. 11 p. 500 c):

> Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀντὶ Θίμβρωνος Δερκυλλίδαν ἔπεμψαν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ἀκούοντες ὅτι πάντα πράττειν εἰώθασιν οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν βάρβαροι μετὰ ἀπάτης καὶ δόλου. διόπερ Δερκυλλίδαν ἔπεμψαν ἥκιστα νομίζοντες ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι· ἦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τῶι τρόπωι Λακωνικὸν οὐδ' ἁπλοῦν ἔχων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τὸ πανοῦργον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες. διὸ καὶ Σκύφον αὐτὸν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προσηγόρευον.

The decision to send Dercyllidas is based on the Spartans' assumption (νομίζοντες) that he would be more suitable for that duty than any other; and this was so because he did not behave like a Spartan, but was brutal, ready to do anything, and showed duplicitous qualities. The voice of the narrator comes in to clarify (ἦν γὰρ οὐδέν) the previous point, which is given through the Spartans' eyes. Since Dercyllidas' ethos is defined as θηριῶδες, does the narrator (and with

77 Cf. Parmeggiani (2011): 475.

78 This may be a corruption of the name Σίσυφος.

him the author) feel disappointed about the Spartan general? In the absence of the full context it is not possible to answer the question; crucial would be, in fact, to bring out how much approval of Spartan qualities (ἁπλοῦν) is normally shown by the narrator. Dercyllidas appears here like Lysander in the relative *Life* of Plutarch, where he too is called πανοῦργος (and σοφιστής), a man acting through deceit (*Lys*. 7.3–4), totally different from Callicratidas, with whom he is compared, and whose simplicity, pride, and justice are judged worthy of a Spartan (ἁπλοῦς 5.5; 7.1). Even so, we are not sure here that the narrator's voice is totally inclined to Callicratidas and critical of Lysander. The same Spartan traits of his character, 'ambition and contentiousness,' give rise to a wider range of unspartan behaviour, in paying court to foreign potentates, in weakening the Spartan system by introducing wealth, in his deviousness, versatility and enterprise, religious unscrupulousness, and shrewd but bloody exploitation of party divisions in foreign cities in the interest of his own followers and friends. It seems as if all that is a sort of result of the competitive spirit of Spartan education. Similarly, Lysander's rival, the more conventional Spartan, Callicratidas, is not exempt from mockery due to Spartan simplicity which he expresses (6.5–7). Nor can we infer that Lysander's unspartan behaviour of chapters 17 (the sending of money to Sparta), 20 and 25 (the attempts to corrupt oracles), 30 (the proposal of a constitutional reform opening up the kingships to all Heraclides), where Ephorus[79] is quoted as a source, is a clear indication of the historian's criticism of Lysander.[80] Plutarch's Lysander, who shows Spartan traits and qualities, may be either unspartan, unscrupulous and harsh, if compared with Callicratidas, or a mild and moderate leader, if compared with Sulla.[81] Again, Lysander may be more straightforward than other canonical Spartans, such as Agesilaus, Pausanias and Gylippus. His personal incorruptibility is thrown into relief by the contrast with Gylippus and the average Spartan (17). Outwitted by Pharnabazus in 404 BC, Lysander with much difficulty obtains permission from the ephors to go to Libya and consult the oracle of Ammon; on his return he is sent to Athens to maintain the rule of the Thirty, and he is snubbed by Pausanias: Lysander, the honest patriot, is seen against the jealousy of the double-dealing king (21–22). Finally, Lysander plays a decisive part in the accession of Agesilaus; despite that, once established, Agesilaus ignores the obligations he owed in return to Lysander; for he is not less ambitious than the other, and, moreover, jealous of his equals (23).

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79 At chapters 17 and 30 he is quoted along with Theopompus.

80 Parmeggiani (2011): 478.

81 Cf. Stadter (1992): 41–53, Russell (1995): 75–94, Pelling (2011 a): 292–300.

Personal reasons of individuals are found in the seemingly pro-Spartan policy of Dionysius the younger (F 211 = Schol. Aristid. p. 294. 13): he made an agreement with the Persian King so that he appeared as helping the Spartans against the Athenians (ἵνα τῷ μὲν φαινομένῳ Λακεδαιμονίοις βοηθῶν ἔλθῃ κατ' Ἀθηναίων), but his true aim was devastating Greece and sharing part of his power with the Persian (τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ πορθήσας τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν μετὰ Πέρσου μερίσειεν). Here Ephorus, if Strabo is close to the original phrasing, seems to echo Thucydides' and the Oxyrhynchus historian's causal language.

Now, possibly Ephorus was also particularly interested in aetiology and the origin of customs, as some fragments would suggest; think of the discussion why Homer was called Homer and Melesigenes (F 1 = [Plut] *vit. Hom.* 1.2), the explanation of the origin of the Apaturian festival (F 22 = Arpocr. s. Ἀπατούρια), as well as the account of the reason for the development of trade market in Aegina (176 = Strab. 8.6.16). But, again, we cannot be certain that all that is part of a broader historiographical plan, or if it responds rather to the interests of the sources that preserved Ephorus' work or to the demands of particular stories in context. In fact, it is Strabo's geographical and ethnographical interests that invite us to associate Ephorus' narrative to Herodotus' *Histories*. Mythical accounts,[82] foundations of cities,[83] and stories of oracles[84] that can be found throughout Ephorus' fragments are also some of the main threads of the narrative texture of Herodotus' work. And Ephorus' account of the causes of the Nile's flooding and of the manner in which that river reaches the sea, if preserved, might have said a lot about that relation.[85] However this—the usual proviso with fragments—may be a consequence of the interests of those who quoted Ephorus' fragments: we cannot be sure that the texture of the fragments is a typical sample of Ephorus' own work and interests, and the subject-matter and source-material may be imposing their own style of preferred explanation.

9.5 Conclusion

Just as in Thucydides, so also in the Oxyrhynchus historian 'morality' has the primary function of enhancing our understanding. Moral examples may teach ethical behaviour, and might be meant as a legacy for future generations of

82 F 31 b = Strab. 9.3.11–12; 34.

83 F 216 = Strab. 6.3.3.

84 F 134 a = Strab. 5.4.5.

85 F 65 e = Diod. 1.37.4. Cf. Aristid. [36] 64. On Ephorus' use of Herodotus as a source see Jacoby *FGrHist* II C p. 31.

leaders and generals. Yet the Oxyrhynchus historian is mainly interested in explaining why things happened as they did, and, unlike Thucydides, he has no concern for human behaviour and psychology. He seems to elaborate an approach that, in reading the past, has its main focus in matters of immediate contingency. If the Oxyrhynchus historian's moral outlook may be aimed at giving political advice or injunctions that should ideally be implemented, it does not seem to convey any general ethical truth about human *phusis*; morality is mainly an *explanatory* means by which the narrator clarifies and expounds how and why certain historical courses took place in a specific way.

The discussion of 'morality' in the *HO* has invited us to turn to other contemporary authors and their particular intellectual context, where a peculiar concern for instructing the reader in virtues and in giving moral *exempla* is found. I refer to Xenophon, Theopompus and Ephorus, whose historical works are evaluated today in relation to the modern category of 'moralism.'[86] To some extent this category might appear as an overstatement of that presumed historical trend. However, these authors do have the tendency to give good and bad examples of both individual and collective behaviour. The character of their narratives is often inspirational and uplifting in intent.

86 Pownall (2004): 65–175.

Conclusion

The Oxyrhynchus historian and Thucydides have similar ways of exploiting moral *exempla* in giving historical explanations. The terminology connected with the language of causation throughout the *HO* has shown the narrator's approach to attributing blame to peoples and their political actions. Consequently, this gives us good reasons to talk in terms of 'morality.' Morality acts in the *HO* in a similar way as it does in Thucydides, where it chiefly 'explains' things. Moral issues are interwoven with didacticism and with the need to provide the reader with ethic lessons and paradigms. Moral examples teach ethical conduct, and they might be conceived by those authors as a legacy for future generations of leaders and generals. Yet the *HO* is mainly interested in explaining why things happened as they did, and there is no concern for the Thucydidean tendency to generalise about human behaviour and psychology. With these results in mind, the comparison between the historiographical practices of the Oxyrhynchus historian, Theopompus, Ephorus and Xenopohn's *Hellenica* has proved to be very helpful, especially in consideration of the fact that Theopompus and Ephorus are potential candidates for the authoriship issue of the *HO*. This has allowed us to find patterns of 'moralism' that make the historiographical perspective of Xenophon, Theopompus, and presumably also of Ephorus, quite different from the view offered by the Oxyrhynchus historian's narrative. More clearly than Ephorus, Theopompus and Xenophon show patterns of 'moralism' which we have defined as 'explanatory,' 'descriptive,' and 'prescriptive.'[1] Explanatory moralism consists in explaining ethical conducts; regarding descriptive and prescriptive moralism, the former shows when a certain type of behaviour is just illustrated, while the latter gives implicit or explicit protreptic indications on how someone should behave. Ephorus seems to share some narrative features with Xenophon and Theopompus: in his fragments there is in fact a certain tendency to put in connection luxurious, violent, impious people with negative outcomes and frugality and simple lifestyle with positive ones; moral prescriptions on how to behave come to the reader indirectly, through the *exempla* given by the narrative itself. It is also possible that Ephorus echoes Thucydides' and the Oxyrhynchus historian's causal language, which shows 'explanatory' features in connection with the notion of 'morality.' However, the flavour of Ephorus' narrative is hard to be catched; for, unlike the case of Theopompus, in Ephorus' fragments there are very few occurrences that

1 Theopompus shows only examples of 'descriptive,' and 'prescriptive' moralism.

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give the historians' exact words and phrasing in some lenght.[2] And the majority of the examples connected with 'moralistic' aspects come from indirect quotations.[3] Despite this, however, the results achieved thus far along with the use of some historiographical categories connected with the notion of 'moralism' can be a helpful tool of enquiry and a good starting point in future studies for a broader re-consideration of the authorship issue of the *HO*.

Further aspects have emerged throughout this book. The *HO*'s material is arranged according to a clear syncronistic narrative style (events happened at sea, on land, and on the Greek mainland); however, the narrative seen as a whole clearly relies on an annalistic framework. In adopting this approach, the historian followed and combined both Thucydidean and Herodotean methods of composition. A good sample of elaborate ring composition style can be found in the account of the Corinthian war. The narration unfolds in a manner consistent with a ring composition structure, very much after the Herodotean model; and it also shows a well-balanced and symmetric disposition of the material, according to an a-b-b^1-b-c-b-b^1-b-a scheme. The narrative goes backward and forward, from one scene to another, and in so doing it abandons a straightforward, linear, exposition and continuously breaks the logical and chronological order of events. Yet, differently from Herodotus, whose narrative contains various voices, or focalisations, aside from the controlling voice of the narrator, but, at any rate, does not suggest which stories are more or less trustworthy, the *HO*'s narrator has a predominant role, and his 'digressive' style gives evidence that he has undertaken to guide his reader in forming opinions about what happened.

The Oxyrhynchus historian shows to adopt fifth- and fourth-century Athenian political vocabulary in his narrative. This has also some implications for the date of composition of the *HO*. The historian is aware of Thucydides' narrative, and indeed he uses some Thucydidean categories of political language, but in some cases he re-adapts and applies them in a particular way. For example, the Thucydidean notion of *polypragmosyne*, a feature of Athens as a whole, comes into the analysis of the political groups described in the *HO* and becomes a feature of what the democrats are represented as doing. Besides, the Oxyrhynchus historian applies to a party active at Athens in the 390s a kind of expansionist policy (*polypragmosyne*) which is highly unrealistical for two main reasons: it proved to be unsuccessful in the medium-term, as that party did not achieve its goals; furthermore, what the Oxyrhynchus his-

2 FF 16, 20, 21, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 42, 43, 47, 52, 54, 63, 65 f, 76, 82–84, 90, 95, 97.

3 With the exception of FF 71 and 96.

torian ascribes to Athens' policy of that time seems more fully justified if seen against the later developments of the 350s and the political debate of those years (on Philip's expansionism in Greece). Therefore we suggest ascribing the *HO* to the second half of the 350s or a bit later—346 at latest.[4] Another example of the Oxyrhynchus historian's use of the Athenian political vocabulary is given by the account of the Boeotian constitution. Here the historian appears as influenced by a kind of political language which is redolent of Thucydides; he merges technical terms of Thucydides' use with those typical of Boeotian institutions: *boule* and *bouleutai* along with *synedria* (P. Oxy. V 842, ll. 412, 433, 405)[5] and *archontes*, archon along with *boiotarchos, boiotarches* (ll. 394, 399, 404, 408).[6]

The *HO* thus recalls Thucydides' language and his view of politics. There is one particular Thucydideanism in the text that immediately attracts the attention of the discriminating reader, that is, the constant recourse to a kind of explanatory mode that echoes Thucydides' theory of causation and his use of *prophasis* and *aitia/aition*. The language of conflict is beyond any doubt intimately related to the theme of historical causation, and the *HO*'s debt to Thucydides' view of individual and collective responsibilities is noteworthy. Thucydides' reading of Greek *staseis* can be found not only in the Oxyrhynchus historian's narrative but also in that of Xenophon; their works seem to share the same Thucydidean pattern of seeing Greek cities as torn between *oligoi* and *demos*. Reflections on historical causation and people's responsibilities have led us to extend our exploration: the role played by clarity, visibility and visual language (and also the correlated lack of visibility) have been discussed here.[7] It appears that the language of causation both in Hippocratic texts and in historical ones shows itself as oscillating between the opposing concepts of φανερόν ~ ἀφανές and related semantic fields. Φανερόν, σαφές and cognates may be meant in a metaphorical sense with reference to what is distinctly seen and clearly understood, in contrast with specious or unclear reasons, explanations or motives adduced by speakers. They may also be related to 'visibility' in a more concrete sense, like that conveyed by descriptions of physical realities, such as, for example, battles and ambushes.

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4 From internal textual evidence it has been possible to provide the *terminus ante quem* of 346 BC for the composition of the work. See ch. 5.2.

5 Thucydides uses *boule* and *boulai* in reference to the oligarchic Boeotian confederacy (5.38.2).

6 Cf. Roesch (1965): 126–128, Orsi (1974): 29–30, Lérida Lafarga (2007): 543 and 549 ff. At chapter 15.2 the Oxyrhynchus historian names *synedria ton archonton* the oligarchic assembly that sat at Rhodes before the Athenian coup.

7 Greenwood (2006).

It is possible that the *HO* is later (even though slightly later) than Xenophon's *Hellenica*. This comes true if we consider both thematic and internal evidence. The Oxyrhynchus historian is well aware of Thebes' hegemonic aspirations, and in particular of her responsibility in causing the outbreak of the Corinthian war; he expresses a political evaluation which is quite similar to that offered by Xenophon (P. Oxy. v 842, 18.2 and *Hell.* 3.5.3; cf. P. Oxy. v 842, 7.2 and *Hell.* 3.5.15). Furthermore, the *HO*'s narrator makes statements that can be clearly understood if they are put in relation to specific parts of Xenophon's *Hellenica*. That is, in the *HO* there are a few expressions used in a negative form and in a strong position within the sentence.[8] It is true that they might be explained as internal references to missing parts of the papyrus; however, there is also the possibility that for some reason those claims intended to reply to previous statements made by Xenophon on the same narrative stuff (P. Oxy. v 842, 21.3 and *Hell.* 4.1.1; again, P. Oxy. v 842, 22.1 and *Hell.* 4.1.16). The use of Xenophon's narrative does not exclude, however, the possibility that the Oxyrhynchus historian resorts to other kinds of sources too, such as Persian accounts either written or coming from informants. It is plausible that the historian, like Ctesias, has in mind Persian audiences. The *HO* devotes in fact considerable attention to Persian events. This is apparent when the work is compared with the *Hellenica* of Xenophon in reference to those passages of the Asiatic campaign of Agesilaus where the Spartan king deals with Persian populations: events are seen through the barbarian perspective and perceptions other than through the Greek viewpoint. Besides, the Oxyrhynchus historian shares with Ctesias the preference for writing Persian names in accordance with their original etymology, differently form Herodotus, for instance, who gives for them a Graecised or popular form.[9]

The Oxyrhynchus historian shares historiographical themes with Xenophon. If compared with Thucydides' historiographical perspective, for instance, both the Oxyrhynchus historian and Xenophon show an unprecedented attention to land scenarios: the idea that it is better for a state to hold hegemony of land, because as a consequence this gives to that state also sea control, comes up in their narrative pretty often, directly or indirectly. It is true that old features may coexist with new ones, and narrative patterns connected with fifth-century view of hegemony can be still found in Xenophon's *Hellenica*: think of the old-fashioned rhetoric on sea power, the Cimonian idea that Athens and Sparta ought to share hegemony, etc. Nonetheless, there is also an

8 Agesilaus went down into Hellespontic Phrygia, he led his army **οὐκ** εἰς [ἥ]ν τοῦ προτέρου [θέρ]ους ἐνέβαλεν (21.3); After his alliance with the Paphlagonian king Agesilaus ἐποιεῖτο δὲ τὴν πορε[ί]|αν **οὐκέτ**[ι τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδόν, ἥν]περ ἦλθε⟨ν⟩, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν κτλ. (22.2). See ch. 3.4.

9 Schmitt (1979): 119–133.

attempt at re-defining old themes and ideas by playing with them and forming new patterns. Perhaps the most telling case is given by Thucydides' association of two scenarios, that of Decelea (land scenario), during the last phases of the Peloponensian war, with Sicily (sea scenario), where the second Athenian expedition was underway (Decelea ~ Sicily); this pattern has been modified by both the Oxyrhynchus historian and Xenophon, who connect the account of the Decelean war with that of the Corinthian war (Decelea ~ Thebes: two land scenarios). The two historians have replaced the old pattern with a new one, which fits, certainly, a different historical background but presumably also new historiographical motivations.

The close relationship between the *HO* and Xenophon's *Hellenica* has led us to turn to Diodorus' narrative, for similar themes about hegemony appear throughout the *Bibliotheke* too. The examination of selected passages from the *HO*, Diodorus' text and Xenophon's *Hellenica* has shown that the historians share a kind of historiographical practice tending to simplify the relations between causes and effects of actions and to reduce them to schemas and simplified patterns. This way recalls orators' usual custom to generalise rather than to identify the individual features of states and their policies. In fact, not only did common themes circulate among historians and orators, but they also shared a particular way of understanding specific contexts—contemporary political divisions, political institutions, states holding hegemonic power, land and sea power—that tended to simplify political terminology so as to bring out broader meanings. Labels such as *plethos/demos* and *oligarchia*, for example, do not denote particular institutional bodies; they are very general terms that can endorse particular ethical meanings and nuances in every specific context, and induce the audience to think in the same terms as those the orator or the historian desires.

Diodorus has come into question also because he is an important source for our knowledge of many fragmentary historians. In this book we have been particularly concerned with the relationship between the *HO* (all three papyrus groups)[10] and Diodorus' narrative of books 13–15. A close papyrological examination of the *HO* has shown new evidence which has allowed us to supplement some lines of it (ll. 9–12 of the *Florence papyrus*); this has also led us to suggest that Diodorus might have used the Oxyrhynchus historian's narrative directly, without Ephorus' mediation.

10 In chapter 4 passages from the *London papyrus*, the *Florence papyrus* and the *Cairo papyrus* (P. Oxy. V 842, PSI XIII 1304, and 26 6 SR 3049, 27 1) have been examined. In other chapters we have dealt with the *London papyrus*.

Appendix

1 A New Supplement for Lines 31–32 of the Theramenes Papyrus (P. Mich. 5982)*

The figure of Theramenes—the main protagonist of the two Athenian oligarchic revolutions of 411 and 404 BC—is elusive. He was clearly controversial: there were different views within Athenian political circles, separating people, historians, and orators, on how far he was a reliable and trustworthy politician. He was suspected of delaying the conclusion of the peace agreements with the Spartans in 404, in order to get the Athenians to accept those conditions which would be most advantageous for Sparta.[1] Nevertheless in the course of time the figure of Theramenes was probably re-thought and remoulded in a 'democratic' sense, probably due to the action of Theramenes' followers and supporters after the restoration of democracy (404 BC); traces of that revisionism are still found in Diodorus.[2]

A few aspects of this debate that arose around Theramenes need to be reconsidered. For, however clouded by those strata of ideological construction, one may still wonder how much *realism* there might have been in the claims that the politician put forward within the Athenian assembly in those ticklish peace talks that followed the end of the Peloponnesian war.

Our examination has its focus on a speech that Theramenes delivered to the Athenian assembly in the aftermath of Aegospotami. The text of it comes from a papyrus fragment, the so-called Theramenes papyrus (P. Mich. 5982), which Chambers published within his edition of the *HO* in 1993, giving reasons for that choice in the preface: '[…] statim [*after its discovery*] oritur quaestio, an hoc opus pars Hellenicorum esse possit (haec coniectura a Maximiliano Treu, 1970, et a Luciano Canfora, 1988, probata est).

* I published a version of this section in *APF* 60 (2014): 34–44.

1 Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.17; Lys. [12] 68.

2 Diod. 14.3.2–3. In Diodorus' account of the installation of the Thirty at Athens (404) the moderate people are presented together with the democrats as forming one single party. Differently, the Aristotelian evidence makes it clear that the *demotikoi* and the moderates had different political views: while the former tried to preserve democracy, the latter, led by their leader Theramenes, aimed at restoring their ancestral constitution (*AP* 34.3). The Diodorean passage is characterised by *sympathy* towards Theramenes, since it emphasises his strong opposition to the Thirty as well as the popular support that he received, and attributes all responsibilities for the oligarchic coup to Lysander alone. Cf. Bearzot (1979): 195–219. On the chronology of the installation of the Thirty and on Theramenes's activity shortly before that event see Stem (2003): 18–34. See chh. 4 and 7.

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sane utitur auctor eadem clara et nuda lingua Attica saeculi quarti, sed primi editores negauerunt idcirco hunc textum e Hellenicis nostris uenisse posse, quia papyrus Michiganensis breue excerptum orationis a Theramene habitae (uersus 12–33) exhiberet, et in excerptis Hellenicorum quae habuimus ante contio nulla exstaret […]' (p. XVII).[3] In other words, the author of the Theramenes papyrus wrote according to fourth-century Attic prose, and despite that the first editors (Youtie-Merkelbach, 1968) excluded the possibility that it was part of the *HO*, on the basis of the assumed lack of speeches in that work. But that in the *HO* there is no evidence of direct speeches is only partially true, for we do find the brief direct speech delivered by Dorimachus, the leader of the Rhodian rebellion (15.2, ll. 365–368; 395 BC). Furthermore, if we keep in mind the limitations of our evidence, the state itself of the *HO* should perhaps discourage us from asserting with absolute certainty that the work did not contain any direct speeches.

Found at Karanis in 1930, the Theramenes papyrus consists of four small fragments forming a single column and also of an unplaced fragment (here not transcribed). There is no doubt that these fragments do not come from any partisan pamphlet[4] but from a historical work. This can be asserted with confidence because Loftus has recently discovered, in the photos of Karanis texts stored in the Papyrology Room of the University of Michigan, a fragment (P. Mich. 5796b) which makes a perfect join with the left-hand side of that unplaced fragment of the Theramenes papyrus, and which refers to an unspecified moment of the Corinthian war.[5] And since the Corinthian war as a subject occupies a quite extensive narrative portion of the *HO* (7.2–5; 16.1–18.5) it is at least plausible that the Theramenes papyrus is part of that work. Yet it is true that Loftus, following Breitenbach's suggestion,[6] maintains that the author of the papyrus' text is the historian Ephorus, and with this hypothesis Hurni has also recently agreed.[7] Even though this is not the place to re-examine the issue, nevertheless the criteria established by Breitenbach might appear too generic to be decisive in giving preference to one historian rather than another: the papyrus' text deals with the last phase of the Peloponnesian war, it would not be a primary source, would show sympathy towards Theramenes and hostility towards democracy, it uses direct speeches and employs Attic prose without rhetorical ornaments.[8] In addition, a few stylistic affinities between the

3 Chambers (1993).

4 Andrewes (1970): 35–38, Rhodes (1981): 21–22, 359–360, Engels (1993): 125–155.

5 Loftus (2000): 11–20.

6 Breitenbach (1989): 121–135.

7 Hurni (2010): 234–238.

8 According to Breitenbach, the candidates for the authorship of the *HO* are Theopompus, Cratippus, and Ephorus. Breitenbach (1989): 128–129. On the authorship of the *HO* see Bianchetti-Cataudella (2001) and ch. 1.

prose of the Theramenes papyrus and the *HO* would seem to offer some support for Chambers' proposal. Terms such as διαπράσσω and ἀπόρρητος (ll. 4 and 5–6) belong to the *HO*'s vocabulary,[9] while they are not attested in Ephorus' fragments. The use of the adverbial attribute between article and its referent, ll. 31–32 τ̣ὰ̣ [π]αρ' ἐκείνων [……].αντα, seems to recall the analog structure of P. Oxy. V 842, 7.2, τὰ παρ' ἐκείνου χρήματα. This evidence along with the frequency of correlations (τοὺς μέν … ἐκεῖν[ον] δέ, ll. 5, 7–8; οὗτοι μέν … ἐγὼ δ', ll. 29–30) and participial constructions (φ̣άσκ[ον]τες, ll. 2–3, παρελθών, l. 11, τῶ[ν | δι]δ̣ομένων, ll. 23–24, ὑ̣π̣ο̣λα|[β]ώ̣ν, ll. 33–34, [πο]ιησόμενον, l. 37) might indeed suggest that both works come from the same author.[10]

Leaving aside the authorship issue, let us turn now to the text:

1 τοὺς Λακε̣δα̣ι̣μ̣ονί[ους ἀν-]
τέλεγον αὐτ̣ῶι φ̣άσκ[ον-]
τες ἁπάντων ἀτοπώ[τα-]
τον αὐτὸν διαπράττεσ[θαι],
5 τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλους τ[ἀ-]
πόρρητα ποιεῖσθαι πρὸ[ς]
τοὺς πολε̣[μ]ί̣ους, ἐκεῖν[ον]
δὲ περὶ ὧν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς
ἐρεῖν μέλλει{ν} ταῦτα π[ρὸς]
10 τοὺς πολίτας λέγειν μὴ τολμᾶ̣ν̣. ὁ δὲ
πρ̣ὸ̣ς̣ τ̣οῦτο παρελθὼν ε[ἶ-]
πε̣ν̣· [τὸ] πλεῖστον τοῦ δέ-
ον[τος ἁ]μαρτάνουσιν
[οἱ] ῥήτορες. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἡ̣[μῖν]
15 [γε] ἦν, ἔφη, τὴ̣ν̣ [εἰ]ρ̣ή̣[νην ἐπιτά-]
[ξα]ι̣, οὐδὲν δ[ι]έφερεν ἂ[ν ὑ-]
[μ]ᾶ̣ς ἀκούειν ἐφ' οἷς αὐτ̣[ὴν]
[ἡγ]οῦμαι τῆι πόλει ποιή[σα-]
[σ]θ̣αι καλῶς ἔχειν. ἐπε̣ι̣-
20 [δὴ] δ̣ὲ οἱ πολέμιοι κύριο̣[ι]
[κα]θεστ̣ᾶ̣σιν̣, [ο]ὐκ ἀσφαλές
[ἐσ]τιν εἰκῇ π̣ε̣ρὶ αὐτῆς λέ-
[γε]ι̣ν. οὐ γὰρ δηλονότι τῶ[ν]
[δι]δ̣ομένων αὐτ̣ο̣ῖ̣ς πα-

9 PSI XIII 1304, 4.4: διαπραξά]μενοι, P. Oxy. V 842, 15.2 διαπραξά|[μ]ενοι, 18.5 διαπραξά|μενοι, and P. Oxy. V 842, 6.1 ἐν] | ἀπορ⟨ρ⟩ήτῳ τ[ῇ β]ουλῇ.

10 Cf. Treu (1970): 31, note 46. For the prose of the Oxyrhynchus historian see Bauer (1913): 1–66.

25 [ρ' ἡ]μ̣ῶν οὐθὲ̣ν ἀ̣ξιώσου-
[σιν] ἀφαιρεῖν, ἕτερα δὲ πρὸς
[τού]τ̣οι̣ς ἐπιτάττειν ἐπι-
[χειρ]ήσουσιν. τὴν οὖν αἵρε-
[σιν] οὗτοι μὲν ἐπ' ἐκείνοις
30 [θήσ]ουσιν, ἐγὼ δ' ἐφ' ὑμῖν.
[...].υ̣.[.] γὰρ τ̣ὰ̣ [π]αρ' ἐκείνων
[......].αντα ἐ̣ν̣ τ̣ῷ̣ βουλεύ-
[σα]σ̣θ̣α̣ι̣ περὶ αὐτῶν.' ὑ̣π̣ο̣λα-
[β]ὼ̣ν δὲ ὀρθῶς λέγειν αὐ-
35 [τὸ]ν ὁ δῆμος πρεσβευτὴν
[αὐ]τοκράτορα τὴν εἰρήνην
[πο]ιησόμενον ἀπέστει-
[λε]ν̣. Θηραμένης δὲ παραυ-
[τίκ]α̣ μ̣ὲ̣ν̣ ὡς ἡ̣ρέθη πρὸς
40 [Λύσ]ανδρ[ο]ν ἔπλευσεν εἰς
[Σά]μ̣ον κ̣α̣ὶ̣ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον
[ἐπ]ε̣χ̣ε̣ίρει πράττειν τὰ
[περ]ὶ τῆς εἰρήνης. ἐπειδὴ
[δὲ] Λύσανδρος αὐτὸν ἐκ̣έ̣-
45 [λευ]εν Λακ̣ε̣δ̣α̣ι̣μ̣[ο]νί̣ο[ις[11]

'… to the Spartans; [*they*] criticised him saying that he was behaving in the most extraordinary way, for while other people were acting in secret against the enemy, he for his part was not taking the risk of revealing to his fellow citizens what he was going to say to the enemies about the peace. And in response to that he came forward and said: 'the speakers thus far are very far from saying what they ought to say. In fact'—he said—'if it had been in our own power to impose the peace plan, I believe that it would have not made any difference whether you heard what I think is in the city's interest to do. But because the enemies are the masters of the matter, it is not safe to speak randomly about the peace. Clearly they will not think it right to subtract anything of what we are offering to them; on the contrary they will try to impose further conditions in addition to those previously offered. Those speakers give to the Spartans control of the decision, I for myself

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11 I follow the edition of Youtie-Merkelbach (1968): 161–169. The iota in the papyrus' text is either adscript (ll. 12, 18) or subscript (l. 39), but when it cannot be read in the papyrus the editors subscribe it (l. 22, 32). As regards the form οὐθὲ̣ν (l. 25) it cannot be said whether it belongs to the original work or if it comes from the later process of transcription. See Engels (1993): 127, note 6.

> give that to you.' [*missing letters*]. The Athenian *demos* judged that he had spoken appropriately and sent him as ambassador with full power (*autokrator*) to make the peace. And Theramenes soon after he was appointed went on a journey to Samos to meet Lysander. With him he began to negotiate concerning the peace. Because Lysander ordered him to … to the Spartans …'[12]

The Theramenes papyrus shows clear points of contact with some chapters of Lysias' speech *Against Eratosthenes* ([12] 69–70), and this similarity has been read by scholars in opposite ways. On the one hand it has been maintained that the author of the papyrus knew that discourse;[13] on the other, Bearzot has suggested that Lysias is replying to the arguments found in the papyrus. This latter suggestion is difficult, since the papyrus' text, if it comes from the *HO* (whose author Bearzot identifies with Cratippus),[14] is clearly later than that speech (written about 404–401 BC). Therefore, the scholar has conjectured the existence of a common source to the two works, that is, the self-defence delivered by Eratosthenes.[15]

It is necessary to re-consider carefully the content of the Theramenes papyrus, in order to explore and clarify its relation with Lysias' speech. This is difficult first of all because it is not clear which peace agreement the papyrus' text refers to. Secondly the lacuna at lines 31–32 is a considerable loss for our understanding of Theramenes' ultimate conduct, and it requires further explanation, since the supplements so far proposed seem unsatisfactory.

Lysias' words show almost *verbatim* similarities with the first ten lines of the papyrus:

> ὑπέσχετο δὲ εἰρήνην ποιήσειν μήτε ὅμηρα δοὺς μήτε τὰ τείχη καθελὼν μήτε τὰς ναῦς παραδούς· ταῦτα δὲ εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδενὶ ἠθέλησεν,[16] ἐκέλευσε δὲ αὐτῷ πιστεύειν. ὑμεῖς δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πραττούσης μὲν τῆς ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλῆς σωτήρια,[17] ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ πολλῶν Θηραμένει, εἰδότες δὲ ὅτι οἱ μὲν **ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τῶν πολεμίων ἕνεκα τἀπόρρητα ποιοῦνται, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πολίταις οὐκ** ἠθέλησεν εἰπεῖν ταῦθ' ἃ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἔμελλεν ἐρεῖν[18]

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12 The translation is mine, with the contribution of Pelling.

13 Andrewes (1970): 36–37, Treu (1970): 19, Lehmann (1972 b): 205–206, Harding (1974): 108. Cf. Lys. [12] 62–78 and [13] 9–17; Rhodes (1981): 359.

14 Bearzot (1991): 65–87, 80–82; cf. (2001): 9–32.

15 Bearzot (1991): 65–87. Bearzot tends to minimise the divergences between the papyrus and Lysias' speech. Lastly, Hurni (2010): 233.

16 The ταῦτα here refers to the expression of 12.68, πρᾶγμα […] μέγα καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον.

17 Cf. ch. 68: [*Theramenes*] ἐπαγγειλάμενος σώσειν τὴν πόλιν αὐτὸς ἀπώλεσε.

18 Ed. Oxford 2007.

> He promised to make the peace without either giving hostages, or tearing down walls, or delivering up ships. He refused to reveal to anyone his plan, but bade all trust him. On the contrary, in the council of the Areopagus, it was indeed you, Athenians, who were acting for safety. Moreover, many people spoke in opposition to Theramenes. You realised that while other people were acting in secret because of the enemy, he did not want to reveal to his own fellow-citizens what he was going to say to the enemies.
>
> LYSIAS 12.69

In comparison with Lysias' text the papyrus is commonly judged as a justification of Theramenes' behaviour given by its author.[19] Strictly, all we can say is that the author is here allowing Theramenes to justify himself through his own words; in the absence of the full context we cannot be sure that they received explicit authorial approval. What we can see, however, is that the papyrus at least phrases the argument in a way that carries some force, and we should be unsurprised that the internal audience—the Athenian assembly—found it persuasive.

The papyrus, relating the content of the speeches that were delivered by those who charged Theramenes with unwillingness to speak, focuses on the cautious behaviour of Theramenes. That accusation of a failure to speak frankly is moulded in the papyrus in a less harsh way than it is in Lysias' text. The verb τολμάω (l. 10) suggests in fact that Theramenes 'was not taking the risk of saying …' Lysias' version at chapter 69 is the starker 'he did not want to say …' (something like 'because he was responsible for …' is thus implied). Theramenes' own speech gives his self-defence which he conducts in terms of *pure realism* and which the internal audience accept, believing at the end that he had spoken appropriately (ὀρθῶς, l. 34). He appears as a pragmatic statesman, who acts according to practical considerations. He would not promise to make peace without concessions (walls, fleet, harbours), as in contrast is strongly emphasised by Lysias (69). Theramenes would act, instead, pragmatically, all the more so if our suggestion captures the whole meaning of his arguments. But before giving our proposal let us discuss the previous supplements.

Lines 31–32 of the papyrus have been supplemented by the first editors as follows: [ἔπλ]ẹυσ̣ẹ γὰρ τὰ̣ [π]αρ' ἐκείνων | [ἀπαντή]σαντα ẹ̀ṿ τ̣ῷ βουλεύ|[σα]σ̣θ̣α̣ι̣ περὶ αὐτῶν, 'denn die Vorschläge, welche von ihnen (den anderen Rednern) kommen, werden zu Schiff (dem Gegner) überbracht, noch während wir darüber beraten.'[20] That would hint at the possibility that even while the Athenians had been still talking, the content of the debate was being reported to the enemy—which would reaffirm, more-

19 Rhodes (1981): 21–22, Engels (1993): 128.

20 Youtie-Merkelbach (1968): 169.

over, that climate of suspicion that Theramenes denounces. But the supplement makes the Greek difficult to read (think of the very unusual [ἀπαντή]σαντα), and, moreover, the continuation of the metaphor, according to which those proposals/ideas that 'met' the assembly now 'took ship,' is very odd. The verb πλέω itself used in a metaphorical sense would come at odd with the plain style of the author, especially if we think that the same verb is found later again at line 40, where it is used in its proper meaning.[21] The editors discuss also a further supplement for the missing letters: [δείκ]ν̣υτ̣[α]ι̣ γὰρ τῶ̣[ι π]αρ' ἐκείνων | [σκοπῶι] π̣άντα κτλ. But they admit that there is not sufficient space for [δείκ]ν̣υτ̣[α]ι̣. Moreover, as has been observed, the traces of the assumed letter omega of τῶ̣[ι in the papyrus seem to suggest rather the shape of an alpha.[22]

After Youtie-Merkelbach's edition further proposals have been suggested by Luppe, Breitenbach, and Vannini, but all of them seem unconvincing. Luppe proposes: [φαν]ο̣ῦσ̣[ι] γὰρ τῆ̣[ι π]αρ' ἐκείνων | [?σκοπῆι?] π̣άντα ἐν τῷ βουλεύ|[σα]σθαι περὶ αὐτῶν.[23] The translation would be: 'denn sie werden (würden) der spartanischen Spionage alles deutlich machen indem sie darüber in der Volksversammlung beraten.' According to the scholar, Theramenes would report to the Spartans the charge τ[ἀ]πόρρητα ποιεῖσθαι πρὸ[ς] | τοὺς πολε̣[μ]ί̣ους (ll. 5–7) that his own fellow citizens had moved against him. But the ῆ̣ of τῆ̣[ι does not fit the traces of ink found in the papyrus.

Breitenbach's supplement hardly makes good sense within that context: ἀκού]ο̣υ̣σ̣[ι] γὰρ τ̣ὰ̣ [π]αρ' ἐκείνων | [ῥηθέντα] π̣άντα ἐ̣ν̣ τ̣ῷ̣ βουλεύ|[σα]σ̣θ̣α̣ι̣ περὶ αὐτῶν, 'denn sie (*scil.* the democrats) hören alles, was von jenen gesagt wird, noch während den Beratungen.' Moreover, the supplement, ἀκού]ο̣υ̣σ̣[ι] and [ῥηθέντα], exceeds the needed spaces, and the scholar's explanation is unsatisfactory: the handwriting of the left part of the column is curved and this could allow more spaces than those counted by the editors.[24] This particular shape of the papyrus seems, in fact, to depend on its state of conservation rather than on the handwriting.

The last proposal comes from Lucia Vannini: κελ]ε̣ύω̣ γὰρ τ̣ὰ̣ [π]α̣ρ' ἐκείνων [εἰ|δότ]α̣[ς] π̣αντα ο̣ὕ̣τ̣ω βουλεύ|[σα]σ̣θ̣α̣ι̣ περὶ αὐτῶν, 'vi esorto ad apprendere tutte le loro proposte (*scil.*, degli Spartani) e, solo allora, a decidere riguardo ad esse.'[25] As regards the meaning, the supplement appears as shifting to an issue that presumably was not in question here. For the main point of the papyrus fragment is what the Athenians are prepared to offer, what Theramenes is going to say to the Spartans, and *not*

21 Vannini (2012): 93.

22 Vannini (2012): 94.

23 Luppe (1978): 14–16. The scholar himself is not wholly convinced, and discusses also the possibility of τοῖς σκοποῖς, even though he admits that it is too long.

24 Breitenbach (1989): 123, note 4.

25 Vannini (2012): 94.

what Theramenes is going to report to the Athenians about assumed offers coming from the Spartan side.

Reading Vannini's proposal, I find very interesting that, unlike the previous supplements, it suggests that the sentence at lines 31–32 shows Theramenes' own words. And in consideration of the fact that the sentence at lines 33–35 clearly refers to what Theramenes has just said, ὑ̣π̣ο̣λα|[β]ὼ̣ν δὲ ὀρθῶς λέγειν αὐ|[τὸ]ν ὁ δῆμος, 'the Athenian *demos* judged that he had spoken appropriately,' I would suggest a further supplement referring once again to Theramenes' own argumentation:

> [ἀλλ' ο]ὐ̣[δὲ] γὰρ[26] τ̣ὰ̣ [π]αρ' ἐκείνων
> [εἶπον[27] ἅ]π̣αντα ἐ̣ν̣ τ̣ῷ̣ βουλεύ-
> [σα]σ̣θ̣α̣ι̣ περὶ αὐτῶν

The sense of Theramenes' last words would be the following:

> Nor indeed did they [*my opponents*] say everything which was coming from their side either [*so they should not expect me to say publicly everything which we might have to offer*] in the process of deliberation about the questions.[28]

It would be a more general consideration on how diplomacy works: that is, both sides should not put all their cards on the table to begin with. That strengthens and gives reason for Theramenes' previous exhortation to his audience not to speak frankly about everything that they would be prepared to concede: since the enemies, if they knew this, would take that as their starting-point and demand more (ll. 23–28). This presumably refers to what is called 'the bottom line:' each part goes into a negotiation with a preliminary offer, but both of them mentally reserve a further line that they would be prepared to go up to, so that their concessions at the end might go beyond

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26 The expression [ἀλλ' ο]ὐ[δὲ] γάρ finds parallels in a part of the manuscript tradition (A, M, H) of Lucian, *De parasito* 1 line 25, in the Scholium *ad* Hom. *Od.* 8.364, line 2 (ed. Dindorf), and in later authors. Furthermore, there are a few examples of the use of ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ (the general pattern is ἀλλά … γάρ) which mark the move to a vital, primary or decisive point within a phrase (Hom. *Od.* 10.202; Bacchyl. 5.162; Hdt. 8.8.1; 9.27.4; Plat. *Prot.* 336 a). Sometimes ἀλλά … γάρ adds something new and important (progressive meaning). Cf. Denniston (1954): 101 f. and 105 ff. In our case the particle δέ might have been added to the negation οὐ to give emphasis to the sentence in question.

27 I am very grateful to Prof. Olli Salomies for suggesting to me the plural form of the verb. In a previous version I had thought of the singular, as referring to Theramenes' ideal opponent. But the supplement now restored makes the Greek definitely intuitive and clear.

28 Translation by Pelling, slightly modified.

what they had been willing to offer in the earlier negotiations.[29] Then, Theramenes' statement, οὐ γὰρ δηλονότι τῶ[ν | δι]δ̣ομένων αὐτ̣ο̣ῖ̣ς πα||[ρ' ἡ]μ̣ῶν οὐθὲν̣ ἀ̣ξ̣ιώσου||[σιν] ἀφαιρεῖν, ἕτερα δὲ πρὸς ||[τού]τ̣οι̣ς̣ ἐπιτάττειν ἐπι||[χειρ]ήσουσιν (ll. 23–28), makes good sense if fitted into this reading. That is, the Athenians would have to be prepared to make further concessions beyond their preliminary offer if the Spartans insisted. But it would be wise to leave the content of that bottom line unsaid at this stage; in fact, in Theramenes' view, the Spartans would find it out if it were made public within Athens herself and would then take that, rather than the terms of the preliminary offer, as their starting-point. This reading also explains well why as a result of that speech Theramenes was sent to Lysander as [αὐ]τοκράτορα (l. 36), that is to say, with the plenipotentiary authority to go beyond anything that has been publicly agreed in that assembly.

From Xenophon's narrative we can deduce the historical background of the peace talks at which the papyrus hints. After the defeat of 404 BC Athenian ambassadors went to discuss the peace with king Agis, who was in Attica, but he sent them to Sparta, for he was not the *kyrios* of the peace (*Hell.* 2.2.12–13). After the failure of those talks at Sparta, an assembly was called at Athens (the first), and Archestratus was imprisoned because he had spoken within the Spartan council in favour of the peace; moreover, he, along with his colleagues, presumably had conceded that a portion ten stadia long of each of the Long Walls should be torn down (*Hell.* 2.2.14–15). Therefore, the Athenian assembly through decree forbade for the future anyone to deliberate on that matter. Here Xenophon inserts Theramenes' intervention and his request to be sent to Lysander, but gives a different motivation from that found in the papyrus' text: he would find out whether the Spartans insisted on the matter of the walls because they wished to reduce the city to slavery, or to obtain a guarantee of a good faith. It is highly problable that the speech of Theramenes contained in the papyrus was indeed delivered on the occasion of this first assembly (*Hell.* 2.2.14–15). The decisive clue comes from the papyrus, where it is said that Lysander ordered Theramenes to go to Sparta (ll. 44–45). And we know from Xenophon that, after Theramenes spoke, he was sent to Lysander (2.2.16). In the course of a new assembly (the second) taking place at Athens, Theramenes related to the Athenians the outcome of his talks with Lysander: the latter had ordered him to go to Sparta for he was not the *kyrios* of the peace, and the masters of the matter were the ephors (κυρίους εἶναι εἰρήνης καὶ πολέμου, 2.2.18). Therefore, as a result of this second assembly Theramenes was sent to Sparta as ambassador *autokrator* within a legation of ten men (αὐτοκράτωρ δέκατος αὐτός, *Hell.* 2.2.16–18).[30]

29 This is a valuable suggestion of Pelling.

30 Youtie-Merkelbach (1968): 169. The decisive assembly for making peace is only the third (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.21; cf. Lys. [13] 17).

In consideration of the arguments given by Theramenes in the papyrus, the totality of what the Athenians might be prepared to concede could not be identical with what had already been offered in the past, because they were already known by everyone, enemy included. From Xenophon's evidence it is possible to infer that the Athenians (in the course of the first assembly) should be prepared to give to the enemy *more* than ten stadia of Long Walls. Or at least they should be aware of that possibility, in spite of the decree itself that prohibited anyone from dealing with that matter. If that is in the air, that is sufficient reason for the strong reaction of the assembly as well as for the resultant decree. Thus, Theramenes could not have promised at all to make peace without any further concessions (walls, fleet, harbours)—contrarily to what Lysias maintains (69)—because that would no longer be a realistic possibility.

Since, according to Lysias and the papyrus, Theramenes was elected as *autokrator* for his first voyage, that to Lysander, it has been assumed that both texts have conflated the two Xenophontic assemblies, describing the content of the first (the voyage to Samos), while giving the results of the second (the election as ambassador *autokrator*).[31] Nevertheless, such a conjecture may not be necessary, nor perhaps should the historical truth of that appointment be denied. For Theramenes might have been elected *autokrator* already for the first voyage, even though there is no mention of that in Xenophon's text. After all he had carte blanche in the dealings with Lysander. Also the papyrus, like Xenophon (referring to the second voyage), might imply that Theramenes was sent with full powers within a body of ten ambassadors, but because of the concise character of the text, the whole legation is not mentioned here.[32]

Xenophon's insistence on the fact that the Spartan ephors only had authority over questions of peace (cf. also Agis' reply to the Athenian ambassadors) adds, moreover, a further accent of realism to Theramenes' arguments as contained in the papyrus, where the speaker stresses that the masters (*kyrioi*) of the peace were indeed the Spartans and not the Athenians (ll. 14–23).

Though Xenophon for his part suspects Theramenes of misconduct for his presumed connivance with Lysander (*Hell.* 2.2.16), nevertheless it is Lysias' charges to which the speaker of the papyrus is replying here, in particular the charge that ἐκεῖ-

31 Bearzot (1997): 192.

32 Ambassadors plenipotentiary had not, however, free authority to accept terms of which there had been no previous consideration, that is they did not give oaths without referring home, nor were they freed from the normal processes of the law and constitution, since they might be put on capital charge. When Theramenes himself and his colleagues reported back from their plenipotentiary appointment (the second voyage, according to Xenophon), it was only after a lively opposition in open debate that the Athenian assembly ratified the proposals which its delegates had put forward (*Hell.* 2.2.22). Cf. Mosley (1973), 30–38 and 68–73.

νος δ' ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πολίταις οὐκ ἠθέλησεν εἰπεῖν ταῦθ' ἃ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἔμελλεν ἐρεῖν (69). According to the papyrus, he did indeed speak, but without disclosing everything.

The image of Theramenes, as has emerged thus far, does not seem to come simply from any defence of the politician written by a Theramenian pamphletist. The papyrus shows, in fact, the statesman in action, pursuing his political line with coherent realism. How far that could also mean connivance with the other side remains open to doubt: Xenophon may give us some reason to suspect it. It remains tempting to assume that the Oxyrhynchus historian was at the start-point of that process of revision of Theramenes' image which would lead later to those 'democratic' developments that we can still find in Diodorus;[33] but, on the other hand, we do not have sufficient elements to affirm that the historian accepted the arguments delivered by Theramenes. The fact that the papyrus' text focuses on the cautious conduct of Theramenes (cf. μὴ τολμᾶ̣ν̣ contrasted with οὐκ ἠθέλησεν of Lysias) to some extent might encourage a reading of that sort, but if so it also would imply that the focalisation through Theramenes' speech coincides with the authorial intention. Whatever that intention was, that realistic tone of Theramenes' speech does carry a ring of historical plausibility: this indeed is how diplomacy works. So Theramenes' 'realism' may well allow us to catch the political 'reality' of what was going on at the time when the speech was delivered.

2 History, Oratory and Their Audiences

From the discussion made in chapter 7 one would suggest that fourth-century historians were influenced by orators with whom they shared themes and ideas. It is also possible that both historians and orators shared audiences and had similar ways of divulgating their works as well. It is highly verisimilar that their works were performed rather than just written: in the process of writing, historians might have given brief samples of their own production through oral performances, made within small groups of students or intellectuals.

The last part of Isocrates' *Panathenaicus* is very helpful to our investigation (199–272), being perhaps the best evidence of the process of publishing and editing works in ancient times. Isocrates shows the ways he used to divulgate that speech; to some degree this is a narrative device;[34] it offers, however, useful evidence to understand how a work might be published in the fourth century. It has been suggested that the

33 See above ch. 4.4.

34 Gray (1994 a): 242–256. Perplexities have been raised about the presence of 'authorial intent' in ancient writers; especially the last part of the *Panathenaicus* has been read as a sample of the so-called 'reader-reception' theory. So Kennedy (1989): 492–497.

pupils themselves of Isocrates made copies for their master, getting thereby a good opportunity to familiarise themselves with his ideas and style.[35] It is pretty clear that historians were part of Isocrates' audience: Theopompus and Ephorus, for instance, are defined by the Suda as *Isocratous acoustes*, that is 'auditors of Isocrates,' though it is controversial whether or not they both were proper disciples of the orator.[36]

The main theme arising from the last part of the *Panathenaicus* is Isocrates' criticism of Sparta. By means of an acute metaliterary device the orator says that he had read the speech in question to some of his current pupils; on that occasion he had also consulted a Spartan sympathiser who was an ex-pupil of his, and this had gave way to a sequence of reactions to that speech; finally his criticism of Sparta had been judgded as untrustworthy. However, in the end Isocrates had won over the Spartan sympathiser's arguments. Nonetheless later—continues the orator—he decided to re-shape his former speech, and to perform it again, in front of a different audience; he invited his ex-disciples who had been living in the city at that time, including the same panegyrist of the Spartans. In this second meeting the Spartan sympathiser points out that Isocrates has written about Sparta in a way that could now be read even as covert praise of that city—it would depend on readers' understanding and response—and invites the ex-master to make his intentions more patent and intelligible (245–248).

It has been suggested that the metaliterary device of the *internal* audience is a conventional one, which occurs also in other speeches of Isocrates, such as *To Nicocles* and *To Philip*. In the case of the *Panathenaicus* this device would be aimed to prepare the *external* audience to the acceptance of that criticism of Sparta; that is, the presence of the sympathiser would be a sort of negative paradigm reaffirming Isocrates' authority.[37] This is not the place to re-examine Isocrates' view about Sparta, though the ambiguity of the text might, perhaps, make it accommodate more than just one reading. But because we are concerned with historians' and orators' audiences, let us turn to that point.

That Isocrates' speeches were read in public should be unhesitatingly accepted. Even if words like ἀκροαταί and οἱ ἀκούοντες could be used in Isocrates' times to mean 'readers,' the expression οἱ παρόντες certainly hints at Isocrates' audience.[38] Isocrates himself does not conceal that some speeches were written to be read privately while others were performed, and that there was a great difference in persuasiveness between spoken and read discourses, to the advantage of the former.[39] He uses three verbs

35 The author in person supervised the circulation of his works. Turner (1952): 19, note 4.

36 Theop. *FGrHist* 115, T 1. Flower (1994): 42 ff.

37 Gray (1994 a): 238–249.

38 Isocr. [12] 6. Cf. Hudson-Williams (1949): 65–69.

39 Cf. Isocr. [5] 1 and 25–26, [15] 1 and 12.

in connection with the notion of 'publication' of his works, διαδίδωμι, ἐκδίδωμι, and ἐκφέρω. But the idea itself of publication was a quite indeterminate concept, which hinted at every way to make a work known. The notion of making a work public implies a first stage in which a speech/content was read aloud to an audience;[40] it was followed by a second step, when drafts were distributed among those who desired to have the work (διαδοτέος τοῖς βουλομένοις λαμβάνειν).[41] Furthermore, the narrative device of the last part of the *Panathenaicus* suggests that several meetings took place, which involved small groups of close collaborators and supporters, before the final drafts were divulgated. These copies could be taken and read even out of the city where the speech/content had been delivered, if drafts of Isocrates' *Panathenaicus* were read at Sparta too.[42]

The idea that also historical works in the fourth century might have been performed, at least initially, to restricted audiences is highly tempting, since historians and orators shared themes and probably also audiences (think of the cases of Theopompus and Ephorus). True, we have no evidence about the ways in which historical works were edited, and we can only speculate about them. As regards Xenophons' *Anabasis*, for example, Tsagalis has recently assumed that the historian wrote a work on the expedition of Cyrus till the arrival of the Ten Thousand to the Black Sea, that is book 4 of the *Anabasis*; after that he started the *Hellenica*. Here, in book 3, he hid his identity saying that the author of the *Anabasis* was a certain Themistogenes of Syracuse.[43] But after the publication of the *Anabasis* by Sophaenetus—one of Xenophon's comrades in arms at the time of Cyrus' expedition—Xenophon felt competitive with Sophaenetus; therefore he decided to publish the *Anabasis* and came back to his previous draft to complete it. Of course, suggestions such as this invite caution, because they are partially related to the analytical approach in studying ancient historical works, and rely too much upon internal evidence which arises from a work or more works written by the same author.[44] That sort of approach has, however, the undoubted merit of imply-

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40 Isocr. [12] 4. ἀναγιγνώσκω, ἐπιδείκνυμι, and δείκνυμι are used with the meaning of a speech that is read aloud to an audience and there is no perceptible difference in meaning; they refer to readings of works that Isocrates envisages as taking place. Hudson-Williams (1949): 67.

41 Isocr. [12] 233. Cf. 246 and 247.

42 Isocr. [12] 233, 262, 247, 250 ff.

43 Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.2.

44 Tsagalis (2009): 451–454. Cf. also Pelling (2013 a): 40, note 1, who maintains that the Xenophontic reference to Themistogenes' work in the *Hellenica* (ὡς μὲν οὖν Κῦρος στράτευμά τε συνέλεξε καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχων ἀνέβη ἐπὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν, καὶ ὡς ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο, καὶ ὡς ἀπέθανε, καὶ ὡς ἐκ τούτου ἀπεσώθησαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐπὶ θάλατταν, Θεμιστογένει τῷ Συρακοσίῳ γέγραπται, 3.1.2) refers to the whole *Anabasis* rather than to the first four books only.

ing that the process of completing drafts and making finished works circulate required several steps; the notion of 'publishing' suggests a long process in which a work initially appeared far from that completion and shape that posterity know for it.

A further interesting suggestion comes from the proem of Duris' *Histories*, where a polemical statement against Theopompus and Ephorus is found. According to Duris, both historians did not care about the mimesis and pleasure that usually arise from delivered speeches; therefore, they focused only on their practice of writing and on rhetorical techniques that suited such written works (ὄυτε γὰρ μιμήσεως μετέλαβον οὐδεμιᾶς ὄυτε ἡδονῆς ἐν τῷ φράσαι, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ γράφειν μόνον ἐπεμελήθησαν).[45] These stylistic observations are expression of a broader debate concerning the different effects provoked on audiences by the practice of speaking and that of writing, τὸ φράσαι and τὸ γράφειν; this debate took place among both historians and orators, if Isocrates too discusses this issue.[46] Duris criticises Theopompus and Ephorus for having produced texts that were very elaborate from a formal point of view, but they failed in arousing emotions, unlike those works that, instead, were conceived and written for public performances. Duris' statements can imply that his own work was written in conformity with the criteria required by a mimetic performance and, therefore, could perhaps accommodate public readings as well. Duris' polemical statements foreshadow a similar reproach made against Thucydides by the rhetorician Dionysius, who emphasises the unsuitability of Thucydides' *Histories* to public readings because of an unpopular and archaic style. The work appears to Dionysius as shaped in a way which makes difficult a full understanding of the main narrative thread (i.e. when someone reads the text), and makes listeners annoyed (i.e. in public recitations).[47] According to Dionysius, this is mainly due to the fact that Thucydides used deliberative speeches and other rhetorical tools within his narrative to show themes of political debate. Dionysius maintains that it was Cratippus who first realised these limits of Thucydides' narrative (οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην ἔμφασιν ἔχοντα τῆς δεινότητος ἐκείνης, μάλιστα δ' ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ῥητορείαις); therefore, the historian did not use any kind of distracting elements in his work (οὐ μόνον ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτὰς ἐμποδὼν γεγενῆσθαι λέγων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὀχληρὰς εἶναι). This may well imply that Cratippus and other fourth-century historians conceived their works as samples of writing to be read aloud in front of an audience, other than works to be destined to individual readings.[48]

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45 Duris *FGrHist* 76, F 1 = Phot. *Bibl.* 176 p. 121 a 41. Cf. Gentili-Cerri (1975): 27 ff., Pédech (1989): 257–389, Landucci Gattinoni (1997): 51–55, Ottone (2015): 209–242. See also Pownall (2013): 43–56.

46 Isocr. [12] 10–11.

47 Dion. Hal. *De comp. verb.* 22 = II 108, 5–12 U.R.

48 Dion. Hal. *De Thuc.* 16 = *FGrHist* 64, F 1. On the controversial issue whether or not

It seems that the literary criticism found in Duris and Dionysius concerns, among other things, also the issue of what works were more or less suitable for performances, and, because there is no reference in both authors to any kind of *external* audience, that criticism does not necessarily entail that the works in question (by Theopompus, Ephorus, or even Thucydides) had *not* been effectively performed. Canfora maintained that Thucydides' narrative itself suggests that the historian did not exclude the possibility that parts of his work were recited: καὶ **ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν** ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον **φανεῖται** (he does not say φανείην ἄν or similar, for example) and κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ **ἀγώνισμα** ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα **ἀκούειν** ξύγκειται (1.22.4).[49] In fact, in cases of multiple motivations in the text, μᾶλλον does not exclude one or more of them, simply establishes which aspect is the most important; thus, *akroasis* was the principal destination for historical works in Thucydides' times, but not the only one. However, one should also raise the question whether *akroasis per se* means oral performance. The term is used in ancient Greek pedagogy to identify the process of learning through listening, as opposed to seeing (*aisthesis*); more specifically within the pedagogy of rhetoric, *akroasis* was an exercise in which students listened to an oration with an ear toward memorising it and absorbing its structure.[50] But personal reading is not excluded either. Momigliano was skeptical about the possibility that fifth- and fourth-century histories were performed. He noticed that much more information about public readings of historical works comes from the Hellenistic and Roman periods than from the fifth and the fourth centuries. For example, reading aloud a book, either in the writer's lifetime, or after his death, was a way of honouring a historian in the Hellenistic period. The Suda under the name of Dicaearchus relates that the Spartans were so pleased with Dicaearchus's description of Spartan constitution (third century BC) that they read it in public once a year.[51] The scholar offered, therefore, a cautious conclusion: 'we simply do not know whether Thucydides, Xenophon and, for that matter the other eminent historians of the fourth century BC (Ephorus, Theopompus) ever read their works in front of an audience' (p. 368). And he fairly felt perplexity about the numerous stories told of Herodotus' presumed lectures.[52] Nonetheless, it

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Cratippus avoided inserting speeches in his narrative see Bleckmann (1998): 262–264. The scholar suggests that Cratippus did not exclude speeches at all, but he used them as historiographical tools better and differently than Thucydides did.

49 Canfora (1971): 657. See Gomme (1972): 139, Hornblower (1991): 61–62.

50 Cf. Kayser (1946) and Grünter (2001).

51 Momigliano (1980): 365 ff.

52 Lucian speaks of successful lectures given by Herodotus at Olympia. Listeners were so pleased that they gave the names of the nine muses to Herodotus' nine books (*Herod.* 1). Marcellinus (*Vit. Thuc.* 54) reflects a widespread tradition on Herodotean readings at Athens (cf. Phot. *Bibl.* 60 and Suda s.v. Thucydides). Dio Chrysostom says that Herodotus

would be quite odd that in a society such as the Greek, where at least in the archaic and classical periods performances were morally uplifting, spoken words were as much important as action, and speaking was felt as a form of action, drafts of historical works were not envisaged as something to be read aloud. It would be a sort of paradox if this practice, which is attested with certainty from the Hellenistic period onwards, had not been alive already before. Momigliano himself suggested, moreover, that Herodotus had in mind Athenian audiences when he wrote the passage on matriarchy (1.173: 'if a free woman marries a man who is slave, their children are full citizens, but if a free man marries a foreign woman, or lives with a concubine, even though he be the first citizen in the state, the children forfeit all the rights of citizenship'), and assumed that only an Athenian listener could remember that the son whom Pericles had with Aspasia, a foreign concubine, was illegitimate (p. 367). And further internal evidence can support the idea that the historian indeed had read parts of his *Histories* in front of audiences. Before referring to the constitutional debate that took place in the Persian court in the period preceding the rise of Darius, Herodotus says that to some Greeks it appeared incredible that such a debate had taken place, but—he stresses—it indeed happened (ἐλέχθησαν λόγοι ἄπιστοι μὲν ἐνίοισι Ἑλλήνων, ἐλέχθησαν δ' ὦν, 3.80.1). The passage seems to hint at discussions that originated after public readings from his work,[53] not least because later Herodotus recalls again those reactions which some Greeks (i.e. those in his audience?) had shown towards his account: μέγιστον θῶμα ἐρέω τοῖσι μὴ ἀποδεκομένοισι Ἑλλήνων Περσέων τοῖσι ἑπτὰ Ὀτάνεα γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι ὡς χρεὸν εἴη δημοκρατέεσθαι Πέρσας (6.43.3).[54] Furthermore, the assumed parody of Herodotus' *Histories* made by Aristophanes (*Ach.* 524–529), would lead us to think of audiences that had been used to attending public recitations of it, and that could, therefore, understand Aristophanes' allusions.[55] In addition, there is a passage of Herodotus' narrative which shows two alternative comparisons of the same geographical feature (the boundaries of Scythia) first to one which is in mainland Greece (the boundaries of Attica) and then to an equivalent in southern Italy (Calabria). It looks as if the historian is making a text appropriate for delivery, either in Athens or in Thurii (4.99.4–5).[56]

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wanted money from Corinth (*Or.* 37, 103), and Plutarch maintains that Herodotus asked for money from Thebes when he lectured there; because he did not get it he became hostile to the Boeotians (*De Herod. mal.* 31).

53 Cf. Jacoby (1903): 242.

54 So Jacoby (1903): 353, followed by Canfora (1971): 569. Cf. Hdt. 3.80.1.

55 So Canfora (1971): 658–660. Cf. Pelling (2000): 141–163 for skepticism about whether Aristophanes' *Acharnians* is alluding to Herodotus.

56 The possibility that different kinds of performances of literary works were put on according to different audiences is indeed highly plausible. Some years ago West (1984): 127–151

3 Diodorus and Rome

Chapter 4 of this book has discussed Diodorus' approach to Athenian history of the late fifth century. The tone of Diodorus 14.4, centred on the harsh behaviour of the Thirty, seems to offer a moral lesson which is fully in accordance with the author's preface to the fourteenth book (14.1).[57] In intorducing the theme of the installation of the Thirty at Athens, the historian says that disaffection by peoples subjected to harsh rulers is a fate that is going to happen to Athens and then also to Sparta and Syracuse (14.2.1–2). Against the Thirty Theramenes is seen positively and distinguishes himself for *epieikeia* and *kagalogathia* (14.4.1). Kindness or acting with moderation (*epieikeia*) is a very important concept which occurrs several times throughout the *Bibliotheke*.[58] For, according to Diodorus' paradigm of empire involving moderation turning to arrogance, those who aspire to authority need to surpass others especially in *epieikeia* (i.e. 27.16); if they, instead, act harshly with their subjects they will suffer their disaffection, and thus will lose their empire. This paradigm involves several passages of the *Bibliotheke*, ranging from mythology to Alexander's *diadochoi*, and is applied to Roman imperialism as well.[59]

Late-Republican writers applied to Roman empire and its decadence a similar reading as that given by Diodorus. They help us to better understand Diodorus' view as well as his narrative patterns. Some passages from Cicero's *De re publica* (3.8.12; 3.12.20–21; 3.14.22) on justice are doubly interesting: first they testify that the debate on Roman empire and especially on that contradiction in terms, justice and *imperium*, was already widespread among Greek thinkers of the Hellenistic age (Philus, one of the speakers of the third book of the dialogue,[60] reproposes Carneades' arguments on justice[61]); second, criticism of a certain 'moralistic' strand of Greek culture, which opposed Roman customs, emerges from Carneades' arguments and shows that debating moral themes and Greek culture was still relevant in Cicero's lifetime and gained a certain success among his readers.[62] After discussing whether and how empire and justice

maintained that many controversial interpolations of Lycophron's *Alexandra* (about a seventh of the poem) might be later additions explicable with the fact that the work appealed to southern Italian audiences, and was intended for performances.

57 Cf. Krentz (1982): 139–140, Sacks (1990): 19–20. *Contra* Stylianou (1998): 72 and 89–92.

58 Cf. Sacks (1990): 101–106.

59 Sacks (1990): 42–43 and (1994): 216–220.

60 The others are Laelius and Scipio.

61 Carneades of Cyrene along with two other Greek philosophers, Diogenes of Babylon and the Peripatetic Critolaus, arrived at Rome in 155 BC as ambassador to ask for a reduction of a financial penalty which the Roman senate had inflicted upon Athens.

62 Against the traditional view according to which Cicero would follow Panaetius' concep-

can be reconciled Philus concludes by saying that, if the Romans had restored all their possessions, they would have fallen back to a life of villages and poverty (3.12.21). This shows that it is not possible to delegitimise any kind of dominion, but it is necessary to understand how conquerors behave after their conquests.[63] Diodorus in a passage where he is supposedly following Posidonius describes the Roman empire as the greatest in memory and the most successful; but a little later he stresses the sharp contrast between the earlier Romans who had acquired power and the utter decadence of his contemporary citizens (37.2.1; 3.1).[64] Posidonius may also be Diodorus' source for the debate between Cato and Scipio Nasica on the future of Carthage. The former was in favour of destroying the city, while the latter supported the necessity of preserving her, since the fear for an external menace would prevent internal disorders as well as allies' rebellions (34–35.3).[65] A shared view considered the end of the Punic fear and the huge income that Rome enjoyed as the chief cause of moral degeneration among Roman governing classes: to give one example close to Diodorus' own day, we could recall Sallust's denunciation of the corruption of customs that spread as soon as Sulla came to power (*Cat.* 11). Diodorus might share with his contemporaries that common feeling and thus have a 'moderately critical' view of Roman imperialism.[66] Furthermore, his reading of Roman history through the paradigm of rise and decadence might go back to the age of Polybius.

Did, in fact, Polybius reflect on whether and how Rome might decline? To some extent he probably did. It is true that, according to Polybius, Roman 'mixed' constitution was undoubtedly a guarantee for stability, if compared to that of Carthage or of other Greek cities (Athens, Thebes, Crete, Sparta, or even to Plato's *Republic*, 6.43–56), and the fact that it contained all elements of previous constitutions (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy) should have avoided that cycle of rise and fall (anacyclosis); nevertheless it was not exempt from decline either.[67] Not only do we find late in the *Histories* a few hints at the moral decay of the Romans (18.35.1–2; 31.25, 35.4; 38.21–22), but there are also clues that suggests that economic and social changes, caused by Roman imperialism and by those *diapontioi polemoi*, changed people radically, ruining the traditional Roman customs (2.21.8; 18.35.1).[68] Polybius did not follow that cycle of succession of empires already known to Herodotus and Ctesias (Assyrians, Medians,

tions, scholars today agree that he could be an interpret of contemporary aristocratic views. Corsaro (1999): 128.

63 Corsaro (1999): 126.

64 Sacks (1990): 121. Cf. Strasburger (1965): 40–53.

65 Malitz (1983).

66 Cf. Sacks (1990): 117–159, Pelling (2007 c): 244–258.

67 Pelling (2007 c): 244–258.

68 Corsaro (1999): 124.

Persians), to which Aemilius Sura added 'Macedonians' and 'Romans' (II–I BC), and which fully explained and justified the success of Rome in the Augustan age.[69] Unlike Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for example, Polybius was far away from that sort of teleological view of history that developed in the Augustan age. Nonetheless he could hardly ignore that model of succession of empires (cf. 38.22.2).[70] He just replaced it with a different pattern, formed by Persians, Spartans, Macedonians, and, finally, by Romans (1.2.2–7), which seems to be conceived from a Greek perspective; perhaps through his work Polybius still wanted to please his Greek audiences and to respond to their expectations.

Near the end of the *Histories* Polybius seems to foreshadow the end of Roman rule, intimating that what happened to Ilion, Assyria, Media, Persia, Macedonia and Carthage might happen again in the future to Rome as well (38.22.1–2). Besides, there is an interesting passage which shows that after the third Punic war some Greeks believed that the imperialistic ambitions of the Romans had led them to war against Carthage (36.9). The fragmentary state of this passage along with the major room given to pro-Roman views invites caution; nevertheless it seems that a sort of warning for the future was in the air when the author wrote, whatever audiences and authorial intentions were: what happened in the past to Athens and Sparta would occur again to Rome. The Romans had gradually and insensibly become perverted to the same ambition for power which had once characterised the Athenians and the Spartans; and though they had advanced more slowly than these, finally they would arrive at the same fulfillment, ἥξειν δ' ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ τέλος ἐκ τῶν προφαινομένων (36.9.5).[71]

Thus the seeds of the Diodorean model of empires that from moderation turn into arrogance seem to go back a long way and particularly to Polybius' teaching: 'For at first they [*the Romans*] had made war with every nation until they were victorious and until their adversaries had confessed that they must obey them and execute their orders. But now they had struck the first note of their new policy by their conduct to Perseus, in utterly exterminating the kingdom of Macedonia, and they had now completely revealed it by their decision concerning Carthage. For the Carthaginians had been guilty of no immediate offence to Rome, but the Romans had treated them with irremediable severity, though they had accepted all their conditions and consented to obey all their orders' (Poly. 36.9.6–8).[72]

69 See, Alonso-Nuñez (1989): 110–119, Id. (1984): 640–644 and (1995): 3–15, Corsaro (1999): 13.

70 Polybius was mainly interested in the succession of empires, while Dionysius in the forming of Roman hegemony. Alonso-Nuñez (1983): 411–426, 418.

71 Cf. Pelling (2007 c): 244–258.

72 Transl. by W.R. Paton.

4 Translations

Diod. 14.80.2–5	**P. Oxy. v 842, 11.4–12.4**
He [*Agesilaus*] dispatched by night the Spartan Xenocles with fourteen hundred soldiers to a thickly wooded place to set an ambush for the barbarians 3. Then Agesilaus himself moved at daybreak along the way with his army. And when he had passed the place of ambush and *the barbarians were advancing upon him without battle order* and harassing his rearguard, to their surprise he suddenly turned about on the Persians. **When a sharp battle followed**, he raised the signal to the soldiers in ambush and they, chanting the battle song, charged the enemy. The Persians, seeing that they were caught between the forces, **were struck** with dismay and turned at once in flight. 4. Pursuing them for some distance, Agesilaus slew over six thousand of them, gathered a great multitude of prisoners, and pillaged their camp which was stored with goods of many sorts.	… hoplites and … hundred light-armed troops, and made Xenocles, a Spartiate, their commander, having ordered that when the Persians happened to be coming against them … draw up for battle … Agesilaus roused up his army at dawn and again led it forward. Having followed as they had been accustomed to do, some of the barbarians attacked the Greeks, others rode around them, and *others began to pursue them* across the plain *in an undisciplined fashion*. 5. When he judged it the right moment to attack the enemy, Xenocles roused the Peloponnesians from their ambush and charged at the double. When the barbarians saw the Greeks charging at them, they fled all over the plain. Seeing them terrified, Agesilaus sent the light-armed troops of his army and the cavalry to pursue them. Together with those who had come from the ambush, they fell upon the barbarians. 6. They chased the enemy but not for very long, for they could not catch them because the majority were cavalry and troops without armour. They killed about six hundred of them, then they broke off the pursuit and went to the camp of the barbarians. Taking the garrison, which was not well organised, by surprise, they seized the camp speedly and captured lots of supplies, many men and much equipment and money, some belonging to others, some to Tissaphernes himself.
5. *Tissaphernes*, **thunderstruck** at the daring of the Lacedaemonians, *wihdrew* from the battle *to Sardis*, and Agesilaus was about to attack the satrapies farther inland, but led his army back to the sea *when he could not obtain favourable omens from the sacrifices*.	12.1 **This being the nature of the battle**, *the barbarians*, **terrified** by the Greeks, *moved away with Tissaphernes to Sardis*. Agesilaus, having waited there three days (in which he returned to the enemy their dead under truce, set up a trophy, and ravaged the entire area), then once again led his force forward to Greater Phrygia. 2. He made the

Diod. 14.80.2–5	P. Oxy. V 842, 11.4–12.4
	journey no longer having his soldiers drawn up in square formation but allowing them to attack what land they wanted and to cause harm to the enemy. Perceiving that the Greeks were advancing, Tissaphernes, once again taking the barbarians with him, followed behind them, keeping many stades distance. 3. Journeying through the plain of Lydia, Agesilaus led the army … through the mountains lying between Lydia and Phrygia. When they had crossed these, he brought the Greeks down to Phrygia until they reached the Maeander river which takes its source from Celaenae which is the greatest city in Phrygia, and flows out to the sea near Priene and … 4. Having encamped the Peloponnesians and their allies, he made a sacrifice to find out whether he should cross the river or not, whether to march against Celaenae or to lead his army back again. *Since it happened that the sacrifices were not auspicious*, he waited there the day on which he arrived and the following day, then withdrew his army … So Agesilaus … the plain of the Maeander … there live the Lydians and …[73]

73 Diodorus is translated by C.H. Oldfather, the *HO* by McKechnie-Kern.

P. Cairo temp. inv. no. 26 6 SR 3049, 27 1, coll. I–II

Col I

… to attack the walls …
… most of the triremes …
… the others, a place in Ephesian territory …
… having disembarked the whole force … on the city.
[But] the Ephesians with the Spartans … them …
… they did not see those of the Athenians with Pasion (since they were still a long way away and marching by a longer route than the others), but seeing those with Thrasyllus, who had only just arrived, they met them in battle at the harbour called Coressus, having as allies those who had helped [them previously] and the most reliable …
… living [in the Kil]bi[an] plain. After this Thrasyllus, the general of the Athenians, as he reached the city, left some of his soldiers attacking, but led others to the hill, which is high and hard to climb. [In this way] some were turned to retreat inside, and some outside, the city. The leaders of the Ephesians were Timarchus and Possicrates …

Col II

… he led the army forward. Since the enemy were retreating, the Athenians followed them eagerly with the intention of taking the city by force. But Timarchus and Possicrates, the leaders of the Ephesians, called up their own hoplites. When the Athenians approached …

Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.6–9

6. After this Thrasyllus led the army back to the coast. He intended next to sail on to Ephesus, but Tissaphernes got to know of the plan and got together a large force to deal with it. He sent horsemen all round the country with instructions that everyone should move on Ephesus for the protection of Artemis.
7. It was on the seventeenth day after his raid that Thrasyllus sailed in to Ephesus. He landed the hoplites at the foot of Mount Coressus and the cavalry, peltasts, marines and all the rest near the marsh on the other side of the city. At dawn he gave orders for both divisions to advance.
8. But those in the city came out to meet him. There were the Ephesians themselves, the allied force brought up by Tissaphernes, the Syracusans (both the crews of the original twenty ships and also of five others under the command of Eucles, the son of Hippon, and Heraclides, the son of Aristogenes, which happened to have just arrived) and the crews of the two ships from Selinus.
9. The whole of this force moved first against the hoplites at Coressus and put them to flight, killing about a hundred and pursuing the rest to the shore. They then turned against the Athenians by the marsh, and these, too, were routed and about three hundred of them killed.[74]

74 Transl. by R. Warner.

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